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MICHAEL  REESE 


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AMERICAN  RIGHTS  & 
BRITISH   PRETENSIONS 

on  the  SEAS 


The  Facts  and  the  Documents, 
Official  and  Other, 
Bearing  upon  the  Present  Attitude  of  Great  Britain 
toward  the  Commerce  of  the  United  States 


Compiled,  with  introductory  memoranda,  by 

WILLIAM  BAYARD  HALE 


New  York 

Robert  M.  McBride  &  Company 

1915 


pu 

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5 


Copyright,  19 15, 
by  William  Bayard  Hale 


>x 


CONTENTS 

I  The  First  Encroachments 

II  The  Summit  of  Arrogance 

III  Ships  and  Cargoes  Stopped  at  Sea 

IV  The  Case  of  Cotton 

V  Indirect  Interference  with  Trade 

VI  Interference  with  Communication 

VII  Our  Larger  Interests 

VIII  List  of  Ships  Detained 

IX  Quotations  Pertinent  to  the  Issue 

X  Official  Documents 

XI  Diplomatic  Correspondence 


S36821 


The  Government  of  Great  Britwin  has  virtually  set  up  in 
the  midst  of  the  busy  seas  an  arbitrary  court,  claiming  unhea/rd-of 
powers  and  exercising  the  most  tyrannous  police  functions;  seiz- 
ing and  haling  into  the  dock  as  suspects  all  travelers  upon  the 
ocean  hightoays,  and  visiting  many  of  them  with  heavy  penalties 
for  unjYroven,  and  indeed  unprovable,  ofenses.  This  lawless 
osstres  of  the  seas,  contemptuous  alike  of  its  own  precedents  and 
of  the  rights  of  others,  scarcely  stoops  to  the  pretense  of  citing 
authority  for  its  actions,  which  are  determined  solely  by  its  brutal 
will,  and  enforced,  though  indeed  largely  through  intimidation, 
by  the  gigantic  power  of  its  naval  police.  The  extent  of  the 
earth's  surface  over  which  this  extraordinary  court  is  perm  it  ted 
to  wield  its  self -arrogated  jurisdiction,  the  magnitude  of  the  in- 
terests which  its  actions  vitally  affect,  and  the  supiiieness  n;ith 
which  sovereign  States  submit  to  the  erection,  upon  the  ruins  of 
their  self-respect  and.  the  debacle  of  their  highest  commercial  and 
political  interests,  of  an  island's  municipal  statutes  into  inter- 
national formulas,  unite  to  render  this  one  of  the  spectacles  of 
history. 


AMERICAN    RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH 
PRETENSIONS 

On  the  SEAS 


THE   FIRST  ENCROACHMENTS 


THE  people  of  the  United  States  have 
spent  a  great  deal  of  breath  in  dis- 
cussing the  respective  merits  and  in- 
terests of  the  nations  at  war  in  Europe. 

Is  it  not  time  for  us  to  give  our  attention 
seriously  to  our  own  interests,  as  they  are 
afifected  by  the  struggle? 

It  is  an  easier  mental  exercise,  a  more 
engaging  diversion,  unquestionably,  to  fol- 
low the  fortunes  of  opposing  armies,  as  dis- 
played in  the  morning  papers  day  by  day, 
than  it  is  to  study  the  unromantic  subject 
of  the  treatment  which  American  interests 
are  receiving  at  the  hands  of  the  belliger- 
ents. Yet,  after  all,  the  question  whether 
Roumania  sides  with  the  British  Allies  or 
with  the  Teutons,  whether  Bulgaria  or 
Servia  gets  Macedonia,  whether  Germany 
retains  or  gives  up  Courland,  is  of  slight 
practical  importance  to  us  compared  with 
the  question  whether  the  condition  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  is  bettered  or 
worsened  by  the  eventfi  of  the  war. 

This  volume  owes  its  existence  to  a  belief 
that  it  is  the  business  of  Americans  to  guard 
the  interests  of  America — and  if  to  guard 
them,  then,  necessarily,  to  study  them.  It 
aims  to  afford  materials  for  such  study  of 
American  interests  in  at  least  one  aspect 
— the  aspect  which,  as  the  months  draw  on, 
emerges  as  perhaps  the  most  anxious  object 
of  our  concern :  the  vindication  of  the  right 
of  neutral  ships  to  sail  the  seas  on  peace- 
able errands  with  innocent  cargoes. 

Against  Germany  that  right  has  been 
vindicated. 

It  remains  to  assert  it  against  Great 
Britain.  Less  tragic  than  German  attacks 
upon  our  rights  at  sea,  the  persistent  tres- 
passes of  the  British  have  not  drawn  the 
same  strained  attention  nor  aroused  the 
same  dramatic  passions.  Nevertheless,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  serious- 
ness of  the  issue  which  Great  Britain  has 
forced  upon  us  by  a  course  of  conduct, 
which,  months  ago,  and  long  before  it  had 


reached  its  present  excess  of  insolence,  the 
United  States  Government  was  obliged  to 
characterize  as  "an  almost  unqualified  de- 
nial of  the  sovereign  rights  of  nations  now 
at  peace."  • 

Let  us  get  a  few  principles  in  mind: 

Civilization  does  not  countenance  the 
view  that  war  works  a  stoppage  of  the  or- 
dinary vocations,  or  interferes  with  the  or- 
dinary lives,  of  non-combatants.  Com- 
merce is  free  to  flow  in  its  regular  channels 
in  war  as  in  peace,  subject  to  two  limita- 
tions or  exceptions  only,  clearly  defined  and 
universally  understood.  These  exceptions 
are  that  vessels  are  forbidden  to  go  through 
a  blockade;  and  that  they  are  forbidden  to 
carry  what  is  denominated  "contraband." 

There  are,  then,  two  grounds  on  which 
goods  may  lawfully  be  stopped  on  their  way 
to  a  belligerent: 

First,  on  the  ground  that  they  are  at- 
tempting to  run  a  blockade,  which  has  been 
formally  declared  and  is  being  physically 
maintained  against  the  port  to  which  the 
goods  are  consigned. 

Second,  on  the  ground  that  the  goods  are 
contraband. 

As  for  goods  coming  from  the  country  of 
a  belligerent,  there  is  only  one  good  ground 
on  which  they  may  be  stopped,  namely :  the 
ground  that  they  are  attempting  to  run  a 
blockade. 

The  subject  of  blockade  will  be  more  fully 
considered  further  on;  at  present  it  is 
enough  to  point  out  the  indisputable  fact 
that  international  law  makes  these  require- 
ments concerning  a  blockade,  namely :  first, 
that  it  must  be  a  real  blockade ;  second,  that 
it  must  be  effective ;  and,  third,  that  it  must 
apply  equally  to  all  nations.  The  United 
States  Government  contends  that  no  block- 
ade exists  against  any  German  port. 

It  follows  that  it  is  only  as  contraband, 
and  only  when  on  the  way  to  Germany  that 

*Note  to  the  British  Government,  March  30,  1915. 


8 


AMfeRr^AN-  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


cargoes  from  America  -are '  lawfully  liable 
to  interference.  Let  us  remind  ourselves 
what,  precisely,  "contraband,"  is. 

Contraband  goods  fall  into  two  distinct 
classes.  Certain  articles,  which  are  mani- 
festly intended  for  warlike  uses,  are  absolute 
contraband.  They  are  subject  to  capture  if 
shown  to  be  destined  to  territory  of  the 
enemy. 

Certain  other  articles,  which  may  or  may 
not  be  intended  for  warlike  uses,  fall  into 
the  category  of  conditional  contraband,  and 
the  rule  of  international  law  regarding  it 
is  this:  Conditional  contraband  is  subject 
to  seizure  by  an  enemy  if  it  is  detected  at 
sea  on  its  way  to  the  army,  navy,  or  official 
administration  of  the  enemy  Government. 
It  is  not  subject  to  seizure  if  consigned  to 
a  neutral  country  or  to  private  citizens  of 
a  country  at  war. 

The  first  issue  between  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  and  that  of  Great  Britain 
lies  here.  Let  us  get  the  facts,  then,  clearly 
in  mind :  It  is  a  firmly  established  principle 
of  modern  international  law  that  articles 
of  conditional  contraband,  carried  in  neu- 
tral ships,  not  intended  for  the  use  of  the 
army,  navy  or  Government  of  a  belligerent, 
are  not  subject  to  capture  or  detention  at 
sea.  If  intended  for  military  use,  they  are 
so  subject — they  are  contraband;  but  if 
destined  for  the  ordinary  use  of  life  in  the 
enemy's  country,  and  not  distinctly  for  the 
enemy's  forces,  they  are  not  contraband.  It 
is  clear  that  no  question  can  arise  as  to  the 
character  of  goods  known  as  conditional 
contraband  when  they  are  on  their  way  to 
a  neutral  port;  in  that  case  they  are  inno- 
cent. 

There  is  nothing  particularly  abstruse  in 
the  subjects  of  blockade  and  contraband. 
They  are  two  subjects  upon  which  inter- 
national law  has  really  reached  clear  con- 
clusions. On  Feb.  26,  1909,  an  interna- 
tional conference  in  session  in  London  pro- 
mulgated what  has  become  known  as  the 
Declaration  of  London  Eelative  to  the  Laws 
of  Naval  Warfare.  The  provisions  of  this 
declaration  were  the  result  of  long  study 
on  the  part  of  experts  in  international  law 
and  practice;  they  represent  the  result  of  a 
careful  weighing  of  the  interest  of  belliger- 
ents on  the  one  side  and  of  neutral  coun- 
tries on  the  other  side  during  the  prevalence 
of  war.  On  the  above  date  the  Declaration 
of  London  received  the  signatures  of  all  the 
Powers  represented  in  the  conference, 
namely:  The  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Russia,  Japan,  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Italy,  Spain  and  Holland.  It  is 
true  that  it  has  never  received  formal  rati- 
fication at  the  hands  of  thie  Powers;  its 
authority  consists  alone  in  the  fact  that  it 
represents  the  attested  and  conceded  con- 
sensus of  expert  opinion  established  by  ac- 
credited   representatives    of    the    world's 


Powers,  and  stands  as  the  fullest  and  latest 
statement  of  the  principles  of  international 
law  on  the  subject. 

The  principles  set  forth  above  are  those 
which  the  signatories  of  the  Declaration  of 
London  declared  to  be  the  understood  and 
accepted  law  of  nations  with  respect  of 
blockade  and  contraband. 

Such  being  the  principles  and  the  laws 
governing  maritime  affairs  in  time  of  war, 
how  has  the  practice  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment conformed  to  them? 

The  long  series  of  abuses  and  outrages 
inflicted  upon  American  commerce  by  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain  may  perhaps 
be  summarized  under  the  following  heads : 

I.  Neutral  merchantmen  carrying  inno- 
cent merchandise  from  American  to  German 
ports,  or  from  German  to  American  ports, 
are  forbidden  to  proceed  on  their  voyages. 
Any  neutral  ship  attempting  to  proceed 
from  an  American  to  a  German  port,  or 
from  a  German  to  an  American  port,  will  be 
taken  to  a  British  port,  where  the  cargo 
will  be  discharged  and  handed  over  to  the 
marshal  of  the  Prize  Court.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  no  ships  now  attempt  to  pass  between 
Germany  and  America.  And,  yet,  under  all 
accepted  rules  of  international  law,  neutral 
ships  have  a  perfect  right  to  proceed  to  Ger- 
man ports  or  to  come  out  from  German 
ports  save  such  as  are  specifically  blockaded. 
There  is  no  blockade  of  any  German  port. 
(See,  however,  page  13,  ff.) 

II.  American  and  other  neutral  vessels 
on  their  way  between  American  ports  and 
other  neutral  ports  are  forced  to  call  at 
British  ports,  there  to  be  examined  and 
often  to  discharge  their  cargoes. 

International  law  allows  the  right  of  visit 
and  search  at  sea,  but  it  does  not  contem- 
plate the  dragging  of  merchantmen  into 
ports  out  of  the  line  of  their  voyage  and 
their  detention  there  for  days,  weeks  or 
months,  at  all  sorts  of  inconvenience  and 
loss. 

III.  Shipments  of  American  goods  of  or- 
dinary character  heretofore  recognized  as 
strictly  peaceable  and  legitimate,  on  their 
way  from  American  to  neutral  ports,  are 
habitually  seized  by  Great  Britain,  being 
forcibly  removed  from  American  and  other 
neutral  ships. 

Under  all  recognized  international  law, 
Americans  have  a  perfect  right  to  ship  ab- 
solutely anything  they  please  to  neutral 
ports,  and  no  belligerent  has  a  right  to 
touch  them.  But  especially  is  it  an  intoler- 
able outrage  for  England  to  stop  American 
shipments  of  such  innocent  goods  as  food- 
stuffs and  clothing  stuffs  on  their  way  to 
Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark  and  the  Nether- 
lands—  countries  with  which  we  have  a 
perfect  right  to  trade  without  consulting 
Great  Britain. 


THE  FIRST  ENCROACHMENTS 


IV.  No  goods  of  German  ownership  or 
origin  are  suffered  to  be  shipped  from  any 
neutral  port  to  America.  Neutral  mer- 
chantmen on  their  way  to  the  United  States 
are  hauled  into  British  ports  and  ransacked 
for  goods  bought  in  Germany  by  American 
merchants  for  use  in  Ajnerican  manufac- 
tures or  for  American  consumption. 

We  are  not  only  forbidden  to  sell  our 
products  to  Germany  and  Austria,  but  we 
are  denied  the  right  to  procure  the  neces- 
sities and  comforts  for  which  we  look  to 
Germany  and  Austria. 

V.  Great  Britain  not  only  interdicts  us 
from  selling  our  products  to  Germany  and 
Austria,  but  she  forbids  our  selling  to  any  of 
the  neutral  countries  more  than  a  certain 
quantity  of  a  product.  Thus  she  has  the 
assurance  to  notify  us  that  we  may  sell 
Norse  countries  only  a  limited  amount  of 
cotton.  Great  Britain  constantly  declares 
that  our  increased  exports  to  neutral  coun- 
tries (which  have  hitherto  been  able  to  buy 
of  the  countries  now  too  busy  in  war  to 
manufacture)  is  suspicious.  So  Great  Brit- 
ain confiscates  our  products  on  the  way  to 
our  customers — and  there  proceeds  to  sell 
them  herself  at  a  profit  for  herself. 

VI.  Great  Britain  refuses  to  recognize 
the  registry  awarded  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  to  ships  purchased  by 
American  citizens,  in  good  faith,  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  relieving  the  distresses  of 
our  commerce. 

VII.  American  merchantmen  which  are 
suspected  by  the  British  government  to  be 
owned  by  persons  whose  nationality  is  of- 
fensive to  it  are  seized  and  dragged  to  Brit- 
ish ports.  One  such  ship,  a  native  Ameri- 
can, proceeding  without  cargo  of  any  kind, 
between  the  ports  of  New  York  and  Norfolk, 
Virginia,  was  captured  within  gun-shot  of 
our  coast  and  taken,  a  prize,  into  Halifax. 

VIII.  Thus  the  insolence  of  unrebuked 
naval  power  has  been  extended  to  our  own 
waters,  and  British  cruisers  hover  on  our 
coasts  and  lie  at  the  entrance  of  our  harbors. 
There  they  wait  to  capture,  and  often  do 
capture,  innocent  merchantmen  suspected  of 
carrying  some  of  the  articles  included  in  the 
almost  all-embracing  British  list  of  contra- 
band. There  they  overhaul  passengers  and 
require  passports  from  American  citizens 
still  within  sight  of  their  own  land.  There 
they  seize  American  vessels  on  one  pretext 
or  another  and  carry  them  off  to  a  British 
prize  court. 

IX.  All  this  direct  interference  with 
American  ships  and  American  goods  is  not 
enough.  It  is  supplemented  by  a  series  of 
ingenious  devices  craftily  calculated  by 
Great  Britain  to  carry  still  further  the  work 
of  destruction  wrought  upon  our  commerce. 
These  devices  are  innumerable,  and  many 
of  them  are  most  adroitly  concealed,  but 


illustrations  of  their  character  are  to  be 
found  in: 

1.  The  exercise  of  intimidating  argu- 
ments designed  (successfully)  to  prevent 
the  American  Government's  meeting  the 
critical  national  necessity  of  an  American 
merchant  marine; 

2.  The  intimidation  ( at  first  by  the  hand 
of  its  ally,  France)  of  American  enterprise 
in  the  legitimate  purchase  of  mercantile 
vessels  to  ply  the  seas  under  the  protection 
of  the  American  Flag;  c 

3.  A  group  of  trade  agreements  enforced 
upon  the  rubber,  textile,  tin  and  other  in- 
dustries of  America  —  agreements  under 
which  American  manufacturers  are  allowed 
to  import  raw  materials  only  under  a  Brit- 
ish license  carrying  heavy  conditions  and 
involving  severe  hardships ; 

4.  Agreements,  like  those  enforced  upon 
exporters  in  many  trades,  in  which  Amer- 
ican producers,  in  order  to  dispose  of  their 
goods,  must  agree  not  to  sell  to  others  than 
those  living  in  British  and  Allied  countries, 
except  on  permit  from  the  British  Admir- 
alty. 

5.  The  enforcement  of  a  censorship  of 
absurd  severity  over  commercial  cablegrams 
between  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of 
the  world,  involving  the  suppression  of  com- 
munication between  American  merchants 
and  their  foreign  customers,  and  between 
foreign  merchants  and  their  American  cus- 
tomers, and  the  appropriation  and  dishon- 
est use  of  intelligence  passing  between 
American  and  foreign  business  houses. 

The  chronology  of  the  British  war  on 
American  commerce  is  easy  to  master — the 
principal  dates  to  learn  are  but  three: 
August  20,  October  29,  1914,  and  March  11, 
1915.  These  are  dates  of  three  Orders  in 
Council  —  for  it  is  by  the  same  method 
and  in  the  same  form  as  that  which  out- 
raged our  forefathers  and  finally  provoked 
them  to  the  War  of  1812  that  England  to- 
day is  closing  the  sea  to  our  commerce. 

,  The  Order  in  Council  of  August  20  de- 
clared it  to  be  the  intention  of  the  British 
Government  to  act  during  the  present  hos- 
tilities in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
the  Declaration  of  London,  subject  to  some 
additions  and  modifications.  A  glance  at 
the  additions  and  modifications  which  thia 
order  and  that  of  October  29  then  proceed 
to  make  reveals  the  fact  that  the  pretens*? 
that  the  British  Government  is  observing 
the  Declaration  of  London  would  be  much 
like  the  claim  of  a  man  who  professed  that 
he  was  carefully  observing  the  command- 
ments of  Moses,  subject  to  the  striking  out 
of  the  nots.  The  additions  and  modifica- 
tions which  the  British  Government  has 
placed  upon  the  Declaration  of  London  are 
of  such  a  character  that  they  obliterate  the 
Declaration. 


10 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


The  Declaration  of  London,  in  Articles 
XXII.,  XXIV.,  and  XXVIII.,  established 
a  list  of  absolute  contraband,  another  of 
conditional  contraband,  and  another  of  mer- 
chandise not  contraband.  These  lists  Great 
Britain  has  revised  beyond  any  possible 
recognition.  The  catalogue  of  absolute  con- 
traband has  been  enormously  expanded,  and 
practically  everything  else  has  been  marked 
down  as  conditional  contraband.  The  free 
list  has  disappeared.  And  this  in  defiance 
of  the  rule  of  the  Declaration  itself,  and  of 
the  well-understood  principle  of  interna- 
tional law,  and  especially  of  the  century- 
long  contention  of  the  United  States,  that  it 
is  vital  to  the  legitimate  commerce  of  neu- 
tral States  that  there  should  be,  as  Mr.  Hay 
when  Secretary  of  State  put  it,  no  deviation 
from  the  rule  which  determines  what  is  and 
what  is  not  lawfully  subject  to  belligerent 
capture,  namely:  warlike  nature,  use,  and 
destination. 

But  even  more  vital  is  the  modification 
which  the  British  Order  in  Council  makes 
in  the  sense  of  Articles  XXXIII.  and 
XXXV.  of  the  Declaration  of  London. 

The  former  article  declares  that  there  can 
be  no  question  of  conditional  contraband 
except  in  cases  where  the  cargo  is  destined 
for  the  use  of  the  administrative  depart- 
ments, or  the  military  or  naval  force  of  the 
enemy.  Under  the  latter  article  there  can 
be  no  question  of  conditional  contraband 
on  vessels  sailing  for  a  neutral  port. 

The  British  Government  announced  that 
it  would  regard  articles  of  conditional  con- 
traband consigned  to  "merchants  or  other 
persons  under  the  control  of  the  authorities 
of  the  enemy"  in  the  same  light  as  if  they 
were  consigned  directly  to  the  military 
forces  of  the  enemy.  This  means  nothing 
else  than  that  provisions,  for  instance,  on 
the  way  to  a  German  port,  consigned  to  a 
private  importer  and  intended  for  no  other 
use  than  the  consumption  by  the  peaceful 
population  in  the  ordinary  way  of  life,  are 
subject  to  capture  by  British  ships  —  be- 
cause all  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  are 
under  the  control  of  the  authorities.  Not 
only  so,  but  the  same  harmless  cargoes  on 
the  way  to  Danish,  Dutch,  or  Norwegian 
ports  are  likewise  subject  to  capture — be- 
cause it  may  suit  the  purposes  of  the  British 
Government  to  suspect  any  importer,  any- 
where, of  being  "under  the  control"  of  Ger- 
man authorities.  In  other  words,  American 
farmers,  cattle-raisers,  and  pork-packers 
are  today,  by  British  edict,  denied  the  right 
to  sell  and  deliver  their  products  to  the 
peaceful  populations  of  the  countries  with 
which  Grekt  Britain  happens  to  be  at  war, 
and  of  the  countries  which  she  suspects 
sympathize  with  them. 

A  year  ago,  when  the  above  sentence  was 
first  written,  it  seemed  a  thing  impossible 
that  Britain  would  be  permitted  to  forbid 


our  selling  the  products  of  our  farms  to 
whom  we  would.  She  has  been  permitted  to 
do  it  for  a  year,  and  the  shock  of  the  thing 
has  passed.  Yet  surely,  even  though  it  has 
been  endured  for  a  year,  it  cannot  be  the 
settled  policy  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  submit  to  so  intolerable  an  op- 
pression. 

There  is  too  long  a  record  of  American 
insistence  on  the  right  to  sell  and  ship  food 
to  civilian  populations  anywhere  in  peace 
or  war.  Something  like  the  following  has 
been  our  historic  attitude: 

In  1795  the  British  Government,  being 
then  at  war  with  France,  by  an  Order  in 
Council  directed  the  seizure  of  all  vessels 
laden  with  provisions  bound  for  French 
ports.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  protested  against  this  action.  It 
secured  the  appointment  in  1795  of  a  Mixed 
Commission  for  the  purpose  of  awarding 
damages  by  reason  of  illegal  captures  and 
condemnations  by  the  British.  This  com- 
mission held  that  the  action  of  the  British 
in  holding  up  provisions  on  the  way  to 
French  ports,  but  not  specifically  intended 
for  the  French  army  and  navy,  was  illegal, 
and  awarded  large  damages. 

The  language  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  Sec- 
retary of  State  of  the  United  States,  in  in 
structing  Mr.  Pinckney,  our  Minister  in 
London,  Sept.  7,  1793,  represents  the  posi- 
tion which  this  Government  has  ever  since 
consistently  maintained : 

When  two  nations  go  to  war,  those  who  choose  to 
live  in  peace  retain  their  natural  right  to  pursue  their 
agriculture,  manufactures,  and  other  ordinary  voca- 
tions, to  carry  the  produce  of  their  industry  for  ex- 
change to  all  nations,  belligerent  or  neutral,  as  usual. 

Mr.  Jefferson  contended  that  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain  and  France  were  at  war  af- 
forded neither  of  them  the  right  to  inter- 
rupt the  agriculture  and  commerce  of  the 
United  States.  Such  interruption  tended 
directly  to  draw  us  from  the  state  of  peace 
in  which  we  wished  to  remain.  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son instructed  Mr.  Pinckney  that  the 
United  States  Government  could  not  allow 
itself  to  be  forced  either  to  withhold  pro- 
visions from  France,  (thus  making  our- 
selves a  party  to  the  war),  or  to  withhold 
them  from  both  France  and  her  enemies, 
(thus  closing  to  our  farmers,  manufactur- 
ers, aud  shippers  all  the  ports  of  Europe). 
He  admitted  that  Great  Britain  might  "feel 
the  desire  of  starvijag  an  enemy  nation,  but 
she  can  have  no  right  of  doing  it  at  our  loss, 
nor  of  making  us  the  instrument  of  it." 

Edmund  Eandolph,  Secretary  of  State, 
on  May  6, 1794,  instructed  Mr.  Jay,  who  had 
gone  on  a  special  mission  to  England  in 
connection  with  the  subject,  that  "provi- 
sions,  except  in  the  instance  of  a  siege. 


THE  FIRST  ENCROACHMENTS 


11 


blockade,  or  investment,  are  not  to  be 
ranketl  among  contraband." 

After  1795  the  Government  of  Great  Brit- 
ain did  not,  for  119  years,  undertake  to 
assert  that  provisions  destined  elsewhere 
than  to  the  government,  army  or  navy  of 
a  belligerent  were  contraband.  Indeed,  un- 
til the  year  1914,  it  consistently  maintained 
the  opposite  position. 

In  the  year  1885,  France,  being  in  a  state 
of  hostility  with  China,  declared  shipments 
of  rice  destined  to  any  ports  in  Northern 
China  to  be  contraband.  The  pretension 
was  resisted  by  Great  Britain,  on  the 
ground  that  though  provisions  may,  in  par- 
ticular instances,  acquire  a  contraband 
character,  they  cannot  in  general  be  so 
treated.  Lord  Granville,  British  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  note  to  M.  Wadding- 
ton,  Feb.  27,  1885,  replied  to  the  French 
contention  that  the  British  Government 
could  not  admit  it. 

The  United  States  Minister  at  Berlin, 
Mr.  Kasson,  wrote  to  Mr.  Bayard,  Secretary 
of  State,  April  23,  1885,  relative  to  the  dis- 
cussion then  going  on  in  Europe  over  the 
French  declaration  making  rice  contraband. 
Mr.  Kasson  said : 

I  beg  your  attention  to  the  importance  of  the  prin- 
ciple involved  in  this  declaration,  as  it  concerns  our 
American  interests.  We  are  neutrals  in  European 
wars.  Food  constitutes  an  immense  portion  of  our 
exports.  Every  European  war  produces  an  increased 
demand  for  these  supplies  from  neutral  cojintries.  The 
French  doctrine  declares  them  contraband,  not  only 
.when  destined  directly  for  military  consumption,  but 
when  going  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade  as  food  for 
the  civil  population  of  the  belligerent  Government.  If 
food  can  be  thus  excluded  and  captured,  still  more  can 
clothing,  the  instruments  of  industry,  and  all  less  vital 
supplies  be  cut  off,  on  the  ground  that  they  tend  to 
support  the  efforts  of  the  belligerent  nation.  Indeed, 
the  real  principle  involved  goes  to  this  extent,  that 
everything  the  want  of  which  will  increase  the  distress 
of  the  civil  population  of  the  belligerent  country  may 
be  declared  contraband  of  war. 

The  entire  trade  of  neutrals  with  belligerents  may 
thus  be  destroyed,  irrespective  of  an  effective  blockade 
of  ports.  War  itself  would  become  more  fatal  to 
neutral  States  than  to  belligerent  interests. 

The  rule  of  feudal  times,  the  starvation  of  beleag- 
uered and  fortified  towns,  might  be  extended  to  an 
.entire  population  of  an  open  country.  It  is  a  return  to 
barbaric  habits  of  war. 

During  the  Boer  war,  question  having 
arisen  as  to  the  position  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment with  regard  to  dispatch  of  i)rovi- 
sions  to  South  Africa,  Lord  Salisbury,  then 
head  of  the  Government,  (Jan.  10,  1900,) 
thus  defined  it : 

Foodstuffs  with  a  hostile  destination  can  be  consid- 
ered contraband  of  war  only  if  they  are  supplies  for 
the  enemy's  forces.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  they  are 
capable  of  being  so  used ;  it  must  be  shown  that  this 
was  in  fact  their  destination  at  the  time  of  the  seizure. 


During  the  Russo-Japanese  war  the  Rus- 
sian government  undertook  to  put  foodstuffs 
on  the  contraband  list.  The  British  Gov- 
ernment protested,  and  the  American  Gov- 
ernment declared  its  total  inability  to  ac- 
quiesce in  the  Russian  position. 

Lord  Lansdowne,  British  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  on  June  11,  1904,  instructed 
Sir  C.  Hardinge,  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  that  his  Government  ob- 
served "with  great  concern  that  rice  and 
provisions  will  be  treated  as  unconditional 
contraband,  a  step  which  they  regard  as  in- 
consistent with  the  law  and  practice  of 
nations." 

The  United  States  Government  was  es- 
pecially emphatic  in  its  refusal  to  admit  the 
Russian  contention.  The  steamship  Arabia, 
bound  for  Japanese  ports  and  laden  with 
railway  material  and  flour,  consigned  to  pri- 
vate commercial  houses,  was  seized  by  the 
Russians  and  taken  to  Vladivostok.  A  prize 
court  held  that  the  Arabia's  cargo  should 
be  confiscated.  In  the  course  of  a  remark- 
able letter  of  instruction  sent  to  Mr.  McCor- 
mick,  our  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
on  Aug.  30,  1904,  Mr.  Hay  made  use  of  the 
following  language: 

When  war  exists  between  powerful  States  it  is  vital 
to  the  legitimate  maritime  commerce  of  neutral  States 
that  there  be  no  relaxation  of  the  rule — no  deviation 
from  the  criterion  for  determining  what  constitutes 
contraband  of  war,  lawfully  subject  to  belligerent  cap- 
ture, namely:  Warlike  nature,  use  and  destination. 
Articles  which,  like  arms  and  ammunition,  are  by  their 
nature  of  self-evident  warlike  use,  are  contraband  of 
war  if  destined  to  enemy  territory;  but  articles  which, 
like  coal,  cotton,  and  provisions,  though  ordinarily 
innocent  are  capable  of  warlike  use,  are  not  subject 
to  caoture  and  confiscation  unless  shown  by  evidence 
to  be  actually  destined  for  the  military  or  naval  forces- 
of  a  belligerent. 

This  substantive  principle  of  the  law  of  nations  can- 
not be  overridden  by  technical  rule  of  the  Prize  Court 
that  the  owners  of  the  captured  cargo  must  prove  that 
no  part  of  it  may  eventually  come  to  the  hands  of  the 
enemy  forces.  The  proof  is  of  an  impossible  nature; 
and  it  cannot  be  admitted  that  the  absence  of  proof  in 
its  nature  impossible  to  make  can  justify  the  seizure 
and  condemnation.  If  it  were  otherwise,  all  neutral 
commerce  with  the  people  of  a  belligerent  State  would 
be  impossible;  the  innocenr  would  suffer  inevitable  con- 
demnation with  the  guilty.    .    .    . 

If  the  principle  which  appears  to  have  been  declared 
by  the  Vladivostok  Prize  Court  and  which  has  not  so 
far  been  disavowed  or  explained  by  his  Imperial 
Majesty's  Government  is  acquiesced  in  it  means,  if 
carried  unto  full  execution,  the  complete  destruction 
of  all  neutral  commerce  with  the  non-combatant  popu- 
lation of  Japan ;  it  obviates  the  necessity  of  blockades ; 
it  renders  meaningless  the  principle  of  the  Declaration 
of  Paris  set  forth  in  the  Imperial  Order  of  F^b.  29 
last  that  a  blockade  in  order  to  be  obligatory  must  be 
effective ;  it  obliterates  all  distinction  between  com- 
merce in  contraband  and  non-contraband  goods,  and  is 
in  effect  a  declaration  of  war  against  commerce  of 
every  description  between  the  people  of  a  neutral  and 
those  of  a  belligerent  State. 


II 


THE    SUMMIT  OF  ARROGANCE 


GEEAT  BEITAIN  does  not,  however, 
now  limit  herself  to  "war  against 
commerce  of  every  description  be- 
tween the  people  of  a  neutral  and  those  of 
a  belligerent  State";  she  has  gone  on  to 
declare  war  against  commerce  of  every  de- 
scription between  the  people  of  neutral 
States  among  themselves.  It  is  no  longer 
the  complaint  of  American  exporters  mere- 
ly that  they  may  not  sell  innocent  goods 
to  the  noncombatants  of  Germany ;  that  oiit- 
rage  has  taken  its  place  as  only  a  minor  fea- 
ture of  the  campaign  of  which  our  trade- 
rights  are  the  victim,  a  campaign  which  has 
reached  the  length  of  forbidding  our  selling 
to  or  buying  from  any  European  country 
except  under  British  supervision  and  with 
British  permission  in  the  case  of  each  and 
every  shipment  of  goods. 

The  first  steps  in  the  hostilities  against 
us  were  those  considered  above,  namely :  the 
extension  of  the  definition  of  contraband  to 
include  practically  all  articles  of  commerce; 
and  the  presumption  of  a  hostile  destination 
in  all  cases.  Within  a  few  months  after  the 
beginning  of  the  war — on  November  2,  1914 
— England  closed  the  English  channel  to 
navigation,  planting  mines  in  the  seas  north 
of  the  British  Isles  and  notifying  the  world 
that  entrance  into  those  waters  was  hazard- 
ous. The  effect  of  this  was  to  compel  trans- 
Atlantic  vessels  to  take  the  northern  route 
and  to  put  into  a  British  port  to  secure  a 
British  pilot — and  submit  to  British  exami- 
nation. 

On  March  11,  1915,  there  issued  an  Or- 
der in  Council  which  the  calmest  and  most 
well-considered  judgment  can  only  describe 
as  probably  the  most  insolent  public  docu- 
ment of  modern  times. 

On  March  11,  1915,  His  British  Majesty, 
by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Coun- 
cil, was  pleased  to  order  and  did  order  that 

"No  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  from 
her  port  of  departure  after  the  first  of 
March,  1915,  shall  be  allowed  to  proceed  on 
her  voyage  to  any  German  port. 

"No  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  fronn 
any  German  port  after  the  first  of  March, 
1915,  shall  he  allowed  to  proceed  on  her 
voyage  with  any  goods  on  board  laden  at 
such  port. 

"Every  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  from 
a  port  other  than  a  German  port  after  the 


first  of  March,  1915,  having  on  hoard  goods 
which  are  of  enemy  origin  or  are  enemy 
property,  may  he  required  to  discharge  such 
goods  in  a  British  or  allied  port." 

Is  it  possible  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  understand  these  words  and  what 
they  mean?  Is  it  possible  that  they  under- 
stand that  during  many  months  the  power 
of  Great  Britain  has  forbidden  a  merchant 
vessel  passing  between  America  and  Ger- 
many under  any  circumstances,  or  its  pass- 
ing between  America  and  any  port  on  the 
continent  of  Europe  except  by  British  per- 
mission and  after  British  examination? 
Can  the  American  people  be  aware  that 
Great  Britain  refuses  to  allow,  and  for  many 
months  has  not  allowed,  an  article  suspected 
to  be  owned  by  a  German,  or  to  have  orig- 
inated on  German,  Austrian,  or  Belgian 
soil,  to  cross  the  Atlantic  Ocean?  Are  we 
really  aware,  do  we  understand,  that  for 
months  every  ship  going  and  coming  be- 
tween American  ports  and  neutral  European 
ports  has  been  stopped  and  examined  by  the 
British  naval  constabulary  and  either  held 
or  unloaded  or  given  a  British  license  to 
continue  her  voyage?  Have  we  apprehended 
the  meaning  of  the  language  which,  on  the 
publication  of  the  March  11th  Order  in 
Council,  our  own  Government  addressed  to 
the  British  Government,  namely,  that  "it 
would  constitute,  were  its  provisions  actual- 
ly to  be  carried  into  effect  as  they  stand,  a 
practical  assertion  of  unlimited  helligerent 
rights  over  neutral  commerce  within  the 
whole  European  area,  and  an  almost  unqual- 
ified denial  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  na- 
tions now  at  peace?"  And  can  we  then  be 
indifferent  to  the  fact  that  for  months  those 
provisions  have  been  actually  in  effect;  that 
for  months  England  has  been  practicing  "an 
almost  unqualified  denial  of  the  sovereign 
rights"  of  the  United  States? 

Today  the  American  Government  is  un- 
able to  assure  merchant  ships  flying  the 
American  flag  that  they  may  cross  the  At- 
lantic to  any  port"  except  by  permission 
of  the  British  Admiralty.  To-day  an 
Iowa  farmer  or  a  Texas  cattle-raiser  is  for- 
bidden, by  the  English  Government,  to  sell 
his  products  to  European  customers  whose 
families  need  food.  Not  a  barrel  of  flour 
Bor  a  ham  can  be  landed  in  Rotterdam  or 


THE  SUMMIT  OF  ARROGANCE 


13 


Copenhagen  without  England's  permission — 
which  is  unobtainable.  Not  a  bale  of  cot- 
ton can  be  shipped  except  on  the  same  terms. 
Not  a  case  of  medicines  nor  a  box  of  Christ- 
mas toys,  much  desired  by  our  people,  can 
be  obtained — for  it  is  more  important  that 
England  should  punish  the  chemists  of  El- 
berfeld  and  the  toy-makers  of  Nuremberg 
than  that  American  hospitals  should  get 
medicines  and  American  children  have  a 
merry  Christmas.  So  there  lie  piled  up  on 
the  wharves  of  Rotterdam  and  Copenhagen 
and  Malmoe,  mountains  of  boxes  of  goods 
for  which  we  are  anxious  to  trade  our  own 
products,  but  which  England  forbids  the 
ships  to  touch,  because  they  are  "goods  of 
enemy  origin." 

The  British  position  is  that  Germany  has 
committed  illegitimate  acts,  and  that  this 
gives  England  "an  unquestioned  right  of  re- 
taliation." Whether  or  not  it  is  becoming 
to  England  to  use  the  illegal  acts  of  her 
enemy  to  excuse  unlawful  acts  of  her  own, 
even  in  respect  of  the  enemy,  it  can  hardly 
be  claimed  that  the  retaliation  should  be  vis- 
ited upon  the  United  States,  an  innocent 
neutral.  England  is  assumed  to  be  the 
enemy  of  Germany,  not  of  the  farmers, 
planters  and  merchants  of  the  United  States, 
but  it  is  the  merest  statement  of  fact  to  say 
that  thousands  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  are  being  interfered  with  in  the  ordi- 
nary pursuit  of  their  livelihood,  not  to  say 
in  the  enjoyment  of  the  ordinary  comforts 
of  life — and  unnecessarily  interfered  with — 
by  the  economic  war  which  Great  Britain  is 
waging  upon  the  United  States  under  the 
excuse  of  its  war  with  Germany. 

It  was  only  after  considerable  hesitation 
that  the  British  Government  allowed  itself 
to  use  the  word  "blockade"  in  describing  the 
measures  it  had  put  in  hand  March  11th  to 
stop  commerce  with  Germany.  It  is  not  a 
physical  fact.  It  does  not  apply  alike  to  all 
countries;  Sweden,  Norway  and  Denmark 
are  freely  trading  with  German  ports  in  the 
Baltic,  access  to  which  the  British  deny  us. 
It  forbids  access  to  neutral  ports.  It  is  not 
maintained  by  ships ;  the  fact  is  the  British 
navy  is,  most  of  it,  safe  in  harbor,  while  the 
so-called  "blockade"  is  enforced,  so  far  as 
it  is  physically  enforced,  largely  by  mines. 

How  tremendous  a  departure  from  all 
known  and  accepted  principles  of  interna- 
tional law  is  this  new  long-distance  paper 
blockade !  Historically,  the  theory  of  block- 
ade by  sea  is  closely  connected  with  that  of 
siege  by  land.  The  original  theory  of  the 
blockade  was  that  it  was  intended  to  reduce 
a  seaside  fort  by  means  of  investment  on  all 
sides.  It  was  often  questioned  (for  in- 
stance, by  perhaps  the  greatest  American 
jurist,  John  Marshall,  afterwards  Chief 
Justice,  then  Secretary  of  State,  in  an  in- 
struction, September  30,  1800,  to  Mr.  King, 
American  Minister  in  London),  whether  the 


rule  of  blockade  could  be  applied  to  a  port 
"not  completely  invested  by  land,  as  well  as 
by  sea."  Mr.  Marshall  was  convinced  that 
the  extension  of  the  doctrine  to  towns  in- 
vested by  sea  alone  was  "an  unjustifiable  en- 
croachment on  the  rights  of  neutrals." 

Even  though  the  principle  of  sea  blockade 
independent  of  siege  by  land  did  establish 
itself,  certain  specified  requirements  have  al- 
ways been  insisted  upon.  Among  these  are 
the  following — the  particular  form  of  state- 
ment being  that  given  by  Prof.  T.  A.  Walk- 
er, of  Cambridge  University.  [Manual  In- 
ternational Law,  III,  77,  78.] 

I.  A  Blockade  to  he  Binding  Must  be  Real. 
It  is  legally  essential  that  there  be  a  blockade  in  fact. 
A  mere  proclamation  of  blockade  unsupported  by  the 
presence  of  an  actual  blockading  force,  i.  e.,  a  "paper 
blockade,"  is  in  no  way  binding  upon  a  neutral. 

II.  A  Blockade  to  be  Binding  Must  he  Effective. 
The  presence  of  an  adequate  force  is  an  absolutely 
essential  condition  for  a  valid  blockade.  The  powers 
of  the  Armed  Neutrality  required  for  the  validity  of  a 
blockade  that  it  should  be  maintained  by  vessel  "an- 
chored and  sufficiently  near"  to  make  the  attempt  to 
enter  manifestly  dangerous     .    .    ." 

It  may  be  convenient  to  have  brought  to- 
gether at  this  point  some  of  the  pertinent  au- 
thorities on  the  subject.  The  rules  of  the 
Declaration  of  Paris  and  of  the  Declaration 
of  London  are  given  later,  under  the  head- 
ing "Official  Documents."  The  quotations 
below  are  from  Secretaries  of  State  of  the 
United  States: 

To  guard  against  the  abusive  extension  of  the  term 
"blockade,"  it  will  be  necessary  explicitly  to  describe  its 
meaning,  and  to  confine  it  as  in  the  declaration  of  the 
Armed  Neutrality,  "to  a  port  where,  by  the  disposition 
of  a  Power  which  attacks  it,  with  vessels  stationed 
sufficiently  near,  there  would  be  evident  danger  to  enter 
it."  [,Mr.  Pickering,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  King, 
Minister  to  England,  June  8,  1796.] 

The  law  of  nations  requires,  to  constitute  a  blockade, 
that  there  should  be  the  presence  and  position  of  a 
force  rendering  access  to  the  prohibited  place  mani- 
festly difficult  and  dangerous.  Every  jurist  of  reputa- 
tion, who  treats  with  precision  on  this  branch  of  the 
laws  of  nations,  refers  to  an  actual  and  particular 
blockade.  [Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr. 
Thornton,  October  27,  /S05.] 

No  maxim  of  the  law  of  nations  is  better  established 
than  that  a  blockade  should  be  confined  to  particular 
ports,  and  that  an  adequate  force  shall  be  stationed  at 
each  to  support  it.  The  force  should  be  stationary,  and 
not  a  cruising  squadron,  and  placed  so  near  the  en- 
trance of  the  harbor  or  mouth  of  the  river  as  to  make 
it  evidently  dangerous  for  a  Vessel  to  enter.  [Mr. 
Monroe,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  de  Onis,  Spanish 
Minister,  March  20,  1816.] 

The  fictitious  blockades  proclaimed  by  Great  Britain 
and  made  a  pretext  for  violating  the  commerce  of 
neutral  nations  have  been  one  of  the  greatest  abuses 
ever  committed  on  the  high  seas.  During  the  late  war 
they  were  carried  to  an  extravagance  which  would 
have  been  ridiculous,  if  in  their  efltects  they  had  not 
afflicted  such  serious  and  extensive  injuries  on  neutral 
nations.  Ports  were  proclaimed  in  a  state  of  blockade 
previous  to  the  arrival  of  any  force  at  them,  were  con- 
sidered in  that  state  without  regard  to  intimations  of 
the  presence  of  the  blockading  force;  .  .  .  the 
British  cruisers  during  the  whole  time  seizing  every 
vessel  bound  to  such  ports,  at  whatever  distance  from 
them.  \_Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Mon- 
roe, Minister  to  England,  January  5,  1804.] 

The  British  Government  in  defending  its 
long-distance  blockade  has  made  reference  to 


14 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


precedents  set  by  the  American  Government, 
especially  to  the  Springbok  case  and  the 
PeterJioff  case.  But  a  study  of  these  cases 
[5  Wallace,  1,  and  5  Wallace,  28]  will 
clearly  show  that  in  neither  of  these  in- 
stances the  decision  of  our  courts  provides 
any  support  for  the  present  British  conten- 
tion. 

The  Peterhoff — to  take  the  time  for  but 
one  instance — was  a  British  vessel  which, 
during  the  Civil  War,  cleared  with  a  cargo 
for  the  Mexican  port  of  Matamoras,  just 
across  the  Eio  Grande  from  Brownsville, 
Texas — then  occupied  by  Confederate  troops. 
The  vessel  was  taken  by  United  States  au- 
thorities, but  the  court's  decision  held  that 
"the  ship  and  cargo  are  free  from  liability 
for  violation  of  blockade."  The  temptation 
to  include  in  the  blockade  our  navy  was  con- 
ducting the  little  Mexican  port  across  from 
the  Confederate  camp  at  Brownsville  was 
surely  no  less  than  the  desire  to  include  in 
the  present  British  blockade  all  the  great 
city  ports  of  neutral  Europe.  But  the 
United  States  court  resisted  that  temptation. 
It  said : 

It  must  be  premised  that  no  paper  or  constructive 
blockade  is  allowed  by  international  law.  When  such 
blockades  have  been  attempted  by  other  nations,  the 
United  States  have  ever  protested  against  them  and 
denied  their  validity.    *    *    * 

We  must  say,  therefore,  that  trade  between  London 
and  Matamoras,  even  with  intent  to  supply,  from  Mata- 
moras, goods  to  Texas,  violated  no  blockade,  and  can- 
tiot  be  declared  unlawful. 

Trade  with  a  neutral  port  in  immediate  proximity  to 
the  territory  of  one  belligerent,  is  certainly  very  incon- 
venient to  the  other.  Such  trade,  with  unrestricted  in- 
land commerce  between  such  a  port  and  the  enemy's 
territory,  impairs  undoubtedly,  and  very  seriously  im- 
pairs, the  value  of  a  blockade  of  the  enemy's  coast. 
But  in  cases  such  as  that  now  in  judgment,  we  ad- 
minister the  public  law  of  nations,  and  are  not  at 
liberty  to  inquire  what  is  for  the  particular  advantage 
or  disadvantage  of  our  own  or  another  country.  We 
must  follow  the  lights  of  reason  and  the  lessons  of 
the  masters  of  international  jurisprudence. 

Much  in  contrast  with  this  sober,  law-re 
vering  reasoning  is  the  position  assumed  by 
the  British  Government  today.  In  its  note 
of  July  24th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  says:  "A 
blockade  limited  to  enemy  ports  only  would 
leave  open  routes  by  which  every  kind  of 
German  commerce  could  pass  almost  as 
easily  as  through  the  jwrts  in  her  own  ter- 
ritory." It  is  therefore  absurd,  is  the  Eng- 
lish conclusion,  to  say  that  they  may  not 
close  those  neutral  routes.  "If  the  blockade 
can  only  become  effective  by  extending  it 
to  enemy  commerce  passing  through  neutral 
ports,  such  an  extension  is  defensible." 

As  a  rule,  goods  which  are  of  German 
ownership  or  origin  are  refused  shipment 
from  neutral  ports,  but  in  some  instances 
such  goods  have  been  accepted  by  ship-mas- 
ters and  have  started  on  their  voyage  to 
America,  only  to  be  seized  by  British  author- 
ities.   What  are  the  rights  in  such  cases? 

The  question  whether  goods   which  are 


the  private  property  of  citizer«!  of  a  bellig- 
erent country  may  be  seized  at  sea,  if  on 
board  a  neutral  vessel,  cannot  be  regarded 
as  decisively  settled.  In  early  times  the 
private  possessions  of  citizens  of  an  enemy 
country  were  regarded  as  good  spoil  wher- 
ever found.  Nowadays,  it  is  unpermissible 
for  a  belligerent  to  seize  private  property  of 
citizens  of  the  enemy  country,  when  found 
on  land.  With  regard  to  private  property 
of  citizens  of  an  enemy  country,  found  at 
sea,  the  law  is  not  quite  so  clear.  While 
there  would  seem  to  be  no  difference  in  the 
inviolability  of  private  property  by  land 
and  by  sea,  practically  the  international 
conscience  cannot  be  said  to  have  advanced 
to  the  point  where  there  is  absolute  unan- 
imity that  enemy  goods  must  be  respected, 
if  they  can  be  captured  on  the  water.  The 
doctrine  "free  ships,  free  goods,"  has  always 
been  popular  in  America,  but,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  we  can  hardly  rest  upon  it  as  an  ac- 
cepted axiom  of  international  law  or  prac- 
tice. Indeed,  our  own  courts,  except  in  cases 
where  definite  treaties  prescribe  a  different 
rule,  have  with  practical  uniformity  upheld 
the  seizure  of  enemy  property,  if  contraband, 
even  when  sailing  under  a  neutral  flag. 
True,  a  score  of  our  treaties  with  foreign 
Powers  recognize  the  principle  "free  ships, 
free  goods."  We  have  no  treaty  with  Great 
Britain  in  which  either  party  recognizes  the 
principle.  However,  both  the  Declaration 
of  Paris  and  the  Declaration  of  London  hold 
that  privately  owned  property  is  inviolable 
at  sea. 

Of  course,  goods  once  the  possession  of  an 
enemy,  but  which  have  been  sold  to  citizens 
of  a  neutral  state  in  the  ordinary  ways  of 
trade  and  in  good  faith,  are  exempt  from 
capture  or  interference. 

As  for  goods  of  origin  in  belligerent  terri- 
tory, precedents  and  opinions  are  contradic- 
tory ;  it  cannot  be  averred  that  there  was  any 
clearly  predominant  decision  up  to  1909, 
when  the  London  Conference  declared 
against  the  seizure  of  property  at  sea  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  the  product  of  the 
enemy's  soil.  During  the  present  war,  the 
British  Government  has  stopped  shipments 
from  Belgium,  as  "goods  of  enemy  origin," 
the  local  government  of  Belgium  being  to- 
day administered  by  Germans.  Thus,  while 
we  are  exhorted  to  contribute,  and  have  con- 
tributed many  thousands  of  dollars  for  the 
relief  of  Belgian  distress,  we  are  not  per- 
mitted, by  Great  Britain,  to  offer  the  most 
practical  form  of  relief,  namely,  by  the  pur- 
chase of  Belgian  goods. 

It  is  of  course  apparent  that,  once  the 
principle  of  tlie  long-distance  blockade  is 
asserted,  the  mere  matter  of  miles  ceases 
to  be  of  any  consequence  at  all.  If  England 
is  free  to  close  the  whole  coast  of  Europe 
by  a  constructive  blockade  somewhere  out  at 
sea,  tliere  is  no  impropriety  in  lier  station- 


THE  SUMMIT  OF  ARROGANCE 


15 


ing  cruisers  at  the  mouth  of  New  York  har- 
bor, the  Delaware  capes  and  Hampton 
Roads,  to  seize  contraband — whatever  she 
pleases  being  "contraband."  The  United 
States  Government  early  in  the  war  made 
representations  to  Great  Britain  that  the 
presence  of  war  vessels  in  the  vicinity  of 
New  York  harbor  was  offensive,  and  the 
cruisers  were  for  a  while  withdrawn.  But 
they  were  soon  busy  again  on  our  coast,  and 
now  were  not  satisfied  merely  to  waylay  or 
capture  vessels  starting  on  the  Atlantic 
voyage. 

On  October  26th,  the  Dutch  steamer  Ham- 
horn,  on  the  way  from  New  York  to  Cabair- 
en,  Cuba,  for  bananas  for  the  American 
market,  was  captured  by  a  British  cruiser 
and  taken  to  Halifax  as  a  prize. 

A  few  days  later,  we  found  that  the  voyage 
from  New  York  to  Norfolk,  Virginia,  had 
become  dangerous.  For  more  than  a  year 
American  ships  bound  to  foreign  neutral 
ports  had  constantly  been  seized  and  their 
cargoes  taken  off  for  England's  benefit.  But 
our  ships  still  retained  the  proud  privilege 
of  travelling  without  molestation  between 
our  own  home  ports. 

On  October  30th,  the  British  Government 
took  away  this  privilege.  On  that  day  one 
of  the  British  blockading  cruisers  off  Sandy 
Hook  captured  the  steamship  Hockintj,  an 
American  vessel,  fiying  the  American  flag, 
owned  by  Americans,  steaming  between  two 
American  ports.  She  had,  and  could  have 
had,  no  contraband  on  board,  for  nothing 
can  be  contraband  passing  between  two 
American  ports.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
she  was  in  ballast,  without  a  pound  of  car- 
go in  her.  The  cruiser  put  an  armed  prize 
crew  on  board  the  Hocking,  hauled  down  the 
American  flag,  ran  up  the  Union  Jack,  and 
took  the  prize  into  Halifax,  where  she  will 
lie  for  months,  and  almost  certainly  be  con- 
fiscated on  the  ground  (which  is  positively 
denied),  that  German  capital  is  invested  in 
her. 

If  this  ship  was  not  safe,  no  American 
coast-wise  trading  ship  is  safe.  However, 
up  to  the  present  time,  American  vessels  are 
permitted  to  navigate  the  Great  Lakes  and 
the  Hudson  River.  On  Nov.  11th,  the  Viri' 
land,  of  Danish  registry,  but  on  the  way 
from  New  York  to  Norfolk,  was  chased  by 
the  British  blockaders  after  leaving  Sandy 
Hook,  but  escaped  by  running  close  inshore 
and  creeping  in  thick  weather  down  the 
coast. 

Thus  far  no  vessel  has  been  pursued  into 
a  port  of  the  United  States,  though  the  Zea- 
landia,  an  American  steamship,  was,  on  Nov. 
5th,  while  anchored  off  Progresso.  Mexico, 
at  the  usual  discharging  place  (there  being 


no  ship-landing  at  Progresso),  within  the 
3-mile  limit,  boarded  and  searched  by  an 
armed  party  from  the  British  cruiser  Iris. 

However,  it  is  not  the  purpose  to  go,  at 
this  point,  into  details  concerning  captured 
ships;  another  chapter  will  do  that.  Other 
chapters  will  take  up  for  more  extended  dis- 
cu.ssion  particular  features  of  the  British 
campaign  against  neutral  commerce,  such  as 
the  interference,  through  iron-clad  trade 
agi'eements,  in  our  domestic  business;  the 
cable  censorship,  ably  used  as  an  aid  to  the 
demoralization  already  wrought  by  the  cen- 
sorship of  cargoes ;  tlie  blacklisting  of  many 
specified  ships  in  the  neutral  trade,  etc.,  etc. 

All  these  devices  for  the  injury  of  rival 
trade,  outrageous  as  they  are,  are  only  out- 
growths of  the  central  iniquity  which  makes 
tliem  possible — England's  violation  of  the 
neutrality  of  the  sea.  No  indictment  could 
be  more  complete  than  that  which  the  facts 
cited,  though  incompletely,  in  this  book, 
bring  against  the  King  and  his  Council  and 
tlie  Admiralty  of  England  as  the  contemner 
of  international  law  and  the  enemy  of  the 
rights  of  nations  at  peace.  No  one  can 
peruse  the  cases  set  down  in  detail  in  later 
pages  of  this  book  without  astonishment  at 
the  height  to  which  British  pretensions 
Iiave  been  allowed  to  mount.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  has  virtually  set  up 
in  the  midst  of  the  busy  seas  an  arbitrary 
court,  claiming  unheard  of  powers  and  exer- 
cising the  most  tyrannous  police  functions ; 
seizing  and  haling  into  the  dock,  as  suspects, 
all  travellers  upon  the  ocean  highways,  and 
visiting  many  of  them  with  heavy  penalties 
for  unproven,  and  indeed  unprovable,  of- 
fenses. This  lawless  assizes  of  the  seas,  con- 
temptuous alike  of  its  own  precedents  and 
of  the  rights  of  others,  scarcely  stoops  to  the 
pretense  of  citing  authority  for  its  actions, 
wliich  are  determined  solely  by  its  brutal 
will,  and  enforced,  though  indeed  largely 
through  intimidation,  by  the  gigantic  power 
of  its  naval  police.  The  extent  of  the  earth's 
surface  over  which  this  extraordinary  court 
is  permitted  to  wield  its  self-arrogated  jur- 
isdiction, the  magnitude  of  the  interests 
which  its  actions  vitally  affect,  and  the 
supineness  with  which  sovereign  States  sub- 
mit to  the  erection,  upon  the  ruins  of  their 
.self-respect  and  the  debacle  of  their  highest 
commercial  and  political  interests,  of  an 
island's  municipal  statutes  into  interna- 
tional formulas,  unite  to  render  this  one  of 
the  spectacles  of  history. 

A  contemplation  of  that  spectacle  sug- 
gests that  the  hour  imposes  upon  the  United 
State  a  duty  of  supreme  historical  impor- 
tance, i 


Ill 


SHIPS  AND   CARGOES   STOPPED   AT   SEA 


AMEKICAN  manufacturers  and  export- 
ers to-day  are  unable,  because  of  Brit- 
ish interference  on  the  high  seas, 
to  send  goods  direct  to  customers  in  any 
neutral,  non-belligerent  European  country. 
Deliveries  of  goods  to  such  nations  can  be 
effected  only  after  the  cargoes  of  vessels  have 
been  examined  by  British  authorities  in 
such  ports  as  Kirkwall,  Leith,  Shields,  Hull 
or  Liverpool,  to  which  all  vessels — American, 
Dutch,  Norwegian  and  Swedish — are  forci- 
bly diverted,  at  a  great  financial  loss.  Even 
then,  the  continuance  of  a  ship's  voyage  and 
the  delivery  of  consignments  are  uncertain, 
because,  on  the  mere  suspicion  that  goods 
may  be  resold  to  Germany  or  her  allies,  car- 
goes are  often  discliarged  and  Iield  for  Prize 
Court  proceedings.  American  exporters  are 
obliged  to  suffer  losses  in  the  deterioration 
of  perishable  goods,  in  the  charter  cost  and 
operating  expenses  of  ships  detained,  and 
in,  what  is  more  serious,  the  destruction  of 
business  relations  enjoyed  for  years  with 
foreign  customers.  In  consequence  of  Brit- 
ish rulings  certain  goods,  such  as  rub- 
ber, wool  and  tin,  manufactured  in  the 
United  States,  cannot  now  be  sold  to  cus- 
tomers in  Norway,  Sweden,  Holland,  Den- 
mark, or  any  neutral  country,  except 
through  British  brokers,  located  in  London. 
These  brokers  charge  a  commission  on  sales 
thus  made.  American  goods  thus  sold,  must 
be  shipped  via  England,  which  necessitates 
great  expenses  in  loading,  reloading  and  in 
warehouse  tolls. 

Shut  off  from  direct  relations  with  their 
legitimate  customers,  American  merchants 
are  thus  rendered  helpless  in  the  disposition 
of  goods  and  the  establishment  of  prices. 
Thus  American  business  abroad,  fostered 
and  developed  for  years  at  great  expense, 
has  been  usurped  by  British  interests  which 
can  themselves,  under  present  conditions, 
without  hindrance  or  competition,  supplant 
American  manufacturers. 

Every  American  enterprise  engaged  in 
foreign  trade  has  suffered  from  Great  Brit- 
ain's maritime  policy.  Even  trade  with 
South  American  countries  has  been  inter- 
fered with  and  damaged.  The  loss  inflicted 
has  fallen  upon  manufacturers,  importers, 
exporters  and  ship-owners.  No  class  of 
goods  has  been  exempt  from  British  deten- 
tion and  seizure.    The  mere  suspicion  on  the 


part  of  any  British  authority  engaged  in  the 
examination  of  ships  is  sufficient  for  the 
holding  of  a  cargo  for  Prize  Court  proceed- 
ings. 

According  to  the  basic  principle  of  Eng- 
lish common  law,  which  places  the  burden 
of  proof  upon  the  accuser,  and  by  the  Dec- 
laration of  London,  which  presumes  that 
all  cargoes  are  innocent  of  an  enemy  desti- 
nation until  proven  guilty,  the  policy  pur- 
sued by  Great  Britain  is  illegal  and  in  vio- 
lation of  the  established  rights  of  neutral 
nations.  Reversing  these  principles,  Great 
Britain  first  assumes  that  all  cargoes  are 
suspect,  and  acts  accordingly.  Thus,  any 
and  all  ships  may  be  held  and  cargoes 
seized.  American  shippers  are  asked  to 
guarantee  that  goods  sent  to  Norway, 
Sweden,  Denmark  and  Holland  will  not  be 
re-sold  by  their  purcliasers  to  Germany  or 
her  allies.  By  what  right  can  Great  Britain 
ask  this  of  American  merchants?  How 
can  such  guarantee  be  logically  given?  The 
captain  of  any  British  patrol  boat,  hailing 
and  taking  into  port  an  American,  Norweg- 
ian, Danish  or  Dutch  boat,  at  his  discretion 
may  assume  that  the  cargoes  may  be  re- 
sold to  Germany.  The  American  shipper,  as 
well  as  his  customers,  has  no  recourse  from 
long  detention,  actual  seizure  and  Prize 
Court  proceedings.  Vessels  are  often 
brought  into  Kirkwall  and  other  British 
ports  even  after  the  cargoes  had  been  ex- 
amined by  representatives  of  British  consuls 
at  American  ports  and  the  holds  officially 
.sealed  before  the  ship  set  sail.  Whether  the 
cargo  be  seized  or  the  vessel  allowed  to  pro- 
ceed, a  financial  loss  is  inflicted  upon  ex- 
porters and  ship  charterers. 

Realizing  their  helplessness  under  the 
monopoly  exercised  by  Great  Britain  upon 
the  sea,  regular  lines,  like  the  Scandinavian- 
American  and  Norwegian-American,  volun- 
tarily call  at  Kirkwall  for  insi)ection.  Other 
lines  using  the  English  channel,  such  as  the 
Holland-American  Line,  stop  at  the  Downs. 
The  mere  deflection  from  their  regular 
course  of  voyage  means  an  expense  in  the 
burning  of  coal  and  in  delay.  If  her  pa- 
pers are  deemed  beyond  criticism  or  sus- 
picion by  the  British  officer  examining  the 
cargo  and  the  vessel  is  allowed  to  proceed, 
there  is  a  delay  of  at  least  forty-eight  hours. 
In  most  cases  ships  are  detained  several 


SHIPS   AND   CARGOES   STOPPED   AT   SEA 


17 


days.  In  other  cases  the  period  which  they 
are  held  has  ranged  from  one  to  six  months. 
The  damage  inflicted,  and  the  gross  injustice 
of  such  detention  upon  the  mere  suspicion  of 
some  petty  examining  official,  are  obvious. 

Vessels  of  lighter  tonnage  pay  a  charter 
fee  averaging  from  $400  to  $500  a  day. 
Larger  vessels  pay  from  $1,400  to  $1,500  a 
day.  The  charter  cost  for  a  trip  may  aver- 
age about  $45,000  to  $50,000.  Each  day's 
detention  in  a  British  port  means  so  much 
loss,  which  is,  of  course,  not  paid  by  the 
British  Government,  but  must  be  deducted 
from  the  profit  on  the  cargo  should  that 
cargo  have  the  good  fortune  to  be  passed  and 
finally  reach  its  destination. 

To  illustrate  the  working  out  of  the  con- 
ditions generally  explained,  certain  specific 
cases  may  be  cited.  These  are  to  be  regarded 
as  illustrations  merely,  as  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  furnish  a  full  list  of  ships  de- 
tained and  cargoes  held : 

The  steamship  Edward  Pierce,  owned  by 
an  American  concern  and  flying  the  Amer- 
ican flag,  sailed  November  25,  1914,  from 
New  York  for  Copenhagen  and  Gothenburg. 
This  vessel  was  detained  at  Falmouth  from 
December  8  to  December  13,  the  master  be- 
ing told  that  consignments  of  flour  and  peas 
were  suspected,  although  these  had  been  sold 
direct  to  parties  in  Copenhagen.  The  vessel 
was  finally  permitted  to  proceed,  the  loss 
in  charter  fees  during  the  delay — on  mere 
suspicion — amounting,  according  to  the 
owners,  to  $7,000.  The  steamship  George 
Eawley,  owned  by  the  same  concern,  sailed 
from  New  York,  November  15,  1914,  for  Co- 
penhagen. This  ship  was  held  at  Falmouth. 
The  master  was  informed  by  the  custom  of- 
ficers that  they  were  compelled  to  detain  the 
ship  on  account  of  flour,  wheat  and  oil  on 
board.  They  later  informed  the  master  that 
the  British  government  suspected  the  des- 
tination of  550  barrels  of  oil.  On  January  1, 
1915,  the  master  was  directed  to  proceed  on 
his  course,  with  the  full  cargo.  The  satis- 
faction of  British  suspicion  in  this  case,  re- 
quiring a  delay  of  thirty-three  days,  cost  the 
owners  $14,000  in  charter  fees  and  other 
expenses. 

On  February  9,  1915,  the  steamship  An- 
tilla,  American,  sailed  from  New  York  for 
Malmoe  and  Copenhagen.  The  ship  was 
stopped  February  24  by  a  British  cruiser 
and  ordered  to  proceed  to  Kirkwall  with  a 
prize  crew  on  board.  The  ship  was  taken  to 
Dundee  on  March  23.  The  cargo  aboard  this 
vessel  had  been  loaded  under  the  inspection 
of  watchmen  appointed  by  the  British  Con- 
sul in  New  York,  and  all  of  the  ship's  mani- 
fests had  been  certified  and  signed  by  the 
British  Consul  before  the  ship  sailed.  De- 
spite this  fact,  and  the  presentation  of  the 
British  consul's  certificate,  the  ship's  papers 


were  seized  by  the  Admiralty  authorities  at 
Dundee,  and  part  of  the  cargo,  consisting 
of  machinery,  hardware,  graphite  and  food- 
stuffs, was  discharged.  The  vessel  itself  was 
held  until  April  27,  when  it  was  allowed  to 
proceed  with  only  the  remainder  of  the  car- 
go. The  damage  in  this  case,  according  to 
the  owners,  amounted  to  $98,000. 

On  April  6,  1915,  an  officer  from  the  Brit- 
ish cruiser  Teutonic  boarded  the  American 
ship,  Joseph  W.  Fordney,  sailing  from  New 
York  to  Malmoe,  when  the  ship  was  four 
miles  off  the  Norwegian  coast  but  inside  the 
headlands  of  Norway.  Despite  tlie  fact  that 
the  captain  showed  that  the  hatches  of  the 
ship  had  been  closed  under  the  supervision 
of  the  British  consul  at  New  York  with  the 
consular  seal,  a  prize  crew  was  sent  aboard 
and  the  vessel  was  ordered  to  Kirkwall, 
where  customs  ofiioers  seized  all  the  ship's 
papers.  The  vessel  was  ordered  to  Dalton 
Bay  and  thence  to  Portishead,  where  it  ar- 
rived April  27.  There  the  cargo  was  arbi- 
trarily ordered  to  discharge,  without  explan- 
ation, and  the  vessel  was  released,  sailing 
for  New  York  on  May  17. 

These  are  only  isolated  and  typical  illus- 
trations of  Great  Britain's  treatment  of 
American  ships  carrying  American  goods. 
Even  in  cases  where  cargoes  are  allowed  to 
proceed,  the  expenses  incurred  by  British  in- 
terference often  wipe  out  any  chance  of 
profit.  The  loss  in  charter  fees  and  operat- 
ing expenses  of  ships  are  repeatedly  in- 
creased by  the  capricious  orders  of  British 
ofiicials.  Often  ships  ordered  to  Kirkwall 
are  not  examined  there  and  the  matter  set- 
tled, but  are  compelled  to  proceed  to  Leith, 
NeAvcastle,  Hartlepool  or  Middlesborough, 
and  are  sometimes  thus  sent  from  port  to 
port,  only  in  the  end  to  have  the  cargo  seized 
for  Prize  Court  proceedings.  These  delays 
occupy  i)eriods  ranging  from  several  days  to 
many  months.  The  steamship  Carolyn, 
American,  for  instance,  sailed  from  Savan- 
nah, Ga.,  March  30,  1915,  with  a  cargo  of 
cotton  for  Rotterdam.  The  ship  put  into 
Kirkwall  for  inspection  on  April  28.  It  was 
then  ordered  to  Leith,  where  the  cargo  was 
detained.  The  ship  was  discharged  only  on 
May  21,  the  delay  in  this  case  covering  a 
perod  of  twenty-three  days. 

Another  instance  of  great  expense  brought 
upon  American  shippers  may  be  found  in 
the  case  of  the  steamship  Leelanaw,  Ameri- 
can, which  sailed  from  New  York  May  17, 
1915,  for  Gothenburg,  Sweden,  carrying  a 
cargo  of  cotton  for  Russia  valued  at  $400,- 
000.  This  ship  was  captured  May  31  by  the 
British  cruiser  Mantua  and  detained  at 
Kirkwall  from  June  2  to  July  6,  a  period  ex- 
ceeding one  month.  Because  the  British  au- 
thorities suspected  that  the  cotton  might  not 
go  into  Russia  from  Sweden,  clearance  to 
Gothenburg  was  refused  and  the  vessel  was 


18 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


forced  to  deviate  its  course  to  Archangel. 
The  shipper  thereby  suffered  great  loss  by 
the  delay  and  deviation,  in  charter  cost,  oper- 
ating expenses,  war  risk  and  maritime  in- 
surance. 

Ships  carrying  valuable  cargoes  are  de- 
tained on  the  most  petty  pretexts.  The 
steamship  Portland,  American,  which  sailed 
from  San  Francisco  April  25,  1915,  for 
Stockholm,  was  detained  at  Kirkwall,  and 
thence  sent  on  to  Blyth,  where  it  was  held 
several  days.  Tlie  liolding  up  of  this  ship 
was  occasioned  merely  by  British  suspicion, 
which  in  this  case  cast  its  eye  upon  a  34:-ton 
cargo  of  dried  fruit,  which  was  sent  to  the 
Prize  Court.  The  mere  suspicion  that  may 
rest  on  food  shipments,  from  wheat  to  peas, 
from  meat  to  prunes,  may  cost  innocent 
American  shipping  concerns  and  exporters 
thousands  of  dollars. 

No  consideration  for  the  deterioration  of 
perishable  cargoes  or  for  the  expense  of  de- 
lay is  shown  by  the  British  authorities.  The 
case  of  the  Norwegian  steamship,  Bjornst- 
jerne  Bjorson,  which  left  New  York  October 
28,  1914,  for  Copenhagen  carrying  a  large 
cargo  of  American  meat  is  illustrative.  This 
ship  was  taken  into  Kirkwall  on  November 
10,  1914,  where  it  was  detained  until  the 
27th.  It  was  then  ordered  to  Newcastle, 
where  it  arrived  November  29.  Only  on 
January  5,  1915,  after  a  delay  of  37  days, 
was  the  cargo  ordered  discharged.  But  even 
then  this  vessel,  flying  a  neutral  flag,  was  not 
released  that  it  might  go  about  its  business. 
It  was  held  until  May,  1915,  about  five 
months  after  the  seizure  of  the  cargo.  For 
the  financial  loss  imposed  the  British  author- 
ities made  no  plausible  excuse. 

The  steamship  Alfred  Nohel,  flying  the 
Norwegian  flag,  suffered  likewise.  This  ship 
sailed  from  New  York  October  20,  1914,  for 
Copenhagen,  carrying  a  cargo  including 
meat.  It  was  detained  at  Lerwick  from  No- 
vember 7  to  the  14,  and  was  then  ordered  to 
Liverpool,  where  the  cargo  was  seized  on 
the  17th.  The  vessel  was  not  released  until 
May  13,  1915,  the  period  of  unnecessary  de- 
lay covering  almost  six  months. 

In  addition  to  the  daily  expense  of  char- 
ter costs,  and  the  operating  cost  of  the  ship 
in  coal,  food  and  the  pay  of  crews,  ship- 
owners must  pay  the  cost  of  anchorage  in 
ports  where  vessels  are  held.  They  must 
pay  for  the  unloading  of  suspected  cargoes, 
and  if  the  cargoes  are  deemed  innocent  in 
the  arbitrary  opinion  of  British  authorities, 
they  must  again  pay  the  cost  of  reloading,  as 
well  as  warehouse  tolls  for  the  storage  of 
goods  while  in  port.  All  of  this  must  be 
borne  by  the  innocent  shipper.  Should  a 
cargo  be  thrown  into  the  Prize  Court,  the 
owners  must  bear  the  expense  of  legal  repre- 
sentation, which  is  not  inconsiderable. 

The  discrimination  against  American  mer- 


chants dealing  with  customers  in  the  Scan- 
dinavian countries  resulted  last  August  in 
the  advance  of  war  risk  insurance  upon  car- 
goes to  these  countries.  Because  of  the  rig- 
orous hold-up  of  trade,  and  the  constant  seiz- 
ures of  shipments,  war  risk  insurance  under- 
writers advanced  their  special  hazard  rates 
two  to  three  per  cent.  The  rates  on  cargoes 
destined  for  ports  in  Denmark,  Norway  and 
Sweden,  not  beyond  Malmoe,  were  raised  to 
7  per  cent,  for  each  $100  of  insurance,  and 
the  rate  on  shipments  sent  to  Scandinavian 
countries  via  Stockholm  to  a  basis  of  8  per 
cent.  On  the  other  hand  the  rates  on  ship- 
ments, in  ships  owned  by  tiie  British  Allies, 
to  allied  ports  remained  as  they  were — 1  per 
cent,  on  each  $100  for  shipments  to  Liver- 
pool, 114  to  Ireland,  1%  to  London,  1%  to 
Havre,  1%  to  the  coast  ports  of  England 
and  Scotland,  and  1^/^  to  the  Far  East  via  of 
the  United  Kingdom.  While  the  rates  to 
neutral  Scandinavian  countries  M'ere  raised, 
it  is  significant  that  no  advance  Avas  made 
in  the  rates  to  Archangel. 

The  policy  of  Great  Britain  has  been 
avowedly  to  discourage  shipping  to  the  neu- 
tral Scandinavian  and  Dutch  countries. 
There  seems  to  be  no  limit  to  the  extent  to 
which  Great  Britain  will  go  in  interfering 
with  commerce  on  the  suspicion  that  goods 
may  be  resold  to  Germany.  On  August  26, 
1915,  for  instance,  the  Swedish  steamship 
United  States  sailed  from  New  York  carry- 
ing a  cargo  for  Copenhagen.  The  ship  had 
unloaded  at  Copenhagen,  a  neutral  port, 
when  the  British  Government,  on  the  sus- 
picion that  the  goods  might  be  resold  to 
Germany,  ordered  this  neutral  vessel  to  re- 
load under  threat  of  seizure  and  to  take  the 
cargo  back  to  Great  Britain.  Tliis  act  ap- 
pears to  be  not  only  a  violation  of  the  rights 
of  neutral  nations  to  trade  with  one  another, 
but  a  gross  infringement  of  the  sovereignty 
of  a  friendly  nation. 

According  to  the  statement  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  in  his  note  of  January  7,  1915,  Great 
Britain  averred  that  she  did  not  intend  to 
consider  foodstuffs  contraband  unless  des- 
tined for  the  armed  forces  of  her  antagonists. 
The  W.  T.  Green  Commission  Co.,  of  St. 
Louis,  chartered  the  Wilhelmina  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  position  announced  by  Great 
Britain  and  establish  a  resumption  of  trade 
whicli  had  consisted  previously  in  the  ex- 
porting of  provisions  to  Germany.  The  Wil- 
helmina  was  accordingly  loaded  with  a  car- 
go of  grain,  flour  and  provisions,  valued  at 
.$200,000.  Tlie  vessel  sailed  from  Brooklyn, 
January  22,  1915,  and  the  goods  were  con- 
signed to  Mr.  Brooking,  manager  of  the  W. 
T.  Green  Company,  who  sailed  in  advance  to 
Hamburg  to  receive  the  cargo.  The  ship 
sailed  with  the  endorsement  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  and  later,  on  January  29,  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Washington  com- 


SHIPS   AND   CARGOES   STOPPED   AT  SEA 


19 


immicateJ  a  guarantee  to  tlie  Department  of 
State  tliat  the  cargo  would  not  be  used  by 
the  German  Government,  its  agents  or  con- 
tractors, nor  by  the  naval  or  military  forces. 
According  to  a  decree  issued  by  the  Ger- 
man Government  on  January  25,  the  Govern- 
ment took  control  of  certain  food  supplies 
within  the  empire,  but  the  decree  specifically 
stated :  "Tlie  provisions  of  this  ordinance  do 
not  apply  to  grain  and  flour  imported  from 
foreign  countries."  Importers,  however,  had 
to  deal  through  the  War  Grain  Company,  the 
Central  Purchasing  Company,  or  German 
community  officials.  This  regulation  regard- 
ing distribution  did  not  throw  such  food- 
stuffs into  the  hands  of  the  German  mili- 
tary agents,  but  meant  that  the  grain  would 
be  distributed  through  these  agencies  for 
private  consumption.  As  the  situation  was 
not  well  understood  abroad,  the  German 
Federal  Council  on  February  5  rescinded  the 
requirement  regarding  importers  operating 
through  the  specified  agencies.  On  February 
4  the  British  Foreign  Office  issued  a  state- 
ment that  it  would  stop  the  Wilhelmina  and 
throw  her  cargo  into  a  Prize  Court.  This 
contemplated  action  was  based,  allegedly,  on 
the  German  Decree  of  January  25.  Paying 
no  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  regulations 
did  not  touch  imported  flour  and  grain, 
nor  to  Count  BernstorlFs  guarantee  that  the 
foodstuffs  should  reach  civilians  only,  the 
British  seized  the  cargo  after  the  Wilhemina 
had  been  forced  to  put  into  Falmouth  on  ac- 
count of  severe  gales.  Sir  Edward  Grey  in- 
formed the  United  States  Government  that 
the  seizure  wa.s  based  on  the  German  Decree 
of  January  25,  and  that  the  modiflcation  of 
the  German  Decree  was  not  known  in  Eng- 
land on  February  9,  when  the  Wilhelmina 
was  seized.  In  regard  to  this  assertion  it 
is  significant  that  the  modification  had  been 
passed  by  the  Bundesrat  on  February  6,  and 
the  news  was  cabled  to  the  United  States  via 
London.  It  was  sent  from  Berlin  February 
6,  passed  the  British  censor  on  February  7, 
and  was  published  in  the  American  papers 
on  February  8.  After  long  delay  the  Amer- 
ican shippers  were  finally  compelled  to  sub- 
mit to  the  purchase  of  the  Wilhelmina  cargo 
by  the  British  Government,  and  in  May 
a  settlement  of  $430,000  was  decided  upon 
by  Lord  Mersey,  referee.  Despite  the  com- 
pensation for  loss  of  time,  the  shippers  con- 
tended that  they  could  find  no  satisfaction 
in  the  settlement  for  the  enforced  surrender 
of  neutral  rights  and  interests. 

Immediately  after  the  beginning  of  the 
war  a  close  espionage  was  established  by 
British  cruisers  oft"  American  ports.  Neu- 
tral vessels,  leaving  for  the  ports  of  non- 
belligerent nations  were  stopped  and 
searched,  and  in  a  number  of  cases  forced 
to  go  to  Halifax.  The  Norwegian  steamer 
Sandefjord  sailed  from  New  York  on  No- 


vember 27,  1914,  witli  a  mixed  cargo,  includ- 
ing 1,000  bags  of  coffee,  for  Copenhagen. 
One  half  hour  after  she  had  dropped  her 
pilot  off  Sandy  Hook  the  vessel  was 
stopped  by  a  British  man-of-war,  a  prize 
crew  was  put  aboard,  and  she  was  forced  to 
go  to  Halifax,  where  part  of  her  cargo  was 
discharged.  The  reason  for  this  was  declared 
to  be  that  the  1,000  bags  of  coffee  destined 
for  Copenhagen  were  suspected,  inasmuch 
as  it  probably  exceeded  the  city's  needs,  and 
that  it  might  consequently  find  its  way  into 
the  homes  of  Germany. 

The  steamship  Brindilla,  flying  the  Amer- 
ican flag,  sailed  from  Bayonne,  N.  J.,  Octo- 
ber 13,  1914,  with  a  cargo  of  kerosene  for 
Alexandria,  Egypt.  This  vessel  had  been 
bought  by  the  Standard  Oil  Co.  from  the 
Riedermann  Line  and  transferred  to  Ameri- 
can registry.  Just  outside  the  three-mile 
limit  of  Sandy  Hook  she  was  seized  by  the 
British  cruiser  Caronia,  taken  to  Halifax 
and  put  through  Prize  Court  proceedings. 
The  steamship  Maracas,  American,  sailing 
from  New  York  December  9, 1914,  for  Genoa, 
without  excuse  or  explanation,  was  forced 
by  a  British  cruiser  to  go  to  Halifax,  where 
later  she  was  given  permission  to  proceed 
on  her  journey. 

For  a  period,  because  of  the  protests  of 
American  shippers,  this  annoyance  abated, 
but  interference  of  a  like  kind,  off  the 
shores  of  the  United  States,  has  again  been 
instituted.  On  October  31,  1915,  the  Dutch 
steamer  Humborn  and  the  American  steamer 
Hocking,  were  brought  into  Halifax.  The 
Hamhorn  had  sailed  from  New  York  Octo- 
ber 27,  with  a  general  cargo  for  Caibarien, 
Cuba,  while  the  Hocking  had  left  New  York 
to  go  to  Norfolk  for  coaJ. 

The  Hocking,  according  to  Captain  Fabre, 
was  captured  by  the  British  just  outside  the 
three-mile  limit  and  in  sight  of  the  New  Jer- 
sey coast,  off  Asbury  Park,  just  about  four 
hours  from  New  York.  Upon  its  arrival  at 
Halifax,  the  American  flag  was  hauled  down 
by  the  prize  crew  in  charge,  just  as,  eight 
months  earlier,  the  Greenbrier's  flag  had 
been  lowered  under  similar  circumstances. 
In  seizing  the  Hocking,  which  had  entered 
American  registry,  on  the  suspicion  of  its 
ownership.  Great  Britain  acted  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Order  in  Council,  of  October 
20,  1915,  abrogating  Section  LVII  of  the 
Declaration  of  London : 

The  neutral  or  enemy  character  of  a  vessel  is  deter- 
mined by  the  flag  which  she  is  entitled  to  fly. 

Great  Britain  has  always  maintained  this 
principle  and  upon  it  has  based  her  mari- 
time conduct  in  war.  Her  intention  of  con- 
tinuing to  do  so  was  restated  in  a  note  dated 
"British  Foreign  Office,  February  10,  1915," 
and  addr<*ss(>d  to  the  American  Ambassador 
at  London,  in  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  said : 


20 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


Another  instance  of  the  efforts  which  his  Majesty's 
Government  have  made  to  deal  as  leniently  as  possible 
with  neutral  interests  may  be  found  in  the  policy  which 
we  have  followed  with  regard  to  the  transfer  to  a 
neutral  flag  of  enemy  ships  belonging  to  companies 
which  were  incorporated  in  the  enemy  country,  but  all 
of  whose  shareholders  were  neutral.  The  rules  appHed 
by  the  British  and  by  the  American  Prize  Courts  have 
always  treated  the  flag  as  conclusive  in  favor  of  the 
captors  in  spite  of  neutral  proprietary  interests. 

When  the  steamship  Dacia,  purchased  by 
Edward  M.  Breitung,  and  placed  under 
American  registry  January  4,  1915,  sailed 
from  Galveston  January  31,  1915,  for  Eot- 
terdam,  with  a  cargo  of  cotton,  valued  at 
$800,000,  to  be  transhipped  to  Bremen,  the 
British  threatened  to  seize  the  vessel.  This, 
however,  they  refrained  from  doing,  as  such 
a  procedure  would  have  been  against  the 
English  position  that  the  character  of  a  ship 
is  to  be  determined  by  the  flag  she  flies. 
Unwilling  at  that  time  to  make  an  issue  of 
such  a  case,  and  violate  all  precedents,  the 
British  Government  got  the  French  to  seize 
the  Dacia,  the  French  Government  having 
no  such  embarrassing  precedents.  Ten 
months  later,  the  British  seized  the  Hocking, 
thus  repudiating  all  the  precedents  of  Brit- 
ish courts  and  reversing  and  stultifying  the 
British  record. 

Richard  G.  Wagner,  president  of  the 
Transatlantic  Company,  which  owns  the 
Hocking,  declared  there  was  not  a  cent  of 
German  capital  in  his  corporation.  The 
Hocking  was  built  in  England  and  was  orig- 
inally the  English  tramp  steamer  Parkland. 
She  was  sold  to  a  Dutch  company  and  her 
name  changed  to  Ameland.  The  vessel  was 
then  sold  to  the  Gronland  Steamship  Com- 
pany, of  Copenhagen,  and  the  name  changed 
to  Oronland.  Among  other  vessels  she  was 
purchased  by  Mr.  Wagner's  company. 

The  change  of  registry  in  the  case  of  the 
Hocking  was  made  October  15,  on  her  re- 
turn from  Argentina.  After  discharging 
cargo  and  being  overhauled  in  Erie  Basin, 
the  Hocking  left  in  ballast  for  Norfolk,  on 
which  trip  she  was  seized. 

The  bill  of  sale  for  each  ship  purchased 
by  Mr.  Wagner  was  submitted  to  the  De- 
partment of  State  by  him  and  is  there  on 
file.  Accompanying  each  bill  of  sale  is  an 
affidavit  stating  that  Mr.  Wagner  and  his 
associates  are  the  sole  owners  of  the  vessels  • 
and  that  the  absolute  and  full  control  of 
them  is  in  their  hands.  In  these  papers  it 
is  further  stated  that  the  ships  have  been 
permanently  transferred  and  sold  without 
reservation  of  any  charter,  and  that  it  is  not 
the  intention  of  the  owners  to  resell  or  trans- 
fer tliem  back  to  their  former  owners.  The 
vessels  received  American  registry  after 
meeting  all  the  requirements  of  the  Govern- 
ment. This  registry  might  not  unnaturally 
be  taken  to  mean  that  the  ships  accorded  it 
were  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  Ameri- 
can flag. 


Great  Britain  has  inflicted  untold  damage 
on  American  business,  not  only  by  interfer- 
ence with  our  sales  to  neutrals,  but  by  re- 
fusing to  permit  the  shipment  to  the  United 
States  of  goods  purchased  from  Germany. 
For  months  goods  amounting  in  value  to 
many  millions  of  dollars  have  littered  the 
ports  of  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Holland, 
especially  Rotterdam. 

On  April  4,  1915,  the  Ogeechee,  flying  the 
American  flag,  left  Bremen  for  New  York 
carrying  a  general  cargo  of  goods  purchased 
by  American  importers  from  German  manu- 
facturers. This  ship  was  seized  by  the  Brit- 
ish and  taken  to  Sharpness,  where  the  car- 
go was  unloaded  and  a  great  portion  con- 
fiscated because  of  its  German  origin. 
An  instance  of  how  such  a  seizure  hurts 
Amei'ican  merchants  may  be  illuminating. 
Among  the  goods  seized  from  the  Ogeechee 
was  a  shipment  of  50  cases  of  glassware  val- 
ued at  $600  for  a  New  York  dealer.  This 
dealer  decided  to  fight  out  the  case  and  en- 
gaged a  lawyer  to  represent  him.  He  finally 
got  his  goods,  but  at  a  cost  far  exceeding 
their  purchase  price.  The  British  charged 
the  original  freight  rate  from  Bremen  to 
New  York  to  cover  the  transportation  from 
Bremen  to  Sharpness,  £27.13.3;  warehouse 
charges  after  goods  were  seized,  £15.2.3 ;  cus- 
toms fees,  £1.0.0;  railroad  express  from 
Sharpness  after  goods  were  released  to  port, 
£2.11.0 ;  freight  to  New  York  on  the  steamer 
Bristol  City,  £49.1.11,  additional  expenses, 
£5.6.0.  In  addition  to  these  charges,  amount- 
ing to  $483.48,  the  legal  fees  involved 
amounted  to  $125,  and  re-insurance  on  the 
shipment  from  England,  $18,  making  a  total 
of  $626.48.  This  brought  the  total  cost  of 
the  wares,  including  their  purchase  price,  up 
to  $1,226.  Had  they  not  been  seized,  the 
cost,  including  purchase  price  and  freight, 
would  have  been  $735.  The  loss  entailed  by 
British  interference  was  therefore  $491. 
This  is  the  case  of  only  one  small  importer 
among  many  who  lost  by  this  single  seizure 
of  the  Ogeechee.  By  this  sample  case  one 
may  gauge  the  losses  inflicted  upon  larger 
manufacturers  and  importers. 

An  idea  of  the  scope  of  British  activities 
on  the  high  seas,  and  the  extent  to  which 
neutral  commerce  has  suffered  since  the  war 
began,  may  be  gleaned  from  the  list  of  ships 
published  on  page  49,  flf.  It  will  be  seen  that 
no  class  of  goods  has  been  exempt  from  seiz- 
ure. Cargoes  of  cotton,  copper,  grain  and 
foodstuffs  have  generally  been  seized  and 
thrown  into  the  Prize  Court.  The  Dutch 
steamer  Rotterdam,  sailing  from  New  York 
for  Rotterdam  with  a  cargo  of  copper,  was 
seized  September  26,  1914,  when  copper  was 
conditional  contraband.  The  cargo  was  pur- 
chased by  the  British  Government.  Other 
cargoes  seized  and  arbitrarily  bought  even 
before  this  metal  was  put  on  the  contraband 


SHIPS  AND   CARGOES   STOPPED   AT  SEA 


21 


list,  were  carried  on  the  Dutch  steamers 
Sloterdyk,  Potsdam  and  Westerdyk.  The 
list  of  copper-carrying  ships  seized  at  Gibral- 
tar is  too  long  to  mention.  Before  Italy 
joined  the  British  Allies  innumerable  ship- 
ments destined  for  that  country  were  seized. 
The  fact  that  the  British  Government  pur- 
chased shipments,  on  a  basis  whereby  it 
practically  made  its  own  prices,  did  not  mit- 
igate the  wrong  involved  or  the  damage  to 
American  shippers  in  the  breaking  off  of 
legitimate  business  relations. 

Within  recent  months  cargoes  of  food- 
stuffs for  the  Scandinavian  countries  and 
Denmark  have  suffered  especially  from  Brit- 
ish suspicion  that  the  shipments  exceeded 
these  countries'  needs.  The  Swedish  steamer 
Indianic  sailed  from  New  York  April  28, 
1915,  with  a  cargo  of  foodstuffs  for  Gothen- 
burg, Sweden.  The  vessel  was*  hauled  into 
Kirkwall  and  the  cargo  sold  at  auction.  The 
Swedish  steamer  Sydland,  which  sailed  from 
New  York  May  1,  1915,  was  taken  into  Har- 
tlepool and  a  cargo  of  machinery  and  food- 
stuffs thrown  into  the  Prize  Court. 

Despite  the  position  maintained  by  the 
United  States  in  its  note  to  Great  Britain  of 
March  30th,  in  which  we  declared  our  right 
to  ship  provisions  and  foodstuffs  without 
hindrance  to  Germany  via  the  Scandinavian 
countries,  Great  Britain  has  continued  to 
seize  cargoes  of  foodstuffs  carried  in  neutral 
ships  to  Holland  and  the  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries on  the  mere  suspicion  that  some  of  this 
food  might  reach  Germany.  By  July,  1915, 
there  was  |14,000,000  worth  of  provisions 
held  up  in  England. 

Disregarding  our  official  protest  against 
the  seizing  of  food.  Great  Britain  put 
through  Prize  Court  proceedings  the  meat 
cargoes  of  four  ships — the  Kim,  Alfred 
'Nobel,  Bjoertistjerne  Bjoernson  and  Fried- 
land — which  were  seized  in  November,  1914. 

On  September  16,  1915,  the  Prize  Court 
ordered  confiscated  three  cargoes  of  meat 
valued  at  |2,500,000.  At  the  time  this  ver- 
dict was  reached  the  cases  of  twenty-nine 
other  vessels  were  pending,  involving  Ameri- 
can shipments  valued  at  |12,500,000. 

The  financial  wrong  wrought  is  not  alone 
in  withholding  |15,000,000  worth  of  meat 
from  neutral  customers,  but  in  the  breaking 
off  of  an  established  trade  annually  amount- 
ing to  many  more  millions. 

Among  recent  meat-carrying  ships  seized 
was  the  Vitalia,  Norwegian,  which  sailed 
from  New  York  August  19,  1915,  for  Rot- 
terdam. She  was  forced  into  Falmouth  Sep- 
tember 7th,  and  the  cargo  seized  for  Prize 
■^ourt  proceedings. 

On  September  30th  the  Danish  steamship 
Frederik  VIII,  sailing  from  New  York  to 
Copenhagen,  was  detained  at  Kirkwall  and 
forced  to  discharge  a  cargo  of  bacon. 

In  a  memorandum  sent  October  11,  1915, 


by  the  British  Government  through  Mr. 
Page,  the  doctrine  was  fiatly  asserted  that 
shippers  sending  foodstuffs  on  neutral  ves- 
sels to  neutral  ports  are  under  obligation 
to  the  Britisli  Government  to  prove  that 
their  goods  are  not  going  to  the  army  or 
navy  or  the  government  of  Germany. 

The  British  memorandum  of  October  11th 
says  that  the  Chicago  shippers  refused  to 
admit  that  their  shipments  to  Copenhagen 
were  intended  for  Germany,  but  that  "the 
pretense  was  kept  up  to  the  end  that  the 
whole  business  was  bona  fide  neutral  trade." 
To  oppose  this  "pretense,"  the  British  Gov- 
ernment maintained  that  "there  were  strong 
indications^'  that  a  large  part  of  this  food 
was  really  intended  to  go  on  to  Germany; 
"strong  indications  that  it  was  not  merely  a 
civilian  German  destination  which  was  con- 
templated." The  British  Government 
averred  that  it  had  been  informed  that  "fat 
bacon,"  besides  being  of  value  for  army  ra- 
tions was  in  much  demand  in  Germany  as 
the  raw  material  of  "glycerine,  out  of 
which  an  explosive  can  be  made."  Thus,  on 
the  pretext  that  Germany  might  utilize 
bacon  for  the  making  of  explosives,  such 
ships  as  the  Frederik  VIII  are  held  and 
cargoes  of  smoked  bacon  sold  to  Copenhagen 
merchants  are  seized  and  thrown  into  the 
Prize  Court. 

A  particularly  outrageous  case  was  that 
of  the  American  steamer  Llama,  which  left 
New  York  October  14, 1915,  for  Copenhagen, 
carrying  a  cargo  of  oil.  The  ship  was  seized 
by  the  British,  boarded  by  a  prize  crew,  and 
on  October  30  run  aground  on  Skal  Skerries, 
Firth,  Scotland. 

Meanwhile,  with  American  business 
thwarted,  throttled  and  utterly  intimidated. 
Great  Britain  has  gone  the  length  of  openly 
blacklisting  ships  flying  neutral  flags — ships 
upon  which  we  are  depending  for  the  trans- 
portation of  goods  we  need  to  buy  and  goods 
we  want  to  sell — on  the  suspicion  that  they 
are  controlled  or  owned  by  German  capital. 
The  British  Admiralty  in  October  published 
a  list  of  forty-seven  such  vessels,  warning 
shipping  men  against  chartering  these  ships. 
Of  this  number  ten  fly  the  American  flag. 
Their  names  are  the  Allaguash  Ausdbti,  the 
Genesee,  the  Hocking,  the  Kankakee,  the 
Ma^mee,  the  Seneca,  the  Spyros,  the  Yai' 
lianos,  the  Winnebago  and  the  Winnecomte. 

The  following  nations  were  represented 
on  the  taboo  list :  Denmark,  eight  ships  be- 
longing to  the  same  company ;  Norway,  eigh- 
teen ships;  Sweden,  two;  Spain,  one;  Hol- 
land, four,  and  Brazil,  four. 

It  was  stated  that  such  of  the  vessels 
named  as  would  agree  to  trade  only  with  the 
British  Allies  would  be  removed  from  the 
list.  What  is  this  but  a  flagrant  intimida- 
tion of  neutral  commerce,  and  a  wanton  dis- 
crimination against  the  trade  of  all  neutral 


22 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


nations  to  the  advantage  alone  of  Great 
Britain?  Tlie  steamship  Hocking,  seized 
while  on  her  way,  not  to  a  German  port,  not 
even  to  a  European  port,  but  actually  when 
plying  between  New  York  and  Norfolk,  Vir- 
ginia, for  coal,  and  taken  to  Halifax  on 
October  31,  1915,  is  one  of  the  blacklisted 
vessels. 

On  November  20,  within  a  month  after  the 
capture  of  the  Hocking,  the  steamship  Gen- 
esee of  American  registry,  flying  the  Ameri- 
can flag,  on  her  way  from  Norfolk  to  Monte- 
.video,  carrying  a  cargo  of  coal,  was  seized  by 
a  British  cruiser  and  taken,  in  charge  of  a 
prize  crew,  to  St.  Lucia,  British  West  Indies. 
The   Genesee  is  owned   by   the  American 
Transatlantic  Company,  and  was  one  of  the 
vessels  placed  on  the  British  blacklist.    The 
Genesee,  according  to  E.  G.  Wagner,  presi- 
dent of  the  Transatlantic   Company,   was 
built  in  England  and  was  run  under  British 
registry   as   the   Avristam;   she   was    sold 
through   a   British   shipping   agency   to   a 
Greek  company,  which  sold  her  to  the  Fin- 
land Steamship  Company,  of  Copenhagen, 
which,  in  turn,  last  June  sold  her  to  the 
American  owners.     The  Genesee  was  char- 
tered to  C.  G.  Blake  &  Co.,  of  Cincinnati,  to 
take  a  cargo  of  3,800  tons  of  coal  to  Monte- 
video.    She  cleared  from  Norfolk,  October 
14,  and  no  reason  for  the  seizure  was  given. 
Because  of  the  blacklisting  of  the  Winne- 
conne  by  the  British  Admiralty,  the  cancel- 
lations of  cargoes,  according  to  P.  H.  Gra- 
ham &  Co.,  charterers,  amounted  to  $10,000. 
Mr.  Graham,  who  is  the  son  of  an  English 
baronet.  Sir  Robert  James  Stuart  Graham, 
was  born  in  the  United  States.    In  an  adver- 
tisement published  in  the  New  York  Journal 
of  Commerce,  October  26th,  Mr.  Graham's 
company  declared  they  had  investigated  the 
assertion  of  the  British  Government  to  the 
effect  that  the  Winneconne  was  controlled  by 
German  capital  and  had  found,  to  the  con- 
trary, that  the  vessel  is  owned  by  a  corpora- 
tion the  stock  of  which  is  entirely  held  by 
citizens  of  the  United  States;  that  the  vessel 
never  flew  the  flag  of  any  of  the  present  bel- 
ligerent nations,  and  that  all  the  regulations 
and  laws  for  securing  United  States  registry 
had  been  complied  with.     Mr.  Graham  an- 
nounced that  the  cargo  of  the  ship  had  been 
examined  and  passed  for  shipment  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the   British   consul   in    New 
York,  for  which  service  a  fee  had  been  paid 
by  check  for  |250.    Every  box  and  .package 
taken  aboard  had  been  inspected,  the  British 
authorities  going  so  far  as  to  X-ray  goods 
packed  in  bales.     The  blacklisting  of  the 
ship   by   the   British   Admiralty   not   only 
caused  cancellations  of  cargoes,  but  caused 
certain  insurance  companies  to  refuse  to  in- 
sure any  part  of  the  cargo,  and  others  to  in- 
crease the  premium. 

By  reason  of  the  continued  interference 


by  Great  Britain  with  cargo-carrying  ships 
on  the  ground  that  Sweden  would  not  guar- 
antee that  goods  shipped  to  Sweden  would 
not  be  resold  to  Germany,  the  Norwegian- 
American  line,  according  to  a  news  despatch 
dated  November  21,  from  Christiania,  de- 
cided to  abandon  the  transportation  of 
freight  from  the  United  States. 

The  liner  Kristianiafjord  arrived  in  Ber- 
gen with  a  cargo  including  6,000  cases  of 
American  pork  and  1,800  bags  of  coffee.  Be- 
cause of  the  suspicion  that  the  pork  might 
not  be  consumed  in  Sweden  or  Norway,  but 
might  perhaps  find  its  way  into  Germany, 
Great  Britain  issued  orders  that  the  goods 
must  be  returned  to  England. 

The  list  of  ships  printed  on  pp.  49  ff.  in- 
clude only  a  portion  of  the  vessels  held.  Be- 
cause of  the  reticence  of  shipping  concerns, 
it  is  not  possible  to  secure  anything  like  a 
comprehensive  list  of  detentions  and  seiz- 
ures. It  has'  been  likewise  impossible  to  se- 
cure adequate  data  from  manufacturers  re- 
garding cargoes  of  merchandise  detained 
and  seized.  British  interference  has  had  the 
effect  of  intimidating  American  business  in- 
terests to  the  degree  that  these  are  afraid  to 
complain  lest  they  invite  further  hostility 
and  persecution  from  the  British  authori- 
ties. Woolen  manufacturers  decline  to  talk 
about  their  difiiculties  in  selling  wool  to 
Scandinavian  customers  for  fear  that  Great 
Britain  will  shut  off  their  import  of  raw 
products.  Exporters  of  grain,  cotton  and 
copper  refuse  to  complain  publicly  of  the 
losses  suffered  for  fear  that  their  entire  ex- 
port trade,  such  as  it  now  is,  may  be  an- 
nihilated. Fear  of  arousing  British  animos- 
ity bars  them  from  uniting  in  vigorous 
complaint. 

There  are  certain  classes  of  crimes  con- 
cerning which  it  is  next  to  impossible  to 
procure  evidence.  Murder  is  said  to  be  the 
safest  of  felonies  because  the  victim,  who  is 
often  a  sole  witness  aside  from  the  criminal, 
is  silenced.  Dishonored  women  do  not  com- 
monly make  public  their  humiliation.  Few 
indeed  of  the  victims  of  English  wrong-doing 
are  willing  to  furnish  the  facts  for  publica- 
tion. As  for  protesting  and  appealing  to  the 
United  States  Government,  few  now  do  even 
that,  either  because  they  have  learned  that 
their  protests  and  petitions  are  of  no  avail, 
or  that  the  United  States  Government  will 
do  nothing  more  than  possibly  put  the  case 
in  a  memorandum  and  send  a  Trade  Adviser 
over  to  the  British  Embassy  to  chat  with 
Sir  Richard  Crawford  over  it. 

The  prostration  of  American  enterprise 
before  the  domineering  naval  strength  and 
commercial  mercilessness  of  England,  and 
acquiescence  without  hope  of  succor,  are 
among  the  most  discouraging  features  of  the 
situation. 


IV 


THE  CASE  OF  COTTON 


PROBABLY  more  human  beings  are  in- 
terested, from  first  to  last,  in  the 
growth,  movement,  manufacture  and 
use  of  cotton  than  in  any  other  industry  on 
earth.  The  cotton  crop  is  the  most  valuable 
single  crop  produced  from  the  soil  of  the 
United  States.  One-fourth  of  the  total  value 
of  our  exports  is  accounted  for  by  cotton. 
In  a  large  area  of  the  United  States  all  pros- 
perity depends  on  the  sale  of  cotton.  All 
other  business  interests  in  the  South  are  de- 
pendent upon  this  staple,  as  is  also  the  earn- 
ing power  of  thousands  of  miles  of  railway 
communicating  w-ith  the  South.  Further- 
more, since  the  population  of  the  cotton 
States  rely  upon  this  product  to  purchase 
other  goods,  the  rest  of  the  country  feels  im- 
mediately the  pinch  of  any  deficiency  of 
growth,  depreciation  in  price,  or  difficulty 
of  sale. 

The  successful  marketing  of  the  cotton 
crop  is  dependent  on  the  foreign  sales  of 
the  raw  product.  Two-thirds  of  the  crop,  in 
recent  years,  has  been  sold  abroad.  To  pre- 
vent interference  with  the  sale  is,  therefore, 
a  matter  of  vital  importance  not  only  to  the 
South  but  to  the  nation.  Auy  hindrance  to 
it  inflicts  more  financial  damage  than  a  par- 
tial crop  failure.  Provided  export  trade  is 
possible,  high  prices  in  foreign  markets  will 
offset  the  loss  of  a  deficient  crop.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  foreign  purchasers  are  lack- 
ing, ruinously  low  prices  prevail.  It  will 
be  of  interest,  therefore,  to  examine  particu- 
larly into  the  influence  which  the  trade  re- 
strictive measures  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment have  had  upon  this  industry.  That 
hardships  have  been  inflicted  and  great 
financial  loss  brought  about  is  obvious. 

Of  our  total  exports  of  cotton.  Great  Brit- 
ain normally  takes  about  one-third.  Here- 
tofore, Germany  and  Austria  have  taken  an- 
other third.  The  war,  owing  to  the  break 
down  of  foreign  peace  industries,  the  inter- 
ruption of  commerce  and  the  abrupt  disor- 
ganization of  credits,  would  inevitably  have 
temporarily  affected  the  cotton  trade  ad- 
versely. On  the  other  hand,  Germany  and 
Austria  formerly  used  a  certain  amount  of 
Egyptian  and  Indian  cotton ;  the  cutting  off 
of  this  supply  obliged  those  countries  to  look 
to  the  United  States  to  make  good  the  de- 
ficiency. Then,  too,  neutral  European  coun- 
tries that  hitherto  purchased  cotton  goods 


from  German  and  Austrian  manufacturers, 
found  it  necessary  to  increase  their  own 
manufactures,  and  therefore  to  increase 
their  imports  from  America.  Finally,  the 
strain  and  waste  of  war  caused  increased 
consumption  of  the  staple  on  the  part  of  all 
belligerents.  This  demand  should  have 
meant  increased  prices  and  prosperity  for 
the  Southern  planter. 

"What  actually  happened  is  common 
knowledge.  The  average  price  per  bale  for 
the  year  ending  July,  1915,  was  $41.04, 
against  |68.06,  for  the  previous  year,  accord- 
ing to  the  figures  of  H.  G.  Hester,  Secre- 
tary of  the  New  Orleans  Cotton  Exchange. 
The  average  price  per  pound  in  the  same 
periods  w^as  7.94  cents,  against  13.49  cents. 
The  crop  for  1914-15  w^as  15,108,011  bales, 
but  it  brouglit  only  |593,432,978,  while  the 
crop  for  1913-14  was  only  14,882,493  bales, 
yet  brought  the  huge  price  of  $977,844,114. 
Why,  with  this  increased  prospective  de- 
mand, this  special  market  in  Germany  and 
Austria,  these  new  markets  in  neutral  Eu- 
rope, with  plenty  of  cotton  to  meet  all  re- 
quirements, should  cotton  sell  for  less  than 
it  costs  to  raise  it,  which  is  about  eight  cents 
a  pound?  Why  and  how  was  this  great  in- 
dustry compelled  to  suffer  a  loss,  compared 
with  the  previous  year's  business,  of  $400,- 
000,000? 

At  the  beginning  of  hostilities  in  Europe, 
in  August,  1914,  the  New  York  and  New 
Orleans  Cotton  Exchanges  closed.  Shipping 
was  paralyzed.  Nearly  all  our  cotton  was 
carried  in  English  or  German  bottoms. 
These  ships  dared  not  sail  for  fear  of  cap- 
ture by  enemy  cruisers.  Ordinary  insurance 
did  not  protect  against  such  capture,  and 
war  risk  insurance  became  necessary. 

The  German  ships  never  left  American 
ports,  and  their  withdrawal  meant  a  big  loss 
in  means  of  carriage.  The  British  Govern- 
ment requisitioned  certain  ships,  but  the 
others  were  free  to  sail  when,  a  short  time 
after,  the  war  started,  the  British  Govern- 
ment insured  against  war  risk  British  ves- 
sels carrying  for  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
when,  after  a  fortnight,  the  British  Admi- 
ralty declared  the  North  Atlantic  free  of 
German  cruisers.  Transportation  of  cotton 
to  England  was  thus  assured ;  but  the  prob- 
lem of  getting  the  staple  to  Germany  or  to 


24 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


European  neutrals  was  by  no  manner  of 
means  solved.  More  than  a  third  of  our 
cotton  exports  were  thus  cut  off  from  their 
markets. 

This  condition  existed  for  several  months 
— long  enough  to  affect  cotton  prices  disas- 
trously— before  arrangements  were  effected 
whereby  cotton  could  be  sent  to  the  neutrals 
and  through  Italy,  Holland,  Sweden  and 
Denmark  to  Germany  and  Austria. 

Even  after  arrangements  for  shipping 
through  neutrals  had  been  devised,  cotton 
movements  were  seriously  hampered.  Amer- 
icans feared  that  Great  Britain  would  not 
allow  cotton  to  be  moved  to  Germany  at 
all.  The  rumors  would  not  die  down  that 
any  day,  while  cargoes  were  in  mid-ocean, 
cotton  might  be  declared  contraband.  That 
Great  Britain  fostered  this  impression 
seems  indubitable.  In  fact  she  took  no 
steps  to  still  them  until  forced  to  by  Wash- 
ington. 

Cotton,  as  is  known,  as  on  the  "free 
list,"  as  unconditionally  non-contraband,  of 
the  Declaration  of  London.  Although  this 
codification  of  international  law  affecting 
commerce  in  war  time  had  never  been  for- 
mally ratified  by  all  the  Great  Powers, 
Great  Britain,  in  an  Order  in  Council  an- 
nounced August  20th,  accepted  the  rulings 
of  the  Declaration  of  London,  with  certain 
exceptions.  Cotton  was  not  affected  by  these 
exceptions. 

However,  cotton  could  not  be  carried  to 
German  ports  in  any  but  neutral  bottoms. 
The  use  of  other  than  American  ships  for 
this  trade  proved  impossible,  for  the  very 
simple  reason  that  British  capital  con- 
trols the  maritime  insurance  business  of  the 
whole  world  and  British  capital  was  not 
available  for  the  aid  in  any  way  of  Great 
Britain's  enemies.  Neutral  vessels  carrying 
cargoes  to  Germany  could  not  get  insurance, 
and  could  not  sail  without  it.  American 
marine  insurance  companies  are  closely  as- 
sociated financially  with  the  English  com- 
panies and  were  in  no  position  to  jeopardize 
that  association.  Foreign  neutral  companies 
were  in  a  similar  position.  The  United 
States  Government's  War  Kisk  Insurance 
Bureau  was  limited  by  law  to  insuring 
American  cargoes  in  American  vessels,  and 
to  insuring  them  for  a  restricted  amount. 
Unfortunately  there  was  a  plethora  of  Amer- 
ican cargoes,  cotton  particularly.  But  where 
were  the  American  vessels  adapted  to  trans- 
Atlantic  cargo  carrying? 

There  was  practically  none,  and  the  ob- 
vious thing  to  do  was  to  buy  the  foreign  ves- 
sels tied  up  in  American  ports  and  enter 
them  under  American  registry,  a  step  that 
had  been  rendered  feasible  by  a  law  passed 
by  Congress  in  1914.  The  experiment  proved 
unsuccessful.  A  Hamburg-American  liner, 
the  Georgia,  was  purchased  by  an  American 


citizen  and  fitted  out  for  the  South  Ameri- 
can trade,  but  since  the  British  Government 
intimated  that  the  validity  of  the  transfer 
was  questioned,  the  ship  never  left  port. 

Of  greater  interest  in  the  effort  to  increase 
the  American  merchant  marine  is  the  case 
of  the  Dacia.  It  will  be  recalled  that  this 
former  Hamburg  American  liner  was  tied  up 
at  Port  Arthur,  Texas.  Careful  study  had 
convinced  lawyers  that  the  validity  of  her 
transfer,  where  the  sale  was  bona  fide  and 
the  change  of  ownership  absolute,  could  not 
be  questioned.  British  precedents  fully 
sanctioned  such  transfers.  The  Dacia  was 
purchased  outright  by  an  American  citizen, 
entered  under  American  registry,  equipped 
with  American  officers  and  an  American 
crew  and  loaded  at  Galveston  with  Texas 
cotton  consigned  to  Bremen.  The  validity  of 
the  transfer  was  acknowledged  by  the 
Department  of  State  at  Washington.  Great 
Britain  announced  that  she  would  cap- 
ture the  ship.  Its  destination  was  then 
changed  to  Rotterdam,  a  neutral  port, 
and  Washington  endeavored  to  get  the 
British  Government  to  permit  the  vessel  to 
make  one  trip.  Great  Britain  would  not  com- 
mit herself,  but  it  was  thought  that  in  view 
of  her  own  precedents  and  her  somewhat  in- 
volved diplomatic  relations  and  purposes 
with  the  United  States  she  would  hesitate  to 
bring  this  matter  to  an  issue.  So  the  Dacia 
sailed.  Then  Great  Britain  showed  that 
there  are  several  ways  to  prevent  unwelcome 
additions  to  the  American  merchant  marine. 
The  Dacia  was  captured  by  a  French  cruiser 
and  thrown  into  a  French  prize  court. 
France  had  never  recognized  the  validity  of 
the  transfer  of  a  ship  of  a  belligerent  nation 
to  a  neutral  flag.  The  Dacia  experiment  had 
failed. 

The  result  was  not  much  of  a  surprise  to 
American  shipping  circles,  whose  manifest 
reluctance  to  undertake  similar  enterprises 
had  impressed  the  Administration  long  be- 
fore the  Dacia  case;  as  a  solution  of  the  dif- 
ficulty the  Ship  Purchase  Bill  had  been  in- 
troduced into  Congress.  This  called  for  the 
organization  of  a  steamship  company  the 
greater  part  of  whose  capital  was  to  be  con- 
tributed by  the  Government,  thus  giving  the 
organization  a  quasi  governmental  standing. 
Of  course  everyone  realized  that  the  pur- 
pose of  the  bill  was  to  provide  bottoms  to 
carry  non-contraband  to  German  ports  and 
that  the  only  available  ships  were  the  Ger- 
man liners  tied  up  in  various  American 
ports.  A  powerful  opposition  soon  mani- 
fested itself  in  Congress  and  in  certain  in- 
fluential newspapers.  The  underlying  mo- 
tive in  this  opposition  was  consciously  and 
unconsciously  to  aid  Great  Britain.  Eng- 
land objected  to  the  transfer  because  the 
money  paid  would  undoubtedly  be  used  to 
create  credits  in  America.  Again,  it  would 
he  impossible  for  His  Majesty's  Government 


THE  CASE  OF  COTTON 


25 


to  exercise  the  "economic  pressure"  against 
a  government-backed  line  that  had  already 
proved  so  successful  against  privately  owned 
ships.  The  opposition  was  so  vehement  that 
the  spokesmen  for  the  bill  were  confused 
and  endeavored  to  placate  it  by  assurances 
that  no  step  would  be  taken  tliat  would  in- 
volve the  United  States  with  any  belligerent. 
The  situation  was  from  one  aspect  humor- 
ous. Everyone  thought  of  nothing  but  Ger- 
man ships  and  British  opposition;  but  the 
adjectives  "German"  and  "British"  tem- 
porarily disappeared  from  the  language. 
For  a  few  weeks,  these  words  became  the 
great  political  taboo.  The  silence  was  elo- 
quent. And  in  it  the  Ship  Purchase  Bill 
was  killed  and  laid  to  rest.  But  in  many  re- 
spects, the  fate  of  the  Bill  is  one  of  the  most 
instructive  examples  that  could  be  found 
of  the  British  attitude  towards  America's 
legitimate  aspirations  for  an  American  mer- 
chant marine,  and  is  worthy  of  long  and 
profound  study. 

Before  the  fate  of  the  Bill  was  decided, 
however,  American  cotton  exporters  to  Ger- 
many i)erceived  that  it  was  hopeless  to  evade 
England's  "economic  pressure"  on  American 
shipping  and  sought  to  deliver  their  goods  to 
Germany  by  neutral  ships  to  neiitral  Euro- 
pean ports.  But  Great  Britain  was  pre- 
pared and  took  powerful  aggressive  action 
at  once.  One  means  used  was  to  bring  pres- 
sure to  bear  on  European  neutrals  to  place 
re-export  embargoes  on  cotton  to  Germany, 
and  another  to  create  a  fear  in  the  minds  of 
shippers  that,  in  spite  of  everything,  Eng- 
land would  declare  cotton  contraband  and 
confiscate  cargoes. 

Neutral  Holland  was  first  influenced  and 
in  the  early  days  of  the  war  placed  an  em- 
bargo on  the  re-exportation  of  cotton. 
Italy,  also,  under  pressure  of  her  economic 
interests  and  her  peculiar  situation  of  hav- 
ing all  her  overseas  commerce  at  the  mercy 
of  the  Franco-British  fleets  in  control  of  the 
Mediterranean,  also  established  a  re-export 
embargo.  Thus  the  two  natural  channels 
for  the  shipment  of  cotton  into  Germany 
were  closed.  Other  neutrals  protested  at 
this  course,  basing  their  protest  on  the  fact 
that  the  Declaration  of  London  specified  cot- 
ton as  always  "free,"  and  that  England  had 
accepted  this  Declaration.  That  England 
fostered  the  rumors  that  she  was  about  to 
rescind  her  action  in  this  matter  and  de- 
clare cotton  absolute  contraband  seems  cer- 
tain. Whether  or  no,  however,  these  rumors 
accomplished  their  purpose;  neutral  ship- 
owners were  afraid  to  accept  cotton  cargoes 
and  consistently  refused  to  do  so. 

The  distress  throughout  the  South  had 
become  acute.  The  current  price  of  cotton 
was  six  cents  a  pound.  The  cotton  growers 
of  limited  means  were  deeply  in  debt.  Small 
wonder  that  thev  began  an  agitation  for  the 


protection  of  their  staple  on  the  high  seas, 
when  they  realized  that  they  could  obtain 
at  least  three  times  the  price  for  their  prod- 
uct in  Germany  that  they  could  from  Eng- 
lish purchasers. 

How  the  low  prices  for  cotton  affected  the 
revenues  of  the  South  during  this  trying 
period,  may  be  learned  from  the  following 
extract  from  the  "Annual  Review  of  the 
American  Cotton  Crop,  1914-15,"  issued  by 
H.  G.  Hester,  Secretary  of  the  New  Orleans 
Cotton  Exchange,  on  August  1st,  of  this 
year: 

The  Commercial  Cotton  Crop  of  the  United  States 
for  the  year  ending  with  the  close  of  July,  1915, 
amounted  to  15,108,011  bales,  showing  an  increase  over 
that  of  1913-14  of  225,518  bales.  The  average  price  for 
middling  cotton  for  the  year  was  7.94  cents  per  pound, 
comparing  with  13.49  cents  last  year  and  12.20  the  year 
before. 

The  average  commercial  value  per  bale  was  $41.04, 
against  $68.06  last  year,  and  $63.59  the  year  before. 

Mr.  Hester  then  presents  the  following 
table,  indicating  the  losses  cotton  growers 
had  suffered  during  the  trying  period  of  the 
fiscal  year  1915 : 

Total  Value  of  Crop. 

Year.                               Bales.  Value. 

1914-15 15,108,011 $593,432,978 

1913-14 14,882,115 $977,844,114 

1912-13 14,106,116 $866,185,562 

This  showed  that,  with  a  record  crop  of 
more  than  15,000,000  bales.  Southern  grow- 
ers had  received  $384,411,136  less  money  for 
it  than  for  a  crop  of  less  than  15,000,000 
bales  the  year  before. 

Among  the  palliatives  for  this  condition 
suggested  was  the  "buy  a  bale"  movement. 
The  purchaser  was  to  buy  a  bale  for  $50, 
pay  storage  charges  for  a  year,  and  sell  his 
bale  at  a  handsome  profit  when  the  year  ex- 
pired. His  cotton  was  thus  to  cost  him  ten 
cents  a  pound  plus  storage  charges.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  purchased  a 
bale  and  presented  it  to  a  hospital.  The 
daughter  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House  also 
bought  a  bale,  as  did  many  other  individuals 
and  organizations.  Patriotic  fervor  took 
other  forms.  "Cotton  Goods  Bargain  Days" 
were  promoted  throughout  the  country.  The 
wearing  of  cotton  clothes  was  urged  to  re- 
lieve the  distress  in  the  South.  Judges,  law- 
yers and  officers  of  the  Mississippi  Supreme 
Court  held  a  session,  all  clad  in  cotton  shirts 
and  overalls.  The  year  has  passed,  and  the 
average  price  of  cotton  has  been  7.84  cents. 
It  is  pertinent  to  inquire  what  became  of 
the  President's  bale,  for  instance,  and  what 
final  good  that  and  similar  purchases  did. 

As  an  outcome  of  the  depression,  the 
Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  reduced  the 
annual  dividend  on  its  shares  from  7  per 
cent,  to  5  per  cent.  The  Southern  Railway 
suspended  altogether  dividend  payments  on 
its  preferred  shares.  How  the  cotton  crisis 
affected  the  railroads  of  the  South  may  be 
learned  from  the  figures  of  the  reports  is- 
.«5ued  by  the  following  three  most  important 


26 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


roads  in  their  annual  statements,  issued  for 
the  year  ending  June  30, 1915 : 

Losses  in  Operating  Revenues. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad $4,173,327 

Southern  Railway  Company 8,551,487 

Louisville  &  Nashville 8,300,451 

In  his  report  to  the  stockholders  of  the 
Illinois  Central  Railroad,  for  the  year  ended 
June  30th,  C.  H.  Markham,  the  road's  presi- 
dent, said: 

Your  company  during  the  past  year  has  suffered  from 
the  depression  in  business  prevalent  throughout  the 
country,  and  this  has  been  most  pronounced  on  the 
lines  south  of  the  Ohio  River.  The  low  price  received 
by  cotton  growers  for  their  product  not  only  affected 
the  revenues  your  company  received  from  the  transpor- 
tation of  lumber,  but  also,  in  connection  with  both  com- 
modities, had  a  depressing  effect  on  the  revenues  from 
the  transportation  of  general  merchandise  and  on  pas- 
senger travel. 

In  his  report  for  the  fiscal  year,  Fairfax 
Harrison,  President  of  the  Southern  Rail- 
way Company,  said : 

It  has  been  a  difficult  year.  The  flame  of  war  which 
burst  forth  all  over  Europe  at  the  beginning  of  August, 
1914,  had  a  sudden  and  withering  effect  upon  industry 
in  the  South.  Preparing  to  market  the  largest  crop  in 
th«  history  of  cotton  growing  in  the  United  States,  the 
Southern  people  were  looking  forward  to  the  profits 
from  the  sale  of  this,  their  chief  staple,  as  a  stimulus 
to  their  purchasing  power.  When,  over  night,  they  were 
apparently  shut  out  by  the  war  from  the  European 
market,  which  has  always  consumed  a  large  part  of  the 
American  cotton  crop,  the  people  of  the  South  were 
thrown  back  upon  their  own  resources  with  a  disturb- 
ingly large  proportion  of  their  chief  money  crop  on 
their  hands  and  an  inadequate  market  price  in  prospect. 
Despite  several  futile  plans  of  assistance  from  without, 
the  South  practically  suspended  for  a  time  its  industrial 
activities.  The  result  was  a  fall,  as  vertiginous  as 
thtt  of  the  price  of  cotton,  in  the  revenues  of  the  rail- 
ways at  the  South,  and  this  lean  diet  was  protracted, 
with  the  condition  which  caused  it,  throughout  the 
year  now  under  review. 

In  the  annual  report  of  the  Louisville  & 
Nashville  Railroad,  the  stockholders  are  in- 
formed that : 

This  great  shrinkage  (in  gross  revenues)  was  due 
largely  to  the  effect  produced  by  the  war  in  Europe 
upon  the  price  and  consumption  of  the  products  and 
manufactures  of  the  territory  served  by  the  Louisville 
&  Nashville  Railroad  Company,  and  to  the  consequent 
decrease  in  passenger  travel. 

In  view  of  the  heavy  losses  they  had  al- 
ready sustained,  and  the  need  of  the  South 
for  relief  from  the  distress  from  which  it 
was  suffering,  cotton  shippers  began  to  press 
the  State  Department  in  Washington  for  the 
adoption  of  measures  to  remedy  the  situa- 
tion. Senator  Hoke  Smith,  of  Georgia,  in- 
troduced in  the  Senate  on  October  22d  a  res- 
olution providing  for  the  appointment  of  a 
committee  of  five  senators  to  take  up  the 
question  of  facilitating  shipments  of  cotton 
to  Europe.  This  committee  was  appointed, 
and  immediately  it  entered  upon  conferences 
with  the  State  Department  and  the  British 
Ambassador. 

Congress  had  it  in  its  power  to  adopt  re- 
prisals against  Great  Britain ;  it  might  have 
placed  an  embargo  on  the  war  material 
which  England  so  sorely  needed.  The  Brit- 
ish Government  knew  this  full  well,  and  in 
order  to  guard  its  interests,  it  was  compelled 


to  emerge  from  the  mysterious  and  tlireaten- 
ing  silence  it  had  maintained  and  relieve  the 
tension  of  uncertainty  with  wliich  it  had 
surrounded  the  question  of  its  attitude  con- 
cerning cotton  shipments.  Sir  Cecil  Spring- 
Rice,  on  October  26th,  wrote  to  Mr.  Lan- 
sing, then  Acting  Secretary  of  State,  as  fol- 
lows: 

Last  night  I  received  a  reply  from  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
in  which  he  authorizes  me  to  give  the  assurance  that 
cotton  will  not  be  seized.  He  points  out  that  cotton  has 
not  been  put  in  any  of  our  lists  of  contraband,  and, 
as  your  Department  must  be  aware  from  the  draft  proc- 
lamation now  in  your  possession,  it  is  not  proposed  to 
include  it  in  our  new  list  of  contraband.  It  is,  there- 
fore, as  far  as  Great  Britain  is  concerned,  in  the  free 
list,  and  will  remain  there. 

There  was  a  world-wide  feeling  of  relief 
at  this  definite  announcement,  for  shippers 
felt  that  now  all  obstacles  had  been  removed, 
and  that  the  great  American  staple  could 
move  freely  to  all  the  countries  of  Europe, 
neutral  and  belligerent  alike.  How  mis- 
taken was  this  confidence  soon  became  man- 
ifest. 

Some  days  after  Sir  Cecil  Spring-Rice's 
letter  to  Mr.  Lansing  was  published,  Den- 
mark declared  an  embargo  on  the  exporta- 
tion of  cotton.  This  closed  the  cotton  trade 
routes  to  Germany  by  way  of  Copenhagen, 
after  Rotterdam  the  most  direct  way  to  the 
Empire.  Great  diflBculty,  moreover,  was  ex- 
perienced in  obtaining  from  France  an  as- 
surance on  her  part  that  she  regarded  cotton 
as  being  on  the  free  list.  It  was  not  until 
December  17th,  that  Secretary  Bryan  could 
make  this  announcement. 

Hardly  had  the  movement  of  cotton  direct 
to  Germany  begun,  when  American  shippers 
began  to  complain  of  the  extraordinary  pre- 
cautions England  was  taking  against  sus- 
pected concealment  of  contraband  material, 
such  as  copper  and  rubber,  in  cotton  cargoes 
destined  for  Germany.  Cotton  shippers  in 
this  country  were  compelled  to  submit  their 
cargoes  to  the  examination  of  British  con- 
suls. The  inspection  became  more  rigid  at 
a  later  demand  from  England  that  all  bales 
of  cotton  be  X-rayed,  and  that  the  photo- 
graphs must  accompany  the  consular  cer- 
tificates as  further  assurance  that  the  cot- 
ton contained  no  hidden  contraband.  All 
these  regulations,  of  course,  caused  much 
additional  delay  and  expense  to  American 
shippers.  But  even  this  was  no  guarantee 
that  the  vessels  would  not  be  detained  by 
British  cruisers  and  subjected  to  search. 

The  British  Government,  on  November 
2nd,  declared  the  North  Sea  a  military  area, 
and  warned  merchant  craft  that,  owing  to 
mines  and  other  dangers  threatening  navi- 
gation, they  must  strictly  follow  the  sailing 
directions  of  the  Admiralty.  These  in- 
structed all  vessels  trading  to  and  from 
Scandinavian  countries  and  Holland,  when 
inward  bound,  to  move  via  the  English  Chan- 
nel and  the  Straits  of  Dover.    This  simpli- 


THE  CASE  OF  COTTON 


27 


fied  the  English  practice  of  seizing  and  de- 
taining neutral  merchant  vessels. 

The  effect  of  this  announcement  was  to 
cause  renewed  demoralization  among  cotton 
shippers.  Owners  of  American  vessels  were 
reluctant  to  charter  them  for  cotton  exports 
to  Germany  and  send  them  through  the 
mined  area  of  the  North  Sea  ( no  Admiralty 
directions  were  given  for  getting  through  to 
Germany),  and  insurance  on  such  craft 
again  soared  to  prohibitive  figures. 

Yet  throughout  this  period  when  by  in- 
direction the  American  cotton  crop  was  be- 
ing forced  to  lower  and  lower  price  levels 
and  its  shipment  to  the  eager  and  profitable 
markets  of  Germany  prevented,  England 
solemnly  denied  that  she  was  interfering  or 
had  any  intention  of  interfering  with  the 
movement  of  this  staple.  In  fact,  in  a  Brit- 
ish communication  dated  as  late  as  February 
10th,  the  statement  was  made : 

Any  decrease  in  American  exports  which  is  attrib- 
utable to  the  war  is  essentially  due  to  cotton.  Cotton 
is  an  article  which  cannot  possibly  have  been  affected  by 
the  exercise  of  our  belligerent  rights,  for,  as  your  Ex- 
cellency is  aware,  it  has  not  been  declared  bv  His  Maj- 
esty's Government  to  be  contraband  of  war,  and  the 
rules  under  which  we  are  at  present  conducting  our 
belligerent  operations  gives  us  no  power  in  the  absence 
of  a  blockade  to  seize  or  interfere  with  it  when  on  its 
way  to  a  belligerent  country  in  a  neutral  ship.  Conse- 
quently no  cotton  has  been  stopped. 

The  latter  statement  was  true  as  far  as  it 
went.  To  more  adequately  present  the  situ- 
ation might  have  been  added — "because,  ow- 
ing to  various  forms  of  indirect  pressure, 
little  or  no  cotton  has  started!" 

On  the  other  hand,  British  merchants  were 
not  slow  to  perceive  the  advantage  which 
their  benevolent  government  was  creating 
for  them.  With  cotton  at  starvation  prices, 
their  agents  began  to  acquire  the  staple  in 
quantities  far  beyond  the  normal  British 
consumption.  How  England  "stocked  up" 
on  cotton  at  these  prices,  is  evident  from 
the  following  table  which  appeared  in  "Cot- 
ton," the  official  journal  of  the  Manchester 
Cotton  Exchange,  Manchester,  England,  on 
October  9,  1915: 

In  Bales. 
Season.  American.  Total. 

1910-11 236,349 413.910 

1911-12 466.264 605,962 

1912-13 397,935 578,020 

1913-14 614,682 907.562 

1914-15 1,197,650 1,505,500 

England,  by  the  end  of  the  season,  August 
31,  1911,  had  a  stock  in  hand  of  413,910 
bales ;  the  next  season  the  stock  amounted  to 
605,962  bales;  in  1913,  she  had  578,020  bales. 
These,  therefore,  represent  the  normal  fig- 
ures. But  by  August  31,  1914,  at  the  close 
of  the  first  month  of  the  war,  she  had  hur- 
riedly begun  to  accumulate,  not  only  Amer- 
ican, but  also  her  Egyptian  and  Indian  cot- 
ton. One  year  later,  with  this  accumula- 
tion, carried  on  during  the  end  of  1914  and 
the  beginning  of  1915,  while  the  South  was 
suffering  from  the  effects  of  the  low  prices, 
she  had  a  reserve  stock  of  1,505,500  bales. 


nearly  three  times  her  normal  amount,  on 
hand. 

This  procedure  aroused  a  storm  of  indig- 
nation throughout  the  South.  The  feeling 
in  the  Cotton  Belt  was  set  forth  clearly  and 
emphatically  in  the  following  resolution 
adopted  by  the  State  Farmers'  Union  of 
Louisiana  (See  Congressional  Record,  Feb- 
ruary 3,  1915,  pp.  3'232-3233)  : 

Resolved,  by  the  Louisiana  State  Farmers'  Educa- 
tional and  Co-opefative  Union  of  America,  that  we 
hereby  pledge  ourselves  to  do  all  in  our  power  to  ob- 
tain for  ourselves  and  our  fellow-citizens  and  man- 
kind generally,  the  freedom  and  unhindered  use  of  the 
seas  and  of  the  air,  and  we  hereby  respectfully  petition 
our  Federal  Government  to  give  due  notice  to  all  na- 
tions, in  view  of  the  losses  sustained  by  the  people  of 
these  United  States,  that  in  future  we  henceforth  shall 
ship  all  of  our  products  at  all  times  and  to  our  cus- 
tomers in  any  nation  just  as  in  the  past;  that  this  na- 
tion, being  neutral,  will  not  favor  one  over  the  other, 
but  will  treat  all  alike,  as  it  ought  to  do,  but  that  our 
government  proposes  to  send  its  own  ships,  under  its 
own  flag,  with  the  products  of  its  own  citizens,  to  its 
customers  in  any  nations  on  earth,  and  will  brook  in- 
terference from  no  one  in  protecting  the  rights  and  the 
property  and  trade  relations  of  its  own  people. 

From  the  day  that  cotton  began  to  move 
to  Germany,  throughout  England  voices 
were  raised  in  protest.  How  to  find  a  real 
excuse  for  preventing  shipments  was  a  prob- 
lem, partly  solved  by  Sir  William  Ramsay, 
the  eminent  British  scientist  who,  in  a  let- 
ter to  the  London  Times,  advocated  the  plac- 
ing of  cotton  on  the  absolute  contraband 
list  because,  he  asserted,  it  was  extensively 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  explosives.  Other 
British  scientists,  more  distinguislied  for 
their  work  in  the  field  of  chemistry,  flatly 
contradicted  Sir  William  Ramsay's  theories. 
W.  F.  Reid,  former  President  of  the  Society 
of  Chemical  Industry,  spoke  as  follows  be- 
fore that  society  in  London : 

There  is  practically  no  cotton  used  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  high  explosives.  The  whole  thing  is  a  great 
fraud.  There  may  be  some  trace  of  cotton  in  the  ex- 
plosive, but  the  bulk  of  it  is  coal  products.  Eminent 
scientists  have  made  erroneous  statements  on  this  sub- 
ject. If  pv'ople  associated  with  science  would  speak  only 
on  the  branches  with  which  they  are  connected,  the  ad- 
vantages would  be  very  great. 

The  British  press  opposed  this  popular 
clamor.  Great  American  interests  were  in- 
volved, and  the  fear  of  an  embargo  on  the 
exports  of  ammunition  as  a  retaliatory 
measure  figured  largely  in  the  public  mind. 
To  declare  cotton  contraband  would  be  a 
particularly  drastic  violation  of  the  Declar- 
ation of  London.  Above  all,  the  British 
Government,  as  a  neutral,  was  on  record  as 
opposed  to  this  step. 

During  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  Rus- 
sian Government  had  undertaken  to  place 
cotton  on  the  list  of  contraband.  The  Rus- 
sian Government  asserted  in  a  note  dated 
April  21,  1905,  that  raw  cotton  was  used  in 
the  manufacture  of  explosives,  and  that,  it 
being  impossible  to  distinguish  between 
cotton  imported  for  this  military  purpose 
and  cotton  imjMjrted  for  ordinary  peaceable 


28 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


use,  it  was  necessary  to  prohibit  its  trans- 
portation altogether. 

The  enforcement  of  this  order  would  have 
shut  off  from  British  India  its  cotton  trade 
with  Japan,  valued  at  approximately  twenty 
million  dollars  annually.  Under  instruc- 
tion from  Lord  Lansdowne,  the  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  notified  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affiairs  that 
the  Russian  position  was  inadmissible.  The 
British  note  said : 

The  quantity  of  raw  cotton  that  might  be  used  for 
explosives  would  be  infinitesimal  in  comparison  with 
the  bulk  of  the  cotton  exported  from  India  to  Japan 
for  peaceful  purposes,  and  to  treat  harmless  cargoes  of 
this  latter  description  as  unconditionally  contraband 
would  be  to  subject  a  branch  of  innocent  commerce  to 
a  most  unwarrantable  interference. 

In  the  meantime,  while  the  so-called  "eco- 
nomic pressure"  was  being  exerted  on  Ger- 
many, British  shippers  continued  to  accum- 
ulate large  stocks  of  cotton  at  the  low 
prices.  Their  representatives  in  the  South 
bought  and  carried  large  quantities  of  the 
staple  for  the  benefit  of  English  spinners. 
When  the  freer  movement  of  cotton  began, 
the  cargoes  were  in  greater  part  composed 
of  the  staple  which  had  been  purchased 
earlier  at  nearly  the  very  lowest  prices  by 
British  representatives. 

This  is  made  evident  by  the  following 
table,  which  shows  that,  while  the  exports 
of  the  staple  from  the  United  States  for  the 
first  seven  months  of  1915,  ending  July 
30th,  amounted  to  5,937,400  bales,  yet  the 
amount  of  money  obtained  was  but  little 
greater  than  for  the  3,713,300  bales  shipped 
abroad  during  the  same  period  in  1914 : 

Department  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States, 
Monthly   summary   of   Foreign   Commerce     of     the 
United  States  July,  1915  : 
Total  bales     Seven  months  ended 
exported.  July,  1914.  1915. 

Bales 3,713,321 5,937,436 

Value $235,102,634 $271,153,652 

It  was  obvious  that  if  Great  Britain 
wanted  to  put  cotton  on  the  contraband  list, 
some  other  excuse  must  be  found.  The  op- 
portunity soon  came.  The  German  Govern- 
ment, on  February  4,  1915,  declared  the  wa- 
ters about  Great  Britain  a  War  Zone  where- 
in enemy  merchant  vessels  would  not  be 
safe.  England  promptly  hinted  at  retalia- 
tion in  the  form  of  complete  stoppage  of  our 
exports  to  Germany.  The  Premier,  Mr. 
Asquith,  speaking  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons on  February  11th,  said  that  the  Brit- 
ish Government  was  about  to  adopt  more 
stringent  measures  against  German  trade. 
He  continued : 

The  government  is  considering  the  question  of  taking 
measures  against  German  trade,  in  view  of  the  viola- 
tion by  the  enemy  of  the  rules  of  war.  I  hope  shortly 
to  make  an  announcement  of  what  those  measures  are 
to  be. 

Practically,  this  announcement  was  a 
trying  out  of  American  public  opinion. 
Some  days  later  another  test  was  made  by 


means  of  a  news  dispatch  from  London 
which  stated  that  "a  blockade  of  German 
coast,  or,  at  any  rate,  the  prohibition  of 
foodstuffs  destined  for  Germany"  was  under 
consideration.  Then,  on  March  1st,  Mr. 
Asquith  announced  in  Parliament  the  now 
famous  March  11th  Order  in  Council.  It 
declared  that  the  British  and  French  Gov- 
ernments would  hold  themselves  free  to  de- 
tain and  take  into  port  ships  carrying  goods 
of  presumed  enemy  destination,  ownership 
or  origin.  The  effect  of  this  was  a  virtual 
blockade  of  the  neuti*al  ports  of  Holland, 
Denmark,  Norway  and  Sweden,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  ports  of  Norway  and  Sweden 
in  the  Baltic  Sea. 

Vessels  immediately  refused  to  accept 
cotton  or  other  shipments  of  German  des- 
tination or  origin.  Insurance  was  with- 
drawn on  all  such  shipments.  A  great  vol- 
ume of  cotton  was  lying  in  this  country  con- 
tracted for  delivery  to  Germany,  but  had 
not  yet  moved. 

The  British  Ambassador  was  "requested" 
by  an  official  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment to  extend  relief  to  the  embarrassed 
shippers  by  adopting  some  rule  that  might 
permit  such  shippers,  who  had  sold  cotton 
to  Germany  before  March  1st,  to  forward 
their  cotton. 

In  a  communication  issued  by  the  British 
Embassy  in  Washington,  on  March  8,  1915, 
it  was  announced  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  make  the  following  concessions : 

1.  All  cotton  for  which  contracts  of  sale  and 
freight  engagements  had  already  been  made  before 
March  2,  to  be  allowed  free  (or  bought  at  contract 
price  if  stopped),  provided  ships  sail  not  later  than 
March  31. 

2.  Similar  treatment  to  be  accorded  to  all  cotton 
insured  before  March  2,  provided  it  is  put  on  board 
not  later  than  March  16. 

3.  All  shipments  of  cotton  claiming  above  pro- 
tection to  be  declared  before  sailing,  and  documents 
produced  to  and  certificates  obtained  from  consular  of- 
ficers or  other  authority  fixed  by  (Allied)  Governments. 
Ships  or  cargoes  consigned  to  enemy  ports  will  not  be 
alloved  to  proceed. 

This  meant,  therefore,  that  cotton  con- 
tracted for  Germany  before  March  1st, 
might  be  shipped  to  neutral  countries  up  to 
March  31st,  but  not  directly  to  Germany. 

The  instance  of  the  steamship  Kina  gives 
evidence  of  what  the  British  Government  de- 
scribed as  a  sympathetic  consideration  of  the 
cotton  interests.  This  vessel,  which  had  a 
cargo  of  cotton  contracted  for  before  March 
1st,  destined  for  Germany,  found  it  impos- 
sible to  load  before  the  end  of  March.  The 
State  Department  sought  permission  from 
the  British  Government  for  a  time  extension 
on  this  one  ship.  Great  Britain  accorded 
this  favor  in  a  cable  despatch  transmitted 
through  the  American  Ambassador  in  Lon- 
don, dated  March  29,  1915 : 

I  am  informed  by  the  Foreign  Office  on  the  24th  that 
the  S.  S.  Keit  (Kina),  in  view  of  the  special  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  will  be  permitted  to  go  forward  on 
her    prearranged    trip    from    Savannah    to    Rotterdam, 


THE  CASE  OF  COTTON 


29 


Goeteborg,  and  Copenhagen,  provided,  however,  that 
her  cargo  of  cotton  is  covered,  with  the  exception  of 
the  date  of  sailing,  by  the  terms  of  the  agreement  re- 
cently concluded  concerning  such  shipments,  and  fur- 
ther provided  that  there  shall  be  allowed  no  undue  delay 
to  occur  in  reloading  this  steamer  on  arrival  at  Savan- 
nah, and  in  the  departure  of  the  steamer  from  Savan- 
nah. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  most  earnestly  requests  that  it  be 
distinctly  understood  that  this  indulgence  must  not  be 
used  as  a  precedent  for  further  exceptions  from  the 
provisions  of  the  agreement  above  referred  to. 

The  Kina  steamed  from  her  port,  but  she 
never  reached  Rotterdam,  for,  notwithstand- 
ing the  above  promises,  she  was  stopped  and 
her  cargo  thrown  into  a  British  prize  court. 
It  was  then  evident  that  Great  Britain  would 
neither  permit  cargoes  to  go  direct  to  a  Ger- 
man port,  nor  allow  cotton  cargoes  destined 
for  Germany  via  neutral  ports  to  reach  their 
destination.  On  March  31st,  a  new  Order 
in  Council  became  known,  empowering  the 
British  Government  to  requisition  the  car- 
goes of  neutral  vessels  found  in  British 
ports.  Since  British  cruisers  could  stop  and 
bring  into  British  ports  any  neutral  vessels 
they  encountered,  it  was  evident  that  ships 
bound  for  neutral  countries  carrying  car- 
goes of  cotton,  or  any  other  commodities, 
could  be  taken  into  British  ports  and  their 
cargoes  requisitioned  at  England's  whim. 

Many  cotton  cargoes  destined  for  neutral 
countries  and  their  legitimate  needs,  were 
seized  and  bought  by  England,  but  the  com- 
pensation thus  accorded  by  no  means  made 
good  the  loss  sustained  by  the  American 
shipper.  His  trade  connections  were  broken 
off,  for  the  foreign  purchaser  thereafter 
would  give  his  orders  to  English  cotton  mer- 
chants rather  than  take  the  risk  of  further 
losses  and  delays  when  trading  with  Ameri- 
cans. It  was  a  golden  windfall  to  the  Brit- 
ish manufacturer  to  find  the  neutral  coun- 
tries of  Europe  restricted  in  their  supplies 
of  raw  cotton.  The  Department  of  Com- 
merce in  Washington,  on  August  5,  1915, 
stated  that  British  exports  of  cotton  goods 
and  cotton  yams  to  Scandinavia  and  Hol- 
land in  the  first  six  months  of  1915,  showed 
a  large  increase  over  1914.  While  our  ex- 
porters were  hampered  in  their  shipments  of 
raw  cotton  to  European  neutrals,  Holland 
and  Sweden  each  bought  from  England  five 
times  as  much  raw  cotton  in  June,  1915,  as, 
in  June,  1914. 

Twenty-six  cargoes  of  cotton,  destined  for 
neutral  ports  in  Europe  were  detained  in 
English  ports  during  March  and  April,  but 
despite  the  efforts  of  the  unofficial  Foreign 
Trade  Advisers  of  the  State  Department, 
England  did  not  begin  to  make  payments 
on  this  cotton  until  the  month  of  June. 
These  detained  cargoes  amounted  on  July 
19th,  to  sixty,  and  by  that  date  only  |3,500,- 
000  had  been  paid  on  the  seized  shipments. 
Finally,  on  July  20th,  the  British  Board  of 
Trade  made  a  ruling  that  detained  cotton 
cargoes,  the  ownership  of  which  had  passed 
to  Germans,  would  be  confiscated  without 


payment.  Meantime  a  form  of  "economic 
pressure"  was  being  exerted  on  cotton 
dealers  in  the  United  States.  Many  of  the 
latter  are  associate  members  of  the  Liver- 
pool Cotton  Exchange,  and  these  were  in- 
structed to  sign  agreements  not  to  deal  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  with  enemies  of  Great 
Britain.  It  was  stated  that  those  who  so 
signed  would  have  their  names  posted  on  the 
Liverpool  Exchange  and  receive  preference 
by  the  Liverpool  members,  which,  in  effect, 
was  a  blacklisting  of  such  Americans  who 
did  not  accede  to  the  British  demands.  The 
agreement  was  as  follows: 

I, ,  of .■  •  >  *° 

Associate  Member  of  the  Liverpool  Cotton  Association, 
do  solemnly  and  sincerely  declare  that  neither  I  nor 
my  firm,  nor  any  partner  in  the  same,  nor  any  branch 
house  or  other  firm  or  firms  in  which  I  or  any  one  of 
my  partners  may  be  directly  or  indirectly  pecuniarily 
interested,  will  trade  or  have  dealings  with  any  person 
or  a  member  or  representative  of  any  firm  or  person 
domiciled  or  carrying  on  business  in  any  State  at  pres- 
ent at  war  with  His  Britannic  Majesty  until  such  time 
as  peace  may  have  been  declared,  and  I  further  under- 
take when  trading  with  subjects  of  neutral  countries 
to  make  all  necessary  inquiries  in  order  to  satisfy  myself 
as  to  the  ultimate  destination  of  the  goods,  and  that 
none  of  them  are  intended  for  consumption  in  or  for 
transit  through  any  State  at  war  with  His  Majesty. 
Declared  this  day  of  

Witness  

Address  of  witness 

There  was  a  renew^al  in  England,  toward 
the  middle  of  July,  of  the  agitation  for  mak- 
ing cotton  contraband,  and  then  the  British 
Government  announced  its  intention  of  re- 
stricting neutral  countries  to  the  amounts 
of  cotton  which  they  had  annually  imported 
in  normal  years.  Any  excess  of  this  amount, 
thereupon,  was  promptly  confiscated  by  Eng- 
land, despite  the  vehement  and  indignant 
protests  of  the  neutrals. 

We  have  seen  now  how  Great  Britain,  step 
by  step,  on  one  specious  plea  or  another,  has 
crippled  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United 
States  in  her  most  valuable  commodity,  cot- 
ton. And  this  cotton,  be  it  remembered,  is 
the  basis  of  British  trade  supremacy.  In 
detail,  her  methods  to  this  end  were  as  fol- 
lows : 

At  the  very  commencement  of  the  war,  in 
unofficial  warnings  she  allowed  shippers  to 
believe  that  she  might  at  any  moment  seize 
all  cotton  shipments  to  Germany.  Through 
her  great  marine  insurance  companies,  she 
made  insurance  rates  to  enemy  ports  pro- 
hibitive. Refusing  to  recognize  the  transfer 
of  foreign  ships  to  the  American  flag,  she 
seized  American  vessels  purchased  from  for- 
eigners. 

Then  England  checked  the  attempt  to 
create  an  American  merchant  marine,  and 
caused  the  abandonment  of  the  Ship  Pur- 
chase Bill  by  her  threats  not  to  acquiesce  in 
the  purchase  by  the  American  Government 
of  foreign-owned  vessels.  She  exerted  pres- 
sure on  neutral  countries  adjacent  to  Ger- 
many,  and   compelled    them   to   place    re- 


30 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


export  embargoes  on  cotton  entering  their 
ports.  Having  by  these  methods,  caused  a 
drop  in  the  price  of  cotton  to  six  cents  a 
pound,  less  than  one-half  its  normal  price, 
impoverishing  the  South,  her  importers 
bought  up,  for  the  benefit  of  the  British  man- 
ufacturing trade,  vast  and  unusual  quanti- 
ties of  the  staple,  which  in  future  months 
was  to  be  exported  by  the  English  in  its 
raw  and  manufactured  state  to  the  benefit 
of  British  commerce  and  the  detriment  of 
America's  foreign  trade. 

Compelled  by  the  indignant  protests  of 
American  cotton  growers  and  their  repre- 
sentatives in  Congress,  to  announce  that  cot- 
ton was  still  on  the  free  list,  Britain  began 
a  systematic  course  of  imposing  expensive 
and  vexatious  rules  and  regulations  on 
American  shippers,  such  as  X-raying  their 
bales  of  cotton  and  enforcing  the  submission 
of  shipments  to  the  examination  of  British 
consuls. 

England  still  further  hampered  the  export 
of  cotton  by  declaring  the  North  Sea  a  mili- 
tary area,  and  forcing  navigation  into  pre- 
scribed channels  so  that  the  seizure  of  neu- 
tral vessels  was  facilitated.  On  March  1st, 
of  this  year,  England  announced  that  she 
would  stop  and  take  into  port  ships  carry- 
ing goods  of  presumed  enemy  destination. 

Great  Britain  then  announced  by  an  Or- 
der in  Council  that  she  would,  if  need  arose, 
requisition  the  cargoes  of  neutral  vessels 
brought  to  British  x>orts.  American  cotton 
merchants  who  did  not  sign  an  agreement  to 
deal  exclusively  with  Great  Britain  and  her 
Allies  were  blacklisted  on  the  Liverpool  Ex- 
change. 

But  the  final  step  was  to  come;  Great 
Britain  was  to  drop  her  mask  and  boldly  de- 
clare that  all  these  restrictions  were  but 
mere  subterfuges,  and  that  all  along  she  had 
determined  not  to  abide  by  her  given  word, 
so  earnestly  repeated,  that  she  regarded  cot- 
ton as  being  on  the  free  list,  in  accordance 
with  international  usage  and  the  provisions 
of  the  Declaration  of  London. 

Suddenly  and  shamelessly,  the  announce- 
ment was  made  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  Great  Britain  intended  to  declare  cot- 
ton absolute  contraband  of  war.  This  Avas 
on  August  23rd,  and  on  August  25th  the 
formal  notification  reached  the  authorities 
at  Washington. 

And  this  declaration  of  embargo  on  cotton 
was  issued  by  the  Government  which  had 
announced  that  it  would  abide  by  the  pro- 


visions of  the  Declaration  of  London,  and 
which  even  as  late  as  October  26,  1914,  had 
given  this  country  the  assurance,  that,  so 
far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  cotton 
"is  in  the  free  list,  and  will  remain  there." 

If  the  British  Government  dealing  with 
an  interest  of  the  magnitude  of  American 
cotton  violates  its  promises  formally  made 
to  another  great  power,  what  confidence  can 
be  felt  in  any  assurances  whatsoever  that 
the  British  Government  may  make? 

Yet  even  this  abandonment  of  her  most 
solemn  promises  and  pledges  was  not  suffi- 
cient. England  has  gone  further.  On  Oc- 
tober 12th,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
made  this  announcement  in  response  to  a 
question : 

Great  Britain  has  declared  raw  cotton,  cotton  waste 
and  cotton  yarn  all  contraband. 

It  is  intended  that  every  possible  step  shall  be  taken 
to  prevent  the  supplies  of  these  articles  from  reaching 
Germany.  It  is  intended  also  to  declare  contraband 
cotton  piece  goods  and  other  cotton  products  and  to 
prohibit  the  exports  to  neutral  countries  contiguous  to 
Germany  and  Austria  of  goods  susceptible  of  being 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  explosives. 

The  end  and  aim  of  Great  Britain's 
activities  in  restraint  of  the  American  cot- 
ton trade  is  fully  reavealed  by  the  follow- 
ing table  taken  from  British  sources, 
"Cotton,"  the  official  journal  of  the  Man- 
chester (England)  Cotton  Association,  Oc- 
tober 9,  1915,  Page  16.  They  explain  how, 
despite  the  war,  and  despite  the  fact  that 
slie  has  lost  her  best  customer,  Germany, 
England  is  exporting  greatly  increased 
(luantities  of  cotton,  while  she  is  curtailing 
American  shipments  to  neutral  countries: 

LIVERPOOL  STATISTICS. 
(In  1,000's  of  bales.) 
Actual  export  of  Great  Britain  from  August  1,  pre- 
vious year,  to  nearest  Friday  to  July  31  of  named  year : 
Year.  American.  Total. 

1912 315  507 

1913 233  429 

1914 177  342 

1915 249  519 

Here  it  may  be  seen  that  Great  Britain 
exported  507,000  bales  of  cotton  in  1912; 
429,000  in  1913;  342,000  in  1914  (to  July 
31st),  and  519,000  for  the  twelve  months 
dating  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war. 
In  the  twelve  months  of  the  war,  naturally, 
England  was  not  sending  her  customary  ex- 
ports of  raw  cotton  to  countries  such  as 
Germany,  Belgium,  Austria-Hungary. 

England's  increased  shipments  of  cotton 
can  be  accounted  for  only  by  the  fact  that 
she  has  been  selling  to  the  neutral  countries 
of  Europe  our  own  cotton  which  she  does 
not  allow  us  to  sell  them  directly. 


V 


BRITAIN'S   INDIRECT   INTERFERENCE   WITH 
AMERICAN   TRADE 


DEPENDENT'  upon  raw  materials,  im- 
ported from  Great  Britain,  British 
colonies,  or  from  nations  whose  out- 
put comes  through  British-controlled  chan- 
nels and,  above  all,  subject  to  the  dominion 
which  Great  Britain  arrogates  to  her- 
self over  the  merchant  marine  of  the  world, 
American  manufacturers,  in  order  to  obtain 
these  necessary  raw  materials,  have  been 
compelled  to  enter  into  agreements  in  re- 
straint of  trade — agreements  by  which  vir- 
tually and  practically  Great  Britain,  a  for- 
eign power,  assumes  control  of  our  great 
national  industries. 

Those  branches  of  industry  vitally  and 
seriously  affected  by  British  dominance  and 
exactions  include  the  rubber,  textile  and  tin 
trades.  By  reason  of  sworn  agreements 
which  manufacturers  must  sign  in  order  to 
obtain  raw  products,  no  sales  can  be  made 
by  American  manufacturers  to  customers  in 
any  country  outside  of  Great  Britain  and 
her  allied  nations.  Sales  to  Germany,  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  Turkey  are  absolutely  pro- 
hibited. Sales  to  neutral  nations,  such  as 
Holland,  Norway,  Sweden  and  even  South 
American  countries,  can  be  effected  only 
through  agents  in  London.  Shipments  to 
United  States  possessions,  including  Porto 
Rico,  tlie  Philippines  and  Hawaii,  can  be 
made  only  by  the  gracious  acquiescence  of 
the  British  Consul  at  ports  of  shipment. 
Sales  of  manufactured,  or  even  partly  manu- 
factured, products  even  to  merchants  in  the 
United  States  are  restricted,  wholesalers 
putting  themselves  under  the  obligation  of 
guaranteeing  that  their  own  customers  in 
turn  will  not  make  sales  to  the  Germanic 
countries.  The  agreements  into  which  rub- 
ber, wool  and  tin  manufacturers  are  obliged 
to  enter  are  specific  and  ironclad,  and  give 
to  British  commercial  representatives  in  the 
United  States  unrestricted,  unhindered  and 
absolute  control  of  these  great  and  impor- 
tant industries.  The  agreements  aforesaid 
are  in  violation  of  United  States  laws— spe- 
cifically of  Section  73  of  the  Act  of  Feb- 
ruary 12,  1913  (CI.  40),  and  Section  3  of 
the  Sherman  Act  of  July  2,  1890 — and  make 
of  all  merchants  signing  them  violators  of 
these  laws  and  enforced  criminals. 


Consider,  as  an  example,  what  has  hap- 
pened in  the  case  of  rubber. 

Great  Britain  declared  rubber  conditional 
contraband  in  September,  1914.  She  placed 
rubber  on  the  absolute  contraband  list  No- 
vember 12,  1914.  Inasmuch  as  seventy  per 
cent,  of  all  rubber  used  in  the  United  States 
comes  from  the  Federated  Malay  States  and 
Ceylon,  and  as  the  British  policy  threatened 
to  shut  off  the  delivery  of  Brazilian  rubber, 
constituting  thirty  per  cent  of  that  used,  and 
which  could  reach  the  United  States  only 
via  England,  or  direct  by  the  British  Booth 
Line,  delivering  goods  only  consigned  to  the 
order  of  the  British  Consul-General,  negotia- 
tions were  begun  in  December,  1914,  for  the 
lifting  of  the  embargo  by  a  committee  repre- 
senting the  Rubber  Club  of  America,  Inc., 
and  the  Department  of  State.  Told  that  the 
United  States  was  helpless,  the  committee 
consulted  with  the  British  Ambassador,  Sir 
Arthur  Cecil  Spring  Rice,  and  later  a  repre- 
sentative—B.  G.  Worth,  of  the  B.  F.  Good- 
rich Co. — went  to  London,  where  conditions 
for  the  import  of  rubber  into  the  United 
States  were  agreed  upon.  The  "Rubber  Club 
of  America"  was  designated  to  act  as  im- 
port agent  for  Great  Britain,  and  Sir  Rich- 
ard Crawford  was  sent  to  the  United  States 
as  commercial  attache  of  the  British  Em- 
bassy, to  take  charge  of  the  situation. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement  decided 
upon,  an  agreement  to  which  each  individual 
manufacturer  must  adhere  under  oath  in 
order  to  obtain  crude  rubber,  no  rubber 
products  whatever  can  be  exported  from  the 
United  States  except  to  Great  Britain  and 
her  allies,  and  no  sales  made  to  neutral  non- 
belligerent countries  except  through  British 
agents  stationed  in  London,  all  shipments 
being  made  by  way  of  and  through  London. 
The  terms  include  a  restricton  in  the  disposi- 
tion even  of  Brazilian  rubber,  thus  enabling 
Great  Britain  to  tie  up  the  entire  rubber 
trade  of  the  United  States.  The  terms  were 
first  made  known  to  rubber  manufacturers 
by  a  circular  sent  to  all  members  of  the 
Rubber  Club  of  America  and  the  Rubber 
Trade  Associaton  of  New  York  on  January 
30,  1915.  The  specifications  given  were  as 
follows: 


32 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


First — Manufacturers  cannot  export  or  sell  to  any 
one  who  might  export  crude  rubber,  waste  rubber  or 
reclaimed  rubber,  except  to  Great  Britain  or  a  British 
possession.  They  may  not  sell  plantation  rubber  even 
to  any  one  in  the  United  States.  A  manufacturer  may, 
however,  sell  Brazilian  rubber  to  a  customer  in  the 
United  States,  but  for  his  own  protection  should  as- 
sure himself  that  no  exportation  is  intended. 

All  plantation  rubber  must  be  used  in  the  factory 
of  the  manufacturer  for  whom  it  is  imported. 

Second — No  direct  shipments  of  partly  manufactured 
goods  may  be  made  to  a  European  neutral,  like  Sweden, 
Holland  or  Italy.  Such  orders  can  be  filled  only 
through  an  agent  in  London.  For  example,  an  order 
for  automobile  tires  for  Sweden  cannot  be  shipped 
direct.  You  must  appoint  an  agent  in  London,  and  he 
must  get  a  permit  from  the  British  Government  to  ship 
the  goods  from  London  to  Sweden.  This  having  been 
arranged,  you  can  forward  the  goods  to  your  London 
agent. 

It  is  recognized  that  this  mode  of  shipment  is  diffi- 
cult for  those  who  have  no  London  agent,  and  the 
embargo  committee  is  endeavoring  to  secure  the  accept- 
ance of  a  plan  which  will  greatly  simplify  it. 

To  such  manufacturers  as  have  no  London  agents 
the  secretary  is  prepared  to  recommend  firms  of  for- 
warding agents  with  both  New  York  and  London 
houses  who  can  attend  to  such  business. 

Third — Bear  in  mind  that  the  British  Consul-Gen- 
eral  at  New  York  has  no  authority  to  modify  these 
rulings.  If  you  attempt  to  make  a  shipment  direct  to 
Sweden,  and  have  the  papers  vised  by  the  British 
Consul,  you  are  still  in  violation  of  your  obligation. 
Informing  the  consul  that  you  are  about  to  violate  will 
not  help  you.  His  signature  means  only  that  he  has 
been  informed,  not  that  your  obligations  have  been 
modified  by  him. 

Fourth — No  goods  must  be  sold  for  delivery  to  an 
enemy  of  Great  Britain.  This  is  plain  enough.  If 
through  intent,  carelessness,  or  misfortune,  your  goods 
are  found  in  transit  to  Germany,  your  permit  will  be 
cancelled.  You  must  be  sure.  This  does  not  mean, 
we  are  informed,  that  there  must  be  an  agreement  not 
to  export  accompanying  every  tire  you  sell,  but  every 
reasonable  precaution  must  be  taken.  You  should  have 
definite  agreements  from  every  customer  who  is  likely 
to  export,  and  we  would  suggest  the  use  of  a  rubber 
stamp  for  all  orders  and  invoices,  stating  that  the  goods 
are  sold  with  the  understanding  that  they  are  not  to 
be  exported,  except  to  Great  Britain,  France  or  Rus- 
sia or  to  a  European  neutral  by  way  of  the  United 
Kingdom  or  to  a  non-European  neutral. 

Fifth — All  goods  exported  to  a  non-European  neu- 
tral, like  the  South  American  countries,  Mexico  or 
Cuba,  must  be  reported  to  the  British  consul  at  the 
port  of  shipment.  We  recommend  that  this  report  state 
only  of  what  the  shipment  consists  and  the  port  of  des- 
tination. We  do  not  understand  that  it  is  necessary 
to  state  prices  or  even  the  name  of  the  consignee. 

Sixth — ^Pending  further  information  we  would  also 
advise  notifying  the  British  consul  of  shipment  to  Porto 
Rico,  the  Philippine  Islands  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

Seventh — Tires  which  you  export  must  bear  adequate 
marks  of  identification.  You  must  inform  the  British 
consul  in  writing,  stating  what  these  are. 

Eighth — The  question  has  been  raised  whether  or 
not  rubber  from  the  Dutch  East  Indies  will  come  under 
these  obligations.  On  this  point  we  would  strongly 
advise,  pending  further  information,  that  Dutch  rub- 
ber be  regarded  exactly  the  same  as  if  it  were  planta- 
tion rubber;  otherwise  misunderstandings  will  almost 
surely  arise,  and  the  shipper  would  perhaps  suffer  can- 
cellation of  his  permits  pending  investigation. 

In  general  it  is  unquestionably  the  desire  of  Sir 
Francis  Hopwood,  who  is  in  charge,  that  everything 
consistent  with  the  protection  of  British  interests  shall 
be  done  for  the  convenience  of  the  American  industry 
and  as  rapidly  as  the  organization  can  be  perfected 
for  handling  it.  If  any  part  of  the  plan  proves  too 
cumbersome  after  trial,  it  is  believed  any  reasonable 
relief  can  be  secwed. 

Sir  Richard  Crawford  has  just  arrived  and  will  be 
attached  to  the  British  Embassy  as  commercial  attache. 
It  ■will  be  a  part  of  his  duties  to  deal  with  the  prob- 
lems arising  in  connection  with  the  rubber  situation, 
and  it  is  promised  that  he  will  co-operate  fully  with 
this  committee. 

Sir  Francis  Hopewood  made  it  particularly  clear  to 
Mr.  Work  that  the  American  industry  could  feel  se- 


cure under  the  present  plan  unless  numerous  violations 
occurred.  Emphatic  warning  was  given  that  in  case 
any  manufacturer,  importer  or  dealer  came  under  sus- 
picion his  permits  should  be  immediately  revoked.  Re- 
instatement will  be  slow  and  difficult.  The  British  Gov- 
ernment will  cancel  Arst  and  investigate  afterward. 

The  initial  communication  was  signed  by 
the  Embargo  Committee,  consisting  of  Ar- 
thur H.  Marks,  of  the  B.  F.  Goodrich  Com- 
pany; H.  Stuart  Hotchkiss,  of  the  United 
States  Rubber  Company;  George  B.  Hodg- 
man,  of  the  Hodgman  Rubber  Company,  and 
William  E.  Bruyn,  of  L.  Littlejohn  &  Com- 
pany. 

American  importers,  in  applying  for  rub- 
ber through  the  Rubber  Cliib  of  America,  are 
obliged  to  sign  an  agreement  embodying  the 
above  requirements.  The  agreement  exacted 
is  as  follows : 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Consul-General  at  New  York. 

In  consideration  of  your  consenting  to  the  delivery 
to  us  of  the  rubber  specified  in  the  margin,  we  hereby 
give  you  the  following  undertaking,  which  shall  remain 
in  force  so  long  as  Great  Britain  is  at  war  with  any 
European  Power : 

We  will  not  export  from  the  United  States  any  raw 
rubber,  reclaimed  rubber,  or  waste  rubber,  whether  the 
same  has  been  imported  from  the  British  Dominions 
or  not,  otherwise  than  to  the  United  Kingdom  or  to 
a   British   possession. 

We  will  not  sell  the  rubber  now  delivered  by  you 
to  any  dealer  or  other  person  or  persons  in  the  United 
States,  but  will  use  it  for  our  own  manufacturing  pur- 
poses. 

All  orders  received  by  us  for  manufactured  or  partly 
manufactured  rubber  goods  to  be  sent  to  neutral  Euro- 
pean countries  shall  be  executed  by  shipments  to  the 
United  Kingdom  and  reshipment  from  there  under  li- 
cense to  be  obtained  for  export  therefrom. 

We  will  not  execute  any  orders  for  manufactured  or 
partly  manufactured  rubber  goods  to  be  sent  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  to  any  country  or  State  at  war  with 
Great  Britain. 

We  will  not  sell  any  manufactured,  or  partly  manu- 
factured, rubber  goods  to  any  person  in  the  United 
States  without  satisfying  ourselves  that  there  is  no 
intention  on  his  part  to  export  or  resell  the  same  for 
exportation  to  any  countries  in  Europe  other  than 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  or  Italy,  otherwise  than 
by  shipping  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  reshipping  from 
there,  under  license  to  be  obtained  for  export  there- 
from. 

If  we  export  any  manufactured  or  partly  manufac- 
tured rubber  goods  to  a  destination  outside  Europe  not 
being  in  a  British  possession,  we  will,  prior  to  or  simul- 
taneously with  the  shipment,  give  you  particulars  of  the 
goods  so  shipped  and  their  destination. 

All  rubber  tires  exported  by  us  or  sold  by  us  for 
export  shall  bear  a  distinctive  name  or  mark,  which  we 
will  communicate  to  you,  so  as  to  identify  them  as 
being  our  manufacture. 

When  he  sells  to  an  American  purchaser, 
the  importer  himself  is  obliged  to  sign  a 
guarantee,  which  is  sent  to  the  British  Con- 
sular representative  at  New  York,  as  fol- 
lows: 

RUBBER  GUARANTEE 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Consul  Gen- 
RUBBER.  eral.   New   York. 

I  beg  to  inform  you  that  I  have 

Ex.  s.  s sold  the  rubber  specified  in  the  mar- 

gia  to 

Packages    whose  guarantee  you  will  find  on  the 

back  hereof.     I  will  produce  to  you 

Weight  at  any  time  on  demand  the  original 

contracts    or    other    documents    evi- 

Marks  dencing  the  sale. 

In  consideration  of  your  consenting  to  the  delivery 
to  them  of  the  said  rubber,  I  undertake  that  I  will  not, 
directly  or  indirectly,  at  any  time  so  long  as  the  pres- 
ent war  continues,  export  any  raw   rubber,  reclaimed 


INDIRECT  INTERFERENCE   WITH  TRADE 


33 


ruober,  or  waste  rubber  from  the  United  States,  ex- 
cept to  the  British  dominions,  and  that  I  will  not  sell 
any  raw  rubber,  reclaimed  rubber  or  waste  rubber  for 
exportation  without  satisfying  myself  that  it  is  not  in- 
tended for  exportation  from  the  United  States,  except 
to  the  British  dominions. 


Date 

(163-2) 

The  intending  purchaser  of  the  consign- 
ment in  turn  signs  a  similar  guarantee  in  his 
application  for  crude  rubber.  These  appli- 
cation forms  are  turned  over  to  the  Rubber 
Club  of  America,  which  is  required  to  stamp 
them  with  "Approved."  The  British  Con- 
sulate at  New  York  then  forwards  the  appli- 
cation to  the  British  Government,  which  per- 
mits the  sending  of  rubber  or  forbids  it,  as 
it  sees  fit. 

Three  large  rubber  concerns — the  United 
States  Rubber  Company,  the  B.  F.  Goodrich 
Company  and  the  Goodyear  Tire  and  Rubber 
Company — are  importing  rubber  through 
the  British  Government  direct,  on  the  same 
guarantees  required  of  other  importers.  In 
addition,  however,  these  firms  were  required 
to  put  up  a  bond  of  £50,000,  to  be  forfeited 
in  case  of  violations  of  their  guarantees. 

A  rubber  manufacturing  concern,  which 
had  done  business  with  one  of  the  countries 
to  which  sales  are  prohibted,  endeavored  to 
secure  raw  rubber  from  the  B.  F.  Goodrich 
Company.  In  reply  the  concern  received  the 
following  letter,  which  reveals  the  strin- 
gency of  conditions  imposed : 

THE  B.  F.  GOODRICH  COMPANY, 
1780-82  Broadway, 
New  York  City 
Dear  Sirs  : 

Without  discussion  as  to  the  merits  of  the  case,  we 
beg  to  advise  that  our  supply  of  crude  gum  is  dependent 
on  the  actions  of  the  English  Government.  Under  cer- 
tain .  restrictions  we  are  enabled  to  obtain  our  require- 
ments. This  involves  a  heavy  cash  penalty  for  failure 
to  observe  the  obligation  we  have  assumed,  far  and 
away  in  excess  of  this  is  involved  the  good  faith  of  our 
Company  in  absolutely  complying  with  its  pledges.  We 
cannot  afford  for  the  sake  of  any  one  business  to  risk 
in  the  slightest  this  latter  obligation.  Necessity,  there- 
fore, compels  certain  operations  to  protect  the  situation 
in  both  your  and  our  interests. 

It  will  not  permanently  serve  you  to  attempt  in  any 
way  to  violate  the  restrictions  now  surrounding  the  ex- 
port of  rubber  goods  to  foreign  countries.  On  the  con- 
trary, you  would  do  a  great  harm  to  the  domestic 
needs  of  this  country.  If  for  any  reason  the  Amer- 
ican manufacturers  of  rubber  goods  are  prevented  from 
executing  their  pledges,  the  supply  of  gum  would  cease, 
hundreds  of  thousands  be  thrown  out  of  employment, 
prices  for  all  classes  of  rubber  goods  reach  unheard- 
of  figures,  all  to  the  hurt  of  the  domestic  buyer  here 
at  home. 

We  feal,  therefore,  we  will  not  be  misunderstood  in 
asking  that  before  we  quote  or  sell  you,  you  execute 
the  attached  form  of  agreement.  On  its  return  signed 
by  an  official  of  your  company,  and  acknowledged  be- 
fore a  notary,  we  will  he  pleased  to  sell  you  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  therein. 
Very  truly  yours, 
THE  B.  F.  GOODRICH  COMPANY. 

With  the  letter  was  enclosed  the  following 
agreement : 


AGREEMENT. 
THE  B.  F.  GOODRICH  COMPANY. 


We  hereby  agree  that  any  quotation  asked  for,  and 
any  purchases  made  by  us  from  you  or  another  of 
any  of  your  products,  shall  be  in  each  and  every  case 
only  for  domestic  use  or  shipment  to  Great  Britain, 
France  or  Russia,  unless  accompanied  by  permit  satis- 
factory to  you.  We  pledge  ourselves  in  this  fact,  and 
agree  that  the  execution  of  this  document  shall  be  bind- 
ing on  us  for  such  length  of  tinre  as  you  shall  consider 
it  to  be  effective,  and  cancellable  only  by  you. 

We  further  agree  to  submit  to  any  and  all  investiga- 
tions that  may  be  necessary  on  your  part,  and  to  give 
free  access  to  any  and  all  of  our  books,  if  called  on  so 
to  do,  to  establish  the  fact  of  our  non-exporting,  or 
selling  to  another  to  export,  in  violation  of  this  agree- 
ment. 

And  further,  we  agree  that  any  order,  even  though 
accepted  by  you,  may  be  cancelled  without  redress  on 
our  part  at  your  option  for  any  cause  whatsoever,  dur- 
ing the  period  that  a  state  of  war  exists  abroad,  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  any  other  country. 

In  case  we  tender  any  order  that  is  for  shipment 
out  of  this  country,  we  will  in  each  instant  state  thereon 
its  destination. 

Signed 

Dated 

Per 

Inscribed  and  sworn  to  before 

me  this   day 

of 


Notary  Public. 

To  summarize  the  situation  as  Great  Brit- 
ain's policy  affects  American  rubber  manu- 
facturers :  In  order  to  obtain  crude  rubber, 
from  British  possessions  as  well  as  from 
neutral  Brazil,  every  manufacturer  must 
sign  an  agreement  whereby  he  relinquishes 
his  right  to  sell  manufactured  goods  to  cus- 
tomers in  any  and  every  country  outside  of 
Great  Britain  and  her  Allies,  and  takes  oath 
that  he  will  not  do  so ;  intending  purchasers 
of  manufactured,  or  partly  manufactured, 
products  must  themselves  make  a  similar 
guarantee.  No  rubber  can,  therefore,  be  sold 
to  customers  in  any  of  the  neutral,  non- 
belligerent European  countries.  Shipments 
even  to  South  American  countries  are  pro- 
hibited except  where  the  goods  are  sold 
through  London  agents  and  shipped  far  out 
of  their  way  to  London,  and  thence  to 
South  America.  To  cite  an  illustrative 
instance : 

A  concern  located  in  New  York,  with  a 
branch  house  in  New  Orleans,  gave  an  order 
July,  1915,  for  rubber  tires  to  the  Goodrich 
Tire  and  Rubber  Company,  for  shipment  to 
Cartegena,  Columbia,  South  America.  This 
house  carried  on  an  extensive  trade  with 
South  and  Central  American  countries.  The 
Goodrich  company  sent  to  the  trading  con- 
cern a  copy  of  the  embargo  aflSdavit,  asking 
them  to  sign  it  in  accordance  with  the  in- 
structions imposed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment. The  concern  in  its  reply  declared  that 
the  goods  ordered  were  for  shipment  to  Car- 
tegena, were  positively  not  to  be  used  for  any 
other  purpose,  and  that  the  Goodrich  con- 
cern might  give  the  details  to  the  British 
Consul  at  New  York  in  order  to  obtain  a 


34 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


shipping  certificate,  if  they  desired.  The 
concern  stated  that  they  themselves  would 
not  ask  permission  of  the  British  Govern- 
,ment  for  the  shipment  of  American  manu- 
factured goods  to  South  America  or  any 
other  part  of  the  globe,  and  that  if  the  Good- 
rich company  could  not  sell  the  goods  under 
these  conditions  they  were  to  cancel  this 
specific  order  as  well  as  all  pending  orders. 
Under  date  of  August  5,  1915,  the  Goodrich 
Tire  and  Rubber  Company  replied  that  they 
could  not  make  shipment  of  the  order  unless 
the  embargo  affidavit  were  signed. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  interference  ex- 
ercised by  Great  Britain  extends  not  only  to 
American  commerce  with  foreign  nations, 
but  to  our  trade  with  South  American  coun- 
tries and  even  our  own  possessions,  such  as 
Porto  Rico,  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines. 
Great  Britain,  through  her  representatives, 
places  a  restraining  hand  upon  the  domestic 
commerce  of  the  United  States.  Shipments 
to  our  own  possessions  can  be  made  only  by 
apprising  the  British  consul  at  the  American 
port  of  shipment.  Controlling  the  sources 
of  supply  of  raw  material.  Great  Britain 
further  forces  American  manufacturers  to 
sign  an  agreement  which  prevents  their  deal- 
ing with  fellow  manufacturers  even  within 
the  borders  of  the  United  States  except  upon 
the  terms  dictated  by  the  British  commer- 
cial representative. 

Exactions  no  less  stringent  than  those  im- 
posed upon  the  rubber  trade,  giving  to  Great 
Britain  an  absolute  control  of  that  industry, 
govern  thatpart  of  the  textile  business  which 
depends  for  its  existence  upon  imported  wool 
from  Great  Britain  and  British  colonies. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Great  Britain 
placed  an  embargo  on  all  shipments  of  wool 
from  England  and  Australia  to  all  countries 
except  France  and  Russia.  On  January  16, 
1915,  the  British  Embassy  at  Washington  an- 
nounced that  merino  wool  would  be  ex- 
ported, provided  the  shipper  made  a  statu- 


tory declaration  that  the  consignee  was 
known  to  him,  and  that  none  of  the  products 
of  the  merino  imported  would  be  shipped 
out  of  the  United  States.  The  legal  adviser 
of  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  went  to  Lon- 
don and  began  negotiations  for  the  condi- 
tioned export  of  wool.  Upon  his  return,  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Alliance  met  Sir  Richard 
Crawford,  and  the  terms  were  agreed  upon 
whereby  England  would  permit  the  import 
of  wool  into  the  United  States.  By  these 
terms  the  Textile  Alliance  was  selected  to 
act  as  agent  of  the  British  Government  in 
the  United  States  to  control  the  import  of 
raw  wool  and  the  export  of  wool  products. 
Of  all  the  amazing  exactions  extorted  from 
American  manufacturers,  none  is  perhaps  so 
striking,  because  so  significant,  as  the  clause 
in  which  the  Textile  Alliance  agreed  to  dis- 
courage the  export  of  American  grown  wool. 
"Realizing  that  such  imports  (of  raw  wool 
under  conditions  imposed  by  the  British 
Government)  might  encourage  the  export  of 
American  grown  wool"  the  Textile  Alliance 
agreed  in  a  communication  to  the  London 
Board  of  Trade:  "We  iinll,  so  far  as  lies  in 
our  power,  endeavor  to  discourage  the  ex- 
port of  such  wool." 

The  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  is  a  trade  or- 
ganization chartered  under  the  laws  of  New 
York  State,  March  5,  1914.  The  organiza- 
tion includes  many,  but  not  all,  of  the  large 
woolen  manufacturers  of  the  United  States. 

To  obtain  wool,  an  American  manufac- 
turer must  join  the  Alliance,  to  which  appli- 
catibns  for  the  import  of  a  stated  allowance 
of  wool  must  be  made.  In  his  application, 
which  must  be  made  to  Albert  M.  Patterson, 
President,  the  manufacturer  agrees  that  he 
will  not  sell  wool  to  any  one  without  first 
securing  the  written  consent  of  the  Alliance 
to  such  sale,  that  he  will  not  export  to  any 
country  except  Great  Britain,  and  that  he 
will  require  of  any  customer — in  the  United 
States — a  similar  guarantee. 

The  application  for  wool  made  by  the 
manufacturer  is  as  follows : 


GUARANTEE  No. 


This  TRIPLICATE  for  Purchaser. 

Guarantee  6p  puccbascr 

TEXTILE  ALLIANCE,  Inc. 

B.L.  No 

New  York  Boston 

Gentlemen  : 

We  hereby  request  you  to  consent  to  the  sale  by 

to  us  of  wool,  tops,  noils,  or  wooled  sheepskins  imported  under  license  of  the  British 

Government,  or  any  Department  thereof,  or  any  Colony  or  Dominion  a  part  of  the  British  Empire,  or  wool,  tops 
or  noils  produced  from  same,  as  per  margin;  and  in  consideration  of  your  consent  we  hereby  guarantee  and 
agree  as  follows : 

1.  That  we  will  not  sell  to  any  dealer  or  other  person  or  persons,  the  said  merchandise  nor  any  part  thereof, 
nor  any  wool,  tops  or  noils  produced  therefrom,  but  will  use  the  same  for  our  own  manufacturing  purposes, 
without  written  consent  first  had  and  obtained  from  you. 

2.  That  if  sale  to  a  manufacturer  of  any  of  this  merchandise  or  any  wool,  tops  or  noils  produced  from  same, 
be  made  by  us  with  your  written  consent,  we  will  obtain  from  the  purchaser  thereof  a  guarantee,  in  form  ap- 
proved by  you,  that  the  same  will  be  used  by  him  solely  for  his  own  manufacturing  purposes. 

3.  That  if  sale  to  a  dealer  of  any  of  this  merchandise  or  any  wool,  tops  or  noils  produced  from  same,  be 
made  by  us  with  your  written  consent,  we  will  obtain  from  the  purchaser  thereof  a  guarantee,  in  form  approved 
by  you,  that  the  same  will  be  used  by  him  solely  for  his  own  manufacturing  purposes. 

4.  That  before  selling  any  yarn  made  wholly  or  in  part  from  any  wool,  tops  or  noils  in  this  transaction,  we 


INDIRECT  INTERFERENCE   WITH  TRADE 


35; 


will  inform  the  purchaser  of  the  conditions  of  this  guarantee  and  satisfy  ourselves  of  his  intention  to  comply  with 
same. 

IVe  will  print  on  our  invoices  and  order  blanks  notice  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  yarn  is  sold,  and 

if  required,  will  obtain  from  the  purchaser  such  written  guarantee  as  to  the  disposal  of  the  yarn  as  the 

Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  or  the  British  Government  may  prescribe. 

Note. — Purchasers  of  yarn  are  not  required  to   file  guarantees   with   the   Textile   Alliance,   Inc.,   unless 

specially  requested  to  do  so. 

5.  That  we  will,  upon  request,  at  any  and  all  times,    furnish   to   you   detailed   statements   of   the   wool,   tops, 
noils,  yarn,  and  wooled  sheepskins  purchased   and"  sold  by  us  on  and  after  the  date  of  this  agreement. 

6.  That  no  part  of  the  merchandise  subject  to  this  agreement  nor  any  wool,  tops,  noils  or  yarn  produced 
therefrom  shall  be  exported  to  any  destination  from  the  United  States  of  America  except  to  Canada. 

7.  That  if  at  any  time  the  British  Government  shall  so  require,  we  will  execute  and  deliver  a  bond  in  the 
form  and  amount  approved  for  the  performance  of  our  undertakings  under  this  agreement. 

8.  That  it  is  understood  that  this  agreement  shall  continue  in  full  force  until  treaties  of  peace  shall  be 
signed  by  Great  Britain  zmth  all  belligerent  nations. 

9.  That  we  release  and  hold  harmless  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  and  A.  M.  Patterson,  individually  and  as 
an  officer  of  the  Alliance  from  all  liability  in  connection  with  the  said  merchandise. 

Yours  truly 
Date  191 

We  hereby  consent  to  the  shipment : 

Textile  Alliance,  Inc., 
191 Per 


If  the  Textile  Alliance  approves  of  the  ap- 
plication, it  is  forwarded  to  the  British  Con- 
sul at  New  York,  who  sends  it  to  the  agent 
of  the  Alliance  in  the  particular  part  of  the 
British  dominions  where  wool  products  are 
obtained.  The  agent  submits  the  application 
and  guarantee  to  the  proper  Government 
agent.  The  filling  of  the  order  is  thereupon 
— optional  with  him. 

The  Textile  Alliance  thus  acts  as  agent 
for  the  purchaser  in  America,  a  full  release 
of  the  shipment  being  given  by  the  applicant 
to  A.  M.  Patterson,  individually  and  as  an 
officer  of  the  Alliance. 

The  relations  of  the  Alliance  to  the  Brit- 
ish Government  are  shown  by  the  following 
letter  sent  by  the  Alliance  to  the  British 
Board  of  Trade,  London : 

February  10,  1915. 
Board  of  Trade, 

London,  England. 
Gentlemen  : 

On  behalf  of  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  we,  the  under- 
signed directors,  in  recognition  of  the  trust  imposed  in 
us  by  ourselves  and  the  Government  of  Great  Britain, 
do  pledge  ourselves  to  the  best  of  our  power  and  ability 
to  carry  out  the  following  undertaking  in  respect  of 
wool  exported  from  Great  Britain  into  the  United 
States  and  consigned  to  A.  M.  Patterson,  Esq.,  president 
of  the  Alliance  for  the  time  being: 

1.  That  neither  the  Textile  Alliance  nor  any  of  the 
associated  bodies  nor  their  members  nor  the  owners  of 
mill  or  mills  for  whom  the  wool  is  destined  shall  re- 
sell any  wool  so  imported  to  any  dealer  or  other  person 
or  persons,  but  that  such  wool  shall  be  used  in  the  mill 
or  mills  for  their  own  manufacturing  purposes  only. 

2.  That  no  part  of  the  wool  nor  any  wool  tops  or 
yarn  made  therefrom  shall  be  re-exported  to  any  desti- 
nation from  the  United  States  of  America. 

3.  That  realizing  that  such  imports  might  encourage 
the  export  of  American-grown  wool  we  will  so  far  as 
lies  in  our  power  endeavor  to  discourage  the  export  of 
such  wool. 

4.  That  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  H.  B.  M.  Am- 
bassador at  Washington  we  will  take  such  measures 
with  the  several  purchases  and  importers  as  shall  best 
effectuate  our  undertaking. 

With  appreciation  of  the  confidence  bestowed  upon 
us,  we  are, 

Yours  very  truly. 

TE.XTILE  ALLIANCE,  INC. 
ALBERT  M.  PATTERSON.  President. 
Attest:  J.  J.  NEVINS,  Secretary. 
ALBERT  M.  PATTERSON, 
Director  for  American  Association  of  Woolen  and 
Worsted  Manufacturers. 
JOHN  P.  WOOD, 

Director  for  National  Association  of  Woolen  and 
Worsted  Manufacturers. 


CAESAR  CONE, 
Director  for  National  Association  of  Woolen  and 
Worsted  Manufacturers. 
WILLIAM  A.  MITCHELL, 
Director  for  National  Association  of  Woolen  and 
Worsted  Manufacturers. 

In  a  confidential  notice,  scheduled  as  Bul- 
letin No.  8,  sent  out  to  its  members  on  June 
30,  1915,  the  Textile  Alliance  took  occasion 
to  remind  exporters  that  "by  notice  issued 
by  the  British  Embassy,  dated  March  12, 
1915,  raw  wool,  wool  tops,  noils  and  woolen 
and  worsted  yaras  are  absolutely  contra- 
band," but  apprised,  them,  however,  that  for 
a  limited  period  the  British  Government 
would  allow  the  export  of  yarns  and  tops  to 
the  United  Kingdom,  without  liability  of  de- 
tention on  part  of  the  naval  authorities  of 
the  Allies,  if  a  certain  procedure  was  fol- 
lowed. 

In  the  procedure,  approved  by  the  British 
Embassy,  it  is  significantly  stated:  "The 
granting  of  licenses  and  permits  to  ship 
rests  solely  with  the  British  Government. 
Interested  parties  must  bear  in  mind  that 
licen.ses  and  permits  mil  he  granted  only  in 
so  far  a.s  may  he  to  the  interest  of  Chreat 
Britain  and  her  Allied  countries;  and,  fur- 
thermore, that  the  granting  of  licenses  does 
not  insure  that  the  merchandise  upon  ar- 
rival in  the  United  Kingdom  is  necessarily 
to  he  delivered  to  the  intended  recipient." 

The  procedure  outlined  runs  as  follows : 

First :  Exporters  must  agree  in  advance  to  comply 
in  all  cases  with  the  prescribed  rules.  The  Textile 
Alliance  will  undertake  to  obtain  the  approval  of  per- 
sons who  desire  to  export  in  the  manner  allowed  and 
who  name  an  agent  in  Great  Britain  to  whom  alone  they 
will  destinate  such  tops  and  yarns.  Persons  already  ap- 
proved as  importers  of  wool,  etc.,  who  have  already 
designated  agents  in  Great  Britain,  will  be  considered 
approved  as  exporters  when  destinating  to  such  agents 
without  special  application  for  approval. 

Second :  The  procedure  as  to  consignment  is  similar 
to  that  established  for  the  import  of  wool  into  the 
United  States.  Intending  shippers  must  notify  the  Tex- 
tile Alliance,  Inc.,  45  E.  17th  St.,  N.  Y.,  or  120  Milk 
St.,  Boston,  in  every  case  of  intention  to  export,  giv- 
ing description  of  shipment,  name  of  steamship,  port, 
and  scheduled  date  of  sailing. 

Shippers  must  attend  entirely  to  their  own  shipping 
as  i«  normal  times  and  must  attend  to  their  own  insur- 
ance and  clearances,  but  every  shipment  must  show  as 


36 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


shipper  "Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,"  and  must  be  consigned 
in  one  of  two  ways,  namely : — • 

(1)  "To  Messrs.  Freshfield,  31  Old  Jewry,  London, 

E.  C,  account  of  Messrs   (Name 

of  recipient)."  In  this  case  the  shipper  must  send  all 
of  the  original  Bills  of  Lading,  and  one  memorandum 
copy  to  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  120  Milk  Street,  Bos- 
ton, or  45  E.  17th  Street,  New  York,  with  notice  that 
all  requirements  have  been  complied  with.  This  will 
enable  the  Alliance  to  transmit  the  Bills  of  Lading  to 
Messrs.  Freshfield  with  proper  notification  to  enable 
them  to  release  the  shipment.  The  Alliance  will  not 
accept  documents  unless  free  from  notice  of  lien. 

(2)  "To  Messrs (name  of  ap- 
proved  Custodian  bankers)    for  account     of     Messrs. 

Freshfield.    Notify  Messrs (name 

of  recipient.)"  Shippers  must  send  us  in  each  case  one 
memorandum  copy  Bill  of  Lading  to  enable  us  to  notify 
the  War  Trade  Department  that  their  requirements 
have  been  complied  with,  and  furnish  Messrs.  Fresh- 
field with  the  necessary  information  that  they  may  au- 
thorize the  custodian  bankers  to  release  the  merchan- 
dise to  the  recipient. 

The  Custodian  bankers  approved  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment are : 

Messrs.  Baring  Bros.  &  Co.,  Ltd. 

Messrs.  Brown,  Shipley  &  Co. 

Messrs.  Higginson  &  Co. 

Messrs.  Morgan,  Grenfell  &  Co. 

Standard  Bank  of.  South  Africa,  Ltd.  (London 
office) . 

Hong  Kong  &  Shanghai  Banking  Corp.  (London  of- 
fice). 

Third :  The  name  of  the  person  in  the  United  King- 
dom to  whom  the  Bill  of  Lading  is  to  be  released  by 
Messrs.  Freshfield,  must  appear  in  the  notice  that  the 
shippers  send  to  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  with  the 
Bill  of  Lading. 

Fourth :  The  Alliance  charge  to  cover  their  expenses 
is  1  per  cent,  of  the  total  selling  price  of  the  merchan- 
dise, including  all  charges,  but  not  including  prepaid 
freight  and  prepaid  insurance,  if  any.  This  charge  is 
payable  at  the  time  of  shipment  and  remittance  should 
accompany  Bills  of  Lading  sent  to  the  Alliance.  It  is 
understood  that  on  the  expiry  of  the  .Agreement  between 
the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc.,  and  the  British  Government 
any  balance  or  fund  created  for  the  services  and  ex- 
penses of  the  Alliance,  shall  be  returned  pro  rata. 

Fifth :  Shipments  made  under  the  foregoing  condi- 
tions may  be  sent  zna  all  routes  and  to  all  destinations 
in  the  United  Kingdom. 

Sixth :  The  granting  of  licenses  and  permits  to  ship 
rests  solely  with  the  British  Government.  Interested 
parties  must  bear  in  mind  that  licenses  and  permits  will 
be  granted  only  in  so  far  as  may  be  to  the  interest  ol 
Great  Britain  and  her  allied  countries,  and  furthermore, 
that  the  granting  of  licenses  does  not  insure  that  the 
merchandise  upon  arrival  in  the  United  Kingdom  is 
necessarily  to  be  delivered  to  the  intended  recipient. 

Seventh :  Consignors  must  pay  all  charges  imposed 
liy  the  Custodian  Bankers  and  should  make  their  bank- 
ing and  shipping  arrangements  independently  of  the 
Textile  Alliance,  Inc. 

Eighth :  Messrs.  Freshfield  will  make  suitable  provi- 
sion for  releasing  shipments  in  the  United  Kingdom 
upon  receipt  of  advice  from  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc., 
that  all  requirements  have  been  complied  with. 

Ninth :  Persons  attempting  to  export  by  irregular 
channels  will  not  only  risk  detention,  but  will  disqualify 
themselves  as  exporters  of  Tops  and  Yarns  and  import- 
ers of  Wool,  etc.,  from  all  parts  of  the  British  Empire. 

Tenth :  The  President  and  the  Textile  Alliance,  Inc., 
assume  no  responsibility  in  regard  to  financial  or  other 
arrangements.  Buyers,  sellers  and  importers  must  in- 
demnify and  agree  to  hold  harmless  the  Textile  Alli- 
ance, Inc.,  and  A.  M.  Patterson,  individually  and  as 
an  officer  of  the  Alliance,  and  Messrs.  Freshfield  from 
ALL  liability. 

Under  existing  conditions,  as  has  been 
shown,  American  manufacturers  do  not  suf- 
fer alone  by  the  detention  of  ships  and  the 
seizure  of  cargoes  by  Great  Britain.  The 
restrictions  placed  upon  various  industries 
within  the  United  States  by  illegal  trade 
agreements  affects  business  with  neutral  na- 
tions not  only  at  present,  or  so  long  as  the 


British  sea  policy  continues,  but  threaten  to 
alienate  customers  in  non-belligerent  coun- 
tries for  3'ears  to  come. 

With  rubber  declared  contraband  by 
Great  Britain,  shipments  of  rubber  goods 
cannot  be  made  by  an  American  manufac- 
turer to  any  customer  in  Holland,  Deumark, 
Norway,  Sweden  or  any  neutral  country.  If 
shipments  are  made,  they  will  be  seized  in 
all  probability  by  Great  Britain.  On  the 
other  hand,  shipments  can,  however,  be  made 
through  British  agents,  the  goods  being  sent 
to  England  and  reshipped  thence  by  the 
agent,  who  collects  a  commission.  Thus  the 
rubber  trade  of  the  world,  outside  of  the 
United  States,  is  practically,  and  to  all  pur- 
poses, thrown  entirely  into  the  hands  of 
British  agents,  who  can  seize  the  trade  re- 
lations broken  by  England's  policy  between 
American  sellers  and  European  buyers  and 
establish  themselves  in  all  countries  where 
American  trade  is  ousted.  And  the  imposi- 
tions placed  upon  the  textile  industry  have 
absolutely  wiped  out  our  export  trade  with 
neutral  European  nations  in  wool. 

An  American  manufacturer  desiring  to 
import  raw  wool  into  the  United  States  must 
make  application  to  the  president  of  the 
Textile  Alliance,  signing  an  agreement  not 
to  sell  any  woolen  products,  manufactured 
or  partly  manufactured,  to  a  customer  in 
any  country  except  Great  Britain.  Like- 
wise shipments  of  manufactured,  or  partly 
manufactured,  goods  to  Great  Britain  can 
also  be  made  only  tlirough  an  arrangement 
with  the  Textile  Alliance.  It  is  absolutely 
impossible  for  American  exporters  to  ship 
yarns,  etc.,  direct  to  customers  in  Sweden, 
Norway,  Holland,  Denmark  or  any  neutral 
country. 

Even  American  manufacturers  who  buy 
their  raw  products  in  the  United  States  suf- 
fer from  these  conditions.  American  raw 
wool,  yarns,  and  "tops"  cannot  be  shipped 
to  a  customer  in  Sweden,  Norway,  Holland 
or  Denmark.  Any  wool  shipped  except 
througli  the  Textile  Alliance  and  to  Great 
Britain  alone  is  liable  to  confiscation.  Ex- 
cept through  the  Textile  Alliance,  or 
through  the  British  Embassy,  no  guaran- 
tees of  delivery  of  American  woolen  goods 
to  customers  abroad  can  be  obtained. 

And  yet,  despite  the  restrictions  to  which 
American  manufacturers  subject  them- 
selves, entangled  as  they  are  by  a  network 
of  agreements,  legal  clauses  and  prohibi- 
tions, all  acting  to  the  advantage  of  Great 
Britain  alone,  American  manufacturers, 
when  they  come  to  the  point  of  selling 
to  customers  in  neutral  countries,  find  that 
the  guarantees  are  quite  ineffectual  and 
worthless.  Goods  may  be  sold  to  British 
customers  direct — even  then  the  delivery  is 
not  guaranteed  by  British  authorities. 

Goods  may  be  consigned  to  customers  in 
neutral  countries  through  British  brokers, 


INDIRECT  INTERFERENCE  WITH  TRADE 


37 


but  then  the  Textile  Alliance  takes  the  po- 
sition that  it  cannot  guarantee  the  safe 
conduct  of  shipments  even  to  the  Lon- 
don brokers.  Thus  tied  up  as  they  are  by 
agreements  and  trade  entanglements,  Amer- 
ican manufactures  enjoy  no  recompense,  in- 
asmuch as  all  the  guarantees  work  out  so 
as  to  be  absolutely  worthless,  and  in  the  end 
they  find  themselves  helpless  in  the  arbitrary 
hands  of  Great  Britain's  naval  authorities. 
What  is  the  result  of  this  bottling-up  of 
legitimate  American  commerce  and  the  re- 
striction of  its  export  trade  to  Great  Britain 
alone?  British  woolen  manufacturers  and 
agents — to  whom  the  entire  export  trade  of 
the  United  States  is  diverted — can  them- 
selves sell  to  whomsoever  they  will.  They 
can — and  do — take  over  the  trade  with  all 
the  concerns  in  Holland,  Denmark,  Norway, 
Sweden,  as  well  as  in  any  other  country, 
who  have  hitherto  dealt  with  American  man- 
ufacturers, and  they  can — and  do — prevent 
American  manufacturers  from  securing  new 
customers  forced  by  the  war  to  look  in  this 
direction. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  fact  that  nearly 
all  of  the  tin,  tin  ore  and  chloride  of  tin 
used  by  American  manufacturers  is  im- 
ported from  Great  Britain  and  her  depend- 
encies, conditions  quite  as  rigid  as  those  im- 
posed for  the  use  of  rubber  and  wool  govern 
this  trade.  That  Great  Britain  has  assumed 
to  control  the  tin  industry  of  the  world  is 
shown  in  a  letter  sent  by  the  Unitetl  States 
Steel  Products  Company — which  is  closely 
allied  with  the  United  States  Steel  Corpora- 
tion— of  which  James  A.  Farrell  and  El- 
bert T.  Gary  are  directors,  to  all  of  its  ex- 
porters and  customers.  Guarantees  that 
sales  of  tin  products  shall  not  be  made  to 
countries  otlier  than  Great  Britain  and  her 
allies  must  be  made  to  obtain  raw  material. 
The  letter  sent  out  by  the  United  States 
Steel  Products  Company  is  as  follows: 

The  tin  plate  sold  by  us  is  manufactured  by  the 
American  Sheet  and  Tin  Plate  Company,  and  the  sup- 
plies of  pig  tin  which  are  used  by  them  in  the  manu- 
facture of  said  tin  plate  are  imported  from  Great  Brit- 
ain and  possessions. 

In  order  to  obtain  such  supplies  of  pig  tin  we  are 
obliged  to  sign  an  undertaking,  which  has  been  put  into 
effect  by  the  British  authorities,  known  as  the  "tin 
guarantee,"  a  complete  copy  of  which  is  given  herewith 
for  your  information. 

In  order  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  this  guarantee, 
notice  is  hereby  given  that  all  sales  and  shipments  made 
by  this  company  on  and  after  this  date  are  made  sub- 
ject to  the  following  conditions : 

"It  is  understood  and  agreed  that  the  within  men- 
tioned tin  plate,  or  tin  canisters  and  tin  boxes  suitable 
for  food  packing  made  therefrom,  is  sold  subject  to  the 
terms  of  the  guarantee  as  promulgated  by  the  British 
government  authorities,  which  requires  (a)  that  orders 
for  such  materials  will  not  be  executed  to  be  sent,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  to  any  country  or  state  at  war 
with  Great  Britain;  (b)  that  no  sales  of  such  materials 
will  be  made  without  obtaining  satisfactory  assurances 
from  the  buyer  that  there  is  no  intention  on  his  part 
to  export  or  resell  the  same  for  exportation  to  any 
country  in  Europe  other  than  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy  or  Russia,  otherwise  than  by  shipping  to  the  United 
Kingdom   and   reshipping   from  there   under   license  to 


be  obtained  for  export  therefrom ;  (c)  if  any  exporta- 
tions  of  such  materials  are  made  to  a  destination  out- 
side of  Europe  not  being  in  British  possessions,  full 
particulars  of  same  are  to  be  reported  to  his  Brittanic 
Majesty's  consul-general  at  New  York  prior  to  or  si- 
multaneously with  the  shipment,  giving  particulars  of 
the  goods  so  shipped  and  their  destination." 

This  notice  is  issued  with  the  understanding  that  the 
terms  and  conditions  under  which  sales  of  tin  plate 
shall  hereafter  be  made  to  this  company  may  be  altered 
or  changed  in  accordance  with  any  changes  or  modifi- 
cations that  may  be  required  by  the  British  government 
authorities. 

Accompanying  rhe  letter  was  the  follow- 
ing copy  of  the  agreement  which  the  United 
States  Steel  Products  Company  had  entered 
into: 

In  consideration  of  your  consenting  to  the  delivery 
to  us  of  the  tin,  chloride  of  tin,  tin  ore,  specified  in 
the  margin,  we  hereby  give  you  the  following  undertak- 
ing, which  shall  continue  in  force  so  long  as  Great  Brit- 
ain is  at  war  with  any  European  power : 

We  will  not  export  from  the  United  States  any  tin, 
chloride  of  tin  or  tin  ore,  whether  the  same  has  been 
imported  from  the  British  dominions  or  not,  otherwise 
than  to  the  United  Kingdom  or  to  a  British  possession. 

We  will  not  sell  the  tin.  chloride  of  tin,  tin  ore  now 
delivered  by  you  to  any  dealer  or  other  person  or  per- 
sons in  the  United  States,  but  will  use  it  for  our  own 
manufacturing  purposes. 

.'\I1  orders  received  by  us  for  tin  plates  or  tin  can- 
isters and  tin  boxess  suitable  for  food  packing  made 
therefrom,  or  for  tin  foil,  solder,  Babbitt's  metal,  type 
metal  or  any  metallic  alloys  containing  tin,  to  be  sent 
to  neutral  European  countries,  shall  be  executed  from 
stocks  maintained  by  us  in  the  United  Kingdom,  or  be 
executed  by  shipments  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  re- 
shipment  from  there,  under  license  to  be  obtained  for 
export  therefrom. 

We  will  not  execute  any  orders  for  tin  plates,  or  tin 
canisters  and  tin  boxes  suitable  for  food  packing  made 
therefrom,  or  for  tin  foil,  solder.  Babbitt's  metal,  type 
metal  or  any  metallic  alloys  containing  tin,  to  be  sent, 
either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  any  country  or  state 
at  war  with  Great  Britain. 

We  will  not  sell  any  tin  plates,  or  tin  canisters  and 
tin  boxes  suitable  for  food  packing  made  therefrom,  or 
for  tin  foil,  solder.  Babbitt's  metal,  type  metal  or  any 
metallic  alloys  containing  tin  to  any  person  in  the 
United  States  without  satisfying  ourselves  that  there  is 
no  intention  on  his  part  to  export,  or  resell  the  same 
for  exportation,  to  any  countries  in  Europe  other  than 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  or  Russia,  otherwise  than 
by  shipping  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  reshipping 
from  there  under  license  to  be  obtained  for  export 
therefrom. 

If  we  export  any  tin  plates  or  tin  canisters  and  tin 
boxes  suitable  for  food  packing  made  therefrom,  or  tin 
foil,  solder.  Babbitt's  metal,  type  metal  or  any  metallic 
alloys  containing  tin,  to  a  destination  outside  of  Europe 
not  being  in  British  possessions,  we  will,  prior  to  or  si- 
multaneously with  the  shipment,  give  you  particulars  of 
the  goods  so  shipped  and  their  destination. 

The  Special  Committee  of  the  Metal  Ex- 
change of  New  York  sent  out  a  letter — 
signed  by  C.  Mayer,  Secretary — specifically 
revealing  the  conditions  Imposed  by  Great 
Britain  upon  tin  manufacturers.  The  let- 
ter was  occasioned  by  the  belief  that  certain 
manufacturers  were  not  observing  the  exac- 
tions required.    It  is  as  follows: 


To  the  Trade : 


NEW  YORK  METAL  EXCHANGE, 

New  York,  Sept.  1.  1915. 


TIN. 


Certain  transactions  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
Tin  Committee  lead  it  to  believe  that  arrangements 
with  the  British  Government  governing  the  importation 
of  tin  are  not  fully  understood. 

Importations  are  permitted  only  for  the  purpose  of 
supplying  domestic  requirements. 

The  jobber  is  required  to  use  all  due  diligence  in  the 
carrying  out  of  the  agreement  thus  entered  into,  when 
selling  the  metal,  and  thereafter  to  stamp  his  invoices 


38 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


with  a  notice  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  tin 
is  sold  with  the  distinct  understanding  that  it  shall  not 
be  exported,  but  must  be  sold  or  used  only  for  the 
purpose   of   supplying   domestic   requirements. 

With  the  circular  are  three  forms  of 
guarantees.  One  to  be  signed  by  the  im- 
porter, one  by  the  manufacturer,  and  one  by 
the  purchaser  from  the  manufacturer,  each 
binding  himself  not  to  sell  or  trade  with 
any  countries  not  countenanced  by  the  Brit- 
ish Empire.  They  are  almost  identical  in 
form.    The  first  is  as  follows : 

Issued  by  the  NEW  YORK  METAL  EXCHANGE. 

TIN  GUARANTEE 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Consul-Gen- 
TIN  eral,   New  York. 

Ex.  s.  s In  consideration  of  your  consent- 
ing to  the  delivery  to  us  of  the  tin, 
chloride  of  tin,  tin  ore  (a),  specified 
in  the  margin,  we, 

Packages hereby  give  you  the  following  un- 
dertaking,  which   shall   remain  in 

Weight force  so  long  as  Great  Britain  is  at 

war  with  any  European  power. 

Quality We  will  not  export  from  the  United 

States  any  tin,  chloride  of  tin,  or  tin 
ore,  whether  the  same  has  been  im- 
ported from  the  British  Dominions 
or  not,  otherwise  than  to  the  United 
Kingdom   or  a   British   possession. 


Marks . 


.We  will  not  sell  the  tin,  chloride  of 
tin,  or  tin  ore  (a)  now  delivered  by 
you  to  any  dealer,  or  other  person 
or  persons,  in  the  United  States,  but 
will  use  it  for  our  own  manufactur- 
ing purposes. 


Date. 


(a)  Strike  out  the  words  which  are  inapplicable. 
(421) 

In  regard  to  the  impositions  made  by 
Great  Britain  and  executed  through  her  offi- 
cial representatives  upon  American  indus- 
tries, it  is  not  only  germain,  but  urgently 
important,  to  remember  that  these  exactions 
are  in  violation  of  United  States  laws. 

Shall  the  United  States,  by  submitting  to 
impositions  and  requirements  now  made 
upon  American  manufacturers  by  a  foreign 
power,  establish  the  precedent  that — for  all 
time — she  shall,  whenever  the  expediency  of 
a  foreign  policy  dictates,  servilely  and  un- 
protestingly  submit  to  an  interference  with 
her  trade,  domestic  as  well  as  foreign,  in 
gross  violation  of  her  own  statutes? 


Here  are  exactions  forced  by  Great  Brit- 
ain ui)on  American  manufacturers : 

Article  1  of  the  rubber  agreement : 

"Manufacturers  cannot  export  or  sell  to  any  one  who 
might  export  crude  rubber,  waste  rubber  or  reclaimed 
rubber  except  to  Great  Britain  or  a  British  possession. 
They  may  not  sell  plantation  rubber  even  to  any  one  in 
the  United  States." 

Fourth  section  of  the  rubber  agreement: 

"No  goods  must  be  sold  for  delivery  to  an  enemy  ot 
Great  Britain  ...  If  through  intent,  carelessness, 
or  misfortune,  your  goods  are  found  in  transit  to  Ger- 
many your  permit  will  be  canceled.  .  .  You  should 
have  definite  agreements  from  every  customer  who  is 
likely  to  export,  and  we  would  suggest  the  use  of  a 
rubber  stamp  for  all  orders  and  invoices,  stating  that 
the  goods  are  sold  with  the  understanding  that  they  are 
not  to  be  exported,  except  to  Great  Britain,  France  or 
Russia  or  to  a  European  neutral  by  way  of  the  United 
Kingdom  or  to  a  non-European  neutral." 

Article  6  of  the  guarantee  made  by  pur- 
chasers of  wool  with  the  Textile  Alliance : 

"That  no  part  of  the  merchandise  subject  to  this 
agreement,  nor  any  wool,  tops,  noils,  or  yarn  produced 
therefrom,  shall  ht  exported  to  any  destination  from 
the  United  States  of  America  except  to  Canada." 

Pledge  made  to  "His  Britannic  Majesty's 
Consul-General  at  New  York"  by  manufac- 
turers desiring  to  obtain  tin : 

"We  will  not  export  from  the  United  States  any  tin, 
chloride  of  tin,  or  tin  ore,  whether  the  same  has  been 
imported  from  the  British  Dominions  or  not,  otherwise 
than  to  the  United  Kingdom  or  to  a  British  Possession. 

"We  will  not  export  from  the  United  States  any  tin, 
delivered  by  you  to  any  dealer  or  other  person  or  per- 
sons in  the  United  States,  but  will  use  it  for  our  own 
manufacturing  purposes." 


And  here  are  the  tables  of  our  laws : 
Section  73  of  the  Act  of  February  12, 1913 

(CI.  40)  : 

Section  73  of  the  Act  of  February  12,  1913  (01.  40): 
■'That  every  combination,  conspiracy,  trust,  agree- 
ment or  contract  is  hereby  declared  to  be  contrary 
to  public  policy,  illegal  and  void  when  the  same  is 
made  by  or  between  two  or  more  persons  or  cor- 
porations either  of  whom  as  agent  or  principal  is 
engaged  in  importing  any  article  from  any  foreign 
country  into  the  United  States,  and  where  such 
combination,  conspiracy,  trust,  agreement  or  contract 
is  intended  to  operate  in  restraint  of  lawful  trade  or 
free  competition  in  lawful  trade  or  commerce,  or  to 
increase  the  market  price  in  any  part  of  the  United 
States  of  any  article  or  articles  imported  or  intended 
to  be  imported,  into  the  United  States,  or  of  any 
manufacture  into  which  said  imported  article  centers 
or  is  intended  to  center." 

Sherman  Act  of  July  2,  1890 : 

"Every  contract,  combination  in  form  of  trust  or 
otherwise,  or  conspiracy,  in  restraint  of  trade  or 
commerce  in  any  Territory  of  the  United  States  or 
of  the  District  of  Columbia,  or  in  restraint  of  com- 
merce between  any  such  Territory  and  another  or 
between  any  such  Territory  or  Territories  and  any 
State  or  States  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  or  with 
foreign  nations  or  between  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia and  any  State  or  States  or  foreign  nations,  is 
hereby  declared  illegal.  Every  person  who  shall 
make  any  such  contract  or  engage  in  any  such  com- 
bination or  conspiracy  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of 
a  misdemeanor  and  on  conviction  thereof,  shall  be 
punished  by  fine  not  exceeding  $5,000  or  by  imprison- 
ment not  exceeding  one  year,  or  by  both  said  pun- 
ishments in  the  discretion  of  the  court." 


VI 


INTERFERENCE  WITH  COMMUNICATION 


IN  times  of  peace  many  thousand  com- 
mercial and  private  messages  pass 
every  day  over  the  cables  connecting 
the  United  States  and  the  other  countries 
of  the  world.  Even  in  war  times  the  num- 
ber of  submarine  telegrams  is  over  five 
thousand  per  day.  Our  commercial  and 
financial  relations  with  the  world  ai*e  de- 
pendent on  cables.  The  wires  beneath  the 
sea  are  our  international  trade  arteries. 
Great  Britain  has  it  in  her  power  to  cut 
those  arteries,  because  of  certain  physical 
facts  and  of  geographical  advantages  which 
she  possesses. 

Today  practically  all  commercial  and 
personal  telegrams  from  the  United  States 
to  foreign  countries  pass  through  the  hands 
of  the  British  censor.  Great  Britain's  right 
in  time  of  war  to  censor  dispatches  is  un- 
questioned. The  International '  Telegraph 
Convention  and  the  International  Radio- 
Telegraph  Convention,  to  which  all  the 
Powers  are  signatories,  expressly  grants 
to  any  government  "the  power  to  in- 
terrupt tlie  system  of  international  tele- 
graphs for  an  indefinite  period,  if  it  judges 
it  necessary,  either  generally,  or  only  upon 
certain  lines  and  for  certain  kinds  of  mes- 
sages, upon  the  condition  that  it  immedi- 
ately advises  each  of  the  other  contracting 
parties."  (See  Article  VIII  of  the  Tele- 
graph Convention,  applying  also  to  wireless 
dispatches.)  Great  Britain  has  complied 
with  the  stipulations  of  this  article.  She 
merely  exercises  the  same  rights  that  the 
United  States  Government  exercises  today 
in  regard  to  wireless  dispatches. 

But  in  actual  practice  the  British  censor 
has  adopted  and  continues  a  policy  which 
has  proved  exacting  beyond  the  needs  of  war, 
onerous  in  the  extreme,  and  one  which  has 
caused  and  is  today  causing  American  com- 
merce financial  losses  running  into  millions 
of  dollars.  In  many  instances  the  action  of 
the  censor  has  been  unreasoning,  arbitrary 
and  practically  despotic.  As  a  result,  buy- 
ers of  American  goods  in  neutral  countries 
have  been  and  are  unable  to  make  purchases 
from  American  exporters.  In  imiwrt- 
ant  deals  involving  the  exchange  of  many 
cables,  vitally  important  messages  in  a  series 
have  been  suppressed  altogether.  The  Brit- 
ish censor  has  it  in  his  power  to  suppress 
messages  for  any  reason,  or  for  no  reason  at 


all.  He  does  so,  under  the  specious  and 
spacious  excuse  of  "war  measures."  He  does 
not  notify  the  sender  of  the  non-delivery  of 
stopped  messages.  Errors  made  in  retrans- 
mission after  passing  the  censor  are  not  cor- 
rected, and  the  censor  is  not  liable  for  dam- 
ages. All  corrections  must  be  made  by  a 
private  message  between  addressee  and 
sender.  The  censor  alters  messages  to  suit 
himself.  He  cuts  out  words  that  displease 
him.  Although  all  messages,  other  than 
those  sent  in  the  limited  si)ecified  codes  and 
so  marked,  are  written  in  plain  English,  the 
censor,  suspicious  of  private  codes,  pur- 
posely alters  messages  to  see  whether  a 
secret  code  is  in  use. 

In  certain  cases  the  contents  of  sup- 
pressed American  commercial  cablegrams  to 
neutral  countries  have  formed  the  basis  for 
commercial  propositions  to  the  addressees 
from  British  firms. 

In  brief,  American  cables  passing  through 
the  hands  of  the  British  censor,  except  mes- 
sages between  the  Department  of  State  and 
our  envoys  abroad,  are  at  the  censor's  mercy. 
No  business  secrets  can  escape  his  eye. 

Great  Britain  wields  this  tremendous 
power  by  reason  of  her  control  of  the  great 
cable  line  centers  and  junctions.  A  glance 
at  the  map  on  page  40,  on  which  the  chief 
.Vmerican  cable  routes  are  indicated,  will 
show  this  clearly. 

The  heavy  lines  show  the  only  cables 
which  terminate  on  American  territory  or  in 
territory  not  belonging  to  or  controlled  by 
Great  Britain  and  her  allies — the  only  lines 
by  means  of  which  an  American  message 
can  be  depended  upon  to  reach  the  foreign 
world.  All  the  cables  crossing  the  Atlantic, 
except  the  French  cable  to  Brest,  and  the 
German  cable,  now  out  of  commission,  ter- 
minate in  England  or  Ireland,  or  the  Azores, 
belonging  to  Great  Britain's  ally,  Portugal. 
On  the  way  south,  American  cables  reach 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  Hayti;  from  Havana 
a  line  extends  across  Panama,  along  the 
west  coast  of  South  America,  and  overland 
to  Buenos  Ayres.  The  Atlantic  coast  cables 
of  South  America  are  all  British  owned. 
The  United  States  Government  owns  the 
cable  from  Seattle  to  Sitka.  American  cap- 
ital owns  the  cable  from  San  Francisco  to 
Hawaii  and  Manila  and  thence  to  Shanghai 
and  Tokio.     Since  Shanghai  is  British  and 


40 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


o 


INTERFERENCE  WITH  COMMUNICATIONS 


41 


Tokio  Japanese,  this  cable  is  indicated  by 
dotted  lines  from  American  to  Allied  ports. 

Business  with  the  west  coast  of  South 
America  is  not  as  yet  a  heavy  item  in  Amer- 
ican trade.  In  the  East,  the  lines  beyond 
Shanghai  are  owned  by  the  British,  and  the 
lines  beyond  Tokio  by  the  Japanese,  largely 
financed  by  British  capital. 

All  American  communications  affecting 
our  great  coffee  and  rubber  trade  with  Bra- 
zil must  pass  over  British  lines. 

Not  only  commercial,  but  official  cables, 
army  dispatches  and  consular  dispatches, 
have  been  held  up.  The  British  Govern- 
ment, upon  protest  from  tlie  Department  of 
State,  has  "explained"  interference  with 
United  States  Government  business,  but 
for  the  financial  loss  suffered  by  our  mer- 
chants no  redress  is  available.  Specific 
charges  of  loss  are  innumerable,  and  from 
a  mass  of  data  the  following  are  selected : 

In  several  cases  New  York  merchants  do- 
ing business  with  Greek  houses  assert  that 
cablegrams  between  New  York  and  Athens 
have  been  intercepted  and  suppressed,  and 
that  within  a  few  days'  time  British  firms 
have  approached  these  same  Greek  houses 
with  propositions  exactly  duplicating  those 
contained  in  the  suppressed  American 
cables.  One  firm,  which  had  conducted  for 
many  years  a  very  profitable  trade  in  dried 
fruits  with  Greece,  has  abandoned  that  trade 
altogether,  because  of  British  interference. 

In  another  case,  an  order  from  a  Scan- 
dinavian to  a  New  York  house  for  48,000 
pounds  of  coffee  was  suppressed  by  the  Brit- 
ish censor;  the  loss  sustained  by  this  firm, 
which  otherwise  has  suffered  severely,  in 
tliis  one  transaction  amounted  to  $3,000.  A 
grain  exporting  house  offered  a  cargo  of 
grain  to  a  house  in  Denmark  for  |il.07  a 
bushel;  the  British  censor  delayed  the  mes- 
sage and  when  it  was  finally  delivered  to  the 
Danish  house  the  price  per  bushel  had  be- 
come $1.03.  The  American  firm  had  to  stand 
a  loss  of  about  $10,000.  An  American  ex- 
porting firm  offered  a  quantity  of  ammuni- 
tion from  a  manufacturer  to  the  Russian 
Government;  the  cablegram  got  no  further 
than  London — but  several  days  later  J.  P. 
Morgan  &  Company  approached  the  manu-. 
facturer  in  the  case  directly  and  the  profits 
in  the  transaction  went  to  the  credit  of  the 
official  purchasing  agents  of  the  British 
Government. 

Protests  against  this  condition  of  affairs 
have  been  laid  before  the  Department  of 
State  by  organizations  and  individuals.  The 
Merchants  Association  of  New  York,  the 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Company,  the 
Swiss  People's  Bank  of  Berne,  the  American 
Trade  Agency  at  Rome,  Spanish  cotton  im- 
porters at  Barcelona,  Danish  firms,  the 
Chamber  of  Commerce  at  Naples,  the  New 
Orleans   Cotton   Exchange,   the   Galveston 


Cotton  Exchange,  the  Manila  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  coffee  exporting  houses  in  Rio 
de  Janeiro — these  and  many  others  have 
made  formal  complaint.  These  protests 
have  been  of  little  avail. 

To  a  formal  protest  from  the  Swiss  Gov- 
ersment,  the  British  General  Post  Office,  un- 
der whose  administration  the  direction  of 
the  censorship  falls,  stated  that  "in  order  to 
avoid  the  inconvenience  which  would  have 
arisen  from  a  total  stoppage  of  communica- 
tion it  was  decided  as  an  act  of  grace  (so 
underlined  in  the  original  communication 
made  by  the  British  Government,'  to  accept 
telegrams  for  transmission  on  the  under- 
standing that  they  were  to  be  accepted  at  the 
senders'  risk  and  subject  to  censorship  by 
the  British  authorities;  that  is,  that  they 
might  be  stopped,  delayed,  or  otherwise 
dealt  with  by  the  censors,  and  that  no  claim 
for  reimbursement  could  be  entertained." 

The  mere  "acceptance  of  telegrams  at  the 
owner's  risk"  is  "an  act  of  grace."  Only  as 
an  act  of  grace,  therefore,  are  American  ex- 
porters permitted  to  send  telegrams  which 
remain  undelivered  to  merchants  in  Greece, 
while  British  firms  later  offer  the  same  prop- 
osition to  the  same  Greek  concerns  to  whom 
the  suppressed  cables  were  addressed.  Onlv 
as  an  act  of  grace,  again,  is  an  American 
grain  exporter  permitted  to  sell  a  cargo  of 
grain  for  four  cents  less  a  bushel  than  he 
had  quoted  it,  thereby  sustaining  a  loss  of 
$10,000.  Only  an  act  of  grace,  is  the  propo- 
sition of  an  American  firm  to  Russia,  Great 
Britain's  ally,  suppressed,  and  the  transac- 
tion diverted  into  the  hands  of  J.  P.  Mor- 
gan &  Company. 

The  extent  of  the  loss  caused  by  this  act 
of  grace  is  not  readily  computable,  but  in 
known  specific  cases  it  already  amounts  to 
many  millions  of  dollars. 

Specific  instances  of  interference  which 
have  formed  the  basis  of  representations 
from  the  Department  of  State  to  Downing 
Street  will  illustrate  England's  absolute  con- 
trol of  American  commercial  messages  to 
neutral  European  countries  and  Brazil.' 

On  November  15,  1914,  the  director  of 
the  Swiss  People's  Bank  at  Berne,  through 
the  American  Minister  to  Switzerland, 
Pleasant  A.  Stovall,  complained  to  the  De- 
partment of  State  that  telegrams  to  New 
York  from  Swiss  financial  institutions  were 
never  delivered.  Messages  between  Berne 
and  New  York  could  be  routed  in  several 
ways:  overland  to  Brest  and  thence  by  the 
French  cable  (Compagnie  Francaise  des 
Cables  Telegraphiques)  to  New  York,  pass- 
ing through  the  French  censor's  hands  at 
Brest;  or  overland  and  by  cable  to  London, 
thence  to  an  Irish  or  English  cable  station, 

v-^ 

'See    Department   of    State    Publication,   "Diplomatic 

Correspondence  with  Belligerent  Governments,"  p.  77. 
'Ibid,  p.  93. 


42 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


thence  to  Newfoundland  or  Nova  Scotia  and 
thence  to  New  York,  passing  through  the 
British  censor's  hands  at  London.  It  is  im- 
possible to  reach  Switzerland  without  pass- 
ing the  British  or  the  French  censor.  In  the 
case  of  the  Swiss  People's  Bank,  the  mes- 
sages never  got  beyond  the  censor.  And 
nothing  could  be  done  about  it. 

The  same  conditions  govern  communica- 
tions with  Italy,  Greece  and  all  Mediteran- 
ean  countries.  It  is  impossible  to  cable  these 
countries  without  encountering  the  French 
or  British  censor.  He  must  read  all  mes- 
sages, and  he  can  and  does  suppress  at  will, 
without  notification  of  stoppage.  In  case 
of  protest,  he  blandly  answers  that  he  has 
no  records  of  his  activity,'  and  that  is  all 
that  there  is  to  it.  If  he  chooses  to'  hand  a 
message  to  a  British  competitor  of  an  Amer- 
ican firm,  he  can.  He  has  no  records.  Cable 
communication  is  permitted  only  as  an  act 
of  grace,  anyway. 

The  particular  case  in  which  the  British 
censor  was  unable  to  trace  suppressed  mes- 
sages illustrates  our  difficulties  in  handling 
a  valuable  part  of  our  South  American  trade 
— Brazil's  coffee  and  rubber.  Nine  tele- 
grams between  March  12,  1915,  and  April 
20th,  from  L.  C.  Fallon  &  Company,  New  Or- 
leans, routed  over  the  Postal  Telegraph  Com- 
pany to  New  York,  thence  to  the  Azores  by 
the  Commercial  Cable  Company,  thence  to 
Rio  de  Janeiro  by  the  Western  Pacific  Cable 
Company,  a  British  concern,  never  reached 
their  destination.  Another  telegram  from 
C.  A.  Fairchild  &  Co.,  New  York,  to  the 
same  address,  "Omstein,  Rio  de  Janeiro," 
also  vanished.  "Ornstein"  is  a  German  ap- 
pearing name.  These  cables  were  probably 
promptly  sent  to  the  London  General  Post 
Office.  One  of  them  was  found.  The  rest 
vanished  as  utterly  as  though  they  had  been 
smoke.  There  were  no  records,  nothing — 
and  no  liability. 

The  following  items  serve  to  show  Amer- 
ican dependence  on  British  lines  in  the  East : 
On  August  21st  and  August  22,  1914,  two 
code  telegrams  from  the  Colonel  command- 
ing the  United  States  forces  at  Tientsin  to 
the  Commanding  General  in  the  Philippines 
were  detained  by  the  British  censor  at  Hong 
Kong.  The  messages  were  signed  "Tilson" 
and  "Rowell,''  and  despatched  to  a  code  ad- 
dress. The  decoding  of  this  address  was  a 
matter  of  a  moment;  but  not  a  moment's 
effort  was  made.  The  telegrams  were  sup- 
pressed. And  for  two  days,  the  commander 
of  the  United  States  forces  in  China  was 
left  out  of  touch  with  his  superiors  in  the 
Philippines  because  of  the  act  of  the  Brit- 
ish censor. 

On  another  occasion,  in  December,  1914, 
a  code  message  from  the  American  Minister 
to  China  at  Peking,  Paul  S.  Renisch,  to  the 
American  Consul-General  in  the  British  pos- 

'"Diplomatic  Correspondence  with  Belligerent  Govern- 
ments," page  94. 


session  at  Hong  Kong,  G.  E.  Anderson,  was 
held  up — though  subsequently  allowed  to 
pass. 

In  both  instances  the  reason  advanced  was 
the  use  of  a  cipher,  not  permitted  by  the 
regulations  laid  down  by  the  British.  The 
United  States  Government  accepted  the  reg- 
ulation, but  the  incident  illustrates  the  sway 
of  the  British  censor  and  the  dependence  of 
this  nation  upon  Great  Britain  for  tele- 
graphic communication  with  the  world.  Our 
direct  relations  with  our  possessions  in  the 
East  are  dependent  upon  a  single  line,  which 
is  crossed  by  the  British  line  from  Van- 
couver to  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  The 
point  of  junction  of  these  two  lines,  readily 
found,  offers  the  exact  location  at  which  to 
intercept  communications  with  Manila,  if 
this  was  not  done  to  the  island  of  Van- 
couver. 

If  occasion  were  to  arise,  the  United 
States  could  be  immediately  isolated.  All 
our  trans-Atlantic  lines  pass  through  Brit- 
ish territory  or  that  of  her  allies.  The  Ger- 
man cable  is  out  of  commission.  The  French 
cable  might  or  might  not  be  available.  Pana- 
ma, Porto  Rico,  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines 
could  be  detached  from  us  by  a  few  snaps  of 
the  cable  cutter. 

Wireless  telegraphy  and  telephony  are  not 
so  readily  blocked.  But  as  a  means  of  com- 
munication they  are  uncertain,  subject  to 
weather  conditions,  and,  above  all,  they  are 
non-secretive.  Privacy  in  communication  is 
impossible ;  theoretically  attainable  in  slight 
measure  by  the  use  of  codes,  it  is  never  safe. 

Yet  in  view  of  the  present  circumstances 
and  the  losses  so  far  sustained  by  American 
business  firms,  the  project  of  allowing 
greater  freedom  in  the  commercial  uses  of 
the  wireless  stations  might  seem  advisable. 
Within  a  short  time,  in  addition  to  the  wire- 
less routes  already  in  use,  direct  communica- 
tions between  the  Cape  Cod  coast  and  Nor- 
way will  be  established.  By  the  exercise  of 
a  judicious  but  intelligent  censorship,  by 
granting  the  use  of  specified  codes,  Ameri- 
can firms  doing  business  with  Europe  might 
be  assured  of  greater  freedom  and  con- 
venience in  their  communications  with  their 
European  correspondents.  Despite  protests 
innumerable,  the  British  Government  has 
been  unwilling  to  grant  to  reputable  Ameri- 
can merchants  and  associations  privileges 
which  they  should  have  and  reasonable  im- 
munity from  the  activities  of  a  not  too  intel- 
ligent censor. 

A  study  of  the  map  of  undersea  com- 
munications, makes  one  thing  convincingly 
clear:  Great  Britain  not  only  dominates 
trade  at  sea,  she  practically  controls  all 
means  of  quick  communication  between  the 
United  States  and  Europe,  Asia,  Africa, 
Australia  and  South  America.  We  are  com- 
pletely at  the  mercy  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  this  respect. 


VII 


OUR   LARGER   INTERESTS 


WILL  the  jwsitions  which  the  present 
Administration  has  taken,  during 
the  progress  of  the  European  war, 
with  reference  to  maritime  warfare,  bear  in- 
spection in  the  cool  light  of  the  best  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States?  To  raise  the 
question  is  to  make  no  reflection  upon  the 
patriotism  of  the  Administration.  What- 
ever may  have  been  the  ruling  motives  which 
determined  them,  there  is  some  reason  to  be- 
lieve that,  from  one  cause  or  another,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  has  taken 
a  series  of  positions  which,  when  scrutinized 
in  the  light  of  commercial  and  political  pos- 
sibilities of  the  future,  work  precisely  the 
wrong  way,  so  far  as  the  interests  of  Amer- 
ica are  concerned. 

Consider : 

Should  the  United  States  ever  become  in- 
volved in  war,  the  war  would  be  one  of  de- 
fense on  our  part.  The  American  people 
would  not  sanction  a  war  of  aggression 
abroad.  No  one  contemplates  aggression. 
We  entertain  no  ideas  of  aggrandizement 
that  suggest  an  aggressive  policy.  Tlie  most 
pi'onounced  advocates  of  a  big  army  and  a 
big  navy  dare  not  urge  more  than  a  policy 
of  "preparedness"  against  attack. 

AVhat,  then,  would  be  the  effect  of  the  poli- 
cies of  the  present  Administration  upon  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  defend  itself 
in  a  foreign  war? 

The  foreign  wars  in  which  we  might  pos- 
sibly become  involved  fall  into  the  following 
general  classes : 

(1)  A  war  with  some  other  Power  or 
Powers  on  the  American  Continent. 

(2)  A  war  with  a  European  Power  or 
a  European  alliance. 

(3)  A  war  with  an  Asiatic  Power  or  an 
Asiatic  alliance. 

(4)  A  war  with  allied  European  and 
American,  allied  European  and  Asiatic,  or 
allied  American  and  Asiatic  Powers. 

1.  Suppose  we  were  engaged  in  war  with 
another  American  Power. 

We  have  taken  the  ground  that  it  is  legiti- 
mate for  the  manufacturers  of  any  nation  to 
supply  the  armies  of  another  nation  with 
arms  and  ammunition.  We  have  gone  fur- 
ther than  this;  we  have  taken  the  jwsition 
that  for  a  Power  to  deny  the  armies  of  an- 
other Power  arms  and  ammunition  would  be 


unneutral;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  people  of  one  country  to  supply  the 
armies  of  a  belligerent  Power  with  muni- 
tions of  war.  In  a  war  between  the  United 
States  and  another  American  Power,  it 
would  consequently  be  the  duty  of  European 
and  Asiatic  arms  and  ammunition  manufac- 
turers to  supply  our  opponent  with  weapons 
with  which  to  fight  against  us.  But  this  is 
opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

2.  The  case  would  be  still  worse  in  the 
event  of  a  war  between  the  United  States 
and  a  European  Power.  Under  the  prece- 
dents established  by  Mr.  Wilson's  Adminis- 
tration, it  would  be  the  duty  of  all  Euroi)ean 
and  Asiatic  manufacturers  to  furnish  arms 
and  ammunition  to  the  Power  combating  us. 
True,  it  would  be  their  duty  likewise  to  sup- 
ply us  with  arms  and  ammunition.  But 
these  would  never  be  delivered  to  us.  For, 
while  the  manufacturers  of  tlie  various 
European  and  Asiatic  countries  would  have 
no  difficulty  in  transporting  munitions  of 
war  overland  to  the  army  and  navy  of  the 
European  Power  .at  war  with  us,  they  could 
by  no  means  send  them  across  the  seas.  We 
have  acceded,  practically,  to  the  proposition 
that  a  blockade  may  be  laid  anywhere ;  it  is 
no  longer  necessary,  under  our  admissions, 
that  a  blockade  be  laid  before  particular 
ports  or  that  it  be  actually  maintained  by 
ships.  A  torpedo  boat  or  two  in  the  Strait 
of  Gibraltar,  a  few  mines  in  the  English 
Channel  and  the  North  Sea,  and  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  of  the  United  States  would  be  in  a 
state  of  blockade.  Not  only  no  ammunition, 
but  nothing  else,  could  get  through.  We 
should  have  all  the  ammunition  makers  of 
Europe  and  Asia  furnishing  our  opponent 
with  guns  and  shells,  while  Ave  ourselves 
would  be  thrown  upon  our  own  resources. 

3.  In  the  event  of  a  Avar  with  an  Asiatic 
Power,  that  Powei*  could  procure  overland 
from  Europe  all  the  munitions  of  war  she 
desired,  and  it  would  be  the  duty  of  Euro- 
pean Powers  to  furnish  her  with  these  in- 
struments of  combat.  But  it  would  be 
opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
to  have  Japan,  for  instance,  supplied  from 
Europe  with  arms  to  be  used  against  us. 

4.  In  the  event  of  an  alliance  between 
European  and  Asiatic  Powers — and  this  is 
precisely  the  combination  of  Powers  most 
likely  to  envisage  us — the  situation  would 


44 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


OUR  LARGER  INTERESTS 


45 


be  far  worse.  All  the  arms  manufactories 
in  the  rest  of  the  world  would  be  combined 
against  the  United  States.  We  should  prob- 
ably not  be  able  to  get  anything  overseas 
into  our  ports. 

The  biggest  navy  we  shall  ever,  by  any 
possibility,  build  would  be  none  too  big  to 
guard  our  own  extensive  coasts.  We  have — 
or  Mr.  Wilson's  Administration  has — ^made 
the  submarine  impossible  as  a  weapon  of 
defense,  to  say  nothing  of  attack.  Other- 
wise by  far  the  most  potent  weapon  of  mari- 
time defense  thus  far  invented,  we  have  de- 
clared it  an  illegitimate  weapon.  The  sub- 
marine, we  say,  must  visit  and  search  be- 
fore it  acts.  But  a  submarine  cannot  visit 
and  search;  a  single  shot  from  the  lightest 
gun  of  a  merchantman  can  sink  a  submarine. 

Furthermore,  we  have  taken  the  position 
that  a  neutral  vessel  carrying  ammunition 
may  not  be  sunk  if  it  happens  to  have  a  neu- 
tral citizen  or  subject  on  board. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  there  is  noth- 
ing whicli  more  vitally  concerns  the  well- 
being,  indeed  the  very  existence,  of  the 
United  States,  more  than  the  maintenance  of 
the  laws  of  war  at  sea  as  enunciated  by  the 
Declaration  of  London.  Being  isolated  alike 
from  Europe  and  Asia,  our  great  defense  is 
the  sea.  We  have  little  interest  in  land  war- 
fare, but  we  have  the  deepest  interest  in  sea 
warfare.  And  it  is  not  the  naval  battles, 
spectacular  as  these  are,  that  concern  us. 
For  us  the  important  matters  are  the  laws 
of  contraband,  blockade  and  coast  defense. 

The  rules  concerning  blockade  in  which 
we  are  most  interested  are  those  laid  down 
in  articles  1,  2  and  18  of  the  Declaration  of 
London,  1909 : 

1.  A  blockade  must  not  extend  beyond  the  ports 
and  coasts  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

2.  In  accordance  with  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of 
1856,  a  blockade,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effec- 
tive— that  is  to  say,  it  must  be  maintained  by  a  force 
sufficient  really  to  prevent  access  to  the  enemy  coast 
line. 

18.  The  blockading  forces  must  not  bar  access  to 
neutral  ports  or  coasts. 

The  British  Order  in  Council  of  March 
11,  while  not  us?ng  the  word  blockade,  prac- 
tically declared  a  blockade  of  the  German 
coasts  and  of  the  coasts  of  the  neutral  coun- 
tries contiguous  to  Germany.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  there  is  no  blockade  at  all.  By  the 
simple  expedient  of  planting  mines  in  the 
Strait  of  Dover  and  between  the  Orkney 
and  Shetland  Islands  and  the  coast  of  Nor- 
way, neutral  ships  are  compelled  to  enter 
British  ports  in  order  to  obtain  pilots 
through  the  mine  fields.  The  waters  north 
of  Scotland  are  patrolled  by  small  boats. 
Battleships  and  cruisers  are  safe  in  British 
harbors,  keeping  out  of  the  way  of  German 
submarines. 

Contraband  is  defined  by  the  British 
memorandum  attached  to  the  report  of  the 


London  Conference  on  the  Rules  of  Warfare 
at  Sea  as  "neutral  property  on  board  ship 
on  the  high  seas  or  in  the  territorial  waters 
of  either  belligerent  which  (1)  is  by  nature 
capable  of  being  able  to  assist  in,  and  (2) 
is  on  its  way  to  assist  in  the  naval  or  mili- 
tary operations  of  the  enemy."  When  these 
two  elements  are  combined,  the  capture  of 
the  goods  by  a  belligerent  is  permissible.  By 
the  second  simple  expedient  of  considering 
that  all  merchandise  on  the  way  to  Germany, 
or  to  countries  adjacent  to  Germany,  is  ca- 
pable of  assisting  in  the  naval  or  military 
operations  of  Germany,  and  by  the  further 
assumption  that  it  is  on  its  way  actually  to 
assist  in  such  naval  or  military  operations, 
the  whole  distinction  between  contraband 
and  innocent  goods  has  been  obliterated  by 
Great  Britain. 

In  consequence  of  this  new  kind  of  block- 
ade, and  of  the  new,  all-embracing  definition 
of  "contraband,"  our  entire  commerce  to  and 
from  Europe  is  surrendered  to  the  control 
of  any  Power  which  has  a  predominant 
naval  strength  or  which  has  a  predominant 
geographical  position. 

Against  no  country  could  these  admis- 
sions work  more  harm  than  against  the 
United  States,  separated  as  it  is  from  Eu- 
rope by  two  oceans,  and,  moreover  and  espe- 
cially, commanded  as  are  its  coasts  by  the 
British  naval  stations,  whose  iron  ring 
around  us  must  appall  the  stoutest  heart 
that  contemplates  the  map. 

While  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  allows  its  people  to  be  plundered  by 
the  new  definition  of  contraband  enunciated 
by  Great  Britain,  it  takes,  with  regard  to 
goods  of  an  actual  and  always  admitted  con- 
traband character,  namely,  arms  and  ammu- 
nition, a  position  of  peculiar  contrast  to  its 
meek  admissions  with  regard  to  goods  here- 
tofore always  considered  innocent. 

There  has  been  some  difference  of  opinion 
among  nations  and  among  authorities  on  in- 
ternational law  as  to  the  duty  of  a  neutral 
government  to  prevent  its  subjects  engaging 
in  contraband  trade,  some  contending  that 
such  a  duty  exists;  others,  including  the 
United  States,  holding  that  the  neutral  State 
is  under  no  duty  to  stop  contraband  ex- 
ports, the  punishment  being  in  the  hands 
of  the  belligerent  adversely  affected  thereby. 
But  probably  never  has  a  nation  undertaken 
to  protect  its  citizens  in  the  contraband 
trade  and  to  claim  (what  the  United  State.j 
Government  claimed  in  its  recent  notes  to 
Austria)  that  contraband  trade  is  legiti- 
mate, and  that  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment has  no  control  over  it,  or  that  the  at- 
tempt to  exercise  such  control  would  be  un- 
neutral, and  therefore  impermissible. 

The  net  result  of  the  positions  we  have 
taken,  or  acceded  to  with  very  mild  protests, 
is  the  preposterous  one  that,  while  the  Gov- 


46 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS    "' 


ernment  of  the  United  States  has  no  control 
over  its  own  trade,  even  its  contraband 
trade,  with  belligerents,  any  belligerent 
that  is  physically  able  to  exercise  it  enjoys 
complete  control  over  our  trade,  even  in  the 
most  innocent  articles. 

Take  again  our  position  with  regard  to  the 
activity  of  submarines.  We  assert  that  a 
submarine  may  not  sink  merchant  vessels 
belonging  to  the  enemy  without  "visit  and 
search."  But  visit  and  search  is  a  right  and 
not  a  duty ;  a  right,  moreover,  the  assertion 
of  which  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  the 
United  States  combatted  for  many  years, 
finally  going  to  war  largely  in  its  contention 
against  it.  Visit  and  search,  furthermore, 
applies  only  to  neutral  vessels.  It  was  an 
unheard  of  thing  until  the  United  States 
Department  of  State  invented  it,  that  a  belli- 
gerent was  compelled  to  visit  and  search  an 
enemy  ship  before  dealing  with  it.  Visit 
and  search  was  a  privilege  claimed  with  re- 
gard to  a  neutral  vessel ;  never  a  duty  incum- 
bent upon  a  warship  with  regard  to  a  bellig- 
erent vessel.  Its  purpose  was  that  of  ascer- 
taining whether  the  suspected  craft  carried 
contraband.  But  there  is  no  longer  a  neces- 
sity for  that,  because  all  vessels  leaving  our 
shores  for  Euroi)e  carry  contraband — under 
the  new  all-inclusive  definitions. 

We  insist  also  that  all  merchant  ships 
carrying  contraband  shall  be  free  from  at- 
tack until  after  it  is  ascertained  that  no 
neutral  citizen  or  subject  is  on  board.  We 
have  asserted  that  the  life  of  this  hypotheti- 
cal neutral  citizen  or  subject,  who  may  be 
or  may  not  be  aboard,  and  who  really  has 
no  right  to  be  on  board,  is  more  vital  than 
the  right  of  the  submarine  commander  to 
defend  the  lives  of  the  soldiers  of  his  coun- 
try who  are  beyond  all  question  in  the 
trenches  where  they  will  be  attacked  by  the 
ammunition  whicli  the  spared  ship  is  carry- 
ing. 

Now  no  question  is  raised  at  this  point 
regarding  the  justice  of  these  claims.  It  is 
merely  pointed  out  that  their  effect  would 
be  utterly  to  destroy  the  efficiency  of  any 
submarines  of  our  own  commission  to  de- 
fend our  coast  against  attack  or  to  prevent 
ammunition  from  reaching  any  enemies  we 
might  have. 

Considerable  sentiment  has  been  devel- 
oped in  the  United  States  in  favor  of  a 
larger  army  and  navy  by  way  of  prepared- 


ness for  future  wars.  But  the  increase  of 
our  army  to  half  a  million  men  and  the  doub- 
ling or  tripling  of  the  size  of  our  navy  will 
not  serve  to  overcome  the  disadvantage  we 
shall  labor  under  in  consequence  of  the 
precedents  we  are  allowing  Great  Britain  to 
pile  up  against  us  in  her  interpretation  of 
the  laws  of  the  sea,  and  the  precedents  we 
are  piling  up  against  Germany  in  our  inter- 
pretation of  the  laws  of  the  sea. 

We  shall  probably  never  send  an  army 
abroad,  at  least  not  to  the  other  hemisphere. 
Our  soldiers  will  stay  at  home  to  defend  our 
own  territory.  But  suppose  a  European  or 
an  Asiatic  enemy  obtains  a  foothold  in 
America,  or  an  American  Power  undertakes 
to  invade  us;  his  munitions  of  war,  in  his 
own  merchant  ships  even,  cannot  be  attacked 
by  our  submarines,  provided  he  brings  a  neu- 
tral passenger  with  him. 

And  as  for  our  great  navy,  what  good  is 
a  great  navy  unless  it  be  the  greatest  navy? 
Great  Britain  maintains  the  right  to  have  a 
navy  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  two  next  largest 
navies  in  the  world,  plus  ten  per  cent.  Is  it 
proposed  to  build  a  navy  greater  than  the 
British  navy?  Is  it  for  a  moment  believed 
that  England  would  permit  tliat?  And  even 
if  England  were  to  permit  it,  one  need  only 
take  a  glance  at  a  map  of  the  world  on  which 
is  displayed  Britain's  widely-scattered  and 
artfully-disposed  naval  stations  to  realize 
how  very  much  greater  indeed  an  American 
navy  would  have  to  be  to  hope  to  cope  suc- 
cessfully even  with  a  British  navy  consider- 
ably smaller.  But,  of  course,  our  navy 
would  not  go  abroad  on  aggressive  expedi- 
tions. Its  primary  work  would  be  to  defend 
our  territory — work  that  a  navy  of  sub- 
marines could  better  do,  if  we  had  not  ruled 
submarines  out  of  warfare.  We  might,  in- 
deed, do  some  blockade  work,  but  it  is  we 
ourselves  who  would  be  the  chief  victims  of 
the  blockade.  Great  Britain,  for  instance, 
by  her  control  of  the  narrow  passages 
through  which  the  commerce  of  the  world 
is  forced  to  pass,  could  practically,  without 
moving  a  ship,  cut  us  off  from  all  connection 
with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Because,  remem- 
ber, everything  is  contraband  now,  and  a 
blockade  may  be  thousands  of  miles  away 
from  the  ports  against  which  it  is  directed. 
And  not  England  alone,  but  any  other  Euro- 
pean naval  Power  could  cut  us  off  from  Eu- 
rope; while  in  conjunction  with  an  Asiatic 
naval  Power  our  enemy  could  absolutely 
close  our  ports. 


VIII 


LIST   OF  SHIPS   DETAINED 


Note. — It  is  impossible,  for  reasons  explained  on  page  Z2,  to  obtain  anything  like  a  full  list  of  ships  de- 
tained and  cargoes  seized  by  Great  Britain  on  their  voyages  between  the  United  States  and  other  neutral  coun- 
tries, but  the  following  list  of  carefully  verified  cases  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  methods  by  which  the  British 
Government  is  strangling  American  commerce. 

The  first  list  includes  the  cases  of  155  vessels  brought  into  British  ports  or  othenmse  detained  for  ex- 
amination. Of  these  40  were  forced  to  discharge  their  cargoes,  ivhich  were  held  for  prise  court  proceedings. 
Thirty  more  were  subjected  to  protracted  detention,  at  great  loss.  One  American  vessel  carrying  oil  to  Copen- 
hagen was  run  aground  by  the  English  prize  crew  aboard  her  off  the  coast  of  Scotland. 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  list  does  not  include  cases  like  that  of  fhe  WILHELMINA,  which,  when  seized 
by  the  British,  was  bound  for  Hamburg  with  an  innocent  cargo,  and  the  DACIA,  which  was  seized  by  the  French 
navy  under  British  instructions. 

Nor  does  this  list  include  the  vessels,  273  in  number,  recorded  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
in  an  appendix  to  its  note  of  October  zist,  as  having  been  detained  in  the  port  of  Kirkwall  alone,  between 
March  nth  and  June  17th.  The  Government  list  is  appended,  bringing  this  merely  illustrative  record  of  ships 
detained  up  to  a  total  of  428: 


LIST  OF   SHIPS   DETAINED 

S.S.  KUMERIC,  British. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  July  17,  1914,  (via  Newport  News,  July  24),  for  Bremen. 

Cargo — 49,000   bushels    of    grain. 

Taken  to  Queenstown,  August  2.  Detained  at  Liverpool,  August  19. 
S.S.  BERWINDMOOR,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  July  21,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 196,000  bushels  of  grain. 

Diverted  to  Falmouth,  August  5.    At  London,  August  21. 
S.S.  CAMPANELLO,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  July  30,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Sent  to  Cardiff,  August  12.     Detained. 
S.S.  SPENSER,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  July  31,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Sent  to  Liverpool. 
S.S.  SAINT  HELENA,  British. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  July  16,  1914  (via  Norfolk,  Virginia,  July  24),  for  Bremen  and  Hamburg. 

Cargo — Phosphate  rock,  wheat  and  cotton. 

Diverted  to  Alanchester.  Cargo  seized  August  12.  Phosphate  rock  released  as  well  as  part  of  cotton. 
Large  quantity  of  cotton  and  the  wheat  not  released,  including  SO  bales  of  cotton  shipped  by  Alex- 
ander Spunt  &  Company,  of  Houston,  Texas,  and  Bremen;  claimed  belonging  to  neutral  subjects  and  as 
such  not  subject  to  seizure,  also  on  ground  that  contract  of  sale  between  American  citizens  dated  May 
8,  1914. 

These  goods,  including  wheat,  condemned  in  Prize  Court. 
S.S.  PENLOVER,  British. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  July  18,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 264,000  bushels  of  grain. 

Diverted  to  Falmouth  and  ordered  to  London,  August  15. 
S.S.  KALOMO,  British. 

Sailed   from  New  Orleans,  July  24,   1914,   for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 64,000  bushels   of  grain. 

Detained  at  Falmouth.     At  London,  August  15. 
S.S.  ANDIJK,   Dutch. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  July  30,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 136.000  bushels  grain. 

Sent  to  Falmouth  for  orders.     Arrived  at  Rotterdam,  August  16. 
S.S.  NORUEGA,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  July  30,  1914,  for  Christiania. 

Cargo — 40,000  bushels  grain. 

Diverted  to  Falmouth.    Arrived  at  Christiania,  August  26. 
S.S.  ORTERIC,  British. 

■   Sailed  from  Galveston,  July  27,  1914.    (Newport  News,  August  4.) 

Detained  at  Queenstown,  August  17.    Arrived  at  Liverpool,  August  21.     Cargo  for  Bremen  and  Hamburg 
seized 
S.S.  NITONIAN,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  July  31,  1914,  for  Antwerp. 

Cargo — 142,000  bushels   grain. 

Diverted  to  Falmouth.     Arrived  at  London,  August  22.    At  Antwerp,  September  S. 
S.S.  GLENFINLAS,   British. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans.  August  1,  1914  (via  Norfolk,  August  7),  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 108,000  bushels  grain. 

Diverted  to  Falmouth,  August  26.    At  London,  September  1. 
S.S.  ST.  DUNSTAN,  British. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  August  4,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 122,400  bushels  grain. 

Diverted  to  Cork  for  orders.     At  Liverpool,  August  27.    At  Manchester,  September  5. 
S.S.  MIRAMICHI,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  July  3.  1914  (via  Galveston,  July  23),  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 16,000  bushels  of  wheat  (part  of  cargo)  shipped  by  Muir  &  Company  for  Rotterdam  to  be  de- 
livered to  George  Fries  &  Company  in  Colmar,  Germany,  and  Gebrueder  Zimmern  &  Company,  Mannheim, 
Germany.  Vessel  not  permitted  to  proceed  to  Rotterdam.  Taken  to  Eastham  and  cargo  consigned  to 
Germany  seized. 

Prize  Court  decided  that  goods  seized  were  property  of  the  American  claimants  and  not  subject  to  seizure. 

Ordered  released  to  claimants  (December,  1914). 
S.S.  KLOSTERFOS,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  28,  1914,  for  Christiania. 

Cargo — Flour  in  barrels. 

Vessel  stopped  and  boarded  by  British  officers  off  the  north  coast  of  Scotland  and  ordered  to  Aberdeen. 

Held  several  days  until  neutral  ownership  of  cargo  was  established.    Arrived  at  Christiania,  September  17. 
S.S.  VITALIA,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  19,  1914,  to  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Meat. 

Detained  at  Falmouth,  September  7. 
S.S.  LORENZO,  American,   (New  York  and  Porto  Rico  Line). 

Chartered  on  August  2,  1914,  by  Gans  S.S.  Line. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  6,  1914,  for  Buenos  Ayres. 

Cargo — Coal. 

Captured  by  British  and  taken  to  St.  Lucia,  September  12. 

October  16— Cargo  condemned. 

October  30— Vessel  condemned. 
S.S.  HEINA,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  August  7,  1914,  for  St.  Thomas. 

Cargo— Coal. 

Seized  September  13,  off  St.  Thomas,  by  French  cruiser  CONDE. 

Detained  six  months,  released  at  Fort  de  France,  March  20,  1915,  reached  New  York,  April  IS,  1915. 


50  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

S.S.  VESTFOS,  Norwegian.  ' 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  28,  1914,  for  Christiania. 

Cargo^Flour  in  barrels. 

Stopped  and  boarded  by  British  officers. 

Taken  to  Kirkwall.     Left  September  14.     Arrived  Christiania,  September  17. 
S.S.  RYNDAM,  Dutch    (Holland-America  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  8,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Seized  by  British  warship  and  brought  into  Cork  Harbor,  September  17.    Released  September  20,  at  Queens- 
town. 

Again  held  up  and  ordered  by  British  cruiser  (September  21)   to  enter  Falmouth.     Arrived  at  Rotterdam, 
September  24. 
S.S.  AMSTELDYK,  Dutch    (Holland-America  Line). 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  September  10,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Captured  by  British  cruiser  and  taken  to  Queenstown,  September  25.     Released.    Arrived  at  Rotterdam, 
October  12. 
S.S.  ROTTERDAM,  Dutch. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  15,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :    American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 
United  Metals  Selling  Company. 
American  Can   Metal  Company. 
L.  Vogelstein   &   Company.  ' 

Norfolk  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 

Seized  September  26.     En  route  while  copper  was  made  conditional  contraband  (absolute  contraband  only 
since  October  29). 

Copper  bought  by  Great  Britain. 

Arrived   Rotterdam,    October    12. 
S.S.  SLOLERDIJK,  Dutch. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  9,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo— Copper. 

Shippers :     American  Metal  Company,  Ltd. 
L.   Vogelstein   &  Company. 

Seized  September  26.     En  route  while  copper  was  made  conditional  contraband  (absolute  contraband  only 
since  October  29). 

Copper  bought  by  British   Government. 

Arrived  Rotterdam,  October  6,  1914. 
S.S.  POTSDAM,  Dutch. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  22,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :    American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 
United  Metals  Selling  Company. 
American   Metal   Company,   Ltd. 
L.  Vogelstein   &   Company. 

Seized  October  9. 

Copper  bought  by  British  Government. 

Arrived  Rotterdam,  October  IS. 
S.S.  WESTERDYK,  Dutch. 

Sailed  from  Baltimore,  September  21,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shipper:    American   Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 

Seized  October  9. 

Copper  bought  by  British  Government. 

Arrived  Rotterdam,  October  18. 
S.S.  BETA,  Swedish. 

Sailed   from   Philadelphia,   September  23,   1914,  for  Helsingborg  and  Oscarshamn. 

Detained  and  taken  to  Kirkwall  for  examination,  October  12. 

Arrived  at  Helsingborg,  October  21. 
S.S.  AQUILA,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  23,  1914,  for  Christiansand,  Korsoer  and  Copenhagen. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  October  12,  for  examination. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,   October  24. 
S.S.  NICHOLAS  CUNEO,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  26,  1914,  for  Christiania. 

Detained  and  taken  to  Kirkwall  for  examination,  October  12. 

Arrived  at  Christiania,  October  19. 
S.S.  NOORDAM,  Dutch   .(Holland-America  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  6,  1914,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo  of  about  13,000  tons  consigned  to  Dutch  Government. 

Wheat,  flour,   foodstuffs  diverted  to  Falmouth,  October  15. 
S.S.  LEANDER,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  25,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Grain. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  October  16. 

Detained  for  general  inspection. 

Left  October  17. 
S.S.  BRINDILLA,  Under  American  Flag. 

Sailed  from  Bayonne,  New  Jersey,  on  October  13,  1914. 

Cargo — Kerosene  for  Alexandria,  Egypt. 

Steamer  bought  by  Standard  Oil  Company  from  Riedermann  Line  and  transferred  from  German  to  Ameri- 
can registry  under  Underwood  Amendment  to  the  Panama  Canal  Act  of  1914. 

Seized  by  British  cruiser  CARONIA  just  outside  three-mile  limit  off  Sandy  Hook,  October  18,  and  taken  to 
Halifax,  Nova  Scotia.    Submitted  to  Prize  Court. 

Released.    Left  Halifax,  October  30. 
S.S.  DANIA,   Danish    (Scandinavian-American  Line). 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  September  26,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained  about  one  week  at  Kirkwall. 


LIST  OF  SHIPS  DETAINED  51 

S.S.  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER,  American. 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  September  27,  1914,  for  Copenhagen,  Denmark. 
Captured  and  taken  to  Orkney  Islands.    At  Kirkwall,  October  17. 
Released  upon  protest  by  United  States  after  considerable  delay. 
S.S.  PRINZ  DER  NEDERLANDEN,  Dutch   (Royal  Dutch  West  India  Mail). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  4,  1914,  for  Havre  and  Amsterdam  by  way  of  West  Indian  and  Venez- 
uelan ports. 
Taken  at  Falmouth  on  October  21.     Arrived  at  Amsterdam,  October  26, 
S.S.  SAN,  American,  oil  tank  (Sun  Oil  Company,  Philadelphia). 
Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  October  8,  1914,  for  Amsterdam. 

Diverted  to  Falmouth  and  released  on  October  25,  at  request  of  American  Government.  Arrived  at  Amster- 
dam, October  29. 
S.S.  MARENGO,  British. 

Sailed  October  10,  1914,  for  Sweden. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     L.  Vogelstein  &  Company. 
Held  at  Hull,  October  25. 
S.S.  ASCOT,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  10,  1914,  for  Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper.    Consigned  to  order,  but  intended  for  delivery  to  Brown,  Borari  &  Company,  in   Baden, 
Switzerland. 

Shippers  :     American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company  450   Tons 

United  Metals  Selling  Company 500      " 

American  Metal  Company,  Ltd 3(X)      " 

L.  Vogelstein  &  Co 50      " 

Norfolk  Smelting  and  Refining  Company  40      " 

Total  1,340      " 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  October  26,  and  seized. 

To  Prize  Court. 
S.S.  SAN  GIOVANNI,  Italian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  14,  1914,  for  Naples. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company.  • 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  October  26.     Cargo  suspected  to  be  intended  for  re-export  to  Germany. 

Arrived  Naples,  November  5. 
S.S.  REGINA  D'lTALIA.  Italian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  IS,  1914,  for  Naples  and  Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper.    2(X)  tons  consigned  to  order,  but  intended  for  delivery  to  U.  Vedorelli,  Milan,  Italy. 

Seized  on  October  26,  at  Gibraltar,  and  held  for  Prize  Court.    Cargo  suspected  to  be  intended  for  re-export 
to  Germany. 

Arrived  Genoa,  November  11. 
S.S.  JOHN  D.  ARCHIBALD,  American  Tank  Steamer  (Standard  Oil  Company). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  23,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo — Oil. 

Held  up  by  French  cruiser  and  convoyed  to  Antibes,  France. 

Detained  two  days  pending  decision  as  to  whether  cargo  was  contraband. 

Finally  released  and  allowed  to  proceed. 
S.S.  PROSPER  HI,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  3,  1914,  for  Copenhagen  and  Gothenburg. 

Cargo — Copper.     1,343,895  pounds  of  copper,  valued  at  $166,649  for  Copenhagen;  246,361  pounds,  valued  at 
$30,559  for  Gothenburg ;  also  foodstuffs  and  crude  rubber.    Arrived  at  Leith,  October  27. 

Detained  at  Scottish  port  and  placed  before  the  Prize  Court,  copper  being  suspected  for  re-export  to  Ger- 
many. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  November  12. 
S.S.  SECURITY,  American   (Standard  Oil  Company  Tug). 

On  or  about  October  27,  1914,  boarded  and  searched  at  St.  John,  N.  B.,  by  Canadian  soldiers,  who  detained 
three  German  members  of  the  crew. 

Upon  protest  of  Captain,  men  were  released,  but  not  allowed  to  leave  Canada. 
S.S.  TYR,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  29,  1914,  for  Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     United  Metals  Selling  Company. 
L.  Vogelstein   &   Company. 

Held  at  Glasgo\y,  November  2. 

Arrived  Gothenburg,  December  17. 
S.S.  FRANCISCO,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  17,  1914,  for  Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     L.  Vogelstein  &  Company. 

Held  at  Hull,  November  2. 
S.S.  ULLER,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  Savannah,  Georgia,  October  26,  1914,  for  Gothenburg. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained  for  inspection  at  Kirkwall  and  allowed  to  proceed. 
S.S.  ITALIA,  Italian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  24,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :    American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 
United  Metals  Selling  Company. 
Norfolk  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 

Held  at  Gibraltar,   November  8. 
S.S.  VERONA,  Italian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  24,  1914,  for  Naples,  Genoa,  and  Palermo. 

Cargo — Copper.  ■ 

Shippers :    American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 
United  Metals   Selling  Company. 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  November  8. 


52  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

S.S.  PALERMO,  Italian. 

Sailed  from  Boston,  October  20,  1914,  to  Naples  and  Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers  :    American  Metal  Company,  Ltd.    300  tons. 

200  tons  of  copper  consigned  to  order,  but  intended  for  Schweizer  Metallwerke,  Thonne,  Switzerland. 
Held  at  Gibraltar,  November  2.    To  Prize  Court. 

Arrived  November  7,  at  Naples. 
S.S.  SAN  GUGLIELMO,  Italian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  21,  1914,  for  Naples. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :    tjnited  Metals  Selling  Company. 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  November  8. 
S.S.  DUCA  DI  GENOA,  Italian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  17,  1914,  for  Naples  and  Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  November  8. 
S.S.  ANTARES,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  October  22,  1914,  for  Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     United  Metals  Selling  Company. 
L.  Vogelstein  &  Company. 

Held  at  Liverpool. 

Arrived  at  Ardrossan,  November  9,  for  Gothenburg. 
S.S.  KROONLAND,   American. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  15,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo — Copper  and  rubber. 

Copper  Shippers :    American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 
United  Metals  Selling  Company. 

Held  November  8,  at  Gibraltar. 

Ordered  before  Prize  Court. 

Arrived  Naples,  November  11. 
S.S.  PLATURIA,  American  (entered  under  American  Registry  in  October,  1914,  Standard  Oil  Company). 

Belonged  formerly  to  Deutsch  Amerikanische  Petroleum  Gesellschaft  {controlled  by  Standard  Oil  Company). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  5,  1914,  for  Aarhus,  Denmark. 

Cargo — Illuminating  Oil. 

Seized  and  taken  to  Stornoway,  Lewis  Islands,  Scotland. 
S.S.  KIRUNA,   Swedish    (Scandinavian- American  Line) 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  25,  for  Swedish  ports. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained  four  days  at  Kirkwall. 
S'.S.  EUROPA,  Italian  (La  Veloce  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  ^,  1914,  for  Naples  and  Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 

Detained  at  Gibraltar,  November  9. 

Alleged  contraband.     Arrived  at  Naples,  November  13. 
S.S.  BJORNSTJERNE  BJORNSON,  Norwegian   (Gans  S.S.  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  28,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall,  November  10. 

Left  Kirkwall,  November  15. 

Ordered  to  Leith,  November  16. 

Cargo  discharged  and  seized.  December  21. 

Steamer  detained  till  May  25,  1915. 
S.S.  FRIDLAND,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  28,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General,  including  meat. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall^  November  10. 

Left  Kirkwall,  November  27. 

Ordered  to  Newcastle,  November  29. 

Cargo  discharged,  January  5,  1915. 

Steamer  detained  till  early  in  May,  1915. 
S.S.  IDAHO,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  24,  1914,  for  Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     L.  Vogelstein  &  Company. 

Held  at  Hull,   November  10. 

Left  Hull,  November  30,  for  New  York. 
S.S.  PERUGIA,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  8,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :    United  Metals  Selling  Company. 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  November  13. 
S.S.  FRAM,  Norwegian   (Gans  S.S.  Line). 

Left  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  October  22,  1914,  for  Danish  ports. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Taken  into  Aberdeen,  November  13.    Ordered  to  Hull. 

Left  Newcastle,  December  8. 

Arrived  at  Nyborg,  December  18. 
S.S.  JOS.  W.  FORDNEY,  American   (American  Exporters'  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  7,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken  into  Falmouth  and  detained  two  days,  then  allowed  to  proceed. 
S.S.  TAURUS,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  1,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :    United  Metals  Selling  Company. 

Held  at  Glasgow,  November  13. 


LIST  .OF  SHIPS  DETAINED  53 

S.S.  TABOR,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  26,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo^Copper. 

Shippers :     United  Metals  Selling  Company. 

Norfolk  Smelting  and  Refining  Company. 

Held  at  Gilbraltar,  November  J3. 

To  Prize  Court. 

Left  Gibraltar,  November  29. 
S.S.  ALFRED  NOBEL,  Norwegian  (Cans  S.S.  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  20,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General,  including  meat. 

At  Lerwick,  November  7. 

Left  Lerwick,  November  14. 

Ordered  to  Liverpool,  cargo  discharged,  and  seized  November  17. 

Prize  Court. 

Released  May  13,  1915. 
S.S.  TORONTO,  British. 

Sailed   from   New  York,   October  31,   1914,   for   Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers  :     L.  Vogelstein  &  Company. 

Held  at  Hull,  November  IS. 
S.S.  SIF,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  30,  1914,  for  Gothenburg. 

Cargo — Copper.  400  tons  sold  and  consigned  to  B.  Ursells'  Successors,  Stockholm,  in  order  to  meet  objec- 
tions to  consignments  "to  order." 

Held  at  Glasgow,  November  18.  for  Prize  Court. 

Arrived  at  Gothenburg,  December  17. 
S.S.  NORHEIM,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  October  17,  1914,  for  Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     United  Metals  Selling  Company. 
L.  Vogelstein  &  Company. 

Held  at  Gibraltar,  November  18. 
S.S.  SIGRUN,  Norwegian. 

Left  New  York,  November  9,  1914,  for  Gothenburg  and  Malmoe. 

Seized  November  26,  and  taken  into  Newport,  England,  December  2. 

Vessel  detained  pending  search  for  suspected  contraband. 

Cargo  held  for  Prize  Court  included,  for  Gothenbu  rg  560,894  pounds  of  copper  valued  at  $70,047;  222  pack- 
ages crude  rubber  valued  at  $21,414;  1,596  barrels  lubricating  oil  valued  at  $8,778.    For  Malmoe:  1,009,532 

•  pounds  copper  valued  at  $126,871 ;  600  barrels  lubricating  oil  valued  at  $3,300.  For  balance  of  cargo,  con- 
sisting of  oilcake,  paraffine,  cornoil,  oats,  cocoa,  feed,  tea,  furs,  engines  and  machinery,  sewing  machines  and 
oleo,  reshipment  allowed. 

Sailed  for  Gothenburg,  January  15,  1915. 

Arrived  Gothenburg,  January  25.  \ 

Arrived  Malmoe,  February  16. 
S.S.  GALILEO,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  7,  1914,  for  Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers  :    L.  Vogelstein  &  Co. 

Held  at  Hull,  November  26. 

Left  Hull,  December  13,  for  New  York. 
S.S.  KIM,  Norwegian  (Gans  S.S.  Line). 

.Sailed  from  New  York,  November  11,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General,  including  meat. 

Taken  into  Falmouth,  November  27;  left  December  4. 

Ordered  to  Newcastle,  December  8;  cargo  discharged  and  seized  January  5,  1915. 

March  27,  Prize  Court  ordered  payment  for  cargo. 

Steamer  detained  until  May  23,  1915. 
S.S.  TANCRED,  Norwegian   (Gans  S.S.  Line). 

Left  Port  Arthur,  Texas,  November  13,  1914,  for  Danish  ports. 

Cargo — Cotton 

Arrived  at  Falmouth.    Detained  for  inspection,  November  28. 

Left  November  30.    Arrived  at  Aarhus,  Denmark,  December  10,  where  cargo  discharged. 
S.S.  STRINDA,  Norwegian  (Gans  S.S.  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  14,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken  into  Falmouth,  November  29.    After  inspection  allowed  to  proceed. 

Left  December  3. 
S.S.  RAN,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  13,  1914,  for  Liverpool  and  Sweden. 

Cargo — Cotton-seed  products,  copper  and  leather ;  part  for  Liverpool,  balance  for  Gothenburg  and  Malmoe. 

Taken  into  custody  by  British  authorities,  November  29,  and  held  as  a  prize.    Released  December  26. 
S.S.  SANDEFJORD,  Norwegian, 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  27,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Prize  crew  put  on  board  outside  of  Sandy  Hook. 

Arrived  at  Halifax,   November  30. 

Cargo  partly  discharged,  suspected  contraband. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  January  15,  1915. 

Sailed,  January  16. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  January  19. 
S.S.  GEORGE  HAWLEY,  American   (.A.merican  Exporters'  Line.    C.  H.  Sprague  .&  Son,  Boston). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  15,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken  into  Falmouth,  November  30;  gave  up  ship's  papers  voluntarily  for  examination. 

Reason  for  detention :    None  given  to  Master  officially. 

Released  January  2.  1915,  and  proceeded  with  full  cargo  to  destination. 

Other  circumstMices  :  Master  protested  in  writing  on  December  5,  1914.  Master  was  verbally  informed  by 
Customs   Officers   that  they  would   have  to  hold  the  vessel  on  account  of  the  flour,  wheat  and  oil  on 


64  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

board.     Later  Master  was  simply  informed  verbally  that  trouble  was  because  the  consignee  of  the  550 
barrels  of  oil  was  at  that  time  under  suspicion  by  the  British  Government.     On  January  1,  1915,  Master 
was  told  to  proceed  with  his  full  cargo  on  board  and  no  excuse  or  reason  given  for  the  thirty-three  days' 
detention  at  Falmouth.     Damage  for  detention  at  charter  rates,  etc.,  etc.,  amounted  to  $14,000. 
S.S.  CANTON,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  17,  1914,  for  Stockholm  and  Gothenburg. 
Cargo — Copper,  375  tons. 

Shipper:     American  Smelting  and  Refining  Co. 
Held  December   1,   The  Tyne. 
S.S.  EDWARD  PIERCE,  American  (American  Exporters'  Line.    C.  H.  Sprague  &  Son,  Boston). 
Sailed  from  New  York,  November  24,  1914,  for  Gothenburg  and  Copenhagen. 
Ca  rgo — General. 

Taken  into  Falmouth,  December  8.     On  December  13,  proceeded  with  full  cargo. 

Master  was  told  verbally  he  was  detained  on  account  of  flour  and  peas  on  board,  although  both  were 
consigned  direct  to  parties  in  Copenhagen.  No  excuse  or  reason  given  for  delay.  Master  was  shown 
a  telegram  to  Customs  Officers  reading,  "American  S.S.  Edward  Pierce  with  suspected  cargo  from  New 
York  expected  Falmouth  about  6th  inst.  If  she  comes  in  send  her  immediately  into  harbor  (Signed) 
F.  C.  December  3,  6  p.  m."  Detention  premeditated  days  ahead  on  mere  suspicion. 
Damage  for  detention  at  charter  rates,  etc.,  etc.,  amounted  to  $7,0(X). 
S.S.  HERM,  Norwegian  (Gans  S.S.  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  12,  1914,  for  Bilbao,  Oporto,"  Lisbon,  Genoa  and  Barcelona. 
Cargo— General. 

Stopped  outside  Lisbon;  ordered  to  Gibraltar,  December  8. 
Released  and  sailed,  December  14. 
S.S.  MARACAS,  American. 

Sailed  from  New  York  December  9,  1914,   for  Genoa,  via  Gibraltar  and  Naples. 
Brought  into  Halifax,   N.   S.,  by  Prize  Crew   from  British  warship,  December  12. 
No   reason   given   for   detention  by  officer  in  charge. 

Later  allowed  to  proceed  to  destination  upon  assurance  that  cargo  not  destined  to  enemy  ports. 
Arrived  Genoa,  January  10,  1915. 
S.S.  BRINDILLA,  American   (Standard  Oil  Company). 

Sailed  from  Alexandria,  Egypt,  on  or  about  November  26,  1914. 

Arrived  at  St.  Michaels,  Azores,  to  take  an  oil  carijo  frnm  a  German  steamer  on  December  12. 
Reported  leaving  St.  Michaels,  December  20,  for  Copenhagen. 

Intercepted  off  the  coast  of  Scotland  and  taken  to   Aberdeen.      (Second   seizure.) 
S.S.  TELLUS,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  18,  1914,  for  Genoa. 
Cargo — 200  tons  of  copper,  sold  and  consigned  to  U.  Vedorelli,  Milan. 
Seized  and  held  at  Gibraltar. 
Arrived  Genoa,  December  28. 
.  S.S.  A.  A.  RAVEN,  American. 

Sailed  from  Wilmington,  Delaware,  December  5,  191S,  for  Rotterdam. 
Cargo — Cotton. 

(First  steamer  since  war  to  reach  Dutch  port  with  cotton  for  Germany.) 
Arrived  at  Rotterdam,  December  24,  1914. 

Held  up  by  British  warship  in  Channel,  delayed  twenty-four  hours  for  examination  of  papers. 
S.S.  MIRJAM,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  24,  1914,  to  Copenhagen. 
Detained  at  Kirkwall,  December  16. 
Released  January  IS,  1915. 
S.S.  SORLAND,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  27,  1914,  for  Gothenburg. 
Cargo — 600  tons  copper. 
Arrived  at  Leith,  December  27. 
Detained. 

Arrived  at  Gothenburg,  January  22,  1915. 
S.S.  NEW   SWEDEN,   Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  December  6,  1914,  for  Sweden. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers :     American   Smelting  and  Refining  Co. 
Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  December  21.     Held  at  Shields,  December  28. 
Sailed  January  10,  1915. 
Arrived  Gothenburg.  January  13. 
S.S.  RAMSDAL,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  November  28^  1914,  for  Christiania. 
Taken  to  Kirkwall.  December  21. 

Arrived  at  Leith,  December  24,  in  charge  of  a  Prize  Crew. 
Arrived  at  Christiania,  February  8,  1915. 
S.S.  ZAMORA,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  December  8,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  December  29. 
Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  January  11,  1915. 
S.S.  KENTUCKY,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Baltimore,  November  24,  1914,  via  New  York  for  Copenhagen. 
Detained  at  Kirkwall,  December  16. 

Arrived  at  Leith,  December  29.     714  tons  of  meat  consigned  to  Denmark  thrown  into  Prize  Court. 
Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  February  2,  1915. 
S.S.  VIRGINIA,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  December  3,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 
At  Kirkwall.  December  23. 
Arrived  at  Shields,  December  30,  1914. 
S.S.  GREENBRIER,  American  (C.  L.  Dimon,  New  York). 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  December  11,  1914  (via  Norfolk,  December  17),  for  Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton,    under    certificate   of    British    Consul   at   New   York. 

Stopped  on  December  30,  by  British  cruiser,  boarded  and  searched. 

British  flag  hoisted  and  taken  to  Kirkwall. 

Detained  three  days  and  then  taken  to  Leith  and  allowed  to  proceed  to  Bremen. 

Arrived  at  Bremen,  January  9,  1915. 


LIST  OF  SHIPS  DETAINED  55 

S.S.  TULA,  American   (Crucible  Steel  Company). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  December  1,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Grain  and  flour. 

Seized  by  the   British  and   detained  at  Leith. 

Upon  investigation  as  to  ultimate  destination  of  cargo  permitted  to  proceed  on  December  31. 

Sailed  January  7,  1915,  and  arrived  at  Copenhagen,  January  11. 
S.S.  HELIG  OLAV,  Danish   (Scandinavian-American  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,    December  3,  1914,  for  Christiansand  and  Copenhagen. 

Boarded  at  Kirkwall  by  British  marines  and  detained  eight  days  pending  investigation  as  to  character  of 
cargo. 

Arrived  at   Copenhagen,   D^ember  23,   1914. 
S.S.  ARKANSAS,  Danish  (chartered  by  Cans  S.S.  Company). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  December  11,  1914,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Meat. 

Arrived  at  Shields  in  charge  of  a  Prize  Crew,  January  2,   1915. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  January  22. 
S.S.  AUGUSTA,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  December  9,  1914,  for  Gothenburg  and  Malmoe. 

Taken  to  Kirkwall. 

Arrived  at   Newcastle,  January  4,   1915,   in  charge  of  a  Prize  Crew. 

At  Hartlepool,  January  10. 

Arrived   at   Gothenburg,   February   1. 
S.S.  ONEKA,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  January  2,  1915,  for  Piraeus,  Greece. 

Cargo — American  oil.     (Standard   Oil   Company.)     Partly  for  Bulgaria  and  Greece. 

Detained  at  Malta,  being  suspected  delivery  to  Turkey. 
S.S.   DENVER,  American   (Mallory  S.S.  Company,   New  York). 

Sailed  from  Norfolk,  December  23,  1914,  for  Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton.     Loaded  under  supervision  of  British  Consul  at  Norfolk. 

Detained  January  6,  1915,  at  Kirkwall. 

Released  on  representation. 
S.S.  GOVERNOR,  American   (Pacific  Coast  Company,   New  York). 

Detained  by  Canadian   Customs  Officials,  January  13,  1915,  at  Vancouver,  B.  C. 

Cargo — Hides  for  San  Francisco,  California. 

Released   after  unloading  hides. 
S.S.  OSCAR  n,  Danish. 

Sailed  from   New  York,  February  4,  1915,   for  Christiania  and  Copenhagen. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall  and  held   for  examination  as  to  her  cargo. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  February  20. 
S.S.  VITALIA,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  February  3,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Packing  products. 

Taken  into  Falmouth,  February  20. 

Released   after   cargo   was   consigned   to   Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 
S.S.  ANTILLA,  American  (New  York  and  Cuba  Mail  S.S.  Company). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  February  9,  1915,  for  Malmoe  and  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Cattle  food  of  various  kinds. 

On  February  24,  stopped  by  British  cruiser  when  in  Lat.  59-58  N,  Long.  9-14  W. 

No  reason  given.  British  cruiser  ordered  vessel  to  proceed  to  Kirkwall  with  a  Prize  Crew  on  board  after 
four  hours'  detention  while  examining  ship's  papers.  On  March  9  was  taken  by  British  Prize  Crew  to 
Dundee.  March  23,  Admiralty  discharged  part  of  cargo  in  Dundee  and  reloaded  the  balance.  On  April 
27,  vessel  was  allowed  to  proceed  with  remainder  of  cargo. 

Alleged  damage  to  vessel  for  detention,  etc.,  amounted  to  $98,000. 

Certified  to  both  by  Danish  and  British  Consuls. 
S.S.  PLATURIA,  American  Registry   (Controlled  by  Standard  Oil  Company). 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia.  February  13,  1915,  for  Malmoe  and  Helsingborg. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  March  2. 
S.S.  PASS  OF  BALMHA,  American. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  January  30,  1915,  for  Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  March  8. 

Released  after  inspection. 

Arrived  at  Bremen,  March  31. 
S.S.  VIGILANCIA,   American    (Walker,   Armstrong  and  Company,  Savannah). 

Sailed  from  Savannah,  Georgia,  February  22,  1915,  for  Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Intercepted  at  sea  by  British  cruiser,  taken  into  Kirkwall. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  March  8. 

Arrived  at  Bremen,  March  15. 
S.S.  GREKLAND,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  February  18,  1915,  for  Gothenburg. 

Cargo — American  meat  products. 

Held  in  Kirkwall  from  March  10.  because  destination  of  cargo  suspected. 

Released  and  sailed  April  1  for  Gothenburg. 
S.S.  A.  A.  RAVEN,  American. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  February  13,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — -Meat. 

Held  at  Deal,  March  12. 

Reconsigned  to  the  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 

Arrived  Rotterdam,  April  2. 
S.S.  SPYROS  VALLIANOS,  Greek. 

Sailed  from  Savannah,  Georgia,  March  10,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained  at  Falmouth. 
S.S.  LIVONIA,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  March  20,  1915,  for  Aalborg  and  Copenhagen. 

Held  at  Falmouth,  April  14.    Bristol,  May  6,  pending  settlement  of  price  of  cotton  cargo. 


56  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

S.S.  SEGURANCA,  American. 

Sailed  from  New  York  on  March  9,  for  Holland. 

Cargo — General. 

Consigned  to  consignees  in  Holland. 

Detained  by  the  British  in  April. 

The  Department  of  State  protested  against  the  detention  of  the  Seguranca,  stating  that  the  shipper's  manifest 
showed  that  the  entire  cargo  was  consigned  to  Dutch  consignees  and  was  accompanied  by  a  certificate 
from  the  British  Consul-General  at  New  York,  and  that  the  loading  of  the  vessel,  moreover,  had  been 
supervised  by  the  British  Consul-General's  inspector.  The  United  States  Government  could  not  admit  the 
right  of  the  British  Government  to  require  that  this  cargo  be  reconsigned  to  the  Netherlands  Oversea 
Trust. 
S.S.  OGEECHEE,  American. 

Sailed  from  Bremen,  April  4,  1915,  for  New  York. 

Arrived  at  Sharpness,  April  18. 

Cargo  confiscated  as  being  of  German  origin. 

Sailed   for  New  York,   May  1. 

Arrived  May  18. 
S.S.  SOUTHERNER,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Charleston,  S.  C,  March  31,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained  at  Falmouth,  pending  negotiations  by  Great  Britain  for  the  purchase  of  cotton  on  board. 

Arrived  at  Rotterdam,  April  & 
S.S.    GIOVANNIG,  Italian. 

Detained,  but  allowed  to  proceed  on  April  20,  1915,  without  discharging  her  cargo. 
S.S.  KELBERGEN,  Dutch. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  April  26,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall. 

Innocence  of  cargo  established  and  released. 
S.S.  MARIE,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  Galveston,  Texas,  March  13,  1915,  for  Malmoe,  Sweden. 

Arrived  at  Clyde  in  charge  of  Prize  Crew. 

Was  stopped  on  suspicion  regarding  destination  of  cargo. 
S.S.  ATHINAL,  Greek. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  May  16,  1915,  for  Palermo  and  Piraeus. 

Arrived,  and  seized,  at  Gibraltar,  May  29. 

Permitted  to  proceed  after  discharging  400  bales  of  cotton  and  1,200  reels  of  barbed  wire. 

Placed  before  Prize  Court,  charge  being  destination  for  Germany. 
S.S.  GARGOYLE,  American  (Vacuum  Oil  Company).     (Changed  from  German  to  American  Registry.; 

Sailed   from   New   Y'ork,   May   10,    1915,   for  Alexandria. 

Cargo — Bulk  oil. 

Reported  at  Malta,  May  31. 

Seized  by  British  authorities  and  Prize  Court  writ  issued. 
S.S.  F.  J.  LISMAN,  American. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  May  23,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

General  cargo  consigned  to  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 

Held  at  London,  June  8,  and  1,000  barrels  of  phosphate  removed  for  disposition  by  Prize  Court. 
S.S.  PORTLAND,  American. 

Sailed  from  San  Francisco,  April  25,  1915,  for  Stockholm  (via  New  York). 

Cargo — General. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  June  16. 

Taken  to  Blyth,  June  19,  where  34  tons  of  dried  fruit  were  sent  to  Prize  Court. 

Arrived  at  Stockholm,  July  8. 
S.S.  VARING,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  Savannah,  Georgia,  May  30,  1915,  for  Swedish  ports. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  June  19. 
S.S.  BERGENSFJORD,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  June  12,  1915,  for  Bergen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken  to  Kirkwall,  June  21. 

Arrived  at  Bergen,  June  24. 
S.S.  NOR,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  June  5,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Held  in  the  Downs  for  examination  of  cargo,  June  28. 
S.S.  MUSKOGEE,  American. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  June  7,  1915   (Newport  News,  June  14),  for  Gothenburg. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall,  July  5,  and  released  July  7,  for  Gothenburg. 

Arrived  July  9. 
S.S.  BRATLAND,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  Baltimore,  June  15,  1915,  for  Aalborg,  Denmark. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall,  July  6. 

Arrived  at  Aalborg,  July  12. 
S.S.  JANNA,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  San  Francisco,  March  4,  1915,  for  Bergen,  Norway. 
Cargo — Grain. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall,  July  8. 
Arrived  at  Bergen,  July  19. 
S.S.  GURRE,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Baltimore,  July  1,   1915,   for  Aalborg,  Denmark. 

Taken  into  Kirkwall,  July  19. 

Released  July  23,  and  sailed  for  Aalborg  and   Randers. 
S.S.  HULDA  MAERSK,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Savannah,  Georgia,  July  10,  1915   (Norfolk,  July  13),  for  Malmoe. 

Cargo — Cottonseed. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall. 

Arrived  at  Malmoe,  August  12. 


LIST  OF  SHIPS  DETAINED  57 

S.S.  NECHES,  American. 

Sailed  from  Rotterdam  to  the  United  States. 
Cargo — General. 

Detained  at  the  Downs  and  brought  to  London,  where  cargo  was  discharged. 

The  United  States  Government,  July  15,  1915,  made  vigorous  protest  against  the  detention  of  the  vessel  and 
the  unloading  of  the  cargo,  which  was  the  property  of  American  citizens,  at  London. 

S.S.  BUFFALO,  British. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  18,  1915,  for  Christiania. 

Cargo — Hacksaws. 

Arrived  at  Hull,  September  5. 

Thrown  into  Prize  Court  on  the  assertion  that  cargo  was  bound  for  Germany. 

S.S.  VITALIA,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  19,  1915,  for  Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Meat. 

Detained  at  Falmouth,  September  7,  and  thrown  into    Prize    Court,    the    British    Government's    contention 
being  that  there  were  fats  and  oils  in  the  cargo  not  consigned  to  the  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 
S.S.  CORNING,  American   (Standard  Oil  Company). 

Sailed  from  Baton  Rouge,  La.,  August,  17,  1915,  to  Malraoe. 

Cargo — Refined   petroleum  and   naphtha. 

Detained   at   Kirkwall,   September  7. 

Standard  Oil  Company  placed  the  case  in  the  hands  of  the  American  Government. 

Released. 

Arrived  at  Malmoe,  September  28. 
S.S.  OSCAR  II,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  9,  1915,  for  Christiansand. 

Taken   to   Kirkwall. 

Sailed  September  21. 
S.S.  LOUISIANA,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  15,  1915,  for  Copenhagen. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall  "prior  to  October  1,  1915,"  and  sent  to  Aberdeen  to  discharge  part  of  her  cargo. 
S.S.  UNITED  STATES,  Danish. 

Sailed  from   New  York,  August  26,   1915,   for  Copenhagen. 
0  Cargo — General. 

Had  unloaded  at  Copenhagen,  when  British  Government  ordered  her  to  reload  and  to  take  cargo  back  to 
England  under  penalty  of  seizure. 
S.S.  HELSINGBORG,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  Port  Arthur,  Texas,  August  28,  1915,  via  Norfolk,  for  Aarhus,  Denmark. 

Cargo — Cottonseed. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  September  28. 

Arrived  at  Blyth,   October  3. 
S.S.  CALIFORNIA,   Danish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  August  31,  1915,  for  Christiania. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained   September  29,  at  Leith. 
S.S.  ABSALOM,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  September  12,  1915,  for  Copenhagen. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall. 
S.S.  ORIGIN,   Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  14,  1915,  for  Kirkwall  and  Vallo. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall. 
S.S.  PETROLITE,  American   (Standard  Oil  Company). 

Sailed    from    Philadelphia,   September   15,    1915,    for  Copenhagen. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  September  29. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,.  October  8. 

(Had  been   previously   detained   by   British  authorities  and  released,  August  17,  1915.) 
S.S.  ST.  JOHN,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  Baltimore,  September  12,  1915,  for  Gothenburg. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall. 

Arrived  at  Gothenburg,  October  8. 
S.S.  ESTER,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  Port  Tampa,  Fla.,  September  5,  1915,  for  Newport  News  and  Malmoe. 

Detained  at  Kirkwall,  September  30. 
S.S.  FREDERICK  VIH,  Danish. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September^22,  1915,  for  Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Bacon. 

Ordered  to  unload  at  Kirkwall,  September  30. 
S.S.  OSMAN,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  September  11,  1915,  via  Norfolk,  for  Copenhagen. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  Oct.  6. 

Released. 

Arrived  at  Copenhagen,  October  12,  1915. 
S.S.  CONRAD  MOHR,  Norwegian. 

Sailed   from  Baton   Rouge,  La.,   September  15,  1915,  via  Norfolk,  for  Bergen. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  October  7. 

Released. 

Arrived  at  Bergen,  October  11. 
S.S.  FR.^M,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  Baltimore,  September  18,  1915,  for  Vaksdal. 

Arrived  at  Kirkwall,  October  7. 

Released. 

Arrived  at  Bergen,  October  11,  191S. 

Second  seizure. 
S.S.  ALADDIN,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  York,  September  21,  1915,  for  Stockholm. 

Brought  to  Kirkwall,  October  7.  I 

Released. 


68  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

S.S.  ORION,  Swedish. 

Sailed  from  Philadelphia,  September  22,   1915,   for  Stockholm. 
Cargo — Coal. 

Brought  into  Kirkwall,  October  10. 
Released  October  14. 
S.S.  VIGINIA,  Danish. 

Sailed   from   New   York,   September   25,    1915,    for  Christiania  and  Copenhagen. 
Cargo — General. 

Taken  to  Kirkwall,  October  10. 
Taken  to  Grimsby,  October  19. 
To  Prize  Court. 
S.S.  MEXICANO,  Norwegian. 

Sailed  from  New  Orleans,  September  24,  1915,  for  Christiania  and  Copenhagen. 
Cargo — General. 
Detained  at  Kirkwall. 
Sailed  October  12,  1915,   for  Christiania. 
S.S.  HOCKING,  American. 

(Formerly  Danish,  purchased  and  transferred  by  American  Transatlantic  Steamship  Company  to  American 

Registry,  July  31,  1915.) 
Objected  to  by  British  alleging  that  she  was  purchased  with  German  capital. 
Sailed  from   New  York,  October  29,   1915,   for   Norfolk. 
Seized  by  British  cruiser  and  taken  to  Halifax,  N.  S.,  October  31,  in  charge  of  Prize  Crew  convoyed  by 

British  warships. 
In  charge  of  Admiralty  Court. 
S.S.  HAMBORN,  Dutch  (Munson  Line). 

Sailed  from  New  York,  October  27,  1915,  for  Cuba. 
Cargo — General. 

Halted  eighty-five  miles   from  New  York  by  British  cruiser. 

Taken  to  Halifax,  N.  S.,  October  31,  by  Prize  Crew,  convoyed  by  British  warships. 
In  charge  of  Admiralty  Court. 
S.S.  LLAMA,  American  (Standard  Oil  Company). 

(Formerly  German,  transferred  to  American  Registry.) 
Sailed  from  New  York,  October  14,  1915,  for  Copenhagen. 
Cargo — Oil. 

Seized  by  British  Prize  Crew  and  afterward  run  aground   (October  31)   on  Skae  Skerries,  Westray  flrth, 
Scotland. 
S.S.  ATHAMAS,  Greek. 

Sailed   from  Galveston  October  15th,  1915   (Norfolk,  October  24th),   for  Rotterdam. 
Seized  and  taken  into  British  port,  November  18th. 
ANDREW  WELCH,  American  bark,  George  W.  McNear,  San  Francisco. 
Sailed  from  San  Francisco,  August  19th,  1915,  for  Halstad,  Sweden. 
Cargo — beans. 

Boarded   by   British   prize  crew  off  the   Shetland  Islands  and  ordered  into  Lerwick. 

On  account  of  storms  carried  towards  Norway  and  towed  into  Christiansand  by  S.S.  "Russland,"  Novem- 
ber 17th. 
S.S.  ZEALANDIA,  American,  sailed  from  Tampa  Sept.   IS,   1915,  cargo:  rosin,  hides,  rubber  for  Sweden, 
arrived  at  Pensacola  Sept.  27th,  left  for  Tampico  Oct.  3rd,  arrived  at  Progresso  Oct.  25th  bound  for  Malmoe, 
Sweden,  boarded  and  searched  by  British  crew,  according  to  Captain,  within  three  miles  limit.     Steamer  still 
remains  at  Progresso  on  account  of  fear  of  capture. 
S.S.  KRISTIANIAFJORD,  Norwegian,  sailed  from  New   York   November  6,    1915   for   Bergen   and   Chris- 
tainia,  general  cargo,  detained  at  Kirkwall,  arrived  at  Bergen  November  21st.    Compelled  to  return  to  England 
6,0(X)  cases  of  American  pork,  1,800  bags  of  coflfee,  the  ultimate  destination  of  which  having  been  questioned 
by  British  authorities. 
S.S.  GENESEE,  American,  owned  by  American  Tran  satlantic  Co.,  New  York,  sailed  from  New  York  Oc- 
tober 11,  1915,  left  Norfolk  October  14  with  cargo  of  coal    for    Montevideo,    seized   and    boarded   by    British 
Prize  crew,  ordered  to  St.  Lucia,  November  20. 


On  the  following  pages  is  an  incomplete  list  of  vessels  carrying  American  cargoes 
which,  sailing  in  practically  all  instances  from  American  to  Scandinavian  ports,  were  di- 
verted hy  British  authorities  to  the  port  of  Kirkioall.  or  called  at  that  port  under  instruc- 
tions from  owners,  between  March  11,  1915,  and  June  17,  1915 : 


DETENTION  RECORD  OF  A  SINGLE  BRITISH  PORT 


Name  of  vessel. 

ELS  A;  part  cargo  put  in  prize  court; 

ordered  Sunderland  discharge. 
MAR  AC  AS;  cargo  put  in  prize  court; 

ordered    Hull    to    discharge. 
GUDRUN;  bound  from  Europe  to  the 

United  States. 

AMPHITRITE    

JENS  BANG;  bound  from  Europe  to 

the  United  States. 

RODFAZE    

R.-\N     

LISKEN  

ABSALON    

WICO    

TORVIG    

GREEN  BRIAR  

EINAR  JARL   

OGEECHEE    

TANCRED    

JOHN  BLUMMER  

SUTRA  

FROGNER    

HJORTHOLM    

CALIFORNIA     

UFFE;  bound  from  Europe  to  United 

States  via  Ardrossan. 

CARL  HENCKEL 

HELGA    

NEWA    

HAVET    

TERNO    

UNITED  STATES   

TEXAS 

HAAKON  VII 

VARING 

SINSEN   

OXELOSUND    

SIGURD    

MYRDAL    

SARK    

BORGLAND    

VARD  

NIKE:  sailed  for  Newcastle 

GULFAXE    

NEW  SWEDEN;  prize  crew  to  New- 
castle. 

STIKELSTAD     

KORSFJORD;  whole  cargo  put  in 
prize  court;  ordered  Grirnsby  to  dis- 
charge. 

CYGNUS :  cargo  put  in  prize  court; 
ordered  West  Hartlepool  to  discharge 

INDIANIC;  bound  from  Europe  to 
United  States. 

VESTA     

CARMELINA    

HENRIK;  part  cargo  put  in  prize 
court;  ordered  to  Leith  to  discharge. 

UNITA     

THORSDAL    

DROTT    

KARMA   

STRINDA    

IRIS    

LARGO    

VINCENT;  bound  from  Europe  to 
United  States. 

RAN  

TERJE  VIKEN 

BRETAGNE  

BODEN  

AVONA  

HELMER  MORCH  

CENTRIC    


Cargo. 


Date  of  arrival 
in  British  ports. 


Date  of  leaving 
British  ports. 


March  1 1 

Cottonseed   cake    March  12 

'• March  12 

Maize    March  12, 

Maize  and   rye   March  12, 

Maize  and  rye   March  12, 


.March  11,  1915 March  IS,  1915 

.March,  11.  1915 March  16,  1915 


1915 March   11,  1915 

1915 March   14,   1915 

1915 March  12,   1915 


Oil    March 

Cottonseed   cake    March 


■  March  12, 
13 
13 


•  March  13 

Cotton   March  13 

March  14 

Cotton   March  14 

Oilcake    March  14, 

Cotton   March  14, 

General    March  IS 

March  17, 

general    March  17, 

March  19, 

Cottonseed   cake    March  20, 

Cottonseed  cake    March  20, 

Cottonseed  cake   March  20, 

March  20 

Maize  March  20, 

General   March  21 

General   March  21 

Cotton   March  21 

Oilcake    March  21 

March  21 

Wheat   March  21 

March  21 

General   March  22, 

Maize  and  barley March  22 

Cotton   March  22, 

Grain,  oilcake  and  starch .  March  23 

Maize    March  23, 

Wheat,    maize,    rye    and  March  23 

barley. 
General   March  23 

General    March  23 

Lard    March  24, 


General March  24, 

March  24, 


March  24, 

Cotton    March  25 

General    March  25 

Maize    March  25 

Maize    March  25 

Oilcake    March  26 

March  26 

Cotton   March  26, 

Cottonseed  cake    . , March  26, 

Rye  March  26 

March  26, 

Maize    March  27 

General    March  27 

Barley   March  27, 

Wheat    March  27, 

Cottonseed  cake  March  27, 

Oil  cake  March  27, 

Cotton  March  28, 


1915 March  14,  1915 

1915 March  14,  1915 

1915 March  12,  1915 

1915 March  13,  1915 

1915 March  31,  1915 

1915 March  IS,  1915 

1915 March  16,  1915 

1915 March  16,  1915 

1915 March  16,  191S 

1915 March  16,  1915 

1915 March  16,  1915 

1915 March  IS,  1915 

1915 March  18,  1915 

1915 March  18,  1915 

1915 March  23,  1915 

1915 March  19,  1915 

1915 March  25,  191S 

1915 March  31,  1915 

1915 March  26,  1915 

1915 March  23,  1915 

1915 March  23,  1915 

1915 March  24,  1915 

1915 March  24,  1915 

1915 March  23,  1915 

1915 March  26,  1915 

1915 March  23,  191S 

1915 March  23,  1915 

1915 March  22,  1915 

1915 March  24,  1915 

1915 March  28,  1915 

1915 March  24,  1915 

1915 March  25,  1915 

1915 April   1,  1915 

1915 March  25,  1915 

1915 March  29,  1915 

1915 April   4,  1915 

1915 March  28,  1915 


1915 March  31,  1915 

1915 March  24,  1915 

1915 March  25,  1915 

1915 March  27,  1915 

1915 April  14,  1915 

1915 March  29,  1915 

1915 March  27,  1915 

1915 March  28,  1915 

1915 March  28,  1915 

1915 March  28,  1915 

1915 March  28,  1915 


1915 March  28, 

1915 March  28, 


1915 
1915 


1915 March  30,  1915 

1915 April  29,  1915 

1915 March  31,  1915 

1915 March  30,  1915 

191S March  30,  1915 

1915 March  30,  1915 

1915 March  30,  191S 


60  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

.,  ,  ,  „  Date  of  arrival  Date  of  leaving 

Name  of  vessel.  Cargo.  in  British  ports.  British  ports. 

STAVN;  part  cargo  put  in  prize  court;    General    March  28,   1915 April  1    191S 

sailed  Leith  to  discharge.  ' 

CLITRA    ..                         Maize    March  28,  1915 April  2,  1915 

ATHENS;  cleared  at  Ardrossan March  29,   1915...    .           April  '9    1915 

DANMARK;  cleared  at  Ardrossan March  29,   1915 April  29'   1915 

BERGENSFJORD   General,    mail    and    pas-  March  30,   1915 April  6,1915 

sengers. 

SIRIUS;  bound  from  Europe  to  United  March  30,   1915 March  30    1915 

States.  ' 

BIA;   wrhole  cargo  put  in  prize   court;    Cotton   March  30,   1915 April  7,   1915 

sailed    to    Manchester    to    discharge. 

OSCAR  TRAPP;  bound  from  Europe  March  30,   1915 March  31,   1915 

to  United  States. 

FIONIA    Barley  and  general March  31,   1915 April  6    1915 

SVERRE    Barley    March  31,   1915 April  13,  1915 

HILDING:    part    cargo    put    in    prize   General    March  31,   1915 April  ?',  1915 

court;  sailed  Leith  to  discharge. 

LIGURIA    Cotton   April       1,   1915 April  4    1915 

NYLAND    Oats   April       1,1915 April  3    1915 

ANTWERPEN    April       1,   1915 April  2    1915 

CAPELLA  Oilcake    April       1,1915 April  3,1915 

ELLEN    Maize    April       1,   1915 .^^pril  3,   1915 

ATLAND     Wheat    April       1,1915 April  2    1915 

DORTE  JENSEN    Maize    April       1,1915......          \pril  4    1915 

NORDLAND    Maize    April       2,1915 April  4!   1915 

ALEXANDRA     ,. .  . .  General    April       2,   1915 April  4,   1915 

UTO;  whole  cargo  put  in  prize  court;    Cottonseed   cake    April       2,   1915 April  11,   1915 

steamer  ordered  to  Hull  to  discharge. 

ROMSDALFJORD;  part  cargo  put  in   General    April       3,   1915 April  12,   1915 

prize    court;    ordered    Sunderland    to 
discharge. 

SVERIGE     ....- Wheat  and  rye  April       3,1915 April  4,1915 

HAMMERSHUS;    cargo    put    in   prize   Rum,   hides    April       3,   1915 .-^pril  17,   1915 

court;   ordered  to  discharge  at  Glas- 
gow. 

ULRICK  HOLM    Grain April       3,   1915 April  6,   1915 

JESSIE     Cottonseed   cake    April       3,1915 April  7,1915 

ROMSDAL April       3,   1915 April  4,   1915 

AVANCE    Cottonseed   cake    April       3,   1915 April  7,   1915 

HANS  JENSEN   Maize    April       4,1915 April  7,1915 

KRONSTAD April       4,   1915 April  7,   1915 

NEDENES    Maize    April       4,1915 April  7,1915 

STEINSTAD    Maize  and  rye    April       4,1915 April  9,1915 

ALBIS;     whole     cargo     put     in     prize   General    April       5,   1915 April  11,   1915 

court;    ordered    Middlesboro    to    dis- 
charge. 

LALY    Cotton  and  tobacco   April       5,   1915 April  13,   1915 

MAUD;  part  cargo  put  in  prize  court;    Cotton  and  flour   April       5,   1915 April  17,   1915 

ordered  Fleetwood  to  discharge. 

WALDIMIR   REITZ    Oilcake    April       5,1915 April  7,1915 

KRONSPRINS  OLAF  Cotton  and  oil  cake   April       5,   1915 April  13,   1915 

ELSE     Maize    April       5,   1915 April  20,   1915 

CHUMPON    .Cotton   April       6,   1915 April  13,   1915 

LLAMA Oil     April       6,   1915 April  13,   1915 

SORLAND;    part    cargo    put    in    prize   General    April       7,   1915 April  10,   191S 

court;    ordered    West    Hartlepool    to 
discharge. 

MUSKOGEE    April       7,  1915 April  14,  1915 

NAVAGO     General     April       7,1915 April  11,1915 

ANNUM;  part  cargo  put  in  prize  court;   General    April       7,   1915 April  11,   1915 

ordered  Hull  to  discharge. 

ALBERT  W.  SELMER  Rye    April       8,1915 April  10,1915 

SILJESTAD    Maize    April      8,1915 April  10,1915 

LEANDER    April       8,   1915 April  10,   1915 

MARIE;  prize  crew  to  Greenock Cotton   April       8,   1915 May  3,   1915 

JOSEPH   W.   FORDNEY;   prize   crew  April       8,   1915 April  19,   1915 

to  Wallow  Bay. 

IMO   Cottonseed   cake    April       9,   1915 April  11,   1915 

ARKANSAS     General                          ..       April       9,1915 April  14,1915 

VIRGINIA    Rye    ' April       9,1915 April  11,1915 

LAPLAND;    part    cargo    put    in    prize   General    April       9,   1915 April  13,   1915 

court;    ordered    to    Barrow    to    dis- 
charge. 

ZAMORA;    part    cargo   |put    in    prize   Grain  and  copper April       9,   1915 April  16,   1915 

court;  ordered  to  Barrow  to  discharge. 

SELMA .                       April     10,   1915 April  13,   1915 

HELLIG  OLAF   General     April     11,1915 April  15,   19r5 

PACIFIC;    part    cargo    put    in    prize  General    April     11,1915 April  16,1915 

court;   ordered  Leith  to  discharge. 

SONGELV    Cottonseed   cake    April     11,   1915 April  19,   1915 

LEJRE;  part  cargo  put  in  prize  court;   Cotton   April     11,   1915 April  20,   1915 

ordered    Sharpness    to    discharge. 

MAGDALENE;  ordered  Manchester  to  Cotton   April     12,    1915 May  2,    1915 

discharge. 

DROT   .    April     12,1915 April  14,1915 

THOLMA    April     12,   1915 .'"ipril  14,   1915 


IS, 

1915 

13, 

1915 

IS, 

1915 

13, 

1915 

18, 

1915 

17, 

1915 

13, 

1915 

16, 

1915 

16, 

1915 

27, 

1915 

1, 

1915 

16, 

1915 

17, 

1915 

17, 

1915 

2, 

1915 

LIST  OF  SfflPS  DETAINED  61 

Date  of  arrival    '                   Date  of  leaving 

Name  of  vessel.                                                Cargo.                    in  British  ports.  British  ports. 

AMERICA;    part    cargo    put    in    prize   General    April     12,   1915 April  16,   1915 

court;     ordered    Sunderland    to    dis- 
charge. 

N.  F.  HOLDING   Grain    April     12,1915 April  14,1915 

GEORGIA ;  prize  crew  to  Sharpness . .  .  Cotton   April     12,   1915 April  20,   1915 

JOHAN    SIEM    Cottonseed   cake    April     13,   1915 April  " 

HANS  BROGE;  cleared  at  Ardrossan..  Rye    April     13,   1915 April 

TORDIS    Cottonseed   cake    April     13,1915 April 

BALTIC;  ship  ordered  to  Hull  to  dis-   Cotton   April     13,   1915 May 

charge. 

BRAKER    Maize    April     13,   1915 April 

ROMA    Lubricating  oil    April     13,   1915 April 

L.  H.  CARL;  cleared  at  Ardrossan April     13,   1915 April 

HERO    Maize    April     14,   1915 April 

MIRJAM    Rye    A.pril     14,   1915 April 

KONG  HAAKON    Maize    April     14,   1915 April 

DICIDO;  prize  crew  to  Fleetwood Cotton   April     14,   1915 May 

LARS   KRUSE    Maize    April     14,   1915 April 

TALAVERA     Maize    April     14,1915 April 

FALKA    Cottonseed   cake    April     15,   1915 April 

CAROLINA;   ordered  Grimsby  to  dis-   Cotton    April     IS,   1915 May 

charge. 

LOUISIANA;    ordered    Hull    to    dis-   General     April     16,1915 April  23,1915 

charge  part  cargo. 

MEXICANO;    ordered    Greenock   with   General    April     16,   1915 April  18,   1915 

prize    crew. 

ANGLIA;  prize  crew  to  Dundee Cotton  and  resin   April     16,   1915 April  24,   1915 

JUNGSHEVD    April     16,   1915 April  18,   1915 

ORN ;  cleared  at  Ardrossan April     16,   1915 April  16,   1915 

BRETAGNE April     17,   1915 April  19,   1915 

STORAKER     Maize    April     18,1915 April  21,1915 

OLAF    KYRRE:    ordered    Grimsby   to  Cotton   April     19,  1915 May  5,   1915 

discharge  cotton. 

HEROS    Wheat  and  rye  April     20,1915 April  22,1915 

BERTHA    Maize    April     21,1915 April  23,1915 

WILH  COLDING;  cleared  at  Ardros-  April     21,   1915 April  21,   1915 

san. 

KRISTIANIAFJORD     General  cargo,   mail   and  April     21,   1915 April  22,   191S 

passengers. 

GOTHARD    Cottonseed   cake    April     21,1915 April  23,1915 

CHRISTIAN  MICHELSEN   General    April     21,   1915 April  24,   1915 

EIDSWA    Cottonseed   cake    April     21,1915 April  24,1915 

TOMSK    April     22,   1915 April  27,   1915 

REGINA     Cottonseed   cake    April     22,   1915 April  24,   1915 

RUSS    Cottonseed   cake    April     22,1915 April  24,1915 

HOGLAND;    bound    from    Europe    to  April     23,   1915 April  23,   191S 

United  States. 

RANDULF    HANSEN     Maize    April     23,1915 April  25,1915 

ST.    CROIX    Cottonseed  cake    April     23,1915 April  25,1915 

RINGHORN    Rye    April     24,1915 April  25,1915 

PIONEER    Petroleum April     24,1915 April  26,1915 

CARL    HENKEL;    via    Newcastle    for  April     24,   1915 April  24,   1915 

bunkers. 

HERO ;  cleared  at  Ardrossan April     24,   1915 April  24,   1915 

LOCKSLEY   Wheat   April     24,   1915 April  27,   1915 

KENTUCKY    General    April     24,   1915 April  27,   1915 

SOBORG    Maize  and  barley April    "25,1915 April  27,1915 

ARTEMIS;  prize  crew  to  Avonmouth..  General    April     25,   1915 April  28,   1915 

GROINTOFT    Maize  and  barley April     25,1915 April  26,1915 

HANS    JENSEN;    via    Ardrossan    for  April     25,1915 April  25,1915 

bunkers. 

KONGSFES   Oil  cake   April     26,   1915 April  28,   1915 

BRYNHILD;   cleared  at  Ardrossan April     26,   1915 April  26,   1915 

DRONNING    OLGA;    prize    crew    to   iVheat,  lard,  etc April     27,1915 April  30,1915 

Leith. 

KRANSPRINS   FREDERICK    Barley    April     27,   1915 ...April  29,   1915 

SALINA    Rye  and  Maize  April     28,   1915 April  29,   1915 

IVAR;  cleared  at  Ardrossan Maize    April     28,   1915 April  28,   1915 

NERBOTTEN     Coal  and  lubricating  oil.  .April     28,1915 April  30,1915 

FREDERICIA;  cleared  at  Ardrossan April     29,    1915 April  29.   1915 

WICO;   cleared   at   North   Shields Ballast   April     29,   1915 April  30,   1915 

CAROLYN;  prize  crew  to  Leith Cotton  and  turpentine. .  ..April     29,   1915 May  3,   1915 

VARING;  via  Newcastle  for  bunkers April     30,   1915 May  1,   1915 

INLAND ;  cleared  at  Ardrossan May         1,  1915 May  1,  1915 

UNITED  STATES   Mails  and   passengers. ...  May        2,  1915 May  4,  1915 

JENS   BANG    Maize May        2,  1915 May  4,  1915 

LUDVIG  PEYRON    Wheat   May        4,   1915 May  5,  1915 

MINERVA;  prize  crew  to  Newcastle. .  General    May        4,  1915 May  7,  1915 

HATHOLMEN    Cottonseed  cake    May        4,1915 May  6,1915 

BUR     Wheat   May        6,  1915 May  8,  191S 

PETROLITE     Petroleum  lubricating  oiL  May        7,1915 May  9,1915 

AUGUSTA;  prize  crew  to  Leith General    May        7,1915 May  10,1915 

GERD;   prize   crew  to   Leith General    May        7,  1915 May  10,  1915 

THEKLA    Linseed  cake  May        7,1915 May  10,1915 

ORION    Maize    May        8,1915 May  10,1915 

PARIS;    cleared    at    Ardrossan Lubricating  oil  May        8,  1915 May  8,  1915 

OTTERSTAD    Cottonseed  cake    May        8,1915 May  10,1915 


62 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


Name  of  vessel. 


Cargo 


Date  of  arrival 
in  British  ports. 


Date  of  leaving 
British  ports. 


SIGYN;  prize  crew  to  Ipswich Wheat,  rye  and  maize. . . .  May 

GUDRUN    Maize    May 

OSCAR  II General   cargo,  mail  and  May 

passengers. 

LONDON;  prize  crew  to  Barrow Lubricating  oil  May 

MARICOPA    Gas   oil   May 

GUNBORG;   prize  crew  to  Dundee. ...  General    May 

LIV    Rye    May 

LOCH  TAY   General    May 

NORDIC;   prize   crew   to   Manchester. .  General    May 

INDIANIC;   prize   crew   to   Leith General    May 

VINLAND    Maize    May 

SVEN;  prize  crew  to  King's  Lynn Rock,  phosphate   May 

SKINFAXE   Maize    May 

OOM AN     Maize    May 

PROSPER  III ;  cleared  at  .^rdrossan May 

DANIA     General    May 

JOHN  BLUMER   Maize    May 

GURTH    Wheat    May 

SOMMERSTAD     Maize    May 

SYDLAND;      prize      crew      to      West   General    May 

Hartlepool. 

UFFE;  cleared  at  Ardrossan Oil  cake    May 

REDFAXE    Rye    May 

EXCELLENCE  PLESKE    Cottonseed  cake    May 

VULCAN;  cleared  by  customs  on  June   Oil    May 

5,  but  detained  by  Admiralty. 

ESTER       Cottonseed   cake    May 

SIGURD;   cleared  at  Ardrossan.  Oil  cake    May 

DRAMMENSFJORD    General    May 

GLENDOOM     Cottonseed  cake    May 

PYTHIA;   prize  crew  to   Immingham. .  Cotton     and     cottonseed  May 

cake. 

SOPHIE     Cottonseed  cake    May 

ALDEBARAN    Maize    May 

KIRUNA    Wheat    May 

FREDERICK    VIII General     mail    and     pas-  May 

sengers. 

JUSTENSEN;   cleared   at   Ayr Maize    May 

ROMANOFF    Barley    May 

TYR;  cleared  by  customs  on  25th General    May 

AMPHITRITE    Rye    May 

OLAF;  cleared  at  Ardrossan Cottonseed  cake    May 

EINAR  JARL;  prize  crew  to   Sunder-   Cottonseed  cake    May 

land. 

LLAMA    Gas  oil May 

EDDERSIDE     Oil  cake    May 

H.  V.  FIEKER  Maize    May 

MARIETTA   DI   GIORGIO    Gas    oil    and    lubricating  June 

oil. 

LYEGLINT    Oil  cake    . .  .  .• June 

SYDIC    Wheat    June 

VIDAR    Cottonseed   cake    June 

LEELANAW;   cleared  for  Archangel..  Cotton   June 

BRETAGNO;    Tyne   for   bunkers Maize    June 

POLSTAD    Cottonseed  cake   June 

GULFAXE     .' Maize    June 

ROS    Rye    June 

M.  J.  MANDAL  ;  cleared  at  Ayr Maize    June 

WHINLATTER;   detained    Barley  and  oil  cake   June 

NARVIK    Rye    June 

BEDEN    Coal   June 

NORDK YN ;  prize  crew  to  Leith Maize  June 

POLARINE;   detained    Petroleum  and  naphtha..    June 

CARL    HENCKEL    Cottonseed  cake   June 

JEMTLAND;  prize  crew  to  Leith Resin,  cotton,  cottonseed  June 

cake  oil. 

PLATURIA:   detained    Oil    June 

CALIFORNIA    General    June 

DJURSLAND    Oil  cake    June 

GUSHING    Petroleum    June 

ABSALON    Lubricating  Oil   June 

LISA;   detained    Resin   Tune 

WICO    Oil    June 

B ALTO     Coal    June 

NORDHAVET;  prize  crew  to  Gribsby.  .Agricultural   implements. .June 

NEW   SWEDEN    Gas  coal   June 

OSCAR  TRAPP  Pitch  pine  wood   June 

HANS  JENSEN  Maize    June 

SIGNE;    cleared    by    customs;    taking  General    June 

bunkers;   expect  sail  July  2,   191S. 
DORTE  JENSEN;  cleared  at  Ardros-   Maize    June 

san. 

PORTLAND;  prize  crew  to  Blyth Barley,  beans,  dried  fruit  June 

and  oil  cake. 
SEACONNET;    prize    crew    to    New-   General    June 

castle. 


8,  1915 May  14,  1915 

8,  1915 May  9,  1915 

9,  1915 May  10,  1915 

10,  1915 May  13,  1915 

10,  1915 May  19.  1915 

10,  1915 May  12,  1915 

11,  1915 May  12,  1915 

11,  1915 May  19,  1915 

12,  1915 May  15,  1915 

12,  1915 May  17,  1915 

13,  1915 May  15,  1915 

13,  1915 May  24,  1915 

14,  1915 May  16,  1915 

14,  1915 May  16,  1915 

14,  1915 May  14,  1915 

14,  1915 May  19,  1915 

15,  1915 May  18,  1915 

IS,  1915 May  17,  1915 

18,  1915 May  20,  1915 

18,  1915 May  21,  1915 

21,  1915 May  21,  1915 

22,  1915 May  25,  1915 

23,  1915 May  27,  1915 

23,  1915 June  9,  1915 

23,  1915 May  25,  1915 

23,  1915 May  24,  1915 

25,  1915 May  27,  1915 

25,  1915 May  27,  1915 

27,  1915 May  30,  1915 

27,  1915 May  29,  1915 

28,  1915 May  30,  1915 

28,  1915 May  30,  1915 

28,  1915 May  29,  1915 

28,  1915  May  28,  1915 

28,  1915 June  30,  1915 

29,  1915 June  29,  1915 

29,  1915 June  1,  1915 

29,  1915 May  29,  1915 

29,  1915 June  11,  1915 

29,  1915 June  5,  1915 

30,  1915 June  1,  1915 

31,  1915 May  31,  1915 

1,  1915 June  18,  1915 

1,  1915 June  3,  191S 

1,  1915 June  3,  191S 

2,  1915 June  6,  1915 

2,  1915 June  26,  1915 

3,  1915 June  5,  1915 

3,  1915 June  6,  1915 

3,  1915 June  5,  1915 

6,  1915 June  8,  1915 

6,  1915 June  6,  1915 

6,  1915 

6,  1915 June 

6,  1915 June 

8,  1915 June 

8,  1915 

9,  1915 June 

9,  1915 June 

10,  1915 

11,  1915 June 

11,  1915 June 

12,  1915 June 

13,  1915 June 

13,  1915 

13,  1915 June  14,  1915 

14,  1915 June  15,  1915 

14,  1915 June  19,  1915 

14,  1915 June  15,  1915 

14,  1915 June  14,  1915 

14,  1915 June  16,  1915 

14,  1915 June  30,  1915 

15,  1915 June  IS,  191S 

15,  1915 June  18,  1915 

16,  191S June  19,  191S 


8, 

1915 

10, 

1915 

17, 

1915 

"ii," 

1915 

12, 

1915 

'"W, 

1915 

17, 

1915 

13, 

1915 

13, 

1915 

IX 


QUOTAnONS   PERTINENT  TO  THE   ISSUE 


THE  PATRIOTIC  PRESS  OF  A  CENTURY  AGO 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  LAW  OF 
NATIONS 

From  The  General  Advertiser,  Philadelphia, 
Dec.  16,  1793 

The  law  of  nations  is  the  tacit  acquies- 
cence of  nations,  in  those  rules  by  which 
they  consent  to  be  governed  in  their  transac- 
tions, with  respect  to  each  other.  This  law 
must  therefore  vary  as  civilization  softens 
and  improves  the  general  mass  of  manners, 
among  those  nations  whose  mutual  inter- 
course subjects  them  to  similar  laws.  Thus 
it  was  anciently  held  that  the  conqueror  had 
the  power  of  life  and  death  over  the  con- 
quered— and  from  thence  was  deduced  the 
practice  of  holding  prisoners  in  a  state  of 
slavery.  Tlie  humanity  of  modern  nations 
has  exploded  this  doctrine,  and  the  law  of 
nations  limits  the  power  of  the  conqueror  to 
a  temporary  confinement.  The  ancient  law 
of  nations  declared,  that  an  enemy's  prop- 
erty, or  even  the  subject  of  a  power  at  war, 
might  be  taken  from  a  neutral  ship,  provid- 
ed that  freight  and  demurrage  were  paid ;  so 
that  the  neutral  vessel  lost  nothing  by  the 
capture.  The  violence  and  inconveniences 
that  this  law,  even  thus  qualified,  gave  birth 
to,  induced  the  Empress  of  Russia  to  pro- 
pose during  the  last  war,  an  alteration  of  it, 
whereby  neutral  vessels  should  he  inviolate, 
except  when  carrying  contraband  goods,  and 
to  prevent  any  misapprehensions  on  that 
subject,  she  enumerated  the  contraband 
goods — to  this  law  all  Europe  (with  one  ex- 
ception) and  the  United  States  formally  ac- 
ceded. Britain,  the  exception  alluded  to, 
not  being  willing  to  relinquish  her  piratical 
system,  did  not  formally  acknowledge  the 
rule — however,  she  respected  it  so  far,  as  to 
confine  her  aggressions  to  the  weaker  states, 
and  those  aggressions  produced  here  were 
with  the  United  Netherlands.  But  as  one 
Individual  of  a  community  cannot  prevent 
the  operation  of  a  law  which  the  majority 
impose,  the  law  of  nations  has  by  their  con- 
sent been  changed,  notwithstanding  the  dis- 
sent of  Britain ;  and  that  this  is  the  opinion 
of  the  President,  appears  from  his  appealing 
to  the  modem  law  of  nations  in  his  procla- 
mation. It  follows,  therefore,  that  every 
seizure  and  detainer  of  our  vessels;  every 
condemnation  of  their  cargoes,  under  pre- 
tense of  their  belonging  to  an  enemy,  is  an 
open  and  gross  violation  of  the  modern  law 
of  nations.    But  whv  do  we  talk  of  modern 


law?  There  is  no  law  either  ancient  or  mod- 
ern— no  law  either  human  or  divine — that 
confines  her  usurpations,  that  sets  bounds 
to  her  violence.  By  a  late  proclama- 
mation  of  the  British  King,  every  vessel 
carrying  the  produce  of  our  own  country,  of 
any  kind,  to  any  port  of  France,  is  made 
liable  to  seizure:  she  must  suffer  the  insol- 
ence of  British  cruisers,  and  be  compelled  to 
dispose  of  her  cargo  at  such  rates  as  they 
choose  to  give.  In  what  law  of  nations  has 
this  usurpation  upon  the  rights  of  a  neutral 
power  ever  been  found?  Injury  does  not  stop 
her — it  goes  further  and  declares,  that  when- 
ever any  place  shall  be  declared  to  be  in  a 
state  of  siege,  that  every  vessel  going  towards 
it  shall  be  lawful  prize — ^so  that  the  Royal 
Proclamation  alters  tlie  nature  of  things, 
and  makes  that  a  state  of  siege,  which  is  not 
so  actually;  and  that  contraband  which  no 
law  of  usage  ever  declared  to  be  such. 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  RIGHTS  OF 
NEUTRALS 

From  The  Aurora,  Philadelphia, 
May  30,  1801 
Who  is  there  that  can  regard  the  great 
laws  whicli  connect  society  and  establish  the 
rights  of  property,  that  will  assert  the  legiti- 
macy of  a  seizure  upon  the  proj^erty  of  a 
traveler  on  shore?  Is  tlie  character  of  prop- 
erty changed,  or  the  title  of  the  proprietor 
changed,  by  the  accident  of  my  rice  or  to- 
bacco being  on  board  a  ship  instead  of  being 
in  my  store  or  on  my  plantation? 


From  The  Aurora,  June  17,  1801. 
We  shall  put  the  case  in  a  simple  point  of 
view.  Mr.  Higginson,  at  Boston,  plans  a 
voyage  to  Canton.  The  ship  on  her  outward 
passage  is  met  by  the  English  frigate  Bos- 
ton, but,  not  satisfied  with  her  papers,  or 
obtaining  information  from  a  vindictive  sea- 
man, or  a  person  sent  by  the  British  Captain 
to  ship  as  a  seaman  in  the  American  vessel 
that  the  cargo  was  French  property,  or 
contraband,  the  vessel  is  carried  into  Provi- 
dence or  Halifax;  there  she  is  libelled — 
lawyers  of  course  are  engaged  and  fees  given 
in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  ship  and 
the  cargo,  and  the  ship  after  a  few  months' 
detention  is  delivered  up,  after  an  expendi- 
ture of  from  five  to  six  thousand  dollars, 
court  fees,  and  lawyers'  fees;  beside  the  de- 
lay of  the  voyage,  the  expense  of  the  crew. 


QUOTATIONS  PERTINENT  TO  THE  ISSUE 


65 


and  the  interest  upon  the  value  of  the  whole 
— even  if  the  cargo  has  escaped  pillage — 
this  is  only  a  case  in  the  mildest  form,  thou- 
sands of  which  have  occurred  since  the 
British  treaty. 


(From  The  Aurora,  December  13,  1805.) 

As  war  itself  is  an  outrage  of  moral  jus- 
tice, and  indifferent  nations  are  not  allowed 
to  interfere  in  their  disputes,  so  neither  are 
indifferent  nations  to  be  involved  in  the  con- 
sequences of  their  dispute;  for  a  vice  or 
crime,  that  is  war,  is  itself  sufficiently  afflict- 
ing to  those  who  are  engaged  in  it ;  the  prin- 
ciples of  universal  justice  demand  then  that 
those  who  are  not  concerned  or  involved  in 
it,  should  be  exempted  from  its  effects.  This 
was,  in  fact,  the  principle  of  the  armed  neu- 
trality of  1780.  The  object  was  to  secure 
peaceable  nations  from  the  injuries  and 
wrongs  of  nations  arrogant  and  despotic,  and 
who  being  themselves  at  war,  would  not  suf- 
fer any  other  nation  to  be  at  peace. 

We  infer,  therefore,  that  if  the  moral  law 
— of  which  Christians  and  Christian  nations 
boast  so  much — is  to  be  the  standard  of  riglit 
and  wrong,  that  it  cannot  be  maintained, 
that  the  peace,  property,  liberty,  rights,  and 
independence  of  free,  peaceable  nations,  can, 
consistently  with  the  moral  law,  be  inter- 
rupted or  injured;  and  that  if  the  moral  law 
is  to  prevail  (and  if  it  does  not  there  is  an 
end  of  all  law),  that  the  peaceable  nation 
has  the  right  to  the  full  latitude  of  the 
treaties  quoted  to  trade  with  all  the  world 
unmolested. 


( From  Th^  Aurora,  December  16,  1805. ) 

A  dollar  at  sea  is  100  cents  on  shore — a 
robbery  of  my  ship  of  five  or  ten  thousand 
dollars  is  as  much  a  robbery  and  a  wrong 
done  to  me  as  the  robbing  of  my  house  in 
town  or  country  of  the  like  amount. 

If  the  law  of  nations  is  to  be  decided  by 
coercion — then  let  Britain  plunder  on  the 
ocean  until  she  once  more  incenses  and  com- 
bines all  nations  against  her.  We  cannot 
meet  her  in  a  line  of  battle  at  sea— for  lier 
fleets  cover  it ;  we  must,  therefore,  make  war 
where  we  can,  sequester  first;  and  if  that 
does  not  procure  justice,  embargo;  if  that 
fails,  confiscate;  and  then  we  cannot  be 
worse  treated  than  we  have  been  and  are 
daily. 


(From  The  Aurora,  December  17,  1805.) 

It  is  time  then  that  we  do  not  submit  to 
the  reproach  of  conniving  at  a  total  change 
of  the  usages  of  civilized  nations — it  is  time 
that  we  rescued  ourselves  from  the  disgrace 
of  an  abandonment  of  the  principles  of  the 
armed  neutrality  of  1780,  in  which  the  true 
principles  of  neutral  national  right  were  as- 
serted. These  principles  .  .  .  cannot 
be  but  constantly  kept  in  view,  "a  nation  in- 


dependent and  neutral  does  not  lose  by  the 
war  of  others,  the  right  which  they  had  be- 
fore the  war,  because  peace  exists  between 
her  and  all  the  belligerent  powers."  Without 
receiving  or  being  obliged  to  follow  the  laws 
of  either  of  these  she  has  a  right  to  follow, 
in  all  places  (contraband  excepted)  the  traf- 
fic which  she  would  have  a  right  to  carry  on 
if  peace  existed  between  all  other  nations, 
as  it  existed  here. 

That  neutral  vessels  have  a  right  to  navi- 
gate freely  from  port  to  port,  even  on  the 
coasts  of  the  powers  at  war. 

That  the  effects  of  the  subjects  of  the  pow- 
ers at  war  shall  be  free  in  neutral  vessels  on 
the  high  sea,  except  such  as  are  acknowl- 
edged by  all  nations  to  be  contraband. 

That  as  the  blockade  of  a  port  is  to  be  un- 
derstood only  where  a  vessel  cannot  enter 
without  evident  danger,  on  account  of  vessels 
of  war  stationed  there  to  form  an  effectual 
blockade.     .     .     . 

But  moral  justice  does  not  enter  into  the 
English  interpretation  of  tlie  law  of  nations. 
Her  principles  and  her  practices  are  anal- 
agous  to  those  of  the  highway  robber,  who, 
because  he  carries  a  pair  of  pistols,  forbids 
the  unarmed  and  innocent  travelers,  whom 
he  meets  on  the  road,  from  passing  till  he  has 
plundered  them.  .  .  The  right  of  search, 
which  was  at  first  a  qualified  right,  subject 
to  restrictions  within  the  bounds  of  reason- 
ableness, has  been  extended  to  a  search  the 
most  vexatious  and  injurious  to  the  cargo, 
on  the  high  seas;  to  the  disregard  of  papers, 
and  to  breaking  open  of  hatches  and  pack- 
ages. 

The  next  step  was,  from  the  right  of  car- 
rying into  port  upon  strong  and  palpable 
suspicion  of  contraband,  to  carrying  in  at 
discretion. 

From  this  followed  the  extension  of  the 
principle  of  contraband  to  articles  not 
actually  war-like,  such  as  timber  and  metals, 
because  they  MIGHT  be  used  in  war.  After 
this  extension,  the  principle  of  contraband 
was  enlarged  to  food,  and  even  to  the  vul- 
gar luxury  of  tobacco.  After  flour  and  to- 
bacco had  been  determined  to  be  contraband 
of  war,  it  was  not  at  all  surprising  that  Eng- 
land should  believe  she  had  befooled  or  dis- 
mayed mankind;  and  having  involved  Hol- 
land in  war,  and  commanded  Genoa  and 
Tuscany  to  declare  war,  when  they  wished 
to  be,  and  it  was  their  interest  to  be,  at 
peace;  it  was  not  at  all  wonderful  to  find 
England  attempting  to  accomplish  by  a 
proclamation  what  she  could  not  effect  by 
her  fleets,  the  blockade  of  the  whole  coast. 
The  blockade  of  the  whole  world,  however, 
suitably  succeeded,  for  in  fact  such  is  the 
effect  of  the  orders,  decrees  and  decisions  of 
the  English  privy  council  and  courts. 

Take  the  new  principles,  or  rather  the  vio- 
lation of  all  just  principles,  held  up  by  the 
English  concerning  the  navigation  of  neu- 


66 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


trals,  and  it  amounts  to  this :  That  the  ports 
of  a  nation  at  war  with  England  and  the 
ports  of  the  colonies  of  that  nation  are  in  a 
state  of  blockade,  when  England  chooses  to 
publish  an  Order  in  Council;  and  whenever 
she  does  not  choose  to  issue  such  an  order, 
it  is  to  be  considered  that  she  relaxes  from 
the  straight  rule,  and  this,  of  course,  is  con- 
sidered as  an  indulgence!  If  the  law  of  na- 
tions and  the  laws  of  war  were  to  be  regu- 
lated in  this  way,  it  would  be  absurd  in  the 
last  degree  to  talk  of  national  independence. 
Not  only  the  United  States,  but  every  nation 
on  earth  would  be  no  better  than  the  vassals 
of  England. 

The  neutral  nation  is  not  surely  bound  to 
lie  still  and  suffer!  .  .  .  England  says: 
"No !  I  am  at  war  in  defense  of  all  order  and 
all  religion,  and  all  government — have  I  not 
stood  up  for  the  Pope  in  1795,  and  the  Turk 
in  1805 — have  I  not  taken  the  Mogul  and  the 
Mahattahs  under  my  protection— and  shall 
I  not  take  the  golden  bull  and  the  Kepublic 
of  Genoa  under  my  effective  protection 
now?"  Extravagant  and  ludicrous  as  this 
personification  of  England  is — it  furnishes 
as  coherent  argument  as  any  that  can  be  set 
up  in  support  of  its  oppression  of  neutrals. 


(From  The  Aurora,  Dec.  5,  1805.) 

Britain  boasts  that  her  present  greatness 
is  owing  to  her  navigation  laws — let  the 
United  States  form  theirs  also. 


(Prom  The  Aurora,  Dec.  18,  1805.) 
It  has  been  too  long  the  fashion  to  esteem 
other  countries  before  our  own  .... 
and  it  is  time  that  the  fashion  of  loving  our 
country  should  once  more  resume  its  benefi- 
cent and  cheering  influence.  Our  situation 
is  original  in  the  annals  of  the  world ;  our 
youth  do  not  sufficiently  appreciate  the 
superiority  of  our  country  over  other  na- 
tions, in  every  particular  that  has  been  con- 
sidered meritorious  and  worthy  of  historical 
celebrity  and  the  imitation  of  great  and 
noble  minds.  It  is  time  that  our  youth  should 
begin  to  feel  this  honor  and  to  act  upon  it.  It 
is  time  that  we  think  with  a  boldness  and 
dignity  suited  to  the  originality  and  glory  of 
their  condition,  and  that  they  learn  to  pre- 
serve sacred  and  to  hand  down  to  their  suc- 
cessors the  glorious  gifts  which  the  virtues 
of  their  forefathers  have  secured  for  them  by 
the  Sjacrifice  of  so  much  blood — those  sacri- 
fices should  be  constantly  kept  in  sight — a/nd 
every  invaMon  of  our  national  rights  should 
be  deemed  am,  invocation  on  us  to  rise,  reas- 
sert and  defend  them  under  every  peril. 


Note. — The  "Aurora"  was  the  most  in- 
fluential newspaper  in  the  United  States  in 
the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Founded  by  Benjamin  Franklin  Bache,  son- 
in-law  and  heir  of  Benjamin  Franklin,  is- 
sued from  the  Franklin  printing  house  at 
No.  15  Franklin  Court,  Philadelphia,  and 
carried  on  by  William  Duane  after  Bache's 
death,  the  '^Aurora"  was  the  chief  single 
agency  that  wrought  the  election  of  Jeffer- 
son and  framed  the  policies  of  the  Govern- 
ment after  the  Republican  party  had  begun 
its  fifty-year  lease  of  power. 

To  the  printing  office  of  the  "Aurora" 
early  in  the  nineteenth  century  came  a 
young  immigrant,  James  Wilson,  grand- 
father of  the  twenty-eighth  President  of  the 
United  States.  James  Wilson  became  chief 
compositor  on  the  "Aurora,"  and  as  such 
worked  for  a  number  of  years.  He  was  de- 
voted to  his  chief,  even  naming  his  first  son 
William  Duane  Wilson.  In  1812,  the  name 
of  James  Wilson  went  up  as  owner  of  the 
"Aurora." 

In  reading  extracts  like  those  above 
(which  might  be  multiplied  many  fold),  one 
is  constrained  to  ask  himself  whether,  dur- 
ing the  past  hundred  years,  civilization  has 
advanced  or  retreated.  Have  manners  soft- 
ened, or  grown  more  barbarous?  Have 
peaceable  populations  maintained  their 
rights  in  fuller  degree,  or  have  they  yielded 
those  they  had  already  achieved?  Are  the 
patriotic  sentiments  which  these  idols  of 
their  day — Bache  and  Duane — penned,  and 
which  the  young  Irish  immigrant  (not  being 
afraid  of  a  hyphen  more  or  less,  he  called 
himself  a  Scots-Irish-American)  put  into 
type — are  they  uncongenial  to  the  minds  of 
Americans  today?  Were  those  sentiments 
mistaken,  were  they  inhumane,  icere  they 
unenlightened?  Or,  are  they  merely  too  vig- 
orous? 

In  short,  why  are  not  the  views  which 
James  Wilson  put  into  type  a  century  ago 
appropriate  to  the  pen  of  his  qrandson  to- 
day? 


QUOTATIONS  PERTINENT  TO  THE  ISSUE 

THOMAS  JEFFERSON  ON  NEUTRAL  RIGHTS 


67 


[Mr.  Jefferson,  Secretary/  of  State,  to  Mr.  C.  Pinckney,  United  States  Minister  in  London, 
September  7,  1793.] 


The  state  of  Avar  existing  between  Great 
Britain  and  France  furnishes  no  legitimate 
right  either  to  interrupt  the  agriciilture  of 
the  United  States  or  the  peaceable  exchange 
of  its  produce  with  all  nations,  and  conse- 
quently the  assumption  of  it  will  be  as  law- 
ful hereafter  as  now,  in  peace  as  in  war.  No 
ground,  acknowledged  by  the  common  rea- 
son of  mankind,  authorizes  this  act  now, 
and  unacknowledged  ground  may  be  taken 
at  any  and  at  all  times. 

We  see  then  a  practice  begun,  to  which 
no  time,  no  circumstances,  prescribe  any 
limits,  and  which  strikes  at  the  root  of  our 
agriculture,  that  branch  of  industry  which 
gives  food,  clothing  and  comfort  to  the  great 
mass  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  States.  If 
any  nation  whatever  has  a  right  to  shut  up 
to  our  produce  all  the  ports  of  the  earth, 
except  her  own  and  those  of  her  friends,  she 
may  shut  up  these  also,  and  so  confine  us 
within  our  own  limits.  No  nation  can  sub- 
scribe to  such  pretensions;  no  nation  can 
agree,  at  the  mere  will  or  interest  of  another, 
to  have  its  peaceable  industry  suspended  and 
its  citizens  reduced  to  idleness  and  want. 
The  loss  of  our  produce,  destined  to  foreign 
markets,  or  that  loss  which  would  result 
from  an  arbitrary  restraint  of  our  markets, 
is  a  tax  too  serious  for  us  to  acquiesce  in. 


It  is  not  enough  for  a  nation  to  say  we 
and  our  friends  will  buy  your  produce.  We 
have  a  right  to  answer  that  it  suits  us  bet- 
ter to  sell  to  their  enemies  as  well  as  their 
friends.  Our  ships  do  not  go  to  France  to 
return  empty ;  they  go  to  exchange  the  sur- 
plus of  our  produce  which  we  can  spare  for 
surpluses  of  other  kinds  which  they  can 
spare  and  we  want;  which  they  can  furnish 
on  better  terms,  and  more  to  our  mind,  than 
Great  Britain  or  her  friends. 

We  have  a  right  to  judge  for  ourselves 
what  market  best  suits  us,  and  they  have 
none  to  forbid  to  us  the  enjoyment  of  the 
necessaries  and  comforts  which  we  may  ob- 
tain from  any  other  independent  country. 

Were  we  to  withhold  from  her  (France) 
supplies  of  provisions,  we  should  in  like 
manner  be  bound  to  withhold  them  from  her 
enemies  also,  and  thus  shut  to  ourselves  all 
the  ports  of  Europe  where  corn  is  in  demand 
or  make  ourselves  parties  in  the  war.  This 
is  a  dilemma  which  Great  Britain  has  no 
right  to  force  upon  us,  and  for  which  no  pre- 
text can  be  found  in  any  part  of  our  con- 
duct. She  may,  indeed,  feel  the  desire  of 
starving  an  enemy  nation,  but  she  can  have 
no  right  of  doing  it  at  our  loss  nor  of  mak- 
ing us  the  instruments  of  it. 


Thomas  Jefferson  to  Baronne  de  Stael  Eolstein,  May  24,  1813. 


England  is  in  principle  the  enemy  of  all 
maritime  nations.  The  object  of  England  is 
the  permanent  dominion  of  the  ocean,  and 
the  monopoly  of  the  trade  of  the  world.  To 
do  this  she  must  keep  a  larger  fleet  than  her 
resources  will  maintain.  The  resources  of 
other  nations  then  must  be  impressed  to 
supply  the  deficiency  of  her  own.  This 
is  sufficiently  developed  and  evidenced  by 
her  successive  strides  towards  the  usurpa- 
tion of  the  sea.  Mark  them  after  her  first 
war,  after  William  Pitt,  the  little,  came  in- 
to her  administration.  She  first  forbade 
neutrals  all  trade  with  her  enemies  in  time 
of  war,  which  they  had  not  in  time  of  peace. 
Then  she  forbade  them  to  trade  from  the 
port  of  one  nation  to  that  of  another  at  war 
with  her,  although  a  right  fully  exercised  in 
time  of  peace.  Next  instead  of  taking  ves- 
sels only  entering  a  blockaded  port,  she  took 
them  over  the  whole  ocean,  if  destined  to 
that  port,  although  ignorant  of  the  blockade, 


and  without  intention  to  violate  it.  Then 
she  took  them  returning  from  that  port,  as 
if  infected  by  previous  infraction  of  block- 
ade. Then  came  her  paper  blockades,  by 
which  she  might  shut  up  the  whole  world 
without  sending  a  ship  to  sea,  except  to  take 
all  those  sailing  on  it,  as  they  must,  of 
course,  be  bound  to  some  port.  And  these 
were  followed  by  her  orders  of  Council,  for- 
bidding every  nation  to  go  to  the  port  of  an- 
other nation  without  coming  first  to  some 
port  of  Great  Britain,  there  paying  a  trib- 
ute to  her,  regulated  by  the  cargo,  and  tak- 
ing from  her  a  license  to  proceed  to  the  port 
of  destination;  which  operation  the  vessel 
was  to  repeat  with  the  return  cargo  on  its 
return.  And  finally  that  her  views  may  not 
longer  rest  in  inference,  in  a  recent  debate, 
her  minister  declared  in  open  parliament 
that  the  object  of  the  present  war  is  a 
monopoly  of  commerce. 


68 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


PRESIDENT  MADISON  ON  PAPER  BLOCKADES 

(From    President    Madison's    Message    to  Congress,  June  18,  18l!2.) 


Under  ])retendecl  blockades,  without  the 
presence  of  an  adequate  force,  and  some- 
times without  the  practicability  of  applying 
one,  our  commerce  has  been  plundered  in 
every  sea ;  the  great  staples  of  our  country 
have  been  cut  oil  from  their  legitimate  mar- 
bets;  and  a  destructive  blow  aimed  at  our 
agricultural  and  maritime  interests.  In  ag- 
gravation of  these  predatory  measures,  they 
have  been  considered  as  in  force  from  the 
dates  of  their  notification;  a  retrospective 
effect  being  thus  added,  as  has  been  done  in 
other  important  cases,  to  the  unlawfulness 
of  the  course  pursued.  And  to  render  the 
outrage  the  more  signal,  these  mock  block- 
ades have  been  reiterated  and  enforced  iu 
the  face  of  official  communications  from  the 
British  Government,  declaring,  as  the  true 
definition  of  a  legal  blockade,  "that  particu- 
lar ports  must  be  actually  invested,  and 
previous  warning  given  to  vessels  bound  to 
them  not  to  enter." 

Not  content  with  these  occasional  expedi- 
ents for  laying  waste  our  neutral  trade,  the 
Cabinet  of  Great  Britain  resorted  at  length 


to  the  sweeping  system  of  blockades,  under 
the  name  of  Orders  in  Council,  which  has 
been  moulded  and  managed  as  might  best 
suit  its  political  views,  its  commercial 
jealousies,  or  the;  avidity  of  British  cruisers. 
To  our  remonstrances  against  the  com- 
plicated and  transcendent  injustice  of  this 
innovation,  the  first  reply  was  that  the  or- 
ders were  reluctantly  adopted  by  Great 
Britain  as  a  necessary  retaliation  on  decrees 
of  her  enemy  proclaiming  a  general  block- 
ade of  the  British  Isles,  at  a  time  when  the 
naval  force  of  that  enemy  dared  not  to  issue 
from  his  own  ports.  She  was  reminded 
without  effect  that  her  own  prior  blockades, 
unsupported  by  an  adequate  naval  force, 
actually  applied  and  continued,  were  a  bar 
to  this  plea;  that  executed  edicts  against 
millions  of  our  property  could  not  be  re- 
taliation on  edicts  confessedly  impossible 
to  be  executed;  that  retaliation,  to  be  just, 
should  fall  on  the  party  setting  the  guilty 
example,  not  on  an  innocent  party  which 
was  not  even  chargeable  with  an  acquies- 
cence in  it. 


PRESIDENT  GRANT'S  IDEA  OF  AN  "UNFRIENDLY  ACT" 

[Mr.  Fish.  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Washburn,  Minister  at  Paris,  October  4, 
1870.     (See  For.  Rel.  3rd  S.  J^lst  C,  Executive  Documents  I,  Franco-German  ^Yar,  31.)]. 


This  government  desires  and  intends  to 
maintain  a  perfect  and  strict  neutrality  be- 
tween the  two  powers  now  unfortunately  en- 
gaged in  war.  It  desires  also  to  extend  to 
both  the  manifestation  of  its  friendly  feel- 
ing in  every  possible  way  and  will  allow  to 
the  vessels  of  war  of  each  power  equally  the 
hospitality  of  its  ports  and  harbors  for  all 
proper  and  friendly  purpose. 

But  this  hospitality  is  liable  to  abuse,  and 
circumstances  have  arisen  to  give  rise  in 
the  minds  of  some  persons  to  the  apprehen- 
sion that  attempts  at  such  abuse  have  taken 
place. 

I  am  not  in  possession  of  facts  to  justify 
me  in  saying  that  such  has  been  the  case, 
but  I  have  deemed  myself  justified  in  call- 
ing the  attention  of  M.  Berthemy,  the 
French  representative  at  this  capital,  to  the 
current  rumors,  sustained  as  they  are  by  the 
presence  of  a  number  of  French  vessels  upon 
the  coast  of  the  United  States.  These  ves- 
sels have  appeared  at  or  near  the  entrance 
of  the  harbor  of  New  York,  off  Sandy  Hook ; 
at  the  entrance  of  the  Long  Island  Sound 
and  at  or  near  the  entrance  of  Chesapeake 
Bay.  One  or  more  is  represented  to  have 
been  anchored  not  far  from  Sandy  Hook,  the 
main  entrance  to  New  York  Harbor,  and 
there  is  a  difference  of  statement  as  to  the 
precise  distance  at  which  she  lay  from 
shoi'e;  some  claiming  that  she  was  within  a 


marine  league.  But  of  this  there  is  no  posi- 
tive evidence.  She  has  entered  the  port  of 
New  York,  as  claimed  by  some,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  watching  a  German  steamer  about 
to  sail  thence.  Three  of  them  have  put  into 
the  harbor  of  New  London,  which  looks  out 
upon  Long  Island  Sound,  the  eastern  en- 
trance to  the  New  York  Harbor,  avowedly 
for  small  repairs.  One  recently  asked  per- 
mission, which  was  granted,  to  make  some 
repairs  at  the  Norfolk  navy  yard,  near  the 
entrance  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 

All  this  may  be  consistent  with  an  inten- 
tion of  perfect  observance  of  the  neutral 
character  of  our  waters  and  jurisdiction  and 
with  an  entire  absence  of  undertaking  any 
hostile  movement  against  the  vessels  of 
north  Germany  from  those  waters  or  that 
jurisdiction. 

A  large  trade  has  been  carried  on  from  the 
ports  of  the  United  States  approached  by 
the  waters  in  which  these  vessels  have  thus 
appeared  by  vessels  belonging  to  north  Ger- 
many. 

The  appearance  of  French  vessels  in  these 
immediate  neighborhoods  in  such  numbers 
and  force  does  not  fail  to  excite  the  alarm 
of  these  vessels  and  must  have  the  effect  to 
a  greater  or  less  degree  of  diminishing  that 
trade. 

The  United  States  is  not  prepared  at  pres- 
ent to  say  that  any  actual  violation  of  in- 


QUOTATIONS  PERTINENT  TO  THE  ISSUE 


69 


ternational  law  lias  been  coniuiitted  or  that 
the  hospitality  of  tliese  waters  has  been  posi- 
tively abused.  But  the  hovering  of  the  ves- 
sels of  war  of  a  Mligerent  on  the  coast  near 
the  entrance  of  the  principal  ports  of  a 
friendly  power  does  interfere  with  the  trade 
of  the  friendly  power. 

The  interruption  of  the  regular  coniniuni- 
cation  with  you  by  reason  of  the  investment 
of  Paris  has  led  me  to  represent  to  M. 
Berthemy  our  views  on  this  subject  and  to 


say  that,  although  the  vessels  of  either  bel- 
ligerents may  not  actually  shelter  within  the 
juristliction  of  the  United  States  and  pro- 
ceed thence  against  tlie  vessels  of  its  enemy, 
this  government  would  regard  as  an  un- 
friendly act  the  hovering  of  such  vessels 
upon  tlie  coast  of  the  United  States  near  to 
its  shores  in  the  neighborhood  of  its  ports 
and  in  tlie  track  of  the  ordinary  commerce 
of  these  ports  with  intent  to  intercept  the 
vessels  of  trade  of  its  enemv. 


THE   BRITISH   AND   GERMAN   WAR  ZONES   COMPARED 

(Special  to  the  ycic  York  Times.) 


Washington.  Feb.  7,  1915. — Develop- 
ments to-day  with  respect  to  the  German 
war  zone  proclamation  indicate  that  the 
American  Government  is  not  likely  at  this 
time  to  file  any  protest  or  make  representa- 
tions to  tlie  German  Government  respecting 
the  enforcement  of  the  German  order.  The 
long  memorandum  delivered  by  the  German 
Foreign  Office  to  Ambassador  Gerard,  ex- 
plaining the  proclamation,  has  been  received 
at  the  State  Department,  and  perusal  of  its 
text,  which  was  cabled  to  American  news- 
papers this  morning,  convinced  officials  here 
that  at  present  no  issue  could  be  raised  with 
Germany  over  tlie  creation  of  the  projected 
war  zone  without  at  the  same  time  raising 
identically  the  same  issue  with  Great 
Britain. 

The  German  memorandum  transmitted  by 
Ambassador  Gerard  emphasizes  the  fact — 
a  vitally  important  one  in  the  present  sit- 
uation— that  Great  Britain  has  declared 
the  entire  North  Sea  to  he  a  toar  area,  and 
that  if  England  lias  not  made  impossible  the 
passage  of  neutral  sliipping  through  the  sea 
between  Scotland  and  Norway  she  has  ren- 
dered "it  so  difficult  and  so  dangerous  that 
she  lias  to  a  certain  extent  effected  a  block- 
ade of  neutral  coasts  and  neutral  ports,  in 
violation  of  all  international  laws." 

The  fact  that  the  British  Government  has 
done  identically  the  same  thing  with  re- 
spect to  the  establishment  of  war  zones  in 
the  open  seas  beyond  the  three-mile  terri- 
torial limit,  has  been  officially  certified  to 
the  State  Department  by  Sir  Cecil  Spring- 
Rice,  the  British  Ambassador.  This  was 
done  three  months  ago,  and  no  protest  has 
ever  been  made  by  the  UnAted  States  against 
the  action  of  Great  Britain  in  establishing 
such  a  war  zone.  Since  the  American  Gov- 
ernment has  not  protested  against  nor  ques- 
tioned the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  estab- 
lish its  war  zone,  it  is  evident  that  it  Avould 
be  impossible  for  the  United  States,  without 
a  violation  of  its  attitude  of  strict  neutral- 
ity, to  attack  or  even  question  the  German 
war  zone  proclamation  at  this  or  any  other 
time,  without  similarly  questioning  the  Brit- 
ish war  zone  order. 


Trump  Card  for  Germany. 

It  dawned  upon  officials  here  today  that 
tlie  German  Government  had  executed  a 
rather  neat  and  clever  counter-diplomatic 
stroke  in  notifying  the  world  of  its  inten- 
tion to  create  a  Avar  zone  around  the  Brit- 
ish Isles  by  taking  a  leaf  out  of  the  British 
book,  and  doing  the  very  thing  that  the  Brit- 
isii  GoA'ernment  had  done.  The  British  and 
(Jerman  war  zone  orders,  as  officially  com- 
municated to  the  State  Department,  were 
compared  and  closely  studied  today.  This 
comparison  was  not  found  to  be  to  the  dis- 
advantage of  the  Germans. 

The  situation  resolves  itself  something 
after  this  fashion  :  For  England  the  official 
date  of  the  beginning  of  the  Avar  was  August 
1th.  England  waited  until  three  months  of 
the  war  had  been  fought  and  then  serA-ed 
notice  on  the  neutral  poAvers  of  the  world  of 
lier  intention  to  establisli  a  AAar  zone.  The 
British  war  zone  was  set  up  on  NovemJ)er 
5th.  The  Germans  icaitcd  an  additional 
three  months,  ticice  as  long  as  did  Great 
Britain,  or  until  February  '/th.  crnctly  si-v 
months  from  the  official  British  beginning  of 
the  war,  and  then  announced  its  decision  to 
establish  a  war  zone,  very  similar  to  that  of 
Great  Britain,  although  somewhat  more  ex- 
tensive. However,  the  principle  iuA-olved 
Avith  respect  to  both  war  zones  is  the  same, 
since  each  is  extenslAe  enough  to  cover  the 
liigh  seas  outside  of  the  three-mile  territor- 
ial limit,  and  the  two  AA'ar  zones  differ  in  im- 
portance only  in  degree,  and  the  character 
of  the  operations  to  be  conducted  in  them. 

War  Zones  Compared. 

A  comparison  of  the  British  and  German 
Avar  zone  orders  disclosed  these  striking 
facts : 

First. — The  British  GoA-ernment  on  Nov. 
4th,  notified  the  United  States  GoA-ernment 
that  its  war  zone  would  be  effective  from 
NOA'.  5th — one  day's  notice. 

Second. — The  German  Government  issued 
its  war  zone  proclamation  on  Feb.  4th,  and 
communicated  it  to  Ambassador  Gerard  on 
the  same  day,  announcing  that  the  German 
war  zone  around  rhe  British  Isles  Avould  be 


70 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


effective    after    Feb.     18tli — fifteen    days' 
notice. 

Third. — The  British  war  zone  covers  the 
whole  of  the  North  Sea. 

Fourth. — The  German  war  zone  covers 
the  entire  English  Channel  and  all  the  ter- 
ritorial and  high  sea  waters  around  the  Brit- 
ish Isles. 

Fifth. — The  British  war  zone  order 
sought  to  close  the  north  of  Scotland  route 
around  the  British  Isles  to  Norway,  the  Bal- 
tic, Denmark  and  Holland. 

Sixth. — The  German  war  zone  seeks  to 
close  the  southern  or  English  Channel  route 
around  the  British  Isles  to  Holland,  Nor- 
way, Sweden,  Denmark  and  the  Baltic. 

Seventh. — The  British  war  zone  decree 
drew  an  arbitrary  line  from  the  Hebrides 
Islands  along  the  Scottish  coast  to  Iceland, 
and  warned  neutral  shipping  that  it  would 
cross  this  line  at  its  risk,  but  that  ships  of 
neutral  nations  might  go  to  Holland  and 
other  neutral  nations  along  the  eastern  lit- 
toral of  the  North  Sea  by  taking  the  Eng- 
lish Channel  and  Straits  of  Dover  route. 

Eighth. — Tlie  German  war  zone  declares 
that  neutral  vessels  will  be  exposed  to  dan- 
ger in  the  English  Channel,  but  routes  of 
navigation  around  the  north  of  Scotland  Is- 
lands in  the  eastern  part  of  the  North  Sea 
and  in  a  strip  thirty  miles  wide  along  the 
Dutch  coast  are  not  open  to  the  danger  zone. 

Ninth. — The  Germans  make  the  south- 
ern channel  route  dangerous,  and  declare  the 
north  of  Scotland  route  safe,  while  the  Brit- 
ish declare  the  north  of  Scotland  route  dan- 
gerous and  the  English  Channel  route  safe, 
the  effect  of  this  being  that  neither  the  north- 
iTn  nor  the  southern  routes  around  England 
will  be  safe  for  neutral  vessels. 


Tenth. — The  British  war  zone  order  was 
based  on  the  discovery  of  mines  in  the  North 
Sea,  while  the  German  decree  is  based  on 
England's  attitude  toward  contraband,  the 
Wilhelmina  case  and  England's  establish- 
ment of  a  war  zone. 

The  British  Proclamation. 

Here  is  the  text  of  the  communication  in 
which  the  British  Ambassador  three  months 
ago  notified  the  American  State  Department 
of  the  establishment  of  the  British  war  zone : 

Owing  to  the  discovery  of  mines  in  the  North  Sea 
the  whole  of  that  sea  must  be  considered  a  military 
area.  Within  this  area  merchant  shipping  of  all 
kinds,  traders  of  all  countries,  fishing  craft,  and  all 
other  vessels  will  be  exposed  to  the  gravest  dan- 
gers from  mines,  which  it  has  been  necessary  to 
lay  from  warships,  searching  vigilantly  by  night 
and  day  for  suspicious  craft. 

All  merchant  and  fishing  vessels  of  every  descrip- 
tion are  hereby  warned  of  the  dangers  they  encoun- 
ter by  entering  this  area  except  in  strict  accordance 
with  Admiralty  decisions.  Every  effort  will  be  made 
to  convey  this  warning  to  neutral  countries  and  to 
vessels  on  the  sea,  but  from  the  5th  of  November 
onwards  the  Admiralty  announce  that  all  ships  pass- 
ing a  line  drawn  from  the  northern  point  of  the 
Hebrides  through  the  Faroe  Islands  to  Iceland  do 
so  at  their  own  peril. 

Ships  of  all  countries  wishing  to  trade  to  and  from 
Norway,  the  Baltic,  Denmark,  and  Holland  are  ad- 
vised to  come,  if  inward  bound,  by  the  English  Chan- 
nel and  Straits  of  Dover.  There  they  will  be  given 
sailing  directions  which  will  pass  them  safely  so  far  as 
Great  Britain  is  concerned,  up  the  East  Coast  of  Eng- 
land to  Faroe  Island,  whence  safe  route  will,  if  pos- 
sible, be  given  to  Lindesnaes  Lightship.  From  this 
point  they  should  turn  north  or  south,  according  to 
their  destination,  keeping  as  near  the  coast  as  possible. 
Converse  applies  to  vessels  outward  bound. 

By  strict  adherence  to  these  routes  the  commerce  of 
all  countries  will  be  able  to  reach  its  destination  in 
safety,  so  far  as  Great  Britain  is  concerned,  but  any 
straying,  even  for  a  few  miles,  from  the  course  thus 
indicated  may  be  followed  by  serious  consequences. 


X 


OFFICIAL   DOCUMENTS 


DECLARATION  OF  PARIS 

April  16,  1856. 

Declaration  respecting  maritime  lam  signed  hy  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Gh-eat  Bri- 
tain, Austria,  France,  Prussia,  Russia,  Sardima  and  Turkey,  assembled  in  Congress  at 
Paris,  April  16, 1856. 

Article  2 
The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods  with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

Article  3 
Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war,  are  not  liable  to  cap- 
ture under  the  enemy's  flag. 

Article  4 

Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective,  that  is  to  say,  maintained 
by  a  force  sufficient  really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coasts  of  the  enemy. 


DECLARATION    OF    LONDON* 

Feb.  26,  1909. 

Preliminary  Provision. 

The  Signatory  Powers  are  agreed  that  the  rules  contained  in  the  following  Chapters 
correspond  in  substance  with  the  generally  recognized  principles  of  international  laic. 


BLOCKADE. 

Article  1 — A  blockade  must  not  extend  beyond  the  ports  and  coasts  belonging  to  or 
occupied  by  the  enemy. 

Article  2 — In  accordance  with  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856,  a  blockade,  in  order 
to  be  binding,  must  be  effective— that  is  to  say,  it  must  be  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient 
really  to  prevent  access  to  the  enemy  coastline. 

Article  3 — The  question  whether  a  blockade  is  effective  is  a  question  of  fact 

Article  5 — A  blockade  must  be  applied  impartially  to  the  ships  of  all  nations 

Article  17 — Neutral  vessels  may  not  be  captured  for  breach  of  blockade  except 
within  the  area  of  operations  of  the  warships  detailed  to  render  the  blockade  effective. 

Article  18 — The  blockading  forces  must  not  bar  access  to  neutral  ports  or  coasts. 

Article  19 — Whatever  may  be  the  ulterior  destination  of  a  vessel  or  of  her  cargo, 
she  cannot  be  captured  for  breach  of  blockade  if,  at  the  moment,  she  is  on  her  way  to  a 
non-blockaded  port. 

CONTEABAND  OF  WAR. 

Article  22. 

The  following  articles  may,  without  notice,  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war,  under 
the  name  of  absolute  contraband : — 

( 1 )  Arms  of  all  kinds,  including  arms  for  sporting  purposes,  and  their  distinctive 
component  parts. 

(2)  Projectiles,  charges,  and  cartridges  of  all  kinds,  and  their  distinctive  compo- 
nent parts. 

(3)  Powder  and  explosives  especially  prepared  for  use  in  war, 

(4;)  Gun  mountings,  limber  boxes,  limbers,  military  wagons,  field  forges,  and  their 

distinctive  component  parts. 

(5)  Clothing  and  equipment  of  a  distinctively  military,  character. 

(6)  All  kinds  of  harness  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

(7)  Saddle,  draught,  and  pack  animals  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

(8)  Articles  of  camp  equipment,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

(9)  Armour  plates. 

(10)  War-ships,  including  boats,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts  of  such  a 
nature  that  they  can  only  be  used  on  a  vessel  of  war. 

(11)  Implements  and  apparatus  designed  exclusively  for  the  manufacture  of  muni- 
tions of  war,  for  the  manufacture  or  repair  of  arms,  or  war  material  for  use  on  land  or  sea. 


*  The  Declaration  of  London  Concerning  the  Laws  of  Naval  Warfare  was  made  at  a  Conference  initi- 
ated by  the  British  Government  in  a  circular  to  the  Powers.  The  British  Government  suggested  the  subject* 
to  be  discussed,  the  invitations  were  accepted,  and  the  Conference  met  on  the  4th  of  December,  1908.  For  the 
assistance  of  the  Conference  the  British  Government  had  collected  material  into  a  volume  which  became  known 
as  the  Red  Book  and  which  served  as  a  basis  for  the  deliberations  of  the  Conference.  All  the  Powers  convened 
in  the  Conference  (namely:  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Japan,  Italy,  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Spain  and  Holland)  were  signatory  to  the  Declaration,  which,  however,  on  account  of  various  circum- 
stances, failed  to  receive  the  formal  ratification  of  the  Powers.  The  authority  of  the  Declaration  of  London, 
nevertheless,  rests  upon  the  Preliminary  Provision,  which  declares  that  the  principles  enunciated^  in  the  Declara^ 
tion  are  those  which  are  in  substance  recognised  principles  of  international  law.  There  is  in  international  law 
no  authority  higher  than  this. 


74  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

Article  23. 

Articles  exclusively  used  for  war  may  be  added  to  the  list  of  absolute  contraband 
by  a  declaration  which  must  be  notified. 

Such  notification  must  be  addressed  to  the  Governments  of  other  Powers,  or  to  their 
representatives  accredited  to  the  Power  making  the  declaration.  A  notification  made 
after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  is  addressed  only  to  neutral  Powers. 

Article  24. 

The  following  articles,  susceptible  of  use  in  war  as  well  as  for  purposes  of  peace, 
may,  without  notice,  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war,  under  the  name  of  conditional  con- 
traband : — 

(1)  Foodstuffs. 

(2)  Forage  and  grain,  suitable  for  feeding  animals. 

(3)  Clothing,  fabrics  for  clothing,  an  J  boots  and  shoes,  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

(4)  Gold  and  silver  in  coin  or  bullion;  paper  money. 

(5)  Vehicles  of  all  kinds  available  for  use  in  war,  and  their  component  parts. 

(6)  Vessels,  craft,  and  boats  of  all  kinds;  floating  docks,  parts  of  docks  and  their 
component  parts. 

(7)  Kail  way  material,  both  fixed  and  rolling-stock,  and  material  for  telegraphs, 
wireless  telegraphs,  and  telephones. 

(8)  Balloons  and  flying  machines  and  their  distinctive  component  parts,  together 
with  accessories  and  articles  recognisable  as  intended  for  use  in  connection  with  balloons 
and  flying  machines. 

(9)  Fuel;  lubricants. 

(10)  Powder  and  explosives  not  specially  prepared  for  use  in  war. 

(11)  Barbed  wire  and  implements  for  fixing  and  cutting  the  same. 

(12)  Horseshoes  and  shoeing  materials. 

(13)  Harness  and  saddlery. 

(14)  Field  glasses,  telescopes,  chronometers,  and  all  kinds  of  nautical  instruments. 

Article  25. 
Articles  susceptible  of  use  in  war  as  well  as  for  purposes  of  peace,  other  than  those 
enumerated  in  Articles  22  and  24,  may  be  added  to  the  list  of  conditional  contraband  by  a 
declaration,  which  must  be  notified  in  the  maimer  provided  for  in  the  second  paragraph  of 
Article  23. 

Article  26. 
If  a  Power  waives,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  the  right  to  treat  as  contraband  of 
war  an  article  comprised  in  any  of  the  classes  enumerated  in  Articles  22  and  24,  such  in- 
tention shall  be  announced  by  a  declaration,  which  must  be  notified  in  the  manner  pro- 
vided for  in  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  23. 

Article  27. 
Articles  which  are  not  susceptible  of  u&e  in  war  may  not  be  declared  contraband  of 
war. 

Article  28. 
The  following  may  not  be  declared  contraband  of  war : — 

(1)  Raw  cotton,  wool,  silk,  jute,  flax,  hemp,  and  other  raw  materials  of  the  textile 
industries,  and  yarns  of  the  same. 

(2)  Oil  seeds  and  nuts;  copra. 

(3)  Rubber,  resins,  gums,  and  laces;  hops. 

(4)  Raw  hides  and  horns,  bones  and  ivory. 

(5)  Natural  and  artificial  manures,  including  nitrates  and  phosphates  for  agricul- 
tural purposes. 

(6)  Metallic  ores. 

(7)  Earths,  clays,  lime,  chalk,  stone,  including  marble,  bricks,  slates,  and  tiles. 

(8)  Chinaware  and  glass. 

(9)  Paper  and  paper- making  materials. 

(10)  Soap,  paint  and  colours,  including  articles  exclusively  used  in  their  manufac- 
ture, and  varnish. 

(11)  Bleaching  powder,  soda,  ash,  caustic  soda,  salt  cake,  ammonia,  sulphate  of 
ammonia,  and  sulphate  of  copi)er. 

(12)  Agricultural,  mining,  textile,  and  printing  machinery. 

( 13 )  Precious  and  semi-precious  stones,  pearls,  mother-of-pearl,  and  coral. 

(14)  Clocks  and  watches,  other  than  clironometers. 

(15)  Fashion  and  fancy  goods. 

(16)  Feathers  of  all  kinds,  hairs,  and  bristles. 

(17)  Articles  of  household  furniture  and  decoration;  oflBce  furniture  and  requisites. 

Article  29. 
Likewise  the  following  may  not  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war: — 
(1)  Articles  serving  exclusively  to  aid  the  sick  and  wounded.     They  can,  however, 


OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS  75 

in  case  of  urgent  military  necessity  and  subject  to  the  payment  of  compensation,  be  requi- 
sitioned, if  their  destination  is  that  specified  in  Article  30. 

(2)  Articles  intended  for  the  use  of  the  vessel  in  which  they  are  found  as  well  as 
those  intended  for  the  use  of  her  crew  and  passengers  during  the  voyage. 

Articif  30. 
Absolute  contraband  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  shown  to  be  destined  to  territory 
belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy,  or  to  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.     It  is  imma- 
terial whether  the  carriage  of  the  goods  is  direct  or  entails  transhipment  or  a  subsequent 
transport  by  land. 

Article  31. 
Proof  of  the  destination  specified  in  Article  30  is  complete  in  the  following  cases : — 

(1)  When  the  goods  are  documented  for  discharge  in  an  enemy  port,  or  for  delivery 
to  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy. 

(2)  When  the  vessel  is  to  call  at  enemy  ports  only,  or  when  she  is  to  touch  at  an 
enemy  port  or  meet  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy  before  reaching  the  neutral  port  for 
which  the  goods  in  question  are  documented. 

Article  32. 
When  a  vessel  is  carrying  absolute  contraband,  her  papers  are  conclusive  proof  as 
to  the  voyage  on  which  she  is  engaged,  unless  she  is  found  clearly  out  of  the  course  indi- 
cated by  her  papers  and  unable  to  give  adequate  reasons  to  justify  such  deviation. 

Article  33.* 

Conditional  contraband  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  shown  to  be  destined  for  the  use 
of  the  armed  forces  or  of  a  government  department  of  the  enemy  State,  unless  in  this  lat- 
ter case  the  circumstances  show  that  the  goods  cannot  in  fact  be  used  for  the  purposes  of 
war  in  progress.  This  latter  exception  does  not  apply  to  a  consignment  coming  under 
Article  24  (4). 

Article  34.t 

The  destination  referred  to  in  Article  33  is  presumed  to  exist  if  the  goods  are  con- 
signed to  enemy  authorities,  or  to  a  contractor  established  in  the  enemy  country  who,  as 
a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  supplies  articles  of  this  kind  to  the  enemy.  A  similar  pre- 
sumption arises  if  tlie  goods  are  consigned  t(^  a  fortified  place  belonging  to  the  enemy,  or 
other  place  serving  as  a  base  for  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  No  such  presumption, 
however,  arises  in  the  case  of  a  mechant  vessel  bound  for  one  of  these  places  if  it  is  sought 
to  prove  that  she  herself  is  contraband. 

In  cases  where  the  above  presumptions  do  not  arise,  the  destination  is  presumed 
to  be  innocent. 

The  presumptions  set  up  by  this  Article  may  be  rebutted. 

Article  35. 
Conditional  contraband  is  not  liable  to  capture,  except  when  found  on  board  a  ves- 
sel bound  for  territory  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy,  or  for  the  armed  forces  of 
the  enemy,  and  when  it  is  not  to  be  discharged  in  an  intervening  neutral  port. 


*The  Drafting  Committee  of  the  Conference  prepared  a  general  report  on   the  Declaration,  in  the  course 
of  which  it  says,  discussing  Article  33 : 

"There  is  no  question  of  destination  for  the  enemy   in   general,   but  of   destination    for   the  use   of  his 
armed  forces  or  government  departments."    .    .    . 


t Discussing  Article  34,  the  Drafting  Committee  said: 

"Contraband  articles  will  not  usually  be  directly  addressed  to  the  military  authorities  or  to  the  govern- 
ment departments  of  the  enemy  state.  Their  true  destination  will  be  more  or  less  concealed,  and  the  captor 
must  prove  it  in  order  to  justify  their  capture.  But  it  has  been  thought  reasonable  to  set  up  presumptions 
based  on  the  nature  of  the  person  to  whom,  or  place  for  which,  the  articles  are  destined.  It  may  be  an  enemy 
authority  or  a  trader  established  in  an  enemy  country  who,  as  a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  supplies  the  enemy 
Government  with  articles  of  the  kind  in  question.  It  may  be  a  fortified  place  belonging  to  the  enemy  or  a  place 
used  as  a  base,  whether  of  operations  or  of  supply,  for  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy." 

"In  the  absence  of  the  above  presumptions,  the  destination  is  presumed  to  be  innocent.  That  is  the  ordi- 
nary law,  according  to  which  the  captor  must  prove  the  illicit  character  of  the  goods  which  he  claims  to  capture." 

Considerable  discussion  took  place  in  the  Press,  and  several  questions  were  asked  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons with  reference  to  this  Article,  both  with  regard  to  the  translation  of  commersant  by  "contractor,"  and  as 
to  whether  enncmi  meant  "enemy  government."  The  Report  in  discussing  the  destination  of  conditional  contra- 
band says,  "It  may  be  an  enemy  authority  or  a  trader  established  in  an  enemy  country  who  as  a  matter  of  com- 
mon knowledge,  supplies  the  enemy  Government  with  articles  of  the  kind  in  question."  The  Under-Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs  (Mr.  Mackinnon  Wood)  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  29th  March,  1909,  that 
the  word  commergant  in  this  Article  "cannot  possibly  apply  to  a  mere  merchant  who  supplies  goods  to  the  gen- 
eral public,"  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Sir  Edward  Grey)  on  the  Sth  April,  1909,  in 
answer  to  a  question  on  the  divergence  between  the  terms  of  Article  34  and  the  General  Report,  replied  as  fol- 
lows :  "For  the  reasons  already  given,  I  cannot  admit  that  there  is  any  ambiguity  as  to  the  meaning  of  Article 
34.  It  is  made  clear,  both  by  Article  33,  on  which  Article  34  is  dependent,  and  by  the  general  official  report 
of  the  Conference,  that  the  viovA  ennenii  in  Article  34  can  only  mean  the  enemy  government.  It  is  evident,  how- 
ever, that  if  the  point  had  been  raised  at  the  time  it  would  have  been  made  perfectly  clear  in  the  drafting,  and 
we  therefore  propose  to  make  a  declaration,  at  the  time  of  the  ratification,  that  the  word  ennemi  in  Article  34 
means  the  government  of  the  enemy."     (The  Times,  6th  April,  1909.) 


76  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

The  ship's  papers  are  conclusive  proof  both  as  to  the  voyage  on  which  the  vessel  is 
engaged  and  as  to  the  port  of  discharge  of  the  goods,  unless  she  is  found  clearly  out  of  the 
course  indicated  by  her  papers,  and  unable  to  give  adequate  reasons  to  justify  such 
deviation. 

Article  36. 

Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Article  35,  conditional  contraband,  if  shown  to 
have  the  destination  referred  to  in  Article  33,  is  liable  to  capture  in  cases  where  the  enemy 
countrv  has  no  seaboard. 

Article  37. 

A  vessel  carrying  goods  liable  to  capture  as  absolute  or  conditional  contraband  may 
be  captured  on  the  high  seas  or  in  the  territoiial  waters  of  the  belligerents  throughout  the 
whole  of  her  voyage,  even  if  she  is  to  touch  at  a  port  of  call  before  reaching  the  hostile  des- 
tination. 

Article  38. 

A  vessel  may  not  be  captured  on  the  ground  that  she  has  carried  contraband  on  a 
previous  occasion  if  such  carriage  is  in  point  of  fact  at  an  end. 

Article  39. 

Contraband  goods  are  liable  to  condemnation. 

Article  40. 

A  vessel  carrying  contraband  may  be  condemned  if  the  contraband,  reckoned  either 
by  value,  weight,  volume,  or  freight,  forms  more  than  half  the  cargo. 

Article  41. 

If  a  vessel  carrying  contraband  is  released,  she  may  be  condemned  to  pay  the  costs 
and  expenses  incurred  by  the  captor  in  respect  of  the  proceedings  in  the  National  Prize 
Court  and  the  custody  of  the  ship  and  cargo  during  the  proceedings. 

Article  42. 

Goods  which  belong  to  the  owner  of  the  contraband  and  are  on  board  the  same  ves- 
sel are  liable  to  condemnation. 

Article  43. 

If  a  vessel  is  encountered  at  sea  while  unaAvare  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  or  of 
the  declaration  of  contraband  which  applies  to  her  cargo,  the  contraband  cannot  be  con- 
demned except  on  payment  of  compensation ;  the  vessel  herself  and  the  remainder  of  the 
cargo  are  not  liable  to  condemnation  or  to  the  costs  and  expenses  referred  to  in  Article  41. 
The  same  rule  applies  if  the  master,  after  becoming  aware  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities, 
or  of  the  declaration  of  contraband,  has  had  no  opportunity  of  discharging  the  contra- 
band. 

A  vessel  is  deemed  to  be  aware  of  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war,  or  of  a  declara- 
tion of  contraband,  if  she  left  a  neutral  port  subsequently  to  the  notification  to  the  Power 
to  which  such  port  belongs  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  or  of  the  declaration  of  contra- 
band respectively,  provided  that  such  notification  was  made  in  sufficient  time.  A  vessel 
is  also  deemed  to  be  aware  of  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  if  she  left  an  enemy  port  after 
the-  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Articlvi  44. 

A  vessel  which  has  been  stopped  on  the  gi'ound  that  she  is  carrying  contraband,  and 
which  is  not  liable  to  condemnation  on  account  of  the  proportion  of  contraband  on  board, 
may,  when  tlie  circumstances  permit,  be  allowed  to  continue  her  voyage  if  the  master  is 
willing  to  hand  over  the  contraband  to  the  belligerent  warship. 

The  delivery  of  the  contraband  must  bt  entered  by  the  captor  on  the  logbook  of  the 
\essel  stopped,  and  the  master  must  give  the  captor  duly  certified  copies  of  all  relevant 
papers. 

The  captor  is  at  liberty  to  destroy  the  contraband  that  has  been  handed  over  to  him 
under  these  conditions. 

TRANSFER  TO  A  NEUTRAL  FLAG. 

Article  56. 

The  transfer  of  an  enemy  vessel  to  a  neutral  fiag,  effected  after  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities, is  void  unless  it  is  proved  that  such  transfer  was  not  made  in  order  to  evade  the 
consequences  to  which  an  enemy  vessel,  as  such,  is  exposed. 

There  is,  however,  an  absolute  presumption  that  a  transfer  is  void — 

(1)  If  the  transfer  has  been  made  during  a  voyage  or  in  a  blockaded  port. 

(2)  If  a  right  to  repurchase  or  recover  the  vessel  is  reserved  to  the  vendor. 

(3)  If  the  requirements  of  the  municipal  law  governing  the  right  to  fly  the  flag 
under  which  the  vessel  is  sailing,  have  not  been  fulfilled. 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  BRITISH  DELEGATION  TO  THE 
SECOND  PEACE  CONFERENCE,  THE  HAGUE 

SiE  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  Edward  Fry 

Foreign  Office,  June  12,  1907. 

25.  His  Majesty's  Government  recognize  to  the  full  the  desirability  of  freeing  neu- 
tral commerce  to  the  utmost  extent  possible  from  interference  by  belligerent  Powers,  and 
they  are  ready  and  willing  for  their  part,  in  lieu  of  endeavoring  to  frame  new  and  more 
eatisfactorj'  niles  for  the  prevention  of  contraband  trade  in  the  future,  to  abandon  the 
principle  of  contraband  of  war  altogether,  t'lus  allowing  the  oversea  trade  in  neutral  ves- 
sels between  belligerents  on  the  one  hand  and  neutrals  on  the  other,  to  continue  during 
war  without  any  restriction,  subject  only  to  its  exclusion  by  blockade  from  an  enemy's 
port.  They  are  convinced  that  not  only  the  interest  of  Great  Britain,  but  the  common  in- 
terest of  all  nations  will  be  found,  on  an  unbiased  examination  of  the  subject,  to  be  served 
by  the  adoption  of  the  course  suggested. 

26.  In  the  event  of  the  proposal  not  being  favourably  received,  an  endeavor  should 
be  made  to  frame  a  list  of  the  articles  that  are  to  be  regarded  as  contraband.  Your  ef- 
forts should  then  be  directed  to  restricting  that  definition  within  the  narrowest  possible 
limits  and  upon  lines  which  have  the  point  of  practical  extinction  as  their  ultimate  aim. 

27.  If  a  definite  list  of  contraband  cannot  be  secured,  you  should  support  and,  if 
necessary,  propose  regulations  intended  to  insure  that  nations  shall  publish,  during  peace, 
the  list  of  articles  they  will  regard  as  contraband  during  war,  and  that  no  change  shall  be 
made  in  the  list  on  the  outbreak  of  or  during  hostilities. 

28.  A  list  might  be  prepared  and  submitted  for  adoption  by  the  Conference,  speci- 
fying the  articles  which  in  no  event  shall  fall  within  the  enumeration  of  contraband,  e.g., 
mails,  foodstuff.s  destined  for  places  other  than  beleaguered  fortresses,  and  any  raw  ma- 
terials required  for  the  purposes  of  peaceful  industry.  It  is  essential  to  the  interest  of 
Great  Britain  that  every  effective  measure  necessary  to  protect  the  importation  of  food 
supplies  and  raw  materials  for  peaceful  industries  should  be  accompanied  by  all  sanc- 
tions which  the  law  of  nations  can  supply. 

29.  His  Majesty's  Government  would  further  be  glad  to  see  the  right  of  search 
limited  in  every  practiable  way,  e.g.,  by  the  adoption  of  a  system  of  Consular  certificates 
declaring  the  absence  of  contraband  from  thf  cargo,  and  by  the  exemption  of  passenger 
and  mail  steamers  upon  defined  routes,  etc. 


THE   ORDERS   IN   COUNCIL 


ORDER  IN  COUNCIL 

August  20,   1914 


Directing  the  Adoption  and  Enforcement  During  the  Present  Hostilities  of  the  Conven- 
tion Known  as  the  Declaration  of  London,  Subject  to  Additions  and  Modifications. 

At  the  court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  the  20th  day  of  August,  1914.    Present,  The  King's 

Most  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 

Whereas  during  the  present  hostilities  the  naval  forces  of  His  Majesty  will  cooperate 

with  the  French  and  Eussian  naval  forces ;  and 
Whereas  it  is  desirable  that  the  naval  operations  of  the  allied  forces  so  far  as  they  affect 

neutral  ships  and  commerce  should  be  conducted  on  similar  principles ;  and 
Whereas  the  Governments  of  France  and  Russia  have  informed  His  Majesty's  Government 

that  during  the  present  hostilities  it  is  their  intention  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 

provisions  of  the  convention  known  as  the  Declaration  of  London,  signed  on  the  26th 

day  of  February,  1909,  so  far  as  may  be  practicable. 

Now,  therefore,  His  Majesty,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council,  is  pleased 
to  order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered,  that  during  the  present  hostilities  the  convention  known 
as  the  Declaration  of  London  shall,  subject  to  the  following  additions  and  modifications, 
be  adopted  and  put  in  force  by  His  Majesty's  Government  as  if  the  same  had  been  ratified 
by  His  Majesty : 

The  additions  and  modifications  are  as  follows: 

( 1 )  The  lists  of  absolute  and  conditional  contraband  contained  in  the  proclamation 
dated  August  4,  1914,  shall  be  substituted  for  the  lists  contained  in  Articles  22  and  24  of 
the  said  declaration. 

(2)  A  neutral  vessel  which  succeeded  in  carrying  contraband  to  the  enemy  with 
false  papers  may  be  detained  for  having  carried  such  contraband  if  she  is  encountered 
before  she  has  completed  her  return  voyage. 

(3)  The  destination  referred  to  in  Article  33  may  be  inferred  from  any  sufficient 
evidence,  and  ( in  addition  to  the  presumption  laid  down  in  Article  34 )  shall  be  presumed 
to  exist  if  the  goods  are  consigned  to  or  for  an  agent  of  the  enemy  State  or  to  or  for  a 
merchant  or  other  person  under  the  control  of  the  authorities  of  the  enemy  State. 

(4)  The  existence  of  a  blockade  shall  be  presumed  to  be  known — 

(a)  To  all  ships  which  sailed  from  or  touched  at  an  enemy  port  a  sufficient 
time  after  the  notification  of  the  blockade  to  the  local  authorities  to  have  enabled  the 
enemy  Government  to  make  known  the  existence  of  the  blockade ; 

( & )     To  all  ships  which  sailed  from  or  touched  at  a  British  or  allied  port  after 
the  publication  of  the  declaration  of  blockade. 

(5)  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Article  35  of  the  said  Declaration,  condi- 
tional contraband,  if  shown  to  have  the  destination  referred  to  in  Article  32,  is  liable  to 
capture,  to  whatever  port  the  vessel  is  bound  and  at  whatever  port  the  cargo  is  to  be  dis- 
charged. 

(6)  The  General  Report  of  the  Drafting  Committee  on  the  said  Declaration  pre- 
sented to  the  "Naval  Conference  and  adopted  by  the  conference  at  the  eleventh  plenary 
meeting  on  February  25,  1909,  shall  be  considered  by  all  Prize  Courts  as  an  aiithoritative 
statement  of  the  meaning  and  intention  of  the  said  Declaration,  and  such  courts  shall 
construe  and  interpret  the  provisions  of  the  said  Declaration  by  the  light  of  the  commen- 
tary given  therein. 

And  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  His  Majesty's  Treasury,  the  Lords  Commissioners 
of  the  Admiralty,  and  each  of  His  Majesty's  Principal  Secretaries  of  State,  the  President 
of  the  Probate,  Divorce,  and  Admiralty  Division  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  all  other 
judges  of  His  Majesty's  Prize  Courts,  and  all  governors,  officers,  and  authorities  whom  it 
may  concern  are  to  give  the  necessary  directions  herein  as  to  them  may  respectively  ap- 
pertain. 

Almeric  Fitzroy. 


OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS  79 

ORDER  IN  COUNCIL 

October  29,  1914 

At  the  Court  of  Buckingham  Palace,  the  29tL  day  of  October,  1914.    Present,  The  King's 

Most  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 

Whereas  by  an  Order  in  Council  dated  the  20th  day  of  August,  1914,  His  Majesty 
was  pleased  to  declare  that  during  the  present  hostilities  the  Convention  known  as  the 
Declaration  of  London  should,  subject  to  certain  additions  and  modifications  therein 
specified,  be  adopted  and  put  in  force  by  His  Majesty's  Government;  and 

Whereas  the  said  additions  and  modifications  were  rendered  necessary  by  the  special 
conditions  of  the  present  war;  and 

Whereas  it  is  desirable  and  possible  now  to  reenact  the  said  Order  in  Council  with 
amendments  in  order  to  minimize,  so  far  as  possible,  the  interference  with  innocent  neu- 
tral trade  occasioned  by  the  war : 

Now,  therefore.  His  Majesty,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council,  is  pleased 
to  order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered,  as  follows : 

1.  During  the  present  hostilities  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  known  as  the  Dec- 
laration of  London  shall,  subject  to  the  exclusion  of  the  lists  of  contraband  and  noncon- 
traband,  and  to  the  modifications  hereinafter  set  out,  be  adopted  and  put  in  force  by  His 
Majesty's  Government. 

The  modifications  are  as  follows : 

(i)  A  neutral  vessel,  with  papers  indicating  a  neutral  destination,  which,  not- 
withstanding the  destination  shown  on  the  papers,  proceeds  to  an  enemy  port, 
shall  be  liable  to  capture  and  condemnation  if  she  is  encountered  before  the 
end  of  her  next  voyage. 

(ii)  The  destination  referred  to  in  Article  33  of  the  said  Declaration  shall  (in  ad- 
dition to  the  presumptions  laid  down  in  Article  34)  be  presumed  to  exist  if  the 
goods  are  consigned  to  or  for  an  agent  of  the  enemy  State. 

(iii)  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Article  35  of  the  said  Declaration,  condi- 
tional contraband  shall  be  liable  to  capture  on  board  a  vessel  bound  for  a 
neutral  port  if  the  goods  are  consigned  "to  order,"  or  if  the  ship's  papers  do 
not  show  who  is  the  consignee  of  the  goods,  or  if  they  show  a  consignee  of  the 
goods  in  territory  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

(iv)  In  the  cases  covered  by  the  preceding  paragraph  (iii)  it  shall  lie  upon  the 
owners  of  the  goods  to  prove  that  their  destination  was  innocent. 

2.  Where  it  is  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  one  of  His  Majesty's  Principal  Secre- 
taries of  State  that  the  enemy  Government  is  drawing  supplies  for  its  armed  forces  from 
or  through  a  neutral  country,  he  may  direct  that  in  respect  of  ships  bound  for  a  port  in 
that  country.  Article  35  of  the  said  Declaration  shall  not  apply.  Such  direction  shall  be 
notified  in  the  "London  Gazette"  and  shall  operate  until  the  same  is  withdrawn.  So  long 
as  such  direction  is  in  force,  a  vessel  which  is  carrying  conditional  contraband  to  a  port 
in  that  country  shall  not  be  immune  from  capture. 

3.  The  Order  in  Council  of  the  20th  August,  1914,  directing  the  adoption  and  enforce- 
ment during  the  present  hostilities  of  the  Convention  known  as  the  Declaration  of  Lon- 
don, subject  to  the  additions  and  modifications  therein  specified,  is  hereby  repealed. 

4.  This  Order  may  be  cited  as  "the  Declaration  of  London  Order  in  Council,  No.  2, 
1914." 

And  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  His  Majesty's  Treasury,  the  Lords  Commissioners 
of  the  Admiralty,  and  each  of  His  Majesty's  Principal  Secretaries  of  State,  the  President 
of  the  Probate,  Divorce,  and  Admiralty  Division  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  all  other 
Judges  of  His  Majesty's  Prize  Courts,  and  all  Governors,  Officers,  and  Authorities  whom 
it  may  concern,  are  to  give  the  necessary  directions  herein  as  to  them  may  respectively  ap- 

^^^  ^^^'  Almeeic  Fitzeoy. 

ORDER  IN  COUNCIL 

March  11,  1915 

At  the  Court  of  Buckingham  Palace,  the  11th  day  of  March,  1915.    Present,  The  King's 

Most  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 
Whereas  the  German  Government  has  issued  certain  orders  which,  in  violation  of 
the  usages  of  war,  purport  to  declare  the  waters  surrounding  the  United  Kingdom  a  mili- 
tary area,  in  which  all  British  and  allied  merchant  vessels  will  be  destroyed,  irrespective 
of  the  safety  of  the  lives  of  passengers  and  crew,  and  in  which  neutral  shipping  will  be 
exposed  to  similar  danger  in  view  of  the  uncertainties  of  naval  varfare ;  and 

Whereas  in  a  memorandum  accompanying  the  said  orders  neutrals  are  warne«i 
Against  entrusting  crews,  passengers,  or  gooJs  to  British  or  allied  ships : 


80  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

Whereas  such  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  give  to  His  Majesty  an  unquestion- 
able right  of  retaliation : 

And  whereas  His  Majesty  has  therefore  decided  to  adopt  further  measures  in  order 
to  prevent  commodities  of  any  kind  from  reaching  or  leaving  Germany,  though  such  meas- 
ured will  be  enforced  without  risk  to  neutral  ships  or  to  neutral  or  noncombatant  life 
and  in  strict  observance  of  the  dictates  of  humanity; 

And  whereas  the  allies  of  His  Majesty  are  associated  with  him  in  the  steps  now  to  be 
announced  for  restricting  further  the  commerce  of  Germany; 

His  Majesty  is  therefore  pleased,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council,  to 
order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered  as  follows : 

1.  No  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  from  her  port  of  departure  after  the  first  March, 
1915,  shall  be  allowed  to  proceed  on  her  voyage  to  any  German  port. 

Unless  the  vessel  receives  a  pass  enabling  her  to  proceed  to  some  neutral  or  allied 
port  to  be  named  in  the  pass,  goods  on  board  any  such  vessel  must  be  discharged  in  a 
British  port  and  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize  court.  Goods  so  dis- 
charged, not  being  contraband  of  war,  shall,  if  not  requisitioned  for  the  use  of  His 
Majesty,  be  restored  by  order  of  the  court,  upon  such  terms  as  the  court  may  in  the  cir- 
cumstances deem  to  be  just,  to  the  person  entitled  thereto. 

2.  No  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  from  any  German  port  after  the  first  March,  1915, 
shall  be  allowed  to  proceed  on  her  voyage  with  any  goods  on  board  laden  at  such  port. 

All  goods  laden  at  such  port  must  be  discharged  in  a  British  or  allied  port.  Goods 
so  discharged  in  a  British  port  shall  be  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize 
court,  and,  if  not  requisitioned  for  the  use  of  His  Majesty,  shall  be  detained  or  sold  un- 
der the  direction  of  the  prize  court.  The  proceeds  of  goods  so  sold  shall  be  paid  into  court 
and  dealt  with  in  such  manner  as  the  court  may  in  the  circumstances  deem  to  be  just. 

Provided,  that  no  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  such  goods  shall  be  paid  out  of  court  until 
the  conclusion  of  peace,  except  on  the  application  of  the  proper  ofiScer  of  the  Crown,  un- 
less it  be  shown  that  the  goods  had  become  neutral  property  before  the  issue  of  this  or- 
der. 

Provided  also,  that  nothing  herein  shall  prevent  the  release  of  neutral  property  laden 
at  such  enemy  port  on  the  application  of  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown. 

3.  Every  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  from  her  port  of  departure  after  the  first  of 
March,  1915,  on  her  way  to  a  port  other  than  a  German  port,  carrying  goods  with  an 
enemy  destination,  or  which  are  enemy  property,  may  be  required  to  discharge  such 
goods  in  a  British  or  allied  port.  Any  goods  so  discharged  in  a  British  port  shall  be 
placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize  court,  and,  unless  they  are  contraband 
of  war,  shall,  if  not  requisitioned  for  the  use  of  His  Majesty,  be  restored  by  order  of  the 
court,  upon  such  terms  as  the  court  may  in  tlie  circumstances  deem  to  be  just  to  the  per- 
son entitled  thereto. 

Provided,  that  this  article  shall  not  apply  in  any  case  falling  within  articles  2  or  4 
of  this  order. 

4.  Every  merchant  vessel  which  sailed  from  a  port  other  than  a  German  port  after 
the  first  of  March,  1915,  having  on  board  goods  which  are  of  enemy  origin  or  are  enemy 
property  may  be  required  to  discharge  such  goods  in  a  British  or  allied  port.  Goods  so 
discharged  in  a  British  port  shall  be  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize 
court,  and  if  not  requisitioned  for  the  use  of  His  Majesty  shall  be  detained  or  sold  under 
the  direction  of  the  prize  court.  The  proceeds  of  goods  so  sold  shall  be  paid  into  court 
and  dealt  with  in  such  manner  as  the  court  may  in  the  circumstances  deem  to  be  just. 

Provided,  that  no  proceeds  of  sale  of  such  goods  shall  be  paid  out  of  court  until  the 
conclusion  of  peace  except  on  the  application  of  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown,  unless  it 
be  shown  that  the  goods  had  become  neutral  property  before  the  issue  of  this  order. 

Provided,  also,  that  nothing  herein  shall  prevent  the  release  of  neutral  property  of 
enemy  origin  on  the  application  of  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown. 

5.  Any  person  claiming  to  be  interested  in,  or  to  have  any  claim  in  respect  of,  any 
goods  (not  being  contraband  of  war)  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize 
court  under  this  order,  or  in  the  proceeds  of  such  goods,  may  forthwith  issue  a  writ  in 
the  prize  court  against  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown  and  apply  for  an  order  that  the 
goods  should  be  restored  to  him,  or  that  their  proceeds  should  be  paid  to  him,  or  for 
such  other  order  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may  require. 

The  practice  and  procedure  of  the  prize  court  shall,  so  far  as  applicable,  be  followed 
mutatis  mutandis  in  any  proceedings  consequential  upon  this  order. 

6.  A  merchant  vessel  which  has  cleared  for  a  neutral  port  from  a  British  or  allied 
port,  or  which  has  been  allowed  to  pass,  having  an  ostensible  destination  to  a  neutral 
port,  and  proceeds  to  an  enemy  port,  shall,  if  captured  on  any  subsequent  voyage,  be  lia- 
ble to  condemnation. 


OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS  81 

7.  Nothing  in  this  order  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  liability  of  any  vessel  or  goods 
to  capture  or  condemnation  independently  of  this  order. 

8.  Nothing  in  this  order  shall  prevent  tiie  relaxation  of  the  provisions  of  this  order 
in  respect  of  the  merchant  vessels  of  any  country  which  declares  that  no  commerce  in- 
tended for  or  originating  in  Germany  or  belonging  to  German  subjects  shall  enjoy  the 
protection  of  its  flag. 

Almehic  Fitzeoy. 


ORDER   IN   COUNCIL 

March  23,   1915 

At  the  Court  of  Buckiugliam  Palace,  the  23:1  day  of  March,  1915.    Present,  The  King's 

ilost  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 

Whereas  by  section  3  of  the  prize  courts  act,  1894,  His  Majesty  in  Council  is  author- 
ized to  make  rules  of  court  for  regulating,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  naval  prize 
act,  1864,  and  the  said  act,  the  procedure  and  practice  of  prize  courts  within  the  meaning 
of  the  naval  prize  act,  1864,  and  the  duties  and  conduct  of  the  officers  of  the  courts  and  of 
the  practitioners  therein,  and  for  regulating  the  fees  to  be  taken  by  the  officers  thereof, 
and  the  costs,  charges,  and  expenses  to  be  allowed  to  the  practitioners  therein : 

And  whereas  in  pursuance  of  the  prize  courts  act,  1894,  certain  rules  were  made  by 
the  order  of  His  Majesty  in  Council,  dated  the  5th  day  of  August,  1914,  and  amended  by 
the  Orders  of  His  Majesty  in  Council  of  the  30th  day  of  September,  1914,  and  the  28th 
day  of  November,  1914,  respectively,  which  said  rules  and  amended  rules  were  by  the 
said  orders  in  council  directed  to  take  effect  provisionally  in  accordance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  section  2  of  the  Rules  Publication  Act,  1893,  from  the  dates  of  the  said  Orders 
in  Council  respectively: 

And  whereas  the  provisions  of  section  1  of  the  rules  publication  act,  1893,  were  duly 
complied  with  in  respect  of  the  said  rules  and  amended  rules,  and  the  same  were  finally 
made  by  the  orders  of  His  Majesty  in  Council,  dated  respectively,  the  17th  day  of  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  the  28th  day  of  November,  1914,  and  the  3d  day  of  February,  1915. 

And  whereas  it  is  expedient  that  the  said  rules  and  amended  rules  should  be  further 
amended. 

And  whereas  on  account  of  urgency  this  order  should  come  into  immediate  opera- 
tion. 

Now,  therefore,  His  Majesty,  by  virtue  of  the  powers  in  this  behalf  by  the  said  act 
or  otherwise  in  him  vested,  is  pleased,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council,  to 
order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered,  as  follows: 

1.  That  in  Order  IX  (discovery,  inspection,  and  admission  of  documents  and  facts) 
of  the  said  rules : 

In  rule  1,  the  words  "upon  filing  an  affidavit"  shall  be  omitted. 
In  rule  1,  instead  of  the  words  "any  other  party"  there  shall  be  substituted  the 
words  "any  party  other  than  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown." 

2.  That  in  Order  XI  (sale,  appraisement,  safe  custody,  and  inspection  of  prize)  of 
the  said  rules,  in  rule  1,  the  following  words  shall  be  omitted :  "on  account  of  the  condi- 
tion of  a  ship,  or  on  application  of  a  claimant,  and  on  or  after  condemnation." 

3.  That  in  Order  XV  (evidence  and  hearing)  of  the  said  rules,  the  following  rule 
shall  be  added: 

"21.  Nothwithstanding  anything  contained  in  these  rules  the  proper  officer  of  the 
Crown  may  apply  to  the  judge  for  leave  to  administer  interrogatories  for  the  examina- 
tion of  any  person  whether  a  party  to  the  cause  or  not." 

4.  That  order  XXIX  (requisition  by  admiralty)  of  the  said  rules,  as  amended  by 
His  Majesty's  Order  in  Council  dated  the  28th  day  of  November,  1914,  shall  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby  revoked,  and  in  lieu  thereof  the  following  order  shall  have  effect: 

'^'ORDER   XXIX — REQUISITION. 

"1.  Where  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the  judge  on  the  application  of  the  proper  officer  of 
the  Crown  that  it  is  desired  to  requisition  on  behalf  of  His  Majesty  a  ship  in  respect  of 
which  no  final  decree  of  condemnation  has  been  made,  he  shall  order  that  the  ship  shall 
be  appraised,  and  that  upon  an  undertaking  being  given  in  accordance  with  rule  5  of 
this  order,  the  ship  shall  be  released  and  delivered  to  the  Crown. 

"2.  Where  a  decree  for  the  detention  of  a  ship  has  been  made  in  accordance  with 
Order  XXVIII,  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown  may  file  a  notice  (Appendix  A,  Form 
No.  55)  that  the  Crown  desires  to  requisition  the  same,  and  thereupon  a  commission  (Ap- 
pendix A,  Form  No.  56)  to  the  marshal  directing  him  to  appraise  the  ship  shall  issue. 
Upon  an  undertaking  being  given  in  accordance  with  rule  5  of  this  order  the  ship  shall 
be  released,  and  delivered  to  the  Crown.     Service  of  this  notice  shall  not  be  required  be- 


82  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

fore  filing,  but  copies  thereof  shall  be  served  upon  the  parties  by  the  proper  officer  of  the 
Crown  as  soon  thereafter  as  possible. 

"3.  Where  in  any  case  of  requisition  under  this  order  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the 
judge  on  behalf  of  the  Crown  that  the  ship  is  required  for  the  service  of  His  Majesty 
forthwith,  the  judge  may  order  the  same  to  be  forthwith  released  and  delivered  to  the 
Crown  without  appraisement. 

"4.  In  any  case  where  a  ship  has  been  requisitioned  under  the  provisions  of  this  or- 
der and  whether  or  not  an  appraisement  has  been  made,  the  court  may,  on  the  applica- 
tion of  any  party,  fix  the  amount  to  be  paid  by  the  Crown  in  respect  of  the  value  of  the 
ship. 

"5.  In  every  case  of  requisition  under  this  order  an  undertaking  in  writing  shall 
be  filed  by  the  proper  officer  of  the  Cro^n  for  payment  into  court  on  behalf  of  the  Crown 
of  the  appraised  value  of  the  ship,  or  of  the  amount  fixed  under  Rule  4  of  this  order,  as 
the  case  may  be,  at  such  time  or  times  as  the  court  shall  declare  by  order  that  the  same 
or  any  part  thereof  is  required  for  the  purpose  of  payment  out  of  court. 

"6.  Where  in  any  case  of  requisition  under  this  order  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the 
judge  on  behalf  of  the  Crown  that  the  Crown  desires  to  requisition  the  ship  temporarily, 
the  court  may,  in  lieu  of  an  order  of  release,  make  an  order  for  the  temporary  delivery 
of  the  ship  to  the  Crown,  and  subject  as  aforesaid  the  provisions  of  this  order  shall  ap- 
ply to  such  a  requisition;  provided  that,  in  the  event  of  the  return  of  the  ship  to  the 
custody  of  the  court,  the  court  may  make  such  order  as  it  thinks  fit  for  the  release  of  the 
undertaking  given  on  behalf  of  the  Crown  or  the  reduction  of  the  amount  undertaken  to 
be  paid  thereby,  as  the  case  may  be ;  and  provided  also  that,  where  the  ship  so  requisi- 
tioned is  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Order  XXVIII,  rule  1,  relating  to  detention,  the 
amount  for  which  the  Crown  shall  be  considered  liable  in  respect  of  such  requisition 
shall  be  the  amount  of  the  damage,  if  any,  which  the  ship  has  suffered  by  reason  of  such 
temporary  delivery  as  aforesaid. 

"7.  The  proceedings  in  respect  of  a  ship  requisitioned  under  this  order  shall  conti- 
nue notwithstanding  the  requisition. 

"8.  In  any  case  of  requisition  of  a  ship  in  respect  of  which  no  cause  has  been  in- 
stituted, any  person  interested  in  such  ship  may,  without  issuing  a  writ,  provided  he 
does  not  intend  to  make  a  claim  for  restitution  or  damages,  apply  by  summons  for  an 
order  that  the  amount  to  be  paid  in  respect  of  such  ship  be  fixed  by  the  court,  and  the 
judge  may,  on  the  hearing  of  such  summons,  order  the  ship  to  be  appraised  or  to  be  val- 
ued, or  give  such  other  directions  for  fixing  the  amount  as  he  may  think  fit." 

5.  That  in  Form  4  in  Appendix  A  to  the  said  rules  there  shall  be  omitted  the  words 
"commander  of  our  ship  of  war"  and  the  words  "taken  and  seized  as  prize  by  our  said 
ship  of  war." 

6.  This  order  shall  take  effect  provisionally  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Sec- 
tion 2  of  the  rules  publication  act,  1893,  from  the  date  hereof. 

Almekic  Fitzroy. 

ORDER  IN  COUNCIL 

OCTOBEE  20,  1915 

At  the  Court  of  Buckingham  Palace,  the  20th  day  of  October,  1915.      Present,  The  King's 

Most  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 

"Whereas  by  the  Declaration  of  London,  Order  in  Council,  Number  2,  1914,  His 
Majesty  was  pleased  to  declare  that  during  the  present  hostilities  the  provisions  of  the 
said  Declaration  of  London  should,  subject  to  certain  exceptions  and  modifications 
therein  specified,  be  adopted  and  put  in  force  by  His  Majesty's  Government ;  and 

"Whereas  by  article  57  of  the  said  Declaration,  it  is  provided  that  the  neutral  or  ene- 
my character  of  a  vessel  is  determined  by  the  flag  which  she  is  entitled  to  fly;  and 

"Whereas  it  is  no  longer  expedient  to  adopt  the  said  article: 

"Now,  therefore.  His  Majesty,  by  and  witli  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council,  is  pleased 
to  order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered,  that  from  and  after  this  date  article  57  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  shall  cease  to  be  adopted  and  put  in  force. 

"In  lieu  of  the  said  article,  British  prize  courts  shall  apply  the  rules  and  principles 
formerly  observed  in  such  courts. 

"This  order  may  be  cited  as  'The  Declaration  of  London  Order  in  Council,  1915.' 

"And  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  His  Majesty's  Treasury,  the  Lords  Commission- 
ers of  the  Admiralty,  and  each  of  His  Majesty's  principal  Secretaries  of  State,  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Probate,  Divorce,  and  Admiralty  Division  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  all 
other  judges  of  His  Majesty's  prize  courts,  and  all  governors,  officers,  and  authorities 
whom  it  may  concern,  are  to  give  the  necessary  directions  herein  as  to  them  may  respect- 
ively appertain." 

Almeric  Fitzrot 


OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS  83 

ORDER  IN  COUNCIL 

November  io,  1915 

Restrictions  on  British  Merchant  Shipping.    Licenses  Necessary  to  Trade  Between  For- 
eign Ports. 

At  the  Court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  the  10th  day  of  November,  1915.    Present,  The 
King's  Most  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 

Whereas,  A  state  of  war  exists  between  His  Majesty  and  the  German  Emperor,  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary,  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  and  the  King  of  the 
Bulgarians : 

And  whereas,  His  Majesty  holds  it  to  be  his  prerogative  duty  as  well  as  his  pre- 
rogative right  to  take  all  steps  necessary  for  the  defense  and  protection  of  the  realm : 

And  whereas.  It  has  been  made  to  appear  to  His  Majesty  that  it  is  essential  to  the 
defense  and  protection  of  the  realm  that,  in  the  exercise  of  his  prerogatives  as  afore- 
said, he  should  prohibit  as  from  and  after  the  first  day  of  December,  1915,  the  carrying 
of  cargo  from  any  foreign  port  to  any  other  foreign  port  by  any  British  steamship  reg- 
istered in  the  United  Kingdom  exceeding  500  tons  gross  tonnage — and  whether  or  not 
such  ship  while  carrying  such  cargo  calls  at  any  intermediate  port  within  His  Majesty's 
dominions — unless  the  owner  or  charterer  of  such  steamship  has  been  granted  exemp- 
tion by  license  as  hereinafter  provided : 

Now,  therefore,  His  Majesty  is  pleased,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council, 
and  in  exercise  of  his  prerogatives  as  aforesaid  and  of  all  other  powers  him  thereunto 
enabling,  to  order  and  it  is  hereby  ordered  that,  from  and  after  the  first  day  of  Decem- 
ber, 1915,  no  British  steamship  registered  in  the  United  Kingdom  exceeding  500  tons 
gross  tonnage  shall  carry  any  cargo  from  any  foreign  port  to  any  other  foreign  port — 
and  whether  or  not  such  ship  while  carrying  such  cargo  calls  at  any  intermediate  port 
within  His  Majesty's  dominions — unless  the  owner  or  charterer  of  such  steamship  has 
been  granted  exemption  by  license  as  hereinafter  provided. 

And  His  Majesty  doth  hereby  declare  that  the  expression  "foreign  port"  herein 
used  shall  mean  and  include  any  port  outside  His  Majesty's  dominions. 

And  His  Majesty,  by  and  with  the  advice  aforesaid,  and  in  exercise  of  his  preroga- 
tives and  powers  as  aforesaid,  is  further  pleased  to  authorize  and  direct  the  president 
of  the  Board  of  Trade  to  appoint  a  committee  of  persons  to  carry  out  and  give  effect  to 
the  provisions  hereof,  and  that  the  said  committee  shall  have  power  to  grant  licenses  of 
exemption  therefrom  to  or  in  favor  of  owners  and  charterers  of  such  steamships  as  afore- 
said, which  licenses  may  be  general  in  reference  to  classes  of  ships  or  their  voyages  or 
special. 

And  His  Majesty  is  further  pleased  to  authorize  the  president  of  the  Board  of 
Trade  from  time  to  time  to  add  other  persons  as  members  of  such  committee,  and  to 
substitute  as  members  thereof  other  persons  for  such  members  as  may  from  time  to 
time  die,  resign,  or  be  or  become  incapable  of  acting  thereon. 

And  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade  is  to  act  and  to  give  instructions  and 
directions  accordingly. 

Almekic  Fitzkoy 


ORDER  IN  COUNCIL 

November  10,  19 15 

Powers  to  Requisition  Tonnage.     Vessels  for  Carriage  of  Foodstuffs. 

At  the  Court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  the  10th  day  of  November,  1915.     Present, 
The  King's  Most  Excellent  Majesty  in  Council. 

Whereas,  A  state  of  war  exists  between  His  Majesty  and  the  German  Emperor,  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary,  the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  and  the  King  of  the  Bul- 
garians : 

And  whereas.  His  Majesty  holds  it  to  be  his  prerogative  duty  as  well  as  his  pre- 
rogative right  to  take  all  steps  necessary  for  the  defense  and  protection  of  the  realm : 

And  whereas,  It  has  been  made  to  appear  to  His  Majesty  that  it  is  essential  to  the 
defense  and  protection  of  the  realm  that  all  British  ships  registered  in  the  United  King- 
dom should  be  made  liable  to  requisition  in  manner  hereinafter  appearing  for  the  car- 
riage of  foodstuffs  and  of  any  other  articles  of  commerce: 


84  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

Now,  therefore,  His  Majesty  is  pleased  by  and  with  the  advice  of  His  Privy  Council, 
and  in  exercise  of  his  prerogatives  as  aforesaid  and  of  all  other  powers  him  thereunto  en- 
abling, to  order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered,  that  any  British  ship  registered  in  the 
United  Kingdom  may  until  further  order  be  requisitioned  by  and  on  behalf  of  His 
Majesty  for  the  carriage  of  foodstuffs  and  of  any  other  articles  of  commerce,  and  such 
requisition  is  to  take  effect  upon  notice  of  requisition  being  served  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided on  the  owner  of  any  such  ship : 

And  His  Majesty  is  further  pleased,  by  and  with  the  advice  aforesaid,  to  authorize 
and  direct  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade  to  give  effect  to  this  order  by  causing 
notice  of  requisition  to  be  served  on  the  owner  of  any  such  ship. 

And  His  Majesty  is  further  pleased,  by  and  with  the  advice  aforesaid,  to  declare 
that  service  of  notice  of  requisition  on  an  owner  shall  be  deemed  sufficient  and  effective 
if  served  in  the  case  of  an  individual  owner  by  being  addressed  to  such  individual  owner 
and  left  at  his  last-known  place  of  business  or  abode,  and  in  case  of  joint  owners  by 
being  addressed  to  such  joint  owners  and  left  at  the  last-known  business  addresses  or 
places  of  abode  of  such  joint  owners,  and  in  the  case  of  a  company  or  corporation  by 
being  addressed  to  such  company  or  corporation  and  left  at  the  registered  or  other  ad- 
dress of  such  company  or  corporation,  or  in  any  of  the  aforesaid  cases  by  being  ad- 
dressed to  the  managing  owner,  ship's  husband,  or  other  the  person  to  whom  the  man- 
agement of  the  ship  is  by  law  entrusted  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  owners,  and  left  at  thi^ 
registered  or  other  last-known  address  or  place  of  abode  of  such  managing  owner,  ship's 
husband,  or  other  such  person,  as  the  case  may  be. 

And  His  Majesty  is  further  pleased,  by  and  with  the  advice  aforesaid,  to  declare 
that  any  notice  of  requisition  which  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade  may  cause  to 
be  served  hereunder,  may  be  signed  by  any  person  or  persons  from  time  to  time  author- 
ized for  such  purpose  either  generally  or  specially  by  the  President  of  the  Board  of 
Trade. 

And  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade  is  to  give  instructions  and  directions 
accordingly. 

Almeric  Fitzkoy. 


XI 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE 


The  following  papers  are  believed  to  contain  all  the  important  communications  exchanged  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  and  that  of  Great  Britain,  with  respect  of  the  rights  of  neutral  trade,  so  far  as 
these  are  at  present  accessible.  In  addition  are  included  salient  communications  exchanged  with  the  German 
Government. 

When  not  otherwise  indicated,  the  text  of  the  papers  is  that  appearing  in  the  two  volumes,  dated  respect- 
ively May  27  and  October  si,  1915,  and  other  memoranda,  published  by  the  Department  of  State.  For  the  text 
of  documents  which  the  Department  of  State  has  not  seen  fit  to  include  in  its  publications,  the  only  resource  has 
been  the  daily  press;  but  only  communications  officially  allowed  to  become  public  have  been  noticed. 


INDEX  TO  DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE 


Date 


From  Whom  and  to  Whom 


Contents 


1914 
London, 
August  5 . 


Washington, 
August  6 . . 


Berlin, 
August  22 . 

London, 
August  27 . 


Berlin, 
September  4 . . 

London, 

September  30. 


Washington, 
October  22 . 

Washington, 
October  22 . 


Washington, 
October  24 . 


London, 
November  2. . 

London, 
November  3. . 


London, 
November  17. 

Berlin, 
November  19. 


Berlin, 
November  23, 


Berlin, 
November  23. 


Ambassador  W.   H.    Page    to    the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 

Ambassador  J.   W.   Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

The    German    Ambassador    to    the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  Acting  Secretary  of  State  to  Am- 
bassador W.  H.  Page 

The  Acting  Secretary  of  State   to 
Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard 


Ambassador   W.    H.    Page    to    the 
Secretary  of  State 

Consul-General  R.  P.  Skinner  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 


Transmits  proclamation  of  British  Govern- 
ment specifying  articles  to  be  treated  as 
contraband  of  war 

Ascertain  if  British  Government  is  willing  to 
observe  provisions  of  Declaration  of  London 
as  applied  to  naval  warfare 

German  Government  will  observe  provisions 
of  Declaration  of  London 

Transmits  note  from  Foreign  Office  defining 
attitude  of  British  Government  as  to  De- 
claration of  London  and  copies  of  memoran- 
dum mentioning  exceptions  to  provisions  df 
Declaration • 

Transmits  Declaration  of  German  Government 
relative  to  contraband 

Transmits  proclamation  of  British  Government 
specifying  certain  additional  articles  to  be 
treated  as  contraband 

Says  German  Government  will  treat  copper  and 
lead  as  conditional  contraband 

Inform  British  Government  that  suggestion  re- 
garding Declaration  of  London  is  withdrawn, 
and  the  United  States  resumes  its  rights  un- 
der existing  international  law  and  the  treaties 
of  the  United  States,  irrespective  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Declaration  of  London 

Inform  German  Government  that  suggestion 
relative  to  Declaration  of  London  is  with- 
drawn, as  some  belligerents  refuse  to  agree 
without  modification 

British  Admiralty's  Proclamation  of  the  North 
Sea  as  a  military  area 

Transmits  proclamation  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment containing  a  revised  list  of  absolute 
and  conditional  contraband 

Says  cotton-seed  cake  is  conditional  contra- 
band  

Says  German  Government  will  treat  lumber, 
rough  or  unworked,  etc.,  as  conditional 
contraband 

Transmits  additional  list  of  articles  which  Ger- 
man Government  will  treat  as  conditional 
contraband 

Transmits  notes  from  Foreign  Office  containing 
notice  of  additions  to  original  German  con- 
traband lists 


I 


INDEX  TO  DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE 


87 


Date 


From  Whom  and  to  Whom 


Contents 


1914 

Washington, 
November  23 

London, 

November  25- 

Berlin, 
December  3 . . 


Berlin, 
December  8 . . 


Berlin, 
December  15 . 

London, 

December  24. 

Washington, 
December  26 


1915 
London, 
January  7 . 


London, 
January  22.. 


Berlin, 
February  6. 


Washington, 
February  10. 


Washington, 
February  10. 


London, 
Feburary  10. 


Washington, 
February  15. 


Berlin, 
February  15. 


Berlin, 
February  15. 


The   German    Ambassador   to   the 
Secretary  of  State 

Consul-General  R.  P.  Skinner  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Consul-General  R.  P.  Skinner  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


The  British  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  W. 
H.Page 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador J.  W.  Gerard 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


The  British  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador 
W.H.Page 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


Protests  British  violations  of  Declaration  of 
London 

Says  British  Government  considers  Toluene 
and  Toluol  as  contraband 

Transmits  note  from  Foreign  Office  stating 
that  German  Government  will  treat  que- 
bracho wood  as  conditional  contraband 

Transmits  proclamation  of  German  Govern- 
ment making  additions  to  conditional  con- 
traband list 

Says  German  Government  will  treat  aluminum 
and  nickel  as  conditional  contraband 

Transmits  proclamation  of  British  Government 
containing  radically  amended  contraband  list 

Transmits  statement  to  be  communicated  to 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  pro- 
testing against  seizures  and  detentions  of 
American  cargoes 

Explains  reasons  for  seizures  and  detentions  of 
American  cargoes.  Says  British  Government 
is  ready  to  enter  into  an  arrangement  by 
which  mistakes  can  be  avoided 

Gives  interpretation  of  British  Government  of 

N    the  terms   "copper"   and   "lubricants"  in 

contraband  list 

Transmits  proclamation  of  German  Admiralty 
of  February  4, 1915,  declaring  waters  aroimd 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  as  within  the  seat 
of  war.    Copy  of  memorial  on  subject 107 

Transmits  note  for  commimication  to  German 
Government  protesting  against  proclamation 
of  German  Admiralty  of  February  4, 1915 . . . 

Instructed  to  point  out  to  British  Government 
the  serious  consequences  which  may  result 
if  the  use  of  neutral  flags  on  British  merchant 
vessels  in  order  to  avoid  capture  is  authorized. 

Transmits  full  reply  of  British  Government  to 
protest  of  Department  of  State  dated  De- 
cember 28,  1914,  protesting  against  seiziu^es 
and  detentions  of  American  cargoes  destined 
for  European  ports 

Instructed  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the 
British  Government  certain  points  in  con- 
nection with  the  cargo  of  the  Wilhelmina 
which  would  make  her  seizure  unjustifiable. . 

Note  from  German  Foreign  Office  explaining 
that  Federal  Council's  provisions  as  to  grain 
importation  applies  to  civilian  population 
exclusively 

Protest  from  German  Foreign  Office  against 
the  use  by  British  merchant  ships  of  neutral 
flags,  arming  merchant  ships,  and  the  mining 
of  the  war  zone 


88 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


Date 


From  Whom  and  to  Whom 


Contents 


1915 
Berlin, 
February  16. 


London, 

February  19. 


London, 
February  19. 


Washington, 
February  20. 


Berlin, 
March  1 . . 

Washington, 
March  1 . . 

Washington, 
March  5 . . 

London, 
March  9 . . 

Washington, 
March  10. 


London, 
March  15 . . 

London, 
March  15.. 


London, 
March  16. 


Washington, 
March  20. 


Washington, 
March  20. 


Washington, 
March  23.. 


The  German  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  Ambassador  J.  W. 
Gerard 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the 
Secretary-  of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 

Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  British  Ambassador  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 

Consul-General  R.  P.  Skinner  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  British  Ambassador  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  I.  N.  Mor- 
ris, Minister  to  Sweden 

The  British  Ambassador  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 


German  Government  says  measures  respecting 
theater  of  war  in  waters  surrounding  Great 
Britain  necessary  because  of  England's 
method  of  conducting  maritime  warfare .... 

Transmits  reply  of  British  Government  rel- 
ative to  proclamation  of  German  Admiralty 
and  use  of  neutral  flags  on  British  merchant 
ships 

Transmits  reply  of  British  Government  to  De- 
partment's protest  regarding  the  seizure  of 
the  Wilhelmina 

Transmits  note  for  communication  to  the 
Foreign  OflSce  regarding  war-zone  declaration 
by  Germany  and  use  of  neutral  flags  by 
British  Government,  and  suggests  certain 
agreement  to  be  entered  into  by  belligerents. 

Transmits  reply  of  German  Government  to 
American  identic  note  of  February  20,  1915, 
to  Great  Britain  and  Germany 

Refers  to  war-zone  declaration  of  German 
Government.  Says  British  Government  will 
be  forced  to  take  measures  to  prevent  com- 
modities of  any  kind  from  reaching  or  leaving 
Germany 

Transmits  statement  for  communication  to 
Foreign  Office  pointing  out  difficulty  of 
determining  action  regarding  retaliatory 
measures  against  German  commerce 

Gives  views  of  British  Government  regarding 
cotton  contracts 

Transmits  list  enumerating  certain  oils  which 
British  Government  will  treat  as  conditional 
contraband 

Transmits  reply  of  British  Government  to 
American  identic  note  of  February  20,  1915. 

Transmits  reply  of  British  Government  to 
American  note  of  March  5,  and  text  of 
British  Order  in  Council  setting  forth  meas- 
ures  retaliatory  against  Germany 

Transmits  proclamation  of  British  Govern- 
ment making  additions  to  lists  of  articles  of 
contraband 

Instructed  to  inform  British  Government  of 
protest  against  the  detention  of  the  Ameri- 
can steamship  Wico 

• 

Says  that  American  protest  against  detention 
of  steamship  Wico  has  been  presented  to 
British  Government 

Says  he  will  give  Department  definite  in- 
formation regarding  "castor  oil,"  etc.,  as 
soon  as  received 


INDEX  TO  DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE 


Date 


From  Whom  and  to  Whom 


Contents 


Page 


1915 
Washington, 
March  30. 


Washington, 
April  4 


London, 
April  7 . 

London, 
Aprils. 


London, 
April  8 . . . . 

Washington, 
April  9 . . . . 


Washington, 
April  10.. 


Washington, 
April  12.  . 


Washington, 
April  21 .  .  . 


Berlin, 
April  26 . 

London, 
April  28 . 


Washington, 
Mav6 


Washington, 
May  13... 


London, 
May  18. 


London, 
May  20 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


The    German  Ambassador  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Consul-General  R.  P.  Skinner  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 

The    British    Ambassador    to    the 
Secretary  of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador 

Ambassador  J.   W.   Gerard  to  the 
Secretary  of  State 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador J.  W.  Gerard 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  


Transmits  note  for  communication  to  British 
Government  explaining  United  States  atti- 
tude regarding  purposed  retaliatory  meas- 
ures against  German  commerce  and  British 
Order  in  Coimcil 

Transmits  memorandum  regarding  the  matter 
of  German-American  trade  and  the  question 
of  delivery  of  arms 

Transmits  copy  of  British  Order  in  Coimcil. . . 


Reports  British  terms  of  settlement  in  Wil- 
helmina  case  and  says  attorneys  strongly 
recommend  acceptance 

Says  that  Foreign  Office  has  decided  to  allow 
steamship  Wico  to  proceed 

Instructed  to  present  protest  to  Foreign  Office 
of  British  Government  against  seizure  of 
American  merchant  ship  Seguranca 

Transmits  list  of  "lubricants"  which  the 
British  Govenmient  now  considers  absolute 
contraband 

Says  that  United  States  reserves  right  to  take 
action  direct  with  Germany  in  regard  to 
German  capture  of  American  ships 

Gives  views  of  United  States  regarding  trade 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany 
and  exportation  of  arms 

Transmits  notice  of  German  Government  rel- 
ative to  amendments  to  contraband  list 

Says  that  American  merchant  ship  Seguranca 
has  been  released  and  allowed  to  resume 
voyage  imder  certain  agreements 

Instructed  to  inform  Foreign  Office  of  British 
Government  that  United  States  does  not 
recognize  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust  and 
finds  no  legal  justification  for  the  detention 
of  non-contraband  cargoes  consigned  to 
other  firms  or  individuals 

Transmits  note  for  communication  to  the 
German  Government  protesting  against  vio- 
lation by  the  German  authorities  of  American 
rights  on  the  high  seas  which  culminated  in 
the  torpedoing  and  sinking  of  the  Lusitania. 

Transmits  note  from  Foreign  Office  of  British 
Government  disclaiming  any  intention  of 
interference  with  commerce  between  neutrals. 

Memorandum  from  British  Foreign  Office  re- 
garding detention  of  American  vessels  bound 
for  neutral  countries.  States  that  British 
Government  feels  justified  in  assuming  that 
"abnormal"  imports  by  neutral  countries  in- 
dicate ultimate  enemy  destination 


135 


138 


139 


139 


140 


140 


141 


141 


141 


142 


144 


144 


145 


146 


147 


90 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 


Date 


From  Whom  and  to  Whom 


Contents 


1915 
Washington, 
May  21 . . . 


Washington, 
May  21 . . . 


London, 
Jmie22. 


Berlin, 
Julys. 


Washington, 
July  14... 


Washington, 
July  15..., 


Washington, 
July  21.... 


London, 
July  24. 


London, 
July  31 . 


London, 
August  21 . 

Washington, 
October  21. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  American 
Press 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  ad  Interim 


The  German  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  Ambassador  J.  W. 
Gerard 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador J.  W.  Gerard 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambas- 
sador W.  H.  Page 


Denies  that  trade  arrangements  made  between 
industries  and  British  Embassy  are  in  any 
way  oflScial  or  binding  upon  the  Government 
of  the  United  States 

Statement  of  British  Embassy  in  regard  to 
character  of  trade  agreements  made  with 
American  industries 

Transmits  note  from  Foreign  OflSce  of  British 
Government  explaining  method  of  procedure 
in  the  case  of  American  vessels  detained  in 
British  court  and  provisions  made  for  ex- 
amination of  such  vessels 

Suggests  arrangement  of  passenger  ships  carry- 
ing non-contraband  cargoes  under  American 
flag  in  which  American  travelers  may  cross 
the  ocean  in  perfect  safety 

Instructed  to  inform  British  Government  that 
United  States  will  insist  upon  rights  of  cit- 
izens under  the  principles  and  rules  of  in- 
ternational law  governing  neutral  trade  in 
times  of  war 

Instructed  to  protest  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment against  the  seizure  of  the  American 
steamship  Neches  traveling  from  a  neutral 
port  to  the  United  States  as  an  infraction  of 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  American  citizens. 

Directed  to  transmit  note  to  German  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that  repetition  of 
submarine  attacks  which  injure  American 
citizens  will  be  regarded  as  deliberately  un- 
friendly   

Transmits  note  from  British  Foreign  Office 
defending  new  method  of  blockade  and  de- 
fining doctrine  of  "continuous  passage"  as  of 
American  origin 

Transmits  note  from  British  Foreign  Office 
suggesting  that  United  States,  if  protests 
against  Orders  in  Coimcil  are  sustained  in 
British  courts,  may  have  recourse  to  inter- 
national tribunal  of  arbitration  and  refuses 
to  modify   determined  procediure 

Proclamation  declaring  cotton  contraband  of 
war 

Transmits  note  of  protest  against  hardships 
inflicted  on  American  vessels  and  trade  by 
British  and  declares  alleged  "blockade  "illegal. 


Page 


149 


149 


150 


152 


154 


154 


155 


156 


158 


160 


160 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE 

Ambassador  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram— Paraphrase.] 

American  Embassy^ 
London,  August  5, 191Jf. 

Mr.  Page  reports  that  he  has  received  from  the  Foreign  Office  list  of  articles  which 
the  British  Government  have  declared  to  be  absolute  contraband  and  conditional  contra- 
band, respectively,  during  the  present  war : 

PBOCLAMATION. 

August  4,  1914.      No.  1250. 
Specifying  the  articles  to  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war. 
GEORGE  R.  I. 

Whereas  a  state  of  war  exists  between  us  on  the  one  hand  and  the  German  Empire  on  the  other: 
And  whereas  it  is  necessary  to  specify  the  articles  which  it  is  our  intention  to  treat  as  contraband  of  war: 
Now,  therefore,  we  do  hereby  declare,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  our  Privy  Council,  that  during  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war  or  until  we  do  give  further  public  notice  the   articles   enumerated   in   Schedule   I   hereto  will   be 
treated  as  absolute  contraband,  and  the  articles  enumerated  in  Schedule  11  hereto  will  be  treated  as  conditional 
contraband : 

SCHEDULE   I. 

The  following  articles  will  be  treated  as  absolute  contraband : 

1.  Arms  of  all  kinds,  including  arms  for  sporting  purposes,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

2.  Projectiles,  charges,  and  cartridges  of  all  kinds,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

3.  Powder  and  explosives  specially  prepared  for  use  in  war. 

4.  Gun  mountings,  limber  boxes,  limbers,  military  wagons,  field  forges,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

5.  Clothing  and   equipment  of  a   distinctively  military  character. 

6.  All  kinds  of  harness  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

7.  Saddle,  draft,  and  pack  animals  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

8.  Articles  of  camp  equipment  and  their  distinctive  component   parts, 
g.  Armor  plates. 

ID.    Warships,  including  boats,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  only  be 
used  on  a  vessel  of  war. 

11.  Aeroplanes,  airships,  balloons,  and  air  craft  of  all  kinds,  and  their  component  parts,  together  with  acces- 
sories and  articles  recognizable  as  intended  for  use  in  connection  with  balloons  and  air  craft. 

12.  Implements  and  apparatus   designed  exclusively  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war,  for  the  manu- 
facture or  repair  of  arms,  or  war  material  for  use  on  land  and  sea. 

SCHEDULE   II. 

The  following  articles  will  be  treated  as  conditional  contraband: 

1.  Foodstuffs. 

2.  Forage  and     grain  suitable  for  feeding  animals. 

3.  Clothing,  fabrics  for  clothing,  and  boots  and  shoes,  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

4.  Gold  and  silver  in  coin  or  bullion ;  paper  money. 

5.  Vehicles  of  all  kinds  available  for  use  in  war  and  their  component  parts. 

6.  Vessels,    craft,    and    boats    of    all    kinds ;    floating  docks,  parts  of  docks,  and  their  component  parts. 

7.  Railway  material,  both  fixed  and  rolling  stock,  and  materials  for  telegraphs,  wireless  telegraphs  and  tele- 
phones. 

8.  Fuel ;  lubricants. 

9.  Powder  and  explosives  not  specially  prepared  for  use  in  war. 

10.  Barbed  wire,  and  implements  for  fixing  and  cutting  the  same. 

11.  Horseshoes  and  shoeing  materials. 

12.  Harness  and   saddlery. 

13.  Field  glasses,  telescopes,  chronometers,  and  all  kinds  of  nautical  instruments. 

Given  at  our  court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  this  fourth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  fourteen,  etc.,  etc. 


92  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page} 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  August  6, 1914, 1  P-"^- 
Mr.  Bryan  instructs  Mr.  Page  to  inquire  whether  the  British  Government  is  willing 
to  agree  that  the  laws  of  naval  warfare  as  laid  down  by  the  Declaration  of  London  of  1909 
shall  be  applicable  to  naval  warfare  during  the  present  conflict  in  Europe  provided  that 
the  Governments  with  whom  Great  Britain  is  or  may  be  at  war  also  agree  to  such  appli- 
cation. Mr.  Bryan  further  instructs  Mr.  Page  to  state  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  believes  that  an  acceptance  of  these  laws  by  the  belligerents  would  prevent  grave 
misunderstandings  which  may  arise  as  to  the  relations  between  neutral  powers  and  the 
belligerents.  Mr.  Bryan  adds  that  it  is  earnestly  hoped  that  this  inquiry  may  receive 
favorable  consideration. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

American  Embassy^ 
Berlin,  August  22, 1914, 1^  midnight. 
Mr.  Gerard  refers  to  Department's  August  19,  4  p.  m.,  and  says  his  August  20, 1  a.  m., 
by  way  of  Copenhagen,  states  that  the  German  Government  will  apply  the  Declaration  of 
London,  provided  its  provisions  are  not  disregarded  by  other  belligerents. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy^ 
London,  August  27,  Wllf. 
Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  inclosed  a  copy  of  the  note  from  the 
Foreign  Office  I  telegraphed  you  on  the  26th  instant  (No.  483)  defining  the  attitude  of 
the  British  Government  with  regard  to  the  so-called  Declaration  of  London,  1909,  to- 
gether with  a  copy  of  a  memorandum  which  accompanied  the  note,  and  a  copy  of  the 
King's  Order  in  Council  of  the  20th  instant  relating  to  this  matter. 

There  will  also  be  found  attached  a  copy  of  a  circular  note  I  have  just  received  from 
the  Foreign  Office  relating  to  the  same  order  in  council  and  to  the  rules  governing  the 
proceedings  in  the  British  prize  courts.  Another  copy  of  the  King's  Order  in  Council  of 
the  20th  instant,  which  accompanied  the  circular  note,  is  inclosed  herewith,  and  there  will 
be  found  as  well,  in  the  pouch  which  accompanies  this  dispatch,  six  copies  of  the  Prize 
Court  Kules. 

I  have,  etc., 

Walter  Hines  Page. 


tlndosure  1.] 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

Foreign  Office, 
London,  August  22, 191Jf. 

Your  Excellency  :  On  the  7th  instant  you  were  so  good  as  to  address  to  me  a  note 
inquiring,  pursuant  to  instructions  from  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington,  whether 
His  Majesty's  Government  were  willing  to  agree  that  the  laws  of  naval  warfare,  as  laid 
down  by  the  Declaration  of  London,  1909,  should  be  applicable  to  naval  warfare  during 
the  present  European  conflict,  provided  that  the  Governments  with  whom  Great  Britain 
is  at  war,  or  with  whom  her  relations  are  not  normal,  also  agree  to  such  application. 

Your  Excellency  added  that  it  was  the  belief  of  your  Government  that  the  acceptance 
of  these  laws  by  the  belligerents  would  prevent  the  possibility  of  grave  misunderstandings 
as  to  the  relations  between  belligerents  and  neutrals. 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  His  Majesty's  Government,  who  at- 
tach great  importance  to  the  views  expressed  in  Your  Excellency's  note  and  are  animated 
by  a  keen  desire  to  consult  so  far  as  possible  the  interests  of  neutral  countries,  have  given 
this  matter  their  most  careful  consideration  and  have  pleasure  in  stating  that  they  have 
decided  to  adopt  generally  the  rules  of  the  declaration  in  question,  subject  to  certain 
modifications  and  additions  which  they  judge  indispensable  to  the  efficient  conduct  of  their 

l(Same    mutatis   mutandis   to:  The   American    Embassies   *t   St.  Petersburg,   Paris,   Berlin,  and   Vienna,   and  the  American   Lega- 
tion  at   Brussels.) 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  93 

naval  operations.     A  detailed  explanation  of  these  additions  and  modifications  is  con- 
tained in  the  inclosed  memorandum. 

The  necessary  steps  to  carry  the  above  decision  into  effect  have  now  been  taken  by  the 
issue  of  an  Order  in  Council,  of  which  I  have  the  honor  to  inclose  copies  herein  for  Your 
Excellency's  information  and  for  transmission  to  your  Government. 

I  may  add  that  His  Majesty's  Government,  in  deciding  to  adhere  to  the  miles  of  the 
Declaration  of  London,  subject  only  to  the  aforesaid  modifications  and  additions,  have 
not  waited  to  learn  the  intentions  of  the  enemy  Governments,  but  have  been  actuated  by 
a  desire  to  terminate  at  the  earliest  moment  the  condition  of  uncertainty  which  has  been 
prejudicing  the  interests  of  neutral  trade. 
I  have,  etc., 

E.  A.  Crewe. 


[Enclosure  2.] 
MEMOBANDUM. 

1.  The  lists  of  contraband  already  published  by  His  Majesty  are  substituted  for  those  contained  in  Articles 
22  and  24  of  the  Declaration  of  London.  Lists  similar  to  those  published  by  His  Majesty  have  been  issued  by  the 
French  Government. 

2.  His  Majesty's  Government  do  not  feel  able  to  accept  in  its  entirety  the  rule  laid  down  in  Article  38  of 
the  Declaration.  It  has  been  the  practice  of  the  British  Navy  to  treat  .  as  liable  to  capture  a  vessel  which 
carried  contraband  of  war  with  false  papers  if  she  was  encountered  on  the  return  voyage,  and  to  this  e.xception 
His  Majesty's  Government  feel  it  necessary  to  adhere. 

3.  The  peculiar  conditions  in  the  present  war  due  to  the  fact  that  neutral  ports  such  as  Rotterdam  are  the 
chief  means  of  access  to  a  large  part  of  Germany  and  that  exceptional  measures  have  been  taken  in  the  enemy 
country  for  the  control  by  the  Government  of  the  entire  supply  of  foodstuffs  have  convinced  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment that  modifications  are  required  in  the  applications  of  Articles  34  and  35  of  the  Declaration.  These 
modifications  are  contained  in   paragraphs  3  and  5  of  the  accompanying  Order  in  Council. 

4.  Article  15  of  the  Declaration  contains  a  provision  as  to  presumptive  knowledge  of  the  blockade  in  certain 
cases  if  the  vessel  has  sailed  from  a  neutral  port.  No  mention  is  made  of  British  or  allied  enemy  ports.  These 
omissions  are  supplied  by  Article  4  of  the  Order  in  Council. 

5.  The  Order  in  Council  also  provides  for  the  acceptance  of  the  very  valuable  commentary  on  the  Declara- 
tion which  was  embodied  in  the  General  Report  prepared  by  Monsieur  Renault. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretari/  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  September  Jf,  191Jf. 
I  repeat  my  August  tenth  a.  m. 

The  Foreign  Office  sends  me  a  list  of  the  articles  which  the  German  Government  in- 
tends to  treat  as  contraband  of  war  in  pursuance  of  the  German  prize  ordinance  printed 
in  Reichgesetzblatt,  1914,  No.  4.  I  find  the  list  agrees  exactly  with  article  '22,  Nos.  1  to 
11,  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  in  respect  of  absolute  contraband  and  to  article  24,  Nos. 
1  to  14,  in  respect  of  conditional  contraband.  The  German  Government  state  that  the  or- 
dinance embodies  the  substance  of  the  Declaration  and  that  they  will  apply  its  provisions 
if  they  are  not  disregarded  by  other  belligerents.  They  request  to  be  informed  what  at- 
titude the  other  powers  have  assumed. 

Copies  of  the  ordinance  have  been  mailed  to  you  and  to  the  London  Embassy. 

Gerard. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  September  30,  Wl//. 
Following  proclamation  regarding  contraband  of  war  has  been  received  from  the 
Foreign  Office. 

Page. 

PROCXAMATION. 

September  21,  1914.      No.  1410. 
Specifying  certain  additional  articles  which  are  to   be  treated  as  contraband  of  war. 
George  R.  I. 

Whereas  on  the  4th  day  of  August  last,  we  did  issue  our  royal  proclamation  specifying  the  articles  which  it 
was  our  intention  to  treat  as  contraband  of  war  during  the  war  between  us  and  the  German  Emperor. 

And  whereas  on  the  12th  day  of  August  last  we  did  by  our  royal  proclamation  of  that  date  extend  our  proc- 
lamation  afore-mentioned  to  the  war  between  us  and  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary. 


94  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

And  whereas  by  an  Order  in  Council  of  the  20th  day  of  August,  1914,  it  was  ordered  that  during  the  present 
hostilities  the  convention  known  as  the  Declaration  of  London  should,  subject  to  certain  additions  and  modi- 
fications therein  specified,  be  adopted  and  put  in  force  as  if  the  same  had  been  ratified  by  us. 

And  whereas  it  is  desirable  to  add  to  the  list  of  articles  to  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war  during  the  present 
war. 

And  whereas  it  is  expedient  to  introduce  certain  further  modifications  in  the  Declaration  of  London  as 
adopted  and  put  into  force. 

Now,  therefore,  we  do  hereby  declare,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  our  privy  council,  that  during  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war,  or  until  we  do  give  further  public  notice,  the  articles  enumerated  in  the  schedule  hereto  will,  not- 
withstanding anything  contained  in  Article  28  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  be  treated  as  conditional  contra- 
band. 

Schedule. 
Copper,  unwrought.  Magnetic  iron  ore. 

Lead,  pig,  sheet,  or  pipe.  Rubber. 

Glycerine.  Hides  and  skins,  raw  or  rough  tanned  (but  not  including 

Ferrochrome.  dressed  leather). 

Haematite  iron  ore. 

Given  at  our  court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  this  twenty-first  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  nine  hundred  and  fourteen,  etc.,  etc. 


[Translation.] 

The  German  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Imperial  German  Embassy, 
Washington,  October  22,  1914. 
Mr.  Secretary  of  State  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  the  Im- 
perial Government  has  declared  copper  and  lead  to  be  conditional  contraband.  In  conse- 
quence thereof  I  beg  Your  Excellency  kindly  to  cause  the  foregoing  to  be  published  in 
accordance  with  the  "Declaration  of  International  Naval  Conference"  of  February  26, 
1909. 

Accept,  etc.,  For  the  Imperial  Ambassador: 

Haniel. 

The  Acting  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  October  22, 1914.    4  P-  in. 

Your  No.  864,  October  19,  Declaration  of  London. 

Inasmuch  as  the  British  Government  consider  that  the  conditions  of  the  present 
European  conflict  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  accept  without  modification  the  Declara- 
tion of  London,  you  are  requested  to  inform  His  Majesty's  Government  that  in  the  circum- 
stances the  Government  of  the  United  States  feels  obliged  to  withdraw  its  suggestion  that 
the  Declaration  of  London  be  adopted  as  a  temporary  code  of  naval  warfare  to  be  ob- 
served by  belligerents  and  neutrals  during  the  present  war;  that  therefore  this  Govern- 
ment will  insist  that  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  in  the 
present  war  be  defined  by  the  existing  rules  of  international  law  and  the  treaties  of  the 
United  States  irrespective  of  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London ;  and  that  this 
Government  reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  enter  a  protest  or  demand  in  each  case  in  which 
those  rights  and  duties  so  defined  are  violated  or  their  free  exercise  interfered  with  by  the 
authorities  of  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government. 

Lansing. 

The  Acting  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  Oerard.^ 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  of  State, 
Wjushington,  October  24,  1914-  5  p.  m. 
Keferring  to  Department's  August  6,  1  p.  m.,  and  Embassy's  October  22,  relative  to 
the  Declaration  of  London,  Mr.  Lansing  instructs  Mr.  Gerard  to  inform  the  German  Gov- 
ernment that  the  suggestion  of  the  department  to  belligerents  as  to  the  adoption  of  dec- 
laration for  sake  of  uniformity  as  to  a  temporary  code  of  naval  warfare  during  the  present 
conflict  has  been  withdrawn  because  some  of  the  belligerents  are  unwilling  to  accept  the 
declaration  without  modifications  and  that  this  Government  will  therefore  insist  that  the 
rights  and  duties  of  the  Government  and  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  the  present  war 
be  defined  by  existing  rules  of  international  law  and  the  treaties  of  the  United  States 
without  regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  declaration  and  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  enter  a  protest  or  demand  in  every  case  in  which  the 
rights  and  duties  so  defined  are  violated  or  their  free  exercise  interfered  with  by  the  auth- 
orities of  the  belligerent  governments. 

l(Same  to   the   embassies  at   St.   Petersburg,   Vienna,   and  Paris,  and  the  legation  at  Brussels.) 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  95 

Announcement  of  the  British  Admiralty,  November  2,  1914,  declaring  the  North 
Sea  a  military  area.* 

During  the  last  week  the  Germans  have  scattered  mines  indiscriminately  in  the 
open  sea,  on  the  main  trade  route  from  America  to  Liverpool  via  the  North  of  Ireland. 

Peaceful  merchant  ships  have  already  been  blown  up,  with  loss  of  life,  by  this 
agency. 

The  White  Star  Liner  Olympic  escaped  disaster  by  pure  luck  and  but  for  warnings 
given  by  British  cruisers  other  British  and  neutral  merchant  and  passenger  vessels  would 
have  been  destroyed. 

These  mines  cannot  have  been  laid  by  any  German  ship  of  war.  They  have  been 
laid  by  some  merchant  vessel  flying  a  neutral  flag,  wliich  has  come  along  the  trade  route 
as  if  for  purpose  of  peaceful  commerce,  and,  wliile  profiting  to  the  full  by  the  immunity  en- 
joyed by  neutral  merchant  ships,  has  wantonly  and  recklessly  endangered  the  lives  of  all 
who  travel  on  the  sea. 

In  these  circumstances,  having  regard  to  the  great  interests  intrusted  to  the  Brit- 
ish navy,  to  the  safety  of  peaceful  commerce  on  the  high  seas,  and  to  the  maintenance  with- 
in the  limits  of  international  law  of  trade  between  neutral  countries,  the  admiralty  feels 
it  necessary  to  adopt  exceptional  measures  appropriate  to  the  novel  conditions  under 
which  this  war  is  being  waged. 

It  therefore  gives  notice  that  the  whole  of  the  North  Sea  must  be  considered  a  mil- 
itary area.  Within  this  area  merchant  shipping  of  all  kinds,  traders  of  all  countries, 
fishing  craft  and  all  other  vessels  will  be  exx)osed  to  the  gravest  dangers  from  mines  it 
has  been  necessary  to  lay  and  from  warships  searching  vigilantly  by  night  and  day  for 
suspicious  craft. 

All  merchant  and  fishing  vessels  of  every  description  are  hereby  warned  of  the  dan- 
gers they  encounter  by  entering  this  area,  except  in  strict  accordance  with  admiralty  di- 
rections. Every  effort  will  be  made  to  convey  this  warning  to  neutral  countries  and  to 
vessels  on  the  sea,  but  from  November  5th  onward  the  admiralty  announces  that  all  ships 
passing  a  line  drawn  from  the  northern  point  of  the  Hebrides  through  the  Fame  Islands 
to  Iceland  do  so  at  their  own  peril. 

Ships  of  all  countries  wishing  to  trade  to  and  from  Norway,  the  Baltic,  Denmark 
and  Holland,  are  advised  to  come,  if  inward  bound,  by  the  English  Channel  and  the  Strait 
of  Dover.  There  they  will  be  given  sailing  directions  which  will  pass  them  safely,  so  far 
as  Great  Britain  is  concerned,  up  the  east  coast  of  England  to  the  Fame  Islands,  whence 
a  safe  route  will,  if  possible,  be  given  to  Lindesnas  Lighthouse. 

From  this  point  they  should  turn  north  or  south,  according  to  their  destination, 
keeping  as  near  the  coast  as  possible.    The  converse  applies  to  vessels  outward  bound. 

By  strict  adherence  to  these  routes  the  commerce  of  all  countries  will  be  able  to 
reach  its  destination  in  safety  so  far  as  Great  Britain  is  concerned,  but  any  straying  even 
for  a  few  miles  from  the  course  thus  indicated  may  be  followed  by  fatal  consequences. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 

London,  November  3, 1914- 

Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  a  proclamation  containing  a 
revised  list  of  articles  which  the  British  Government  have  decided  to  declare  absolute  or 
conditional  contraband,  respectively,  during  the  present  war,  as  well  as  a  copy  of  an 
Order  in  Council  defining  the  attitude  of  His  Majesty's  Government  toward  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  during  the  present  hostilities  and  the  rules  which  have  been  decided  to  be 
adopted  in  modification  of  the  declaration. 

I  have,  etc.,  Walter  Hines  Page. 

PROCLAMATION. 

October  29,   1914.       No.   1613. 

Revising  the  List  of  Contraband  of  War. 
George  R.  I. 

Whereas,  on  the  fourth  day  of  August,  1914,  We  did  issue  Our  Royal  Proclamation  specifying  the  articles 
which  it  was  Our  intention  to  treat  as  contraband  of  war  during  the  war  between  Us  and  the  German  Emper- 
or; and 

Whereas,  on  the  twelfth  day  of  August,  1914,  We  did  by  Our  Royal  Proclamation  of  that  date  extend  Our 
Proclamation   aforementioned  to   the   war  betwejn  Us  and  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary;  and 

•  Not  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  etc.     The  New  York  Tribune,  November  3,  1914. 


96  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH   PRETENSIONS 

Whereas  on  the  twenty-first  day  of  September,  1914,  We  did  by  Our  Royal  Proclamation  of  that  date  make 
certain  additions  to  the  list  of  articles  to  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war;  and 

Whereas  it  is  expedient  to  consolidate  the  said  lists  and  to  make  certain  additions  thereto : 
Now,  therefore,  We  do  hereby  declare,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  Our  Privy  Council,  that  the  lists  of  contra- 
band contained  in  the  schedules  to  Our  Royal  Proclamations  of  the  fourth  day  of  August  and  the  twenty-first 
day  of  September  aforementioned  are  hereby  withdrawn,  and  that  in  lieu  thereof  during  the  continuance  of  the 
war  or  until  We  do  give  further  public  notice  the  articles  enumerated  in  Schedule  I.  hereto  will  be  treated  as 
absolute  contraband,  and  the  articles  enumerated  in  Schedule  II.  hereto  will  be  treated  conditional  contraband. 

SCHEDULE   I. 

1.  Arms  of  all  kinds,  including  arms  for  sporting  purposes,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

2.  Projectiles,  charges,  and  cartridges  of  all  kinds,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

3.  Powder  and  explosives  specially  prepared  for  use  in  war. 

4.  Sulphuric  acid. 

5.  Gun  mountings,  limber  boxes,  limbers,  military  wagons,  field  forges  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

6.  Range-finders  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

7.  Clothing  and  equipment  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

8.  Saddle,  draft,  and  pack  animals  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

9.  All  kinds  of  harness  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

10.  Articles  of  camp  equipment  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

11.  Armor  plates. 

12.  Haematite  iron  ore  and  haematite  pig  iron. 

13.  Iron  pyrites. 

14.  Nickel  ore  and  nickel. 

15.  Ferrochrome  and  chrome  ore. 

16.  Copper,  unwrought. 

17.  Lead,  pig,  sheet,  or  pipe. 

18.  Aluminium. 

19.  Ferro-silica. 

20.  Barbed  wire,  and  implements  for  fixing  and  cutting  the  same. 

21.  Warships,  including  boats  and  their  distinctive  component  parts  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  only  be 
used  on  a  vessel  of  war. 

22.  Aeroplanes,  airships,  balloons,  and  aircraft  of  all  kinds,  and  their  component  parts,  together  with  acces- 
sories and  articles  recognizable  as  intended  for  use  in  connection  with  balloons  and  aircraft. 

23.  Motor  vehicles  of  all  kinds  and  their  component  parts. 

24.  Motor  tires ;  rubber. 

25.  Mineral  oils  and  motor  spirit,  except  lubricating  oils. 

26.  Implements  and  apparatus  designed  exclusively  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war,  for  the  manu- 
facture or  repair  of  arms,  or  war  material  for  use  on  land  and  sea. 

SCHEDULE    II. 

1.  Foodstuffs. 

2.  Forage  and  feedings  stuff  for  animals. 

3.  Clothing,  fabrics  for  clothing,  and  boots  and  shoes  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

4.  Gold  and  silver  in  coin  or  buUion;  paper  money. 

5.  Vehicles  of  all  kinds,  other  than  motor  vehicles,  available  for  use  in  war,  and  their  component  parts. 

6.  Vessels,  craft,  and  boats  of  all  kinds;  floating  docks,  parts  of  docks,  and  their  component  parts. 

7.  Railway  materials,  both   fixed  and  rolling  stock,  and   materials   for   telegraphs,   wireless   telegraphs,   and 
telephones. 

8.  Fuel,  other  than  mineral  oils.     Lubricants. 

9.  Powder  and  explosives  not  specially  prepared  for  use  in  war. 

10.  Sulphur. 

1 1.  Glycerine. 

12.  Horseshoes  and  shoeing  materials. 

13.  Harness  and  saddlery. 

14.  Hides  of  all  kinds,  dry  or  wet;  pigskins,   raw  or   dressed;   leather,  undressed   or  dressed,   suitable   for 
saddlery,  harness,  or  military  boots. 

15.  Field  glasses,  telescopes,  chronometers,  and  all  kinds  of  nautical  instruments. 

Given  at  our  court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  this  twenty-ninth  day  of  October,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand   nine  hundred  and  fourteen,  etc.,  etc. 


Consul  General  Skinner  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[  Telegram — Extract.  ] 

Amebican  Consulate  General, 
London,  November  17,  J91Jf — 6  p.  m. 
Foreign  Office  states :     "Cottonseed  cake,  being  feeding  stuff  for  cattle,  is  conditional 
contraband  and  will  be  treated  in  strict  accordance  witli  Order  in  Council,  article  1,  sub- 
article  3." 

Skinnbe. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  •  97 

Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  November  19, 1914. 
Proclamatiou  of  November  17th  defines  all  rough  or  unworked  lumber  as  conditional 
contraband  under  number  nine  or  article  twenty-three  of  German  prize  ordinance  because 
susceptible  of  use  as  fuel.     Exceptions  are  lignum  vitae,  palisander,  ebony,  and  similar 
woods  and  all  woods  greatly  enhanced  in  value  through  working  by  hand  or  machine. 

Gebaed. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  November  23, 1914. 
German  Government  has  added  following  to  list  of  conditional  contraband : 
No.  17.    Woods  of  all  kinds,  rough  or  worked,  that  is  hewn,  sawed,  planed,  grooved, 
etc. ;  cylinder  tar. 

No.  18.     Sulphur,  crude  or  refined,  and  sulphuric  acid. 

Gerard. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  November  23, 1914- 
Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  translations  of  two  notes  received 
from  the  imperial  foreign  ofl&ce  conveying  notification  of  additions  to  the  original  lists  of 
articles  regarded  as  contraband  by  the  Germai-  Government,  which,  as  reported  in  my  tele- 
gram of  August  10, 1  p.  m.,  corresponded  in  all  respects  with  articles  22  and  24  of  the  Dec- 
laration of  London. 
I  have,  etc., 

James  W.  Gerard. 


[Inclosure  1 — Translation.] 
NOTE  VERBALE. 

In  supplement  to  its  note  verbale  of  August  6,  1914,  IIIa.9222,  the  foreign  office  has  the  honor  to  inform  the 
embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America  that  during  the  present  hostilities  the  following  materials  will  be  con- 
sidered as  conditional  contraband  by  Germany  in  addition  to  the  articles  and  materials  designated  under  No.  11, 
I-I4-- 

15.  Copper  (unworked)  and 

16.  Lead  in  blocks,  plates  or  tubes. 

The  foreign  office  begs  that  the  embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America  will  kindly  inform  its  Government 
of  the  above  as  soon  as  possible. 
Berlin,  October  22,  1914. 

[Inclosure  2 — ^Translation.] 

NOTE  VERBALE. 

In  supplement  to  its  notes  verbales  of  August  6,  1914,  and  October  22,  1914,  llla.9222  and  17064,  the  foreign 
office  has  the  honor  to  inform  the  embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America  that  during  the  present  hostilities  the 
following  will  be  considered  by  Germany  as  conditional  contraband  in  addition  to  the  articles  and  materials  desig- 
nated under  11,  1-16: 

17.  Woods  of  all  kinds,  rough  or  treated  (in  particular  hewn,  sawed,  planed,  grooved),  charcoal,  cyclinder  tar. 

18.  Sulphur,  crude  or  refined,  sulphuric  acid. 

The  foreign  office  begs  that  the  embassy  will  kindly  notify  its  Government  of  the  above  as  soon  as  possible. 
Berlin,  November  23,  1914. 


The  German  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State.* 

According  to  an  Order  in  Council  of  August  20,  1914,  the  British  Government  in- 
tends to  act,  during  the  present  hostilities,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Dec- 
laration of  London  relative  to  the  law  of  naval  warfare  of  February  26,  1909,  subject  to 
some  additions  and  modifications.  However,  these  additions  and  modifications  are  of 
such  a  nature  that  they  obliterate  the  said  declaration  in  several  vital  points  and,  at  the 

*  Not  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence,   etc.     The  New  York  Times,  November  34,  19:4. 


98  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

same  time,  encroach  on  the  accepted  rules  of  international  law.    Further  modifications  of 
great  consequence  are  contained  in  the  proclamation  of  September  21,  1914. 

First.  The  most  vital  modifications  of  the  Declaration  of  London  are  contained  in 
the  rule  concerning  conditional  contraband  under  Nos.  3  and  5  of  the  above-mentioned  Or- 
der in  Council. 

Article  33  of  the  Declaration  of  London  defines  that  there  can  be  no  question  of 
conditional  contraband  except  in  the  case  where  cargo  is  destined  for  the  use  of  the  ad- 
ministrative departments  or  the  military  forces  of  the  hostile  power.  Moreover,  according 
to  Article  35  the  question  whether  goods  are  conditional  contraband  or  not  can  under  no 
circumstances  arise  when  the  vessel  is  sailing  for  a  neutral  port. 

The  above  provisions  which  are,  in  the  main,  in  accordance  with  the  accepted  rules 
of  international  law  and  represent  the  outcome  of  the  just  weighing  of  the  interests  of 
the  belligerents  on  the  one  side  and  of  the  neutral  countries  on  the  other  side,  are  as  good 
as  annulled  by  the  said  Order  in  Council,  for,  according  to  its  No.  3  the  hostile  destina- 
tion of  the  cargo  is  to  be  presumed  in  every  case  where  the  consignee  of  the  cargo  is  under 
the  control  of  the  authorities  of  the  hostile  State.  This,  however,  means  nothing  else  but 
that  each  and  every  ca::go  shipped  to  the  hostile  country  is  liable  to  be  seized  because  all 
inhabitants  of  that  country  are  under  the  control  of  the  authorities.  This  rule  is  supple- 
mented by  No.  5  of  the  said  Order,  which  sets  forth  that  all  vessels  on  the  voyage  for  neu- 
tral ports  are  liable  to  be  seized  for  having  conditional  contraband  on  board.  Thus,  the 
rule  of  the  continuous  voyage,  applicable  only  in  the  case  of  absolute  contraband,  is  de- 
clared applicable  also  with  regard  to  conditional  contraband  in  contravention  of  Article 
35  of  the  Declaration  of  London.  In  this  manner  the  more  lenient  regulations  with  regard 
to  conditional  contraband,  established  by  the  Declaration  of  London,  are  simply  set  aside 
with  the  result  that  conditional  contraband  is  virtually  on  the  same  footing  as  absolute 
contraband.  In  consequence  the  supply  by  neutrals  of  objects  of  conditional  contraband, 
especially  of  foodstuffs,  destined  only  for  the  consumption  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  bellig- 
erent country,  which  is  universally  considered  legitimate  in  international  law,  is  practi- 
cally rendered  illusory,  whereby  the  interests  of  the  belligerents  as  well  as  neutrals  are 
violated  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations. 

As  events  at  the  theatres  of  naval  warfare  prove,  England  proceeds  in  this  respect 
in  the  most  high-handed  manner,  even  enforcing  a  control  over  supplies  destined  for  the 
countries  adjacent  to  Germany,  and  thereby  endangering  their  victualing. 

Second.  The  British  Government  considers  itself  at  liberty  to  totally  disregard  the 
lists  of  absolute  contraband,  and  of  merchandise  not  to  be  declared  contraband  (free  list) 
contained  in  articles  XXII,  XXIV  and  XXVIII  of  the  Declaration  of  London.  In  its  defi- 
nition of  contraband  of  August  5,  1914,  specially  upheld  by  No.  1  of  the  said  Order  in 
Council,  it  has  declared  airships  and  parts  thereof  absolute  contraband,  while  according 
to  No.  8  of  Article  XXIV  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  such  objects  can  only  be  regarded 
as  conditional  contraband.  Above  all,  by  proclamation  of  September  21,  1914,  it  has  de- 
clared rubber,  hides  and  skins,  as  well  as  various  kinds  of  iron  ore,  to  be  conditional  con- 
traband, although  these  articles  are  not  at  all,  or  only  in  an  indirect  way,  suitable  for  pur- 
poses of  warfare,  and  were  therefore  placed  in  the  free  list.  (Article  XXVIII,  Nos.  3,  4 
and  6.)  In  this  manner  the  universally  accepted  principle  of  international  law  that  neu- 
tral trade  with  objects  for  exclusively  peaceful  use  must  not  be  disturbed  by  the  bellig- 
erents is  wantonly  set  aside. 

Third.  No.  2  of  the  said  Order  in  Council  contains  a  further  aggravation  of  the 
rules  concerning  contraband.  For  Article  38  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  in  accordance 
with  the  accepted  principle  of  international  law,  permits  the  seizure  of  a  vessel  for  carry- 
ing contraband  only  as  long  as  such  is  on  board  the  vessel ;  whereas  the  British  Govern- 
ment claims  the  right  of  seizing  the  vessel  during  its  entire  voyage,  if  carriage  of  contra- 
band has  taken  place  under  false  shipping  documents.  In  this  manner  neutral  shipping 
with  the  belligerent  territory  is  exposed  to  constant  chicane,  since  vessels  may  be  seized 
not  only  by  reason  of  evident  facts,  viz.,  the  existence  of  contraband  on  board,  but  also  by 
reason  of  a  frequently  not  provable  affirmation  with  regard  to  their  previous  acts. 

Fourth.  By  the  rule  established  under  No.  4  of  the  said  Order  in  Council  the 
right  of  seizure  on  account  of  blockade  running  is  unduly  extended,  since  according  there- 
to knowledge  of  the  blockade  is  to  be  assumed  even  in  the  case  that,  after  a  certain  time 
since  the  notification  of  the  blockade  of  an  enemy  jwrt  to  the  local  authorities  has  elapsed, 
a  vessel  has  sailed  from  another  enemy  port.  By  this  rule,  the  British  Government  at- 
tempts, beyond  the  limits  drawn  by  international  law,  to  put  the  authorities  of  the  hostile 
country  into  the  service  of  the  British  naval  forces,  and  to  enforce  this  service  by  the  cap- 
ture of  neutral  vessels. 

Fifth.  According  to  an  acknowledged  principle  of  international  law  confirmed  by 
the  Declaration  of  London,  only  such  persons  traveling  on  board  of  merchant  vessels  are 
liable  to  be  made  prisoners  of  war  as  have  already  incorporated  in  the  hostile  military 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  99 

forces.  This  rule  is  clearly  established  by  Article  45,  No.  2,  in  conjunction  with  Article 
47  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  and  is,  moreover,  treated  in  detail  in  the  general  report 
of  the  drafting  committee  of  the  Conference  of  London,  in  the  first  paragraphs  to  notes  to 
45.  As  it  is  set  forth  in  the  general  report,  for  judicial  reasons  as  well  as  for  practical 
considerations,  it  was  agreed  at  the  conference  that  persons  belonging  to  the  active  mili- 
tary forces,  exclusively,  shall  be  liable  to  be  made  prisoners  of  war  when  traveling  on  neu- 
tral ships,  not,  however,  persons  who,  in  order  to  fulfil  their  military  services,  are  return- 
ing to  their  country,  as  in  the  case  of  members  of  the  reserve.  Although  the  said  Order  in 
Council  has  acknowledged  as  binding  the  above-mentioned  two  articles,  as  well  as  the 
notes  of  the  general  report,  the  British  naval  forces  have,  nevertheless,  seized  on  merchant 
vessels,  sailing  under  the  Dutch,  Norwegian,  or  Italian  flag,  German  subjects  liable  to  do 
military  service,  but  not  yet  incorporated  in  tlie  military  forces,  and  made  them  prisoners 
of  war.  In  this  manner  they  have  not  only  gravely  violated  the  established  principles  of 
international  law,  as  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of  London,  but  also  infringed  on  an  act 
of  their  own  legislation,  i.e.,  the  said  Order  in  Council. 

According  to  a  decree  of  the  President  of  the  French  Republic,  published  in  the 
Journal  Officiel  of  August  6,  1914,  France  has  taken  the  same  stand  as  Great  Britain  in 
the  said  Order  in  Council.  Moreover,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  British  naval  forces, 
the  French  naval  forces  have  captured  German  persons  liable  to  do  military  service,  on 
neutral  vessels,  notably  on  Dutch  and  Spanish  vessels. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  the  regulations  issued  by  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  even 
more  so  their  respective  naval  forces,  are  disregarding  in  the  most  wanton  way  the  pro- 
visions embodied  in  the  Declaration  of  London  relative  to  the  law  of  naval  warfare. 

It  is  Great  Britain's  acknowledged  aim  to  hit  not  only  the  military  but  also  the 
commercial  power  of  their  adversaries,  by  way  of  paralyzing  neutral  trade,  and  in  pur- 
suing this  purpose  they  encroach  in  an  unjustifiable  manner,  not  only  upon  the  legiti- 
mate commerce  between  the  neutrals  and  the  enemy,  but  also  upon  the  commerce  among 
the  neutral  countries  themselves.  It  is  true  that,  thus  far,  the  Declaration  of  London  has 
not  been  ratified.  However,  in  its  preamble  it  has  been  specially  acknowledged  by  the  dele- 
gates of  all  its  signatory  powers,  including  those  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  that,  in 
the  main,  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London  are  in  accordance  with  the  generally 
acknowledged  principles  of  international  law,  which  must  be  considered  much  more  seri- 
ous, because  in  the  course  of  former  wars  in  which  she  was  neutral,  notably  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  Great  Britain  has  always  protested  most  emphatically  against  violations 
of  international  law  of  the  indicated  order.  (See  the  British  Blue  Boole,  Russia  No.  1, 1903, 
correspondence  respecting  contraband  of  war,  page  8,  etc. ) 

The  Imperial  German  Government  has  thus  far  strictly  observed  the  Declaration 
of  London  and  has  embodied  the  contents  of  its  provisions  in  the  German  prize  court  regu- 
lations of  September  30,  1914,  (cf.  Reichsgesetzhlatt,  1914,  page  275).  It  has  not  changed 
this  attitude  even  in  view  of  the  flagrant  violations  of  law  committed  by  its  adversaries. 

However,  The  Imperial  German  Government  must  now  study  the  question  whether 
it  will  be  able  to  continue  to  maintain  the  above  attitude  if  the  enemy  powers  abide  by 
the  procedure  observed  by  them,  and  if  the  neutral  powers  allow  such  violations  of  the 
principles  of  neutrality  to  go  on  to  the  detriment  of  German  interest. 

The  Imperial  German  Government  considers  it,  therefore,  of  interest  to  learn 
which  position  the  neutral  powers  intend  to  take  toward  the  attitude  adopted  by  Great 
Britain  and  France  contrary  to  international  law,  and  particularly  whether  it  is  their  in- 
tention to  take  measures  against  the  acts  of  violence  committed  on  board  their  merchant 
vessels  against  German  subjects  and  German  property. 


Consul  General  Skinner  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Consulate  General^ 

London,  November  25,  1914. 
British  authorities  inform  me  to-day  in  their  view  toluene  and  toluol  are  contraband. 

Skinnee. 


100  AMERICAN   RIGHTS   AND   BRITISH   PRETENSIONS 

Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  December  3,  1914- 
Sir  :  With  reference  to  my  dispatch  No.  280,  dated  November  23,  1914,  I  have  the 
honor  to.  transmit  to  you  herewith  a  copy,  in  translation,  of  a  note  received  from  the 
imperial  German  foreign  oflSce,  dated  November  30,  1914,  in  reply  to  an  inquiry  addressed 
by  me  to  the  foreign  office  to  ascertain  whether  Germany  regards  quebracho  wood  in  logs 
as  contraband  of  war.     It  appears  from  the  note  of  the  foreign  office  that  quebracho 
wood  is  held  by  the  German  Government  to  fall  under  the  order  of  the  imperial  chancel- 
lor of  November  23,  1914,  and  to  be  considered  as  conditional  contraband. 
I  have,  etc. 

James  W.  Gerard. 

[  Inclosure — Translation.] 
NOTE  VERBALE. 

The  foreign  office  has  the  honor  to  inform  the  embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America,  in  reply  to  the  note 
verbale  of  the  20th  instant  (F.  O.  No.  1165),  that  quebracho  wood  is  not  to  be  considered  as  fuel  within  the  mean- 
ing of  article  23,  No.  9,  of  the  German  prize  ordinance,  nor  to  be  deemed  contraband  for  this  reason. 

However,  by  an  order  of  the  imperial  chancellor,  dated  November  23,  1914,  Reichs-Gesetzblatt,  page  481,  all 
kinds  of  woods  have  been  expressly  declared  to  be  conditional  contraband,  and  quebracho  wood  in  logs  is  includ- 
ed in  such  declaration. 

Berlin,  November  30,   1914. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  December  8,  lOlJ/. 
Sir:  With  reference  to  the  department's  cable,  No.  749,  of  December  3,  1914,  and  to 
my  dispatch.  No.  280,  of  November  23,  1914,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  here- 
with three  copies  of  the  Reichs-Gesetzblatt,  1914,  No.  101,  containing  the  proclamation 
of  the  German  Government  relative  to  the  treatment  of  wood,  cylinder  tar,  sulphur,  and 
sulphuric  acid  as  conditional  contraband. 

I  have,  etc.  James  W.  Gerard. 


[Inclosure — Translation.] 

Reichs-Gesetzblatt.    Year  1914.    No.  loi. 

(No.  4549.)  Addition  to  the  prize  ordinance  of  September  30,  1909  (Reichs-Gesetzblatt,  1914,  p.  275)  of 
November  23,  1914. 

I  hereby  prescribe  in  addition  to  the  ordinance  of  October  18,  1914  (Reichs-Gesetzblatt,  p.  441),  that  in  the 
prize  list  of  September  30,  1909,  under  the  numeral  23,  the  following  two  further  numbers  be  subjoined : 

17.    Woods  of  every  kind,  in  the  rough  or  manufactured  (especially  also  cut,  sawn,  planed,  grooved),  wood- 


tar. 


18.     Sulphur,  raw  or  refined,  sulphuric  acid. 

Berlin,  November  23,   1914.  Delbruck. 

Vice  Imperial  Chancellor, 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  December  15,  191Jf. 
Sir:  With  reference  to  my  telegram  of  even  date,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to 
you  herewith  five  copies  of  a  proclamation  of  the  German  Government,  dated  December 
14,  1914,  declaring  aluminum  and  nickel  to  be  conditional  contraband.    A  translation  of 
the  proclamation  is  likewise  appended. 

I  have,  etc.  James  W.  Gerard. 

[Inclosure  1— Translation.] 
Supplement  to  the  prize  ordinance  of  September  30,   1909-     (Reichsgesetzblatt,   1914,   page   275.) 
In  supplement  to  the  order  of  November  23,  1914  (Reichsgesetzblatt,  page  481),  I  hereby  order  that  the  fol- 
lowing two  numbers  shall  be  added  to  article  23  of  the  prize  ordinance   of   September  30,   1909: 

19.  Aluminum. 

20.  Nickel  . 

Berlin,  December  14,  1914. 

Vice  Imperial  Chancellor.  (Signed)  Delbruck. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  •"•;■.  j;.- ;•.);  ..\    101 

[Inclosure  2 — Translation.] 
NOTE  VERBALE. 

The  foreign  office  has  the  honor  to  inform  the  embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America,  in  supplement  to 
the  notes  verbale  of  August  6,  October  22,  and  November  23,  1914,  Nos.  IIIa9222,  17064,  and  19785  that  during 
the  present  hostilities  the  following  articles  will  be  considered  as  conditional  contraband  by  Germany,  in  addition 
to  those  recited  in  the  notes  verbale  mentioned,  Nos.  i-i8 : 

19.  Aluminum. 

20.  Nickel. 

The  foreign  office  begs  that  the  embassy  would  be  good  enough  to  inform  its  Government  of  the  above  as 
soon  as  possible. 

Berlin,  December  14,  1914. 


Consul  General  Skinner  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Ameeican  Consulate  General, 

London,  December  24,  1914. 
Mr.  Skinner  states  that  radically  amended  contraband  list  is  promulgated  by  procla- 
mation of  December  23,  1914,  as  follows : 

PROCLAMATION. 

December  23,  1914. 
Revising  the  List  of  Articles  to  be  Treated  as  Contraband  of   War. 
George  R.  I. 

Whereas  on  the  4th  day  of  August,  1914,  we  did  issue  our  royal  proclamation  specifying  the  articles  which  it 
was  our  intention  to  treat  as  contraband  of  war  during  the  war  between  us  and  the  German  Emperor ;  and 

Whereas  on  the  12th  day  of  August,  1914,  we  did  by  our  royal  proclamation  of  that  date  extend  our  proclama- 
tion aforementioned  to  the  war  between  us  and  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary;  and 

Whereas  on  the  21st  day  of  September,  1914,  we  did  by  our  royal  proclamation  of  that  date  make  certain  ad- 
ditions to  the  list  of  articles  to  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war ;  and 

Whereas  on  the  29th  day  of  October,  1914,  we  did  by  our  royal  proclamation  of  that  date  withdraw  the  said 
lists  of  contraband  and  substitute  therefor  the  lists  contained  in  the  schedules  to  the  said  proclamation;  and 

Whereas  it  is  expedient  to  make  certain  alterations  in  and  additions  to  the  said  lists : 

Now,  therefore,  we  do  hereby  declare,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  our  Privy  Council,  that  the  lists  of  con- 
traband contained  in  the  schedules  to  our  royal  proclam  tion  of  the  twenty-ninth  day  of  October  aforementioned 
are  hereby  withdrawn,  and  that  in  lieu  thereof  during  the  continuance  of  the  war  or  until  we  do  give  further 
public  notice  the  articles  enumerated  in  Shedule  I  hereto  will  be  treated  as  absolute  contraband,  and  the  articles 
enumerated  in  Schedule  II  hereto  will  be  treated  as  conditional  contraband. 

SCHEDULE   I. 

1.  Arms  of  all  kinds,  including  arms  for  sporting  purposes,   and   their  distinctive  component  parts. 

2.  Projectiles,  charges,  and  cartridges  of  all  kinds  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

3.  Powder   and   explosives   specially   prepared   for  ase  in  war. 

4.  Ingredients  of  explosives,  viz,  nitric  acid,  sulphuric  acid,  glycerine,  acetone,  calcium  acetate  and  all  other 
metallic  acetates,  sulphur,  potassium  nitrate,  the  fractions  of  the  distillation  products  of  coal  tar  between  benzol 
and  cresol,  inclusive,  aniline,  methylaniline,  dimethylaniline,  ammonium  perchlorate,  sodium  perchlorate,  sodium 
chlorate,  barium  chlorate,  ammonium  nitrate,  cyanamide,  potassium  chlorate,  calcium  nitrate,  mercury. 

5.  Resinous  products,  camphor,  and  turpentine   (oil  and  spirit). 

6.  Gun  mountings,  limber  boxes,  limbers,  military  wagons,  field  forges,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

7.  Range-finders  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

8.  Clothing   and   equipment   of   a   distinctively   military  character. 

9.  Saddle,   draught,   and   pack   animals   suitable    for  use  in  war. 

10.  All  kinds  of  harness  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

11.  Articles  of  camp  equipment  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

12.  Armour  plates. 

13.  Ferro  alloys,  including  ferro-tungsten,  ferro-molyMenum,  ferro-manganese,  ferro-vanadium,  ferro-chrome. 

14.  The  following  metals :  Tungsten,  molybdenum,  vanadium,  nickel,  selenium,  cobalt,  haematite  pig-iron, 
manganese. 

15.  The  following  ores :  Wolframite,  scheelite,  molybdenite,  manganese  ore,  nickel  ore,  chrome  ore,  haematite 
iron  ore,  zinc  ore,  lead  ore,  bauxite. 

16.  Aluminum,  alumina,  and  salts  of  aluminium. 

17.  Antimony,  together  with   the  sulphides  and  oxides  of  antimony. 

18.  Copper,   unwrought   and   part   wrought,   and   copper  wire. 

19.  Lead,  pig,  sheet,  or  pipe. 

20.  Barbed  wire,  and  implements  for  fixing  and  cutting  the  same. 

21.  Warships,  including  boats  and  their  distinctive  component  parts  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  only  be 
used  on  a  vessel  of  war. 

22.  Submarine  sound  signaling  apparatus. 

23.  Aeroplanes,  airships,  balloons,  and  aircraft  of  all  kinds,  and  their  component  parts,  together  with  acces- 
sories and  articles  recognizable  as  intended  for  use  in  connection  with  balloons  and  aircraft. 


102  •,-r^:i."'i'!!  AIvIERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

24.  Motor  vehicles  of  all  kinds  and  their  component  parts. 

25.  Tires  for  motor  vehicles  and  for  cycles,  together  vifith  articles  or  materials  especially  adapted  for  use 
in  the  manufacture  or  repair  of  tires. 

26.  Rubber   (including  raw,  waste,  and  reclaimed  rubber)   and  goods  made  wholly  of  rubber. 

27.  Iron  pyrites. 

28.  Mineral  oils  and  motor  spirit,  except  lubricating  oils. 

29.  Implements  and  apparatus   designed  exclusively  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war,  for  the  manu- 
facture or  repair  of  arms,  or  war  material  for  use  on  land  and  sea. 

scHEDin.e  II. 

1.  Foodstuffs. 

2.  Forage  and  feeding  stuffs  for  animals. 

3.  Clothing,  fabrics  for  clothing,  and  boots  and  shoes  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

4.  Gold  and  silver  in  coin  or  bullion ;  paper  money. 

5.  Vehicles  of  all  kinds,  other  than  motor  vehicles,  available  for  use  in  war,  and  their  component  parts. 

6.  Vessels,  craft,  and  boats  of  all  kinds ;  floating  docks,  parts  of  docks,  and  their  component  parts. 

7.  Railway  materials,  both  fixed  and  rolling  stock,  and   materials   for  telegraphs,   wireless  telegraphs,  and 
telephones. 

8.  Fuel,  other  than  mineral  oils.    Lubricants. 

9.  Powder  and  explosives  not  specially  prepared  for  use  in  war. 

10.  Horseshoes  and  shoeing  materials. 

11.  Harness  and  saddlery. 

12.  Hides  of  all  kinds,  dry  or  wet ;  pigskins,  raw  or   dressed ;    leather,   undressed   or   dressed,   suitable   for 
saddlery,  harness,  or  military  boots. 

13.  Field  glasses,  telescopes,  chronometers,  and  all  kinds  of  nautical  instruments. 

Given  at   our  court   at   Buckingham   Palace,  this  Twenty-third  day  of  December,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  fourteen,  etc.,  etc. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  E.  Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  December  26, 1914- 

The  present  condition  of  American  foreign  trade  resulting  from  the  frequent  seiz- 
ures and  detentions  of  American  cargoes  destined  to  neutral  European  ports  has  be- 
come so  serious  as  to  require  a  candid  statement  of  the  views  of  this  Government  in 
order  that  the  British  Government  may  be  fully  informed  as  to  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  toward  the  policy  which  has  been  pursued  by  the  British  authorities  dur- 
ing the  present  war. 

You  will,  therefore,  communicate  the  following  to  His  Majesty's  principal  secretary 
of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  but  in  doing  so  you  will  assure  him  that  it  is  donfe  in  the 
most  friendly  spirit  and  in  the  belief  that  frankness  will  better  serve  the  continuance  of 
cordial  relations  between  the  two  countries  than  silence,  which  may  be  misconstrued 
into  acquiescence  in  a  course  of  conduct  which  this  Government  can  not  but  consider 
to  be  an  infringement  upon  the  rights  of  American  citizens. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  viewed  with  growing  concern  the  large 
number  of  vessels  laden  with  American  goods  destined  to  neutral  ports  in  Europe, 
which  have  been  seized  on  the  high  seas,  taken  into  British  ports  and  detained  some- 
times for  weeks  by  the  British  authorities.  During  the  early  days  of  the  war  this  Gov- 
ernment assumed  that  the  policy  adopted  by  the  British  Government  was  due  to  the  un- 
expected outbreak  of  hostilities  and  the  necessity  of  immediate  action  to  prevent  contra- 
band from  reaching  the  enemy.  For  this  reason  it  was  not  disposed  to  judge  this  policy 
harshly  or  protest  it  vigorously,  although  it  was  manifestly  very  injurious  to  American 
trade  with  the  neutral  countries  of  Europe.  This  Government,  relying  confidently  upon 
the  high  regard  which  Great  Britain  has  so  often  exhibited  in  the  past  for  the  rights  of 
other  nations,  confidently  awaited  amendment  of  a  course  of  action  which  denied  to 
neutral  commerce  the  freedom  to  which  it  was  entitled  by  the  law  of  nations. 

This  expectation  seemed  to  be  rendered  the  more  assured  by  the  statement  of  the 
foreign  office  early  in  November  that  the  British  Government  were  satisfied  with  guaran- 
tees offered  by  the  Norwegian,  Swedish,  and  Danish  Governments  as  to  nonexportation 
of  contraband  goods  when  consigned  to  named  persons  in  the  territories  of  those  Govern- 
ments, and  that  orders  had  been  given  to  the  British  fleet  and  customs  authorities  to 
restrict  interference  with  neutral  vessels  carrying  such  cargoes  so  consigned  to  verifica- 
tion of  ship's  papers  and  cargoes. 

It  is  therefore  a  matter  of  deep  regret  that,  though  nearly  five  months  have  passed 
since  the  war  began,  the  British  Government  have  not  materially  changed  their  policy 
and  do  not  treat  less  rigorously  ships  and  cai'goes  passing  between  neutral  ports  in  the 
peaceful  pursuit  of  lawful  commerce,  which  belligerents  should  protect  rather  than  in- 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  103 

terrupt.  The  greater  freedom  from  detention  and  seizure  which  was  confidently 
expected  to  result  from  consigning  shipments  to  definite  consignees,  rather  than  "to 
order,"  is  still  awaited. 

It  is  needless  to  point  out  to  His  Majesty's  Government,  usually  the  champion  of  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  and  the  rights  of  trade,  that  peace,  not  war,  is  the  normal  relation 
between  nations  and  that  the  commerce  between  countries  which  are  not  belligerents 
should  not  be  interfered  with  by  those  at  war  unless  such  interference  is  manifestly  an 
imperative  necessity  to  protect  their  national  safety,  and  then  only  to  the  extent  that  it 
is  a  necessity.  It  is  with  no  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  momentous  nature  of  the  pres- 
ent struggle  in  which  Great  Britain  is  engaged  and  with  no  selfish  desire  to  gain  undue 
commercial  advantage  that  this  Government  is  reluctantly  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  present  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Government  toward  neutral  ships  and  cargoes  ex- 
ceeds the  manifest  necessity  of  a  belligerent  and  constitutes  restrictions  upon  the  rights 
of  American  citizens  on  the  high  seas  which  are  not  justified  by  the  rules  of  international 
law  or  required  under  the  principle  of  self-preservation. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  does  not  intend  at  this  time  to  discuss  the 
propriety  of  including  certain  articles  in  the  lists  of  absolute  and  conditional  contraband, 
which  have  been  proclaimed  by  His  Majesty.  Open  to  objection  as  some  of  these  seem  to 
this  Government,  the  chief  ground  of  present  complaint  is  the  treatment  of  cargoes  of 
both  classes  of  articles  when  bound  to  neutral  ports. 

Articles  listed  as  absolute  contraband,  shipped  from  the  United  States  and  consigned 
to  neutral  countries,  have  been  seized  and  detained  on  the  ground  that  the  countries  to 
which  they  were  destined  have  not  prohibited  the  exportation  of  such  articles.  Unwar- 
ranted as  such  detentions  are,  in  the  opinion  of  this  Government,  American  exporters 
are  further  perplexed  by  the  apparent  indecision  of  the  British  authorities  in  applying 
their  own  rules  to  neutral  cargoes.  For  example,  a  shipment  of  copper  from  this  coun- 
try to  a  specified  consignee  in  Sweden  was  detained  because,  as  was  stated  by  Great 
Britain,  Sweden  had  placed  no  embargo  on  copper.  On  the  other  hand,  Italy  not  only 
prohibited  the  export  of  copper,  but,  as  this  Government  is  informed,  put  in  force  a  de- 
cree that  shipments  to  Italian  consignees  or  "to  order,"  which  arrive  in  ports  of  Italy  can 
not  be  exported  or  transshipped.  The  only  exception  Italy  makes  is-  of  copper  which 
passes  through  that  country  in  transit  to  another  country.  In  spite  of  these  decrees, 
however,  the  British  Foreign  Office  has  thus  far  declined  to  affirm  that  copper  shipments 
consigned  to  Italy  will  not  be  molested  on  the  high  seas.  Seizures  are  so  numerous  and 
delays  so  prolonged  that  exporters  are  afraid  to  send  their  copper  to  Italy,  steamship 
lines  decline  to  accept  it,  and  insurers  refuse  to  issue  policies  upon  it.  In  a  word,  a  legiti- 
mate trade  is  being  greatly  impaired  through  uncertainty  as  to  the  treatment  which  it 
may  expect  at  the  hands  of  the  British  authorities. 

We  feel  that  we  are  abundantly  justified  in  asking  for  information  as  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  British  Government  propose  to  carry  out  the  policy  which  they  have  adopt- 
ed, in  order  that  we  may  determine  the  steps  necessary  to  protect  our  citizens,  engaged 
in  foreign  trade,  in  their  rights  and  from  the  serious  losses  to  which  they  are  liable 
through  ignorance  of  the  hazards  to  which  their  cargoes  are  exposed. 

In  the  case  of  conditional  contraband  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  appears  to  this 
Government  to  be  equally  unjustified  by  the  established  rules  of  international  conduct. 
As  evidence  of  this,  attention  is  directed  to  the  fact  that  a  number  of  the  American  car- 
goes which  have  been  seized  consist  of  foodstuffs  and  other  articles  of  common  use  in 
all  countries  which  are  admittedly  relative  contraband.  In  spite  of  the  presumption  of 
innocent  use  because  destined  to  neutral  territory,  the  British  authorities  made  these 
seizures  and  detentions  without,  so  far  as  we  are  informed,  being  in  possession  of  facts 
which  warranted  a  reasonable  belief  that  the  shipments  had  in  reality  a  belligerent  desti- 
nation, as  that  term  is  used  in  international  law.  Mere  suspicion  is  not  evidence  and 
doubts  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  neutral  commerce,  not  against  it.  The  effect  upon 
trade  in  these  articles  between  neutral  nations  resulting  from  interrupted  voyages  and 
detained  cargoes  is  not  entirely  cured  by  reimbursement  of  the  owners  for  the  damages 
which  they  have  suffered,  after  investigation  has  failed  to  establish  an  enemy  destination. 
The  injury  is  to  American  commerce  with  neutral  countries  as  a  whole  through  the  haz- 
ard of  the  enterprise  and  the  repeated  diversion  of  goods  from  established  markets. 

It  also  appears  that  cargoes  of  this  character  have  been  seized  by  the  British  authori- 
ties because  of  a  belief  that,  though  not  originally  so  intended  by  the  shippers,  they  will 
ultimately  reach  the  territory  of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain.  Yet  this  belief  is  fre- 
quently reduced  to  a  mere  fear  in  view  of  the  embargoes  which  have  been  decreed  by 
the  neutral  countries,  to  which  they  are  destined,  on  the  articles  composing  the  cargoes. 

That  a  consignment  "to  order"  of  articles  listed  as  conditional  contraband  and 
shipped  to  a  neutral  port  raises  a  legal  presumption  of  enemy  destination  appears  to  be 


104  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

directly  contrary  to  the  doctrines  previously  held  by  Great  Britain  and  thus  stated  by 
Lord  Salisbury  during  the  South  African  War: 

Foodstuffs,  though  having  a  hostile  destination,  can  be  considered  as  contraband  of  war  only  if  they  are  for 
the  enemy's  forces;  it  is  not  sufficient  that  they  are  capable  of  being  so  used,  it  must  be  shown  that  this  was  in 
fact  their  destination  at  the  time  of  their  seizure. 

With  this  statement  as  to  conditional  contraband  the  views  of  this  Government  are 
in  entire  accord,  and  upon  this  historic  doctrine,  consistently  maintained  by  Great  Brit- 
ain when  a  belligerent  as  well  as  a  neutral,  American  shippers  were  entitled  to  i-ely. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  readily  admits  the  full  right  of  a  belligerent 
to  visit  and  search  on  the  high  seas  the  vessels  of  American  citizens  or  other  neutral 
vessels  carrying  American  goods  and  to  detain  them  when  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to 
justify  a  belief  that  contraband  articles  are  in  their  cargoes;  but  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, judging  by  their  own  experience  in  the  past,  must  realize  that  this  Government  can 
not  without  protest  permit  American  ships  or  American  cargoes  to  be  taken  into  British 
ports  and  there  detained  for  the  purpose  of  searching  generally  for  evidence  of  contra- 
band, or  upon  presumptions  created  by  special  municipal  enactments  which  are  clearly 
at  variance  with  international  law  and  practice. 

This  Government  believes,  and  earnestly  hopes  His  Majesty's  Government  will  come 
to  the  same  belief,  that  a  course  of  conduct  more  in  conformity  with  the  rules  of  inter- 
national usage,  which  Great  Britain  has  strongly  sanctioned  for  many  years,  will  in  the 
end  better  serve  the  interests  of  belligerents  as  well  as  those  of  neutrals. 

Not  only  is  the  situation  a  critical  one  to  the  commerical  interests  of  the  United 
States,  but  many  of  the  great  industries  of  this  country  are  suffering  because  their  products 
are  denied  long-established  markets  in  European  countries,  which,  though  neutral,  are 
contiguous  to  the  nations  at  war.  Producers  and  exporters,  steamship  and  insurance 
companies  are  pressing,  and  not  without  reason,  for  relief  from  the  menace  to  trans- 
Atlantic  trade  which  is  gradually  but  surely  destroying  their  business  and  threatening 
them  with  financial  disaster. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  still  relying  upon  the  deep  sense  of  justice  of 
the  British  Nation,  which  has  been  so  often  manifested  in  the  intercourse  between  the  two 
countries  during  so  many  years  of  uninterrupted  friendship,  expresses  confidently  the 
hope  that  His  Majesty's  Government  will  realize  the  obstacles  and  difficulties  which  their 
present  policy  has  placed  in  the  way  of  commerce  between  the  United  States  and  the  neu- 
tral countries  of  Europe,  and  will  instruct  its  oflEicials  to  refrain  from  all  unnecessary 
interference  with  the  freedom  of  trade  between  nations  which  are  sufferers,  though  not 
participants,  in  the  present  conflict ;  and  will  in  their  treatment  of  neutral  ships  and  car- 
goes conform  more  closely  to  those  rules  governing  the  maritime  relations  between  bel- 
ligerents and  neutrals,  which  have  received  the  sanction  of  the  civilized  world,  and  which 
Great  Britain  has,  in  other  wars,  so  strongly  and  successfully  advocated. 

In  conclusion,  it  should  be  impressed  upon  His  Majesty's  Government  that  the 
present  condition  of  American  trade  with  the  neutral  European  countries  is  such  that, 
if  it  does  not  improve,  it  may  arouse  a  feeling  contrary  to  that  which  has  so  long  existed 
between  the  American  and  British  peoples.  Already  it  is  becoming  more  and  more  the 
subject  of  public  criticism  and  complaint.  There  is  an  increasing  belief,  doubtless  not 
entirely  unjustified,  that  the  present  British  policy  toward  American  trade  is  responsible 
for  the  depression  in  certain  industries  which  depend  upon  European  markets.  The  at- 
tention of  the  British  Government  is  called  to  this  possible  result  of  their  present  policy 
to  show  how  widespread  the  effect  is  upon  the  industrial  life  of  the  United  States  and  to 
emphasize  the  importance  of  removing  the  cause  of  complaint. 

Beyan. 


The  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

Foreign  Office,  January  7,  1915. 

YoTJB  Excellency:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  note  of  the 
28th  of  December. 

It  is  being  carefully  examined  and  the  points  raised  in  it  are  receiving  consideration, 
as  the  result  of  which  a  reply  shall  be  addressed  to  Your  Excellency,  dealing  in  detail  with 
the  issues  raised  and  the  points  to  which  the  United  States  Government  have  drawn  at- 
tention. This  consideration  and  the  preparation  of  the  reply  will  necessarily  require  some 
time,  and  I  therefore  desire  to  send  without  further  delay  some  preliminary  observations 
which  will,  I  trust,  help  to  clear  the  ground  and  remove  some  misconceptions  that  seem  to 
exist. 

Let  me  say  at  once  that  we  entirely  recognize  the  most  friendly  spirit  referred  to  by 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  105 

Your  Excellency,  and  that  we  desire  to  reply  in  the  same  spirit  and  in  the  belief  that,  as 
Your  Excellency  states,  frankness  will  best  serve  the  continuance  of  cordial  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

His  Maesty's  Government  cordially  concur  in  the  principle  enunciated  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  that  a  belligerent,  in  dealing  with  trade  between  neutrals, 
should  not  interfere  unless  such  interference  is  necessary  to  protect  the  belligerent's  na- 
tional safety,  and  then  only  to  the  extent  to  which  this  is  necessary.  We  shall  endeavor 
to  keep  our  action  within  the  limits  of  this  principle  on  the  understanding  that  it  admits 
our  right  to  interfere  when  such  interference  is  not  with  "bona  fide"  trade  between  the 
United  States  and  another  neutral  country  but  with  trade  in  contraband  destined  for 
the  enemy's  country,  and  we  are  ready,  whenever  our  action  may  unintentionally  exceed 
this  principle,  to  make  redress. 

We  think  that  much  misconception  exists  as  to  the  extent  to  which  we  have,  in 
practice,  interfered  with  trade.  Your  Excellency's  note  seems  to  hold  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment responsible  for  the  present  condition  of  trade  with  neutral  countries,  and  it  is 
stated  that,  through  the  action  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  the  products  of  the  great 
industries  of  the  United  States  have  been  denied  long  established  markets  in  European 
countries  which,  though  neutral,  are  contiguous  to  the  seat  of  war.  Such  a  result  is  far 
from  being  the  intention  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  and  they  would  exceedingly  re- 
gret that  it  should  be  due  to  their  action.  I  have  been  unable  to  obtain  complete  or  con- 
clusive figures  showing  what  the  state  of  trade  with  these  neutral  countries  has  been 
recently,  and  I  can  therefore  only  ask  that  some  further  consideration  should  be  given 
to  the  question  whether  United  States  trade  with  these  neutral  countries  has  been  so 
seriously  affected.  The  only  figures  as  to  the  total  volume  of  trade  that  I  have  seen  are 
those  for  the  exports  from  New  York,  for  the  month  of  November,  1914,  and  they  are  as 
follows,  compared  with  the  month  of  November,  1913 : 

Exports  from  New    York  for  November,    1^13   [and]   November,  1914,  respectively. 

Denmark    $558,000    $7,101,000 

Sweden    377,ooo      2,858,000 

Norway    477,ooo      2,318,000 

Italy 2,971,000      4,781,000 

Holland    4,389,000      3,960,000 

It  is  true  that  there  may  have  been  a  falling  off  in  cotton  exports,  as  to  which  New 
York  figures  would  be  no  guide,  but  His  Majesty's  Government  have  been  most  careful  not 
to  interfere  with  cotton,  and  its  place  on  the  free  list  has  been  scrupulously  maintained. 

We  do  not  wish  to  lay  too  much  stress  upon  incomplete  statistics;  the  figures  above 
are  not  put  forward  as  conclusive;  and  we  are  prepared  to  examine  any  further  evidence 
with  regard  to  the  state  of  trade  with  these  ncnitral  countries  which  may  point  to  a  dif- 
ferent conclusion,  or  show  that  it  is  the  actioii  of  His  Majesty's  Government  in  particular, 
and  not  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  and  consequent  diminution  of  purchasing  power 
and  shrinkage  of  trade,  which  is  responsible  for  adverse  effects  upon  trade  with  the  neu- 
tal  countries. 

That  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  on  such  a  scale  has  had  a  very  adverse  effect  up- 
on certain  great  industries,  such  as  cotton,  is  obvious ;  but  it  is  submitted  that  this  is  due 
■to  the  general  cause  of  diminished  purchasing  power  of  such  countries  as  France,  Ger- 
many, and  the  United  Kingdom,  rather  than  to  interference  with  trade  with  neutral 
countries.  In  the  matter  of  cotton,  it  may  be  recalled  that  the  British  Government  gave 
special  assistance  through  the  Liverpool  Cotton  Exchange  to  the  renewal  of  transactions 
in  the  cotton  trade  of  not  only  the  United  Kingdom  but  of  many  neutral  countries. 

Your  Excellency's  note  refers  in  particular  to  the  detention  of  copper.  The  figures 
,  taken  from  ofiicial  returns  for  the  export  of  copper  from  the  United  States  for  Italy  for 
the  months  during  which  the  war  has  been  in  progress  up  to  the  end  of  the  first  three 
weeks  of  December  are  as  follows : 

Nineteen  thirteen :  Fifteen  million  two  hundred  two  thousand  pounds.  Nineteen  four- 
teen :  Thirty-six  million  two  hundred  eight-five  thousand  pounds.  Norway,  Sweden,  Den- 
mark, and  Switzerland  are  not  shown  separately  for  the  whole  period  in  the  United  States 
returns  but  are  included  in  the  heading  "Other  Europe"  (that  is,  Europe  other  than  the 
United  Kingdom,  Russia,  France,  Belgium,  Austria,  Germany,  Holland,  and  Italy).  The 
corresponding  figures  under  this  heading  are  as  follows ; 

Nineteen  thirteen:  Seven  million  two  hundred  seventy-one  thousand  pounds.  Nine- 
teen fourteen :  Thirty-five  million  three  hundred  forty-seven  thousand  pounds. 

With  such  figures  the  presumption  is  very  strong  that  the  bulk  of  copper  consigned 
to  these  countries  has  recently  been  intended,  not  for  their  own  use,  but  for  that  of  a  bel- 
ligerent who  can  not  import  it  direct.  It  is  therefore  an  imperative  necessity  for  the 
safety  of  this  country  while  it  is  at  war  that  His  Majesty's  Government  should  do  all  in 


106  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

their  power  to  stop  such  part  of  this  import  of  copper  as  is  not  genuinely  destined  for 
neutral  countries. 

Your  Excellency  does  not  quote  any  particular  shipment  of  copper  to  Sweden,  which 
has  been  detained.  There  are,  however,  four  consignments  to  Sweden  at  the  present  time 
of  copper  and  aluminium  which,  though  definitely  consigned  to  Sweden,  are,  according  to 
positive  evidence  in  the  possession  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  definitely  destined  for 
Germany. 

I  can  not  believe  that,  with  such  figures  before  them  and  in  such  cases  as  those  just 
mentioned,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  question  the  propriety  of  the 
action  of  His  Majesty's  Government  in  taking  suspected  cargoes  to  a  prize  court,  and  we 
are  convinced  that  it  can  not  be  in  accord  with  the  wish  either  of  the  Government  or  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  strain  the  international  code  in  favor  of  private  in- 
terests so  as  to  prevent  Great  Britain  from  taking  such  legitimate  means  for  this  purpose 
as  are  in  her  power. 

With  regard  to  the  seizure  of  foodstuffs  to  which  Your  Excellency  refers.  His  Ma- 
jesty's Government  are  prepared  to  admit  that  foodstuffs  should  not  be  detained  and  put 
into  a  prize  court  without  presumption  that  they  are  intended  for  the  armed  forces  of  the 
enemy  or  the  enemy  government.  We  believe  that  this  rule  has  been  adhered  to  in  prac- 
tice, hitherto,  but  if  the  United  States  Government  have  instances  to  the  contrary,  we  are 
prepared  to  examine  them,  and  it  is  our  present  intention  to  adhere  to  the  rule,  though  we 
can  not  give  an  unlimited  and  unconditional  undertaking  in  view  of  the  departure  by  those 
against  whom  we  are  fighting  from  hitherto  accepted  rules  of  civilization  and  humanity 
and  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  extent  to  which  such  rules  may  be  violated  by  them  in 
future. 

From  the  4th  of  August  last  to  the  3d  of  January  the  number  of  steamships  proceed- 
ing from  the  United  States  for  Holland,  Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Italy  has  been 
seven  hundred  and  seventy-three.  Of  these  there  are  forty-five  which  have  had  consign- 
ments or  cargoes  placed  in  the  prize  court  while  of  the  ships  themselves  only  eight  have 
been  placed  in  the  prize  court  and  one  of  these  has  since  been  released.  It  is,  however, 
essential  under  modern  conditions  that  where  there  is  real  ground  for  suspecting  the  pres- 
ence of  contraband,  the  vessels  should  be  brought  into  port  for  examination :  in  no  other 
way  can  the  right  of  search  be  exercised,  and  but  for  this  practice  it  would  have  to  be 
completely  abandoned.  Information  was  received  by  us  that  special  instructions  had  been 
given  to  ship  rubber  from  the  United  States  under  another  designation  to  escape  notice, 
and  such  cases  have  occurred  in  several  instances.  Only  by  search  in  a  port  can  such  cases, 
when  suspected,  be  discovered  and  proved.  The  necessity  for  examination  in  a  port  may 
also  be  illustrated  by  a  hypothetical  instance,  connected  with  cotton,  which  has  not  yet 
occurred.  Cotton  is  not  specifically  mentioned  in  Your  Excellency's  note,  but  I  have  seen 
public  statements  made  in  the  United  States  that  the  attitude  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment with  regard  to  cotton  has  been  ambiguous,  and  thereby  responsible  for  depression 
in  the  cotton  trade.  There  has  never  been  any  foundation  for  this  allegation.  His  Ma- 
jesty's Government  have  never  put  cotton  on  the  list  of  contraband ;  they  have  through- 
out the  war  kept  it  on  the  free  list ;  and,  on  every  occasion  when  questioned  on  the  point, 
they  have  stated  their  intention  of  adhering  to  this  practice.  But  information  has 
reached  us  that  precisely  because  we  have  declared  our  intention  of  not  interfering  with 
cotton,  ships  carrying  cotton  will  be  specially  selected  to  carry  concealed  contraband; 
and  we  have  been  warned  that  copper  will  be  concealed  in  bales  of  cotton.  Whatever  sus- 
picions we  have  entertained,  we  have  not  so  far  made  these  a  ground  for  detaining  any 
ship  carrying  cotton,  but,  should  we  have  information  giving  us  real  reason  to  believe  in 
the  case  of  a  particular  ship  that  the  bales  of  cotton  concealed  copper  or  other  contra- 
band, the  only  way  to  prove  our  case  would  be  to  examine  and  weigh  the  bales ;  a  process 
that  could  be  carried  out  only  by  bringing  the  vessel  into  a  port.  In  such  a  case,  or  if 
examination  justified  the  action  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  the  case  shall  be  brought 
before  a  prize  court  and  dealt  with  in  the  ordinary  way. 

That  the  decisions  of  British  prize  courts  hitherto  have  not  been  unfavorable  to  neu- 
trals is  evidenced  by  the  decision  in  the  Miramichi  case.  This  case,  which  was  decided 
against  the  Crown,  laid  down  that  the  American  shipper  was  to  be  paid  even  when  he  had 
sold  a  cargo  c.  i.  f.  and  when  the  risk  of  loss  after  the  cargo  had  been  shipped  did  not 
apply  to  him  at  all. 

It  has  further  been  represented  to  His  Majesty's  Government,  though  this  subject  is 
not  dealt  with  in  Your  Excellency's  note,  that  our  embargoes  on  the  export  of  some 
articles,  more  especially  rubber,  have  interfered  with  commerical  interests  in  the  United 
States.  It  is,  of  course,  difficult  for  His  Majesty's  Government  to  permit  the  export  of 
rubber  from  British  Dominions  to  the  United  States  at  a  time  when  rubber  is  essential 
to  belligerent  countries  for  carrying  on  the  war,  and  when  a  new  trade  in  exporting 
rubber  from  the  United  States  in  suspiciously  large  quantities  to  neutral  countries  has 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  107 

actually  sprung  up  since  the  war.  It  would  be  impossible  to  permit  the  export  of  rubber 
from  Great  Britain  unless  the  right  of  His  Majesty's  Government  were  admitted  to  sub- 
mit to  a  prize  court  cargoes  of  rubber  exported  from  the  United  States  which  they  believe 
to  be  destined  for  an  enemy  country,  and  reasonable  latitude  of  action  for  this  purpose 
were  conceded.  But  His  Majesty's  Government  have  now  provisionally  come  to  an  ar- 
rangement with  the  rubber  exporters  in  Great  Britain  which  will  permit  of  licenses  being 
given  under  proper  guaranties  for  the  export  of  rubber  to  the  United  States. 

We  are  confronted  with  the  growing  danger  that  neutral  countries  contiguous  to  the 
enemy  will  become  on  a  scale  hitherto  unprecedented  a  base  of  supplies  for  the  armed 
forces  of  our  enemies  and  for  materials  for  manufacturing  armament.  The  trade  figures 
of  imports  show  how  strong  this  tendency  is,  but  we  have  no  complaint  to  make  of  the 
attitude  of  the  Governments  of  those  countries,  which  so  far  as  we  are  aware  have  not 
departed  from  proper  rules  of  neutrality.  We  endeavor  in  the  interest  of  our  own  national 
safety  to  prevent  this  danger  by  intercepting  goods  really  destined  for  the  enemy  without 
interfering  with  those  which  are  "bona  fide"  neutral. 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  Government  of  the  United  States  have  changed 
their  previous  practice  and  have  prohibited  the  publication  of  manifests  till  30  days  after 
the  departure  of  vessels  from  the  United  States  ports.  We  have  no  "locus  standi"  for 
complaining  of  this  change,  and  did  not  complain.  But  the  effect  of  it  must  be  to  in- 
crease the  diflSculty  of  ascertaining  the  presence  of  contraband  and  to  render  necessary 
in  the  interests  of  our  national  safety  the  examination  and  detention  of  more  ships  than 
would  have  been  the  case  if  the  former  practice  had  continued. 

Pending  a  more  detailed  reply,  I  would  conclude  by  saying  that.  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment do  not  desire  to  contest  the  general  principles  of  law,  on  which  they  understand 
the  note  of  the  United  States  to  be  based,  and  desire  to  restrict  their  action  solely  to 
interferences  with  contraband  destined  for  the  enemy.  His  Majesty's  Government  are 
prepared,  whenever  a  cargo  coming  from  the  United  States  is  detained,  to  explain  the 
case  on  which  such  detention  has  taken  place  and  would  gladly  enter  into  any  arrange- 
ment by  which  mistakes  can  be  avoided  and  reparation  secured  promptly  when  any  injury 
to  the  neutral  owners  of  a  ship  or  cargo  has  been  improperly  caused,  for  they  are  most 
desirous  in  the  interest  both  of  the  United  States  and  of  other  neutral  countries  that  Brit- 
ish action  should  not  interfere  with  the  normal  importation  and  use  by  the  neutral  coun- 
tries of  goods  from  the  United  States. 

I  have,  etc.,  E.  Geey. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State.      , 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  January  22, 1915. 
British  Government  now  informs  me  that  the  heading  "Copper  unwrought"  was  in- 
tended to  include  all  copper  in  such  form  as  to  render  it  usable  for  manufacturing  pur- 
poses. This  description  being  vague,  the  former  heading  will  be  changed  in  new  lists  to 
read  "Copper,  unwrought  and  part  wrought  and  copper  wire."  This  is  intended  to  in- 
clude copper  sheets,  circles,  slabs,  bars,  pipes,  ingots,  scrap,  rods,  plates,  solid  drawn, 
tubes,  etc.,  and  all  grades  of  copper  wire.  The  word  copper  is  deemed  to  include  alloys 
in  which  copper  is  the  main  ingredient. 

Page. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  February  6,  1915. 
Sib  :  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  two  copies  of  the  proclamation  of 
the  German  Admiralty  of  February  4,  1915,  declaring  the  waters  surrounding  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  to  be  comprised  Avithin  the  seat  of  war,  as  well  as  two  copies  each  in 
German  and  French  of  the  memorial  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  this  subject  and  an 
English  translation  of  the  same. 

I  have,  etc.,  James  W.  Gerard. 


[Inclosure  1 — ^Translation.] 
PROCLAMATION. 

1.  The  waters  surrounding  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  including  the  whole  English 
channel  are  hereby  declared  to  be  war  zone.  On  and  after  the  18th  of  February,  1915, 


108  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

every  enemy  merchant  ship  found  in  the  said  war  zone  will  be  destroyed  without  its  be- 
ing always  possible  to  avert  the  dangers  threatening  the  crews  and  passengers  on  that 
account. 

2.  Even  neutral  ships  are  exposed  to  danger  in  the  war  zone  as  in  view  of  the  mis- 
use of  neutral  flags  ordered  on  January  31  by  the  British  Government  and  of  the  acci- 
dents of  naval  war,  it  can  not  always  be  avoided  to  strike  even  neutral  ships  in  attacks 
that  are  directed  at  enemy  ships. 

3.  Northward  navigation  around  the  Shetland  Islands,  in  the  eastern  waters  of  the 
North  Sea  and  in  a  strip  of  not  less  than  30  miles  width  along  the  Netherlands  coast  is 
in  no  danger. 

VON   POHL, 

Chief  of  the  Admiral  Staff  of  the  Navy, 
Berlin^  February  4,  1915. 


[Indosure  2 — -Translation.] 

MEMORIAL  OF  THE  IMPERIAL  GERMAN  GOVERNMENT  RESPECTING  RETALIATORY  MEASURES  RENDERED  NECESSARY  BY  THE 
MEANS  EMPLOYED  BY  ENGLAND  CONTRARY  TO  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  INTERCEPTING  NEUTRAL  MARITIME  TRADE  WITH 
GERMANY. 

Since  the  commencement  of  the  present  war  Great  Britain's  conduct  of  commercial 
warfare  against  Germany  has  been  a  mockery  of  all  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations. 
While  the  British  Government  have  by  several  orders  declared  that  their  naval  forces 
should  be  guided  by  the  stipulations  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  they  have  in  reality 
repudiated  this  Declaration  in  the  most  essential  points,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
their  own  delegates  at  the  Maritime  Conference  of  London  acknowledged  its  acts  as 
forming  part  of  existing  international  law.  The  British  Government  have  placed  a  num- 
ber of  articles  on  the  contraband  list  which  are  not  at  all,  or  only  very  indirectly  capa- 
ble of  use  in  warfare,  and  consequently  can  not  be  treated  as  contraband  either  under 
the  Declaration  of  London  or  under  the  generally  acknowledged  rules  of  international 
law.  In  addition,  they  have  in  fact  obliterated  the  distinction  between  absolute  and  con- 
ditional contraband  by  confiscating  all  articles  of  conditional  contraband  destined  for  Ger- 
many, whatever  may  be  the  port  where  these  articles  are  to  be  unloaded,  and  without  re- 
gard to  whether  they  are  destined  for  uses  of  war  or  peace.  They  have  not  even  hesi- 
tated to  violate  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  since  their  naval  forces  have  captured  on 
neuti-al  ships  German  property  which  was  not  contraband  of  war.  Furthermore,  they 
have  gone  further  than  their  own  orders  respecting  the  Declaration  of  London  and  caused 
numerous  German  subjects  capable  of  bearing  arms  to  be  taken  from  neutral  ships  and 
made  prisoners  of  war.  Finally,  they  have  declared  the  North  Sea  in  its  whole  extent 
to  be  the  seat  of  war,  thereby  rendering  difficult  and  extremely  dangerous,  if  not  impos- 
sible, all  navigation  on  the  high  seas  between  Scotland  and  Norway,  so  that  they  have 
in  a  way  established  a  blockade  of  neutral  coasts  and  ports,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
elementary  principles  of  generally  accepted  international  law.  Clearly  all  these  measures 
are  part  of  a  plan  to  strike  not  only  the  German  military  operations,  but  also  the  eco- 
nomic system  of  Germany,  and  in  the  end  to  deliver  the  whole  German  people  to  reduc- 
tion by  famine,  by  intercepting  legitimate  neutral  commerce  by  methods  contrary  to 
international  law. 

The  neutral  powers  have  in  the  main  acquiesced  in  the  measures  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment ;  in  particular  they  have  not  been  successful  in  securing  the  release  by  the  Brit- 
ish Government  of  the  German  subjects  and  German  merchandise  illegally  taken  from 
their  vessels.  To  a  certain  extent  they  have  even  contributed  toward  the  execution  of  the 
measures  adopted  by  England  in  defiance  of  the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  by 
prohibiting  the  export  and  transit  of  goods  destined  for  peaceable  purposes  in  Germany, 
thus  evidently  yielding  to  pressure  by  England.  The  German  Government  have  in  vain 
called  the  attention  of  the  neutral  powers  to  the  fact  that  Germany  must  seriously  ques- 
tion whether  it  can  any  longer  adhere  to  the  stipulations  of  the  Declaration  of  London, 
hitherto  strictly  observed  by  it,  in  case  England  continues  to  adhere  to  its  practice,  and 
the  neutral  powers  persist  in  looking  with  indulgence  upon  all  these  violations  of  neutral- 
ity to  the  detriment  of  Germany.  Great  Britain  invokes  the  vital  interest  of  the  British 
Empire  which  are  at  stake  in  justification  of  its  violations  of  the  law  of  nations,  and 
the  neutral  powers  appear  to  be  satisfied  wi^:h  theoretical  protests,  thus  actually  admit- 
ting the  vital  interests  of  a  belligerent  as  a  sufficient  excuse  for  methods  of  waging  war 
of  whatever  description. 

The  time  has  come  for  Germany  also  to  invoke  such  vital  interests.  It  therefore 
finds  itself  under  the  necessity,  to  its  regret,  of  taking  military  measures  against  Eng- 
land in  retaliation  of  the  practice  followed  by  England.  Just  as  F.ngland  declared  the 
whole  North  Sea  between  Scotland  and  Norway  to  be  comprised  within  the  seat  of  war, 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  109 

so  does  Germany  now  declare  the  waters  surrounding  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  includ- 
ing the  whole  English  Channel  to  be  comprised  within  the  seat  of  war,  and  will  prevent 
by  all  the  military  means  at  its  disposal  all  navigation  by  the  enemy  in  those  waters.  To 
this  end  it  will  endeavor  to  destroy,  after  February  18  next,  any  merchant  vessels  of  the 
enemy  which  present  themselves  at  the  seat  of  war  above  indicated,  although  it  may  not 
always  be  possible  to  avert  the  dangers  which  may  menace  persons  and  merchandise. 
Neutral  powers  are  accordingly  forewarned  not  to  continue  to  entrust  their  crews,  pas- 
sengers, or  merchandise  to  such  vessels.  Their  attention  is  furthermore  called  to  the  fact 
that  it  is  of  urgency  to  recommend  to  their  own  vessels  to  steer  clear  of  these  waters.  It 
is  true  that  the  German  Navy  has  received  instructions  to  abstain  from  all  violence 
against  neutral  vessels  recognizable  as  such ;  but  in  view  of  the  hazards  of  war,  and  of 
the  misuse  of  the  neutral  flag  ordered  by  the  British  Government,  it  will  not  always  be 
possible  to  prevent  a  neutral  vessel -from  becoming  the  victim  of  an  attack  intended  to 
be  directed  against  a  vessel  of  the  enemy.  It  is  expressly  declared  that  navigation  in  the 
waters  north  of  the  Shetland  Islands  is  outside  the  danger  zone,  as  well  as  navigation 
in  the  eastern  part  of  the  North  Sea  and  in  a  zone  thirty  marine  miles  wide  along  the 
Dutch  coast. 

The  German  Government  announces  this  measure  at  a  time  permitting  enemy  and 
neutral  ships  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements  to  reach  the  ports  situated  at  the 
seat  of  war.  They  hope  that  the  neutral  powers  will  accord  consideration  to  the  vital 
interests  of  Germany  equally  with  those  of  England,  and  will  on  their  part  assist  in 
keeping  their  subjects  and  their  goods  far  from  the  seat  of  war ;  the  more  so  since  they 
likewise  have  a  great  interest  in  seeing  the  termination  at  an  early  day  of  the  war  now 
ravaging. 

Berlin^  February  4, 1915. 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  Gerard. 

[Telegram.] 

Department  Op  State, 
Washington,  February  10,  1915. 

Please  address  a  note  immediately  to  the  Imperial  German  Government  to  the  fol- 
lowing effect. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  having  had  its  attention  directed  to  the  pro- 
clamation of  the  German  Admiralty  issued  on  the  fourth  of  February,  that  the  waters 
surrounding  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  including  the  whole  of  the  English  Channel, 
are  to  be  considered  as  comprised  within  the  seat  of  war;  that  all  enemy  merchant  ves- 
sels found  in  those  waters  after  the  eighteenth  inscant  will  be  destroyed,  although  it 
may  not  always  be  possible  to  save  crews  and  passengers;  and  that  neutral  vessels  ex- 
pose themselves  to  danger  within  this  zone  of  war  because,  in  view  of  the  misuse  of  neu- 
tral flags  said  to  have  been  ordered  by  the  British  Government  on  the  thirty-first  of  Jan- 
uary and  of  the  contingencies  of  maritime  warfare,  it  may  not  be  possible  always  to  ex- 
empt neutral  vessels  from  attacks  intended  to  strike  enemy  ships,  feels  it  to  be  its  duty 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  German  Government,  with  sincere  respect  and  the 
most  friendly  sentiments  but  very  candidly  and  earnestly,  to  the  very  serious  possibili- 
ties of  the  course  of  action  apparently  contemplated  under  that  proclamation. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  views  those  possibilities  with  such  grave  con- 
cern that  it  feels  it  to  be  its  privilege,  and  indeed  its  duty  in  the  circumstances,  to  re- 
quest the  Imperial  German  Government  to  consider  before  action  is  taken  the  critical 
situation  in  respect  of  the  relations  between  this  country  and  Germany  which  might 
arise  were  the  German  naval  forces,  in  carrying  out  the  policy  foreshadowed  in  the  Ad- 
miralty's proclamation,  to  destroy  any  merchant  vessel  of  the  United  States  or  cause 
the  death  of  American  citizens. 

It  is  of  course  not  necessary  to  remind  the  German  Government  that  the  sole  right  of 
a  belligerent  in  dealing  with  neutral  vessels  on  the  high  seas  is  limited  to  visit  and 
search,  unless  a  blockade  is  proclaimed  and  effectively  maintained,  which  this  Govern- 
ment does  not  understand  to  be  proposed  in  this  case.  To  declare  or  exercise  a  right  to 
attack  and  destroy  any  vessel  entering  a  prescribed  area  of  the  high  seas  without  first 
certainly  determining  its  belligerent  nationality  and  the  contraband  character  of  its  car- 
go would  be  an  act  so  unprecedented  in  naval  warfare  that  this  Government  is  reluctant 
to  believe  that  the  Imperial  Government  of  Germany  in  this  case  contemplates  it  as 
possible.  The  suspicion  that  enemy  ships  are  using  neutral  flags  improperly  can  create 
no  just  presumption  that  all  ships  traversing  a  prescribed  area  are  subject  to  the  same 
suspicion.  It  is  to  determine  exactly  such  questions  that  this  Government  understands 
the  right  of  visit  and  search  to  have  been  recognized. 

This  Government  has  carefully  noted  the  explanatory  statement  issued  by  the  Im- 


110  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

perial  German  Government  at  the  same  time  with  the  proclamation  of  the  German 
Admiralty,  and  takes  this  occasion  to  remind  the  Imperial  German  Government  very  re- 
spectfully that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  open  to  none  of  the  criticisms  for 
unneutral  action  to  which  the  German  Government  believe  the  governments  of  certain  of 
other  neutral  nations  have  laid  themselves  open;  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  not  consented  to  or  acquiesced  in  any  measures  which  may  have  been  taken 
by  the  other  belligerent  nations  in  the  present  war  which  operate  to  restrain  neutral 
trade,  but  has,  on  the  contrary,  taken  in  all  such  matters  a  position  which  warrants  it 
in  holding  those  governments  responsible  in  the  proper  way  for  any  untoward  effects 
upon  American  shipping  which  the  accepted  principles  of  international  law  do  not  jus- 
tify; and  that  it,  therefore,  regards  itself  as  free  in  the  present  instance  to  take  with  a 
clear  conscience  and  upon  accepted  principles  the  position  indicated  in  this  note. 

If  the  commanders  of  German  vessels  of  war  should  act  upon  the  presumption  that 
the  flag  of  the  United  States  was  not  being  used  in  good  faith  and  should  destroy  on  the 
high  seas  an  American  vessel  or  the  lives  of  American  citizens,  it  would  be  difficult  for 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  view  the  act  in  any  other  light  than  as  an  inde- 
fensible violation  of  neutral  rights  which  it  would  be  very  hard  indeed  to  reconcile  with 
the  friendly  relations  now  so  happily  subsisting  between  the  two  Governments. 

If  such  a  deplorable  situation  should  arise,  the  Imperial  German  Government  can 
readily  appreciate  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  be  constrained  to 
hold  the  Imperial  German  Government  to  a  strict  accountability  for  such  acts  of  their 
naval  authorities  and  to  take  any  steps  it  might  be  necessary  to  take  to  safeguard  Ameri- 
can lives  and  property  and  to  secure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their 
acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  in  view  of  these  considerations,  which  it 
urges  with  the  greatest  respect  and  with  the  sincere  purpose  of  making  sure  that  no 
misunderstanding  may  arise  and  no  circumstance  occur  that  might  even  cloud  the  inter- 
course of  the  two  Governments,  expresses  the  confident  hope  and  expectation  that  the 
Imperial  German  Government  can  and  will  give  assurance  that  Amei'ican  citizens  and 
their  vessels  will  not  be  molested  by  the  naval  forces  of  Germany  otherwise  than  by  visit 
and  search,  though  their  vessels  may  be  traversing  the  sea  area  delimited  in  the  procla- 
mation of  the  German  Admiralty. 

It  is  added  for  the  information  of  the  Imperial  Government  that  representations 
have  been  made  to  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  in  respect  to  the  unwarrantied 
use  of  the  American  flag  for  the  protection  of  British  ships. 

Bryan. 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 
[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  February  10,  1915. 

The  department  has  been  advised  of  the  Declaration  of  the  German  Admiralty  on 
February  fourth,  indicating  that  the  British  Government  had  on  January  thirty-first 
explicitly  authorized  the  use  of  neutral  flags  on  British  merchant  vessels  presumably 
for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  recognition  by  German  naval  forces.  The  department's 
attention  has  also  been  directed  to  reports  in  the  press  that  the  captain  of  the  Lusi- 
tania,  acting  upon  orders  or  information  received  from  the  British  authorities,  raised 
the  American  flag  as  his  vessel  approached  the  British  coasts,  in  order  to  escape  antici- 
pated attacks  by  German  submarines.  To-day's  press  reports  also  contain  an  alleged 
ofiftcial  statement  of  the  Foreign  Office  defending  the  use  of  the  flag  of  a  neutral  country 
by  a  belligerent  vessel  in  order  to  escape  capture  or  attack  by  an  enemy. 

Assuming  that  the  foregoing  reports  are  true,  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
reserving  for  future  consideration  the  legality  and  propriety  of  the  deceptive  use  of  the 
flag  of  a  neutral  power  in  any  case  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  capture,  desires  very 
respectfully  to  point  out  to  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  the  serious  conse- 
quences which  may  result  to  American  vessels  and  American  citizens  if  this  practice  is 
continued. 

The  occasional  use  of  the  flag  of  a  neutral  or  an  enemy  under  the  stress  of  imme- 
diate pursuit  and  to  deceive  an  approaching  enemy,  which  appears  by  the  press  reports 
to  be  represented  as  the_^recedent  and  justification  used  to  support  this  action,  seems 
to  this  Government  a  very  different  thing  from  an  explicit  sanction  by  a  belligerent 
government  for  its  merchant  ships  generally  to  fly  the  flag  of  a  neutral  power  within 
certain  portions  of  the  high  seas  which  are  presumed  to  be  frequented  with  hostile  war- 
ships. The  formal  declaration  of  such  a  policy  of  general  misuse  of  a  neutral's  flag 
jeopardizes  the  vessels  of  the  neutral  visiting  those  waters  in  a  peculiar  degree  by  rais- 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  111 

ing  the  presumption  that  they  are  of  belligerent  nationality  regardless  of  the  flag  which 
they  may  carry. 

In  view  of  the  announced  purpose  of  tlie  German  Admiralty  to  engage  in  active 
naval  operations  in  certain  delimited  sea  areas  adjacent  to  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  view  with  anxious  solicitude 
any  general  use  of  the  flag  of  the  United  States  by  British  vessels  traversing  those 
waters.  A  policy  such  as  the  one  which  His  Majesty's  Government  is  said  to  intend  to 
adopt  would,  if  the  declaration  of  the  German  Admiralty  is  put  in  force,  it  seems  clear, 
afford  no  protection  to  British  vessels,  while  it  would  be  a  serious  and  constant  menace 
to  the  lives  and  vessels  of  American  citizens. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  trusts  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment will  do  all  in  their  power  to  restrain  vessels  of  British  nationality  from  the  decep- 
tive use  of  the  flag  of  the  United  States  in  the  sea  area  defined  in  the  German  declara- 
tion, since  such  practice  would  greatly  endanger  the  vessels  of  a  friendly  power  navi- 
gating those  waters  and  would  even  seem  to  impose  upon  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain  a  measure  of  responsibility  for  the  loss  of  American  lives  and  vessels  in  case  of 
an  attack  by  a  German  naval  force. 

Please  present  a  note  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the  sense  of  the  foregoing  and  impress 
him  with  the  grave  concern  which  this  Government  feels  in  the  circumstances  in  regard 
to  the  safety  of  American  vessels  and  lives  in  the  war  zone  declared  by  the  German 
Admiralty. 

You  may  add  that  this  Government  is  making  earnest  representations  to  the  Ger- 
man Government  in  regard  to  the  danger  to  American  vessels  and  citizens  if  the  decla- 
ration of  the  German  Admiralty  is  put  into  eflfect. 

Beyan. 


The  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  W.  E.  Page. 

Foreign  Office,  Feburary,  10, 1915. 

Your  Excellency  :  Your  Excellency  has  already  received  the  preliminary  answer, 
which  I  handed  to  you  on  the  7th  January,  in  reply  to  your  note  of  the  28th  December 
on  the  subject  of  the  seizures  and  detentions  of  American  cargoes  destined  for  neutral 
European  ports. 

Since  that  date  I  have  had  further  opportunity  of  examining  into  the  trade  statis- 
tics of  the  United  States  as  embodied  in  the  customs  returns,  in  order  to  see  whether  the 
belligerent  action  of  Great  Britain  has  been  in  any  way  the  cause  of  the  trade  depression 
which  Your  Excellency  describes  as  existing  in  the  United  States,  and  also  whether  the 
seizures  of  vessels  or  cargoes  which  have  been  made  by  the  British  Navy  have  inflicted 
any  loss  on  American  owners  for  which  our  existing  machinery  provides  no  means  of 
redress.  In  setting  out  the  results  of  my  investigation  I  think  it  well  to  take  the  oppor- 
tunity of  giving  a  general  review  of  the  methods  employed  by  His  Majesty's  Government 
to  intercept  contraband  trade  with  the  enemy,  of  their  consistency  with  the  admitted  right 
of  a  belligerent  to  intercept  such  trade,  and  also  of  the  extent  to  which  they  have  endeav- 
ored to  meet  the  representations  and  complaints  from  time  to  time  addressed  to  them  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  Government. 

Toward  the  close  of  your  note  of  the  28th  December  Your  Excellency  describes  the 
situation  produced  by  the  action  of  Great  Britain  as  a  pitiful  one  to  the  commercial  in- 
terests of  the  United  States,  and  said  that  many  of  the  great  industries  of  the  country 
were  suffering  because  their  products  were  denied  long-established  markets  in  neutral 
European  countries  contiguous  to  the  nations  at  war. 

It  is  unfortunately  true  that  in  these  days,  when  trade  and  finance  are  cosmopolitan, 
any  war — particularly  a  war  of  any  magnitude — must  result  in  a  grievous  dislocation 
of  commerce,  including  that  of  the  nations  which  take  no  part  in  the  war.  Your  Excel- 
lency will  realize  that  in  this  tremendous  struggle  for  the  outbreak  of  which  Great  Britain 
is  in  no  way  responsible,  it  is  impossible  for  the  trade  of  any  country  to  escape  all  injury 
and  loss,  but  for  such  His  Majesty's  Government  are  not  to  blame. 

I  do  not  understand  the  paragraph  which  I  have  quoted  from  Your  Excellency's  note 
as  referring  to  these  indirect  consequences  of  the  state  of  war,  but  to  the  more  proximate 
and  direct  effect  of  our  belligerent  action  in  dealing  with  neutral  ships  and  cargoes  on 
the  high  seas.  Such  action  has  been  limited  to  vessels  on  their  way  to  enemy  ports  or 
ports  in  neutral  countries  adjacent  to  the  theater  of  war,  because  it  is  only  through  such 
ports  that  the  enemy  introduces  the  supplies  which  he  requires  for  carrying  on  the  war. 

In  my  earlier  note  I  set  out  the  number  of  ships  wliich  had  sailed  from  the  United 
States  for  Holland,  Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Italy,  and  I  there  stated  that  only 
8  of  the  773  had  been  placed  in  the  prize  court,  and  that  only  45  had  been  temporarily 
detained  to  enable  particular  consignments  of  cargo  to  be  discharged  for  the  purpose  of 


112  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

prize-court  proceedings.  To  measure  the  effect  of  such  naval  action  it  is  necessary  to 
take  into  consideration  the  general  statistics  of  the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  dur- 
ing the  months  preceding  the  outbreak  of  war  and  those  since  the  outbreak. 

Taking  the  figures  in  millions  of  dollars,  the  exports  of  merchandise  from  the  United 
States  for  the  seven  months  of  January  to  July,  1914,  inclusive,  were  1,201,  as  compared 
with  1,327  in  the  corresponding  months  of  1913,  a  drop  of  126  millions  of  dollars. 

For  the  months  of  August,  September,  October,  and  November,  that  is  to  say,  for  the 
four  months  of  the  war  preceding  the  delivery  of  your  Excellency's  note,  the  figures  of  the 
exports  of  merchandise  were  (again  in  millions  of  dollars)  667  as  compared  with  923  in 
the  corresponding  months  of  1913,  a  drop  of  256  millions  of  dollars. 

If,  however,  the  single  article  of  cotton  be  eliminated  from  the  comparison,  the  figures 
show  a  very  different  result.  Thus  the  exports  of  all  articles  of  merchandise  other  than 
cotton  from  the  United  States  during  the  first  seven  months  of  1914  were  966  millions  of 
dollars,  as  against  1,127  millions  in  1913,  a  drop  of  161  millions  of  dollars,  or  14%  per 
cent.  On  the  other  hand,  the  exports  of  the  same  articles  during  the  months  August  to 
November  amounted  to  608  millions  of  dollars  as  compared  with  630  millions  in  1913, 
a  drop  of  only  22  millions,  or  less  than  4  per  cent. 

It  is  therefore  clear  that,  if  cotton  be  excluded,  the  effect  of  the  war  has  been  not  to 
increase  but  practically  to  arrest  the  decline  of  American  exports  which  was  in  progress 
earlier  in  the  year.  In  fact,  any  decrease  in  American  exports  which  is  attributable  to 
the  war  is  essentially  due  to  cotton.  Cotton  is  an  article  which  can  not  possibly  have 
been  affected  by  the  exercise  of  our  belligerent  rights,  for,  as  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  it 
l)as  not  been  declared  by  His  Majesty's  Governient  to  be  contraband  of  war,  and  the  rules 
under  which  we  are  at  present  conducting  oui-  belligerent  operations  give  us  no  power  in 
the  absence  of  a  blockade  to  seize  or  interfere  with  it  when  on  its  way  to  a  belligerent 
country  in  neutral  ships.    Consequently  no  cotton  has  been  touched. 

Into  the  causes  of  the  decrease  in  the  exports  of  cotton  I  do  not  feel  that  there  is  any 
need  for  me  to  enter,  because,  whatever  may  have  been  the  cause,  it  is  not  to  be  found  in 
the  exercise  of  the  belligerent  rights  of  visit,  search,  and  capture,  or  in  our  general  right 
when  at  war  to  intercept  the  contraband  trade  of  our  enemy.  Imports  of  cotton  to  the 
United  Kingdom  fell  as  heavily  as  those  to  other  countries.  No  place  felt  the  outbreak 
of  war  more  acutely  than  the  cotton  districts  of  Lancashire,  where  for  a  time  an  immense 
number  of  spindles  were  idle.  Though  this  condition  has  now  to  a  large  extent  passed 
away,  the  consumption  of  the  raw  material  in  Great  Britain  was  temporarily  much  dim- 
inished.   The  same  is  no  doubt  true  of  France. 

The  general  result  is  to  show  convincingly  that  the  naval  operations  of  Great  Britain 
are  not  the  cause  of  any  diminution  in  the  volume  of  American  exports,  and  that  if  the 
commerce  of  the  United  States  is  in  the  unfavourable  condition  which  your  Excellency 
describes,  the  cause  ought  in  fairness  to  be  sought  elsewhere  than  in  the  activities  of  His 
Majesty's  naval  forces. 

I  may  add  that  the  circular  issued  by  the  Department  of  Commerce  at  Washington 
on  the  23rd  January  admits  a  marked  improvement  in  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United 
States,  which  we  have  noted  with  great  satisfaction.  The  first  paragraph  of  the  circular 
is  worth  quoting  verbatim : 

A  marked  improvement  in  our  foreign  trade  is  indicated  by  the  latest  reports  issued  by  the  Department  of 
Commerce  through  its  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  sales  of  foodstuffs  and  certain  lines  of  manu- 
factures having  been  unusually  large  in  November,  the  latest  period  for  which  detailed  information  is  at  hand. 
In  that  month  exports  aggregated  206,000,000  dollars,  or  double  the  total  for  August  last,  when,  by  reason  of  the 
outbreak  of  war,  our  foreign  trade  fell  to  the  lowest  level  reached  in  many  years.  In  December  there  was 
further  improvement,  the  month's  exports  being  valued  at  246,000,000  dollars,  compared  with  233,000,000  in  Decem- 
ber, 1913,  and  within  4,000,000  of  the  high  record  established  in  December,  1912. 

A  better  view  of  the  situation  is  obtained  by  looking  at  the  figures  month  by  month. 
The  exports  of  merchandise  for  the  last  five  months  have  been  (in  millions  of  dollars)  : 

August    1 10 

September    156 

October    I94 

November    205 

December 246 

The  outbreak  of  war  produced  in  the  United  States,  as  it  did  in  all  neutral  countries, 
an  acute  but  temporary  disturbance  of  trade.  Since  that  time  there  seems  to  have  been  a 
steady  recovery,  for  to-day  the  exports  from  the  United  States  stand  at  a  higher  figure  than 
on  the  same  date  last  year. 

Before  passing  away  from  the  statistics  of  trade,  and  in  order  to  demonstrate  still 
more  clearly  if  necessary  that  the  naval  operations  of  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  have 
had  no  detrimental  effect  on  the  volume  of  trade  between  the  United  States  and  neutral 
countries,  it  is  worth  while  to  analyse  the  figures  of  the  exports  to  Europe  since  the  out- 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  113 

break  of  hostilities.  For  this  purpose  the  European  countries  ought  to  be  grouped  under 
three  heads:  Great  Britain  and  those  fighting  with  her,  neutral  countries,  and  enemy 
countries.  It  is,  however,  impossible  for  me  to  group  the  countries  in  this  way  satisfac- 
torily, as  the  figures  relating  to  the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  with  each  country 
have  not  yet  been  published.  In  the  preliminary  statement  of  the  export  trade  of  the  United 
States  with  foreign  countries  only  principal  countries  are  shown,  and  various  countries 
which  are  tabulated  separately  in  the  more  detailed  monthly  summary  of  commerce  and 
finance  are  omitted.  Those  omitted  include  not  only  the  Scandinavian  countries,  the 
exports  to  which  are  of  peculiar  importance  in  dealing  with  this  question,  but  also  Aus- 
tria. 

So  far  as  it  is  possible  to  distribute  the  figures  under  the  headings  which  I  have  in- 
dicated above  (all  the  figures  being  given  in  thousands  of  dollars)  the  results  are  as 
follows : 

Total  exports  to  Europe  from  the  1st  August  to  the  30th  November,  413,995,  as 
against  597,342  in  1913.  Of  these,  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  took  288,312,  as  against 
316,805  in  1913.  Germany  and  Belgium  took  1,881  as  against  177,136  in  1913;  whereas 
neutral  countries  (among  which  Austria-Hungary  is  unavoidably  included)  took  123,802, 
as  against  103,401  in  1913. 

The  general  complaint  in  Your  Excellency's  note  was  that  the  action  of  Great  Britain 
was  affecting  adversely  the  trade  of  the  United  States  with  neutral  countries.  The  naval 
operations  of  Great  Britain  certainly  do  not  interfere  with  commerce  from  the  United 
States  on  its  way  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  allied  countries,  and  yet  the  exports 
to  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  during  those  four  months  diminished  to  the  extent  of  over 
28,000,000  dollars,  whereas  those  to  neutral  countries  and  Austria  increased  by  over 
20,000,000  dollars. 

The  inference  may  fairly  be  drawn  from  these  figures,  all  of  which  are  taken  from  the 
official  returns  published  by  the  United  States  Government,  that  not  only  has  the  trade  of 
the  United  States  with  the  neutral  countries  in  Europe  been  maintained  as  compared 
with  previous  years,  but  also  that  a  substantial  part  of  this  trade  was,  in  fact,  trade  in- 
tended for  the  enemy  countries  going  through  neutral  ports  by  routes  to  which  it  was 
previously  unaccustomed. 

One  of  the  many  inconveniences  to  which  this  great  war  is  exposing  the  commerce  of 
all  neutral  countries  is  undoubtedly  the  serious  shortage  in  shipping  available  for  ocean 
transport,  and  the  consequential  result  of  excessive  freights. 

It  cannot  fairly  be  said  that  this  shortage  is  caused  by  Great  Britain's  interference 
with  neutral  ships.  At  the  present  time  there  are  only  seven  neutral  vessels  awaiting  ad- 
judication in  the  prize  courts  in  this  country,  and  three  in  those  in  the  British  dominions. 
As  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  I  have  already  instructed  our  ambassador  at  Washington  to 
remind  the  parties  who  are  interested  in  these  vessels  that  it  is  open  to  them  to  apply  to 
the  court  for  the  release  of  these  ships  on  bail,  and  if  an  application  of  this  sort  is  made 
by  them  it  is  not  likely  to  be  opposed  by  the  Crown.  There  is  therefore  no  reason  why 
such  an  application  should  not  be  favourably  entertained  by  the  court,  and,  if  acceded 
to,  all  these  vessels  will  again  be  available  for  the  carriage  of  commerce.  Only  one  neutral 
vessel  is  now  detained  in  this  country  in  addition  to  those  awaiting  adjudication  in  the 
prize  court. 

Every  effort  has  been  made  in  cases  in  which  it  has'  been  found  necessary  to  institute 
proceedings  against  portions  of  the  cargo  to  secure  the  speedy  discharge  of  the  cargo  and 
the  release  of  the  ship,  so  as  to  enable  it  to  resume  work.  Great  Britain  is  suffering  from 
the  shortage  of  shipping  and  the  rise  in  freights  as  acutely  as,  if  not  more  than,  other 
nations  and  His  Majesty's  Government  have  taken  every  step  that  they  could  consistently 
with  their  belligerent  interests  to  increase  the  tonnage  available  for  the  transport  of  sea- 
borne commerce.  The  enemy  ships  which  have  been  condemned  in  the  prize  courts  in  this 
country  are  being  sold  as  rapidly  as  possible  in  order  that  they  may  become  available  for 
use ;  and  those  which  have  been  condemned  In  the  prize  courts  oversea  are  being  brought 
to  this  country  in  order  that  they  may  be  disposed  of  here,  and  again  placed  in  active 
employment. 

The  difficulties  have  been  accentuated  by  the  unforseen  consequences  of  the  con- 
vention which  was  signed  at  The  Hague  in  1907  relative  to  the  status  of  enemy  mer- 
chant vessels  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  This  convention  was  a  well-intentioned  effort  to  di- 
minish the  losses  which  war  must  impose  upon  innocent  persons,  and  providetl  tliat  enemy 
merchant  ships  seized  by  a  belligerent  in  whose  ports  they  lay  at  the  outbreak  of  war 
should  not  be  condemned,  but  should  merely  be  detained  for  the  period  of  the  war,  unless 
they  were  liberated  in  the  days  of  grace.  We  could  come  to  no  arrangement  with  the 
German  Government  for  the  reciprocal  grant  of  days  of  grace,  and  the  German  merchant 
vessels  lying  in  British  ports  when  the  war  broke  out  have  therefore  been  sentenced  to 
detention  in  lieu  of  condemnation.     The  normal  result  would  have  been  still  further  to 


114  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

reduce  the  volume  of  shipping  available  for  the  commerce  of  the  world.  To  ease  the  situa- 
tion, however,  His  Majesty's  Government  are  resorting  to  the  power  of  requisitioning 
which  is  given  by  the  convention,  so  that  these  ships  may  again  be  placed  in  active 
service. 

Your  excellency  will  see  therefore  that  His  Majesty's  Government  are  doing  all 
in  their  power  to  increase  the  volume  of  shipping  available.  I  hope  it  will  be  realized 
that  the  detention  of  neutral  ships  by  His  Majesty's  Government  with  a  view  to  the  cap- 
ture of  contraband  trade  on  its  way  to  the  enemy  has  not  contributed  nearly  so  much  to 
the  shortage  of  shipping  as  has  the  destruction  of  neutral  vessels  by  submarine  mines  in- 
discriminately laid  by  the  enemy  on  the  high  seas,  many  miles  from  the  coast,  in  the  track 
of  merchant  vessels  Up  till  now  25  neutral  vessels  have  been  reported  as  destroyed  by 
mines  on  the  high  seas;  quite  apart  from  all  questions  of  the  breach  of  treaties  and  the 
destruction  of  life,  there  is  far  more  reason  for  protest  on  the  score  of  belligerent  interfer- 
ence with  innocent  neutral  trade  through  the  mines  scattered  by  the  enemy  than  through 
the  British  exercise  of  the  right  of  seizing  contraband. 

I  trust  that  what  I  have  said  above  will  be  sufficient  to  convince  your  Excellency's 
Government  that  the  complaints  that  the  naval  policy  of  Great  Britain  has  interfered 
with  the  shipments  of  American  products  to  long-established  markets  in  neutral  Eu- 
ropean countries  is  founded  on  a  misconception. 

In  justice  to  the  peoples  of  both  countries,  I  feel  that  this  opportunity  should  be 
taken  to  explain  the  lines  on  which  His  Majesty's  Government  have  been  acting  hitherto, 
so  as  to  show  that  the  line  they  have  followed  is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the  general 
fundamental  principle  of  international  law  and  to  indicate  the  care  with  which  they 
have  endeavored  to  meet  the  representations  which  have  been  made  by  the  United 
States  Government  from  time  to  time  during  the  war  on  these  questions. 

No  one  in  these  days  will  dispute  the  general  proposition  that  a  belligerent  is  entitled 
to  capture  contraband  goods  on  their  way  to  the  enemy ;  that  right  has  now  become  con- 
secrated by  long  usage  and  general  acquiescence.  Though  the  right  is  ancient,  the  means 
of  exercising  it  alter  and  develop  with  the  changes  in  the  methods  and  machinery  of 
commerce.  A  century  ago  the  difficulties  of  land  transport  rendered  it  impracticable 
for  the  belligerent  to  obtain  supplies  of  sea-borne  goods  through  a  neighboring  neutral 
country.  Consequently  the  belligerent  actions  of  his  opponents  neither  required  nor 
justified  any  interference  with  shipments  on  their  way  to  a  neutral  port.  This  principle 
was  recognized  and  acted  on  in  the  decisions  in  which  Lord  Stowell  laid  down  the  lines 
on  which    captures  of  such  goods  should  be  dealt  with. 

The  advent  of  steam  power  has  rendered  it  as  easy  for  a  belligerent  to  supply  him- 
self through  the  ports  of  a  neutral  contiguous  country  as  through  his  own  and  has  there- 
fore rendered  it  impossible  for  his  opponent  to  refrain  from  interfering  with  commerce 
intended  for  the  enemy  merely  because  it  is  on  its  way  to  a  neutral  port. 

No  better  instance  of  the  necessity  of  countering  new  devices  for  despatching  con- 
traband goods  to  an  enemy  by  new  methods  of  applying  the  fundamental  principle  of 
the  right  to  capture  such  contraband  can  be  given  than  the  steps  which  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  found  it  necessary  to  take  during  the  American  Civil  War.  It  was 
at  that  time  that  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage  was  first  applied  to  the  capture  of 
contraband,  that  is  to  say,  it  was  then  for  the  first  time  that  a  belligerent  found  himself 
obliged  to  capture  contraband  goods  on  their  way  to  the  enemy,  even  though  at  the  time  of 
capture  they  were  en  route  for  a  neutral  port  from  which  they  were  intended  subse- 
quently to  continue  their  journey.  The  policy  then  followed  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment was  not  inconsistent  with  the  general  principles  already  sanctioned  by  internation- 
al law,  and  met  with  no  protest  from  His  Majesty's  Government,  though  it  was  upon 
British  cargoes  and  upon  British  ships  that  tlae  losses  and  the  inconvenience  due  to  this 
new  development  of  the  application  of  the  old  rule  of  international  law  principally  fell. 
The  criticisms  which  have  been  directed  against  the  steps  then  taken  by  the  United 
States  came,  and  come,  from  those  who  saw  in  the  methods  employed  in  Napoleonic 
times  for  the  prevention  of  contraband  a  limitation  upon  the  right  itself,  and  failed  to 
see  that  in  Napoleonic  times  goods  on  their  way  to  a  neutral  port  were  immune  from  cap- 
ture, not  because  the  immediate  destination  conferred  a  privilege,  but  because  capture 
under  such  circumstances  was  unnecessary. 

The  facilities  which  the  introduction  of  steamers  and  railways  have  given  to  a  bel- 
ligerent to  introduce  contraband  goods  through  neutral  ports  have  imposed  upon  his 
opponent  the  additional  difficulty,  when  endeavoring  to  intercept  such  trade,  of  distin- 
guishing between  the  goods  which  are  really  destined  for  the  commerce  of  that  neutral 
country  and  the  goods  which  are  on  their  way  to  the  enemy.  It  is  one  of  the  many  diffi- 
culties with  which  the  United  States  Government  found  themselves  confronted  in  the 
days  of  the  Civil  War,  and  I  cannot  do  better  than  qiiote  the  words  which  Mr.  Seward, 
who  was  then  Secretary  of  State,  used  in  the  course  of  the  diplomatic  discussion  arising 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  115 

out  of  the  capture  of  some  goods  on  their  way  to  Matamoros  which  were  believed  to  be 
for  the  insurgents: 

Neutrals  engaged  in  honest  trade  with  Matamoros  must  expect  to  experience  inconvenience  from  the  existing 
blockade  of  Brownsville  and  the  adjacent  coast  of  Texas.  While  this  Government  unfeignedly  regrets  this  in- 
convenience, it  cannot  relinquish  any  of  its  belligerent  rights  to  favour  contraband  trade  with  insurgent  territory. 
By  insisting  upon  those  rights,  however,  it  is  sure  that  that  necessity  for  their  exercise  at  all,  which  must  be 
deplored  by  every  friendly  commercial  Power,  will  the  more  speedily  be  terminated. 

The  opportunities  now  enjoyed  by  a  belligerent  for  obtaining  supplies  through  neu- 
tral ports  are  far  greater  than  they  were  fifty  years  ago,  and  the  geographical  conditions 
of  the  present  struggle  lend  additional  assistance  to  the  enemy  in  carrying  out  such  im- 
portation. We  are  faced  with  the  problem  of  intercepting  such  supplies  when  arranged 
with  all  the  advantages  that  flow  from  elaborate  organisation  and  unstinted  expendi- 
ture. If  our  belligerent  rights  are  to  be  maintained,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  for  us 
to  distinguish  between  what  is  really  bona  fide  trade  intended  for  the  neutral  country 
concerned  and  the  trade  intended  for  the  enemy  country.  Every  effort  is  made  by  organ- 
izers of  this  trade  to  conceal  the  true  destination,  and  if  the  innocent  neutral  trade  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  the  enemy  trade  it  is  essential  that  His  Majesty's  Government 
should  be  entitled  to  make,  and  should  make,  careful  enquiry  with  regard  to  the  destina- 
tion of  particular  shipments  of  goods  even  at  the  risk  of  some  slight  delay  to  the  parties 
interested.  If  such  enquiries  were  not  made,  either  the  exercise  of  our  belligerent  rights 
would  have  to  be  abandoned,  tending  to  the  prolongation  of  this  war  and  the  increase  of 
the  loss  and  suffering  which  it  is  entailing  upon  the  whole  world,  or  else  it  would  be 
necessary  to  indulge  in  indiscriminate  captures  of  neutral  goods  and  their  detention 
throughout  all  the  period  of  the  resulting  prize  court  proceedings.  Under  the  system  now 
adopted  it  has  been  found  possible  to  release  without  delay,  and  consequently  without 
appreciable  loss  to  the  parties  interested,  all  the  goods  of  which  the  destination  is  shown 
as  the  result  of  the  enquiries  to  be  innocent. 

It  may  well  be  that  the  system  of  making  such  enquiries  is  to  a  certain  extent  a  new 
introduction,  in  that  it  has  been  practised  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  in  previous  wars ; 
but  if  it  is  correctly  described  as  a  new  departure,  it  is  a  departure  which  is  wholly  to 
the  advantage  of  neutrals,  and  which  has  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  them  so 
far  as  possible  from  loss  and  inconvenience. 

There  was  a  passage  in  a  note  which  the  State  Department  addressed  to  the  British 
ambassador  at  Washington  on  the  7th  November  to  which  I  think  it  may  be  well  to  re- 
fer: 

In  the  opinion  of  this  Government,  the  belligerent  right  of  visit  and  search  requires  that  the  search  should 
be  made  on  the  high  seas  at  the  time  of  the  visit,  and  that  the  conclusion  of  the  search  should  rest  upon  the  evi- 
dence found  on  the  ship  under  investigation,  and  not  upon  circumstances  ascertained  from  external  sources. 

The  principle  here  enunciated  appears  to  me  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  practice  in 
these  matters  of  the  United  States  Government,  as  well  as  of  the  British  Government.  It 
certainly  was  not  the  rule  upon  which  the  United  States  Government  acted  either  during 
the  Civil  War  or  during  the  Spanish-American  War,  nor  has  it  ever  been  the  practice  of 
the  British  Government,  nor  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  of  any  other  Government  which  has 
had  to  carry  on  a  great  naval  war ;  as  a  principle  I  think  it  is  impossible  in  modern  times. 
The  necessity  for  giving  the  belligerent  captor  full  liberty  to  establish  by  all  the  evi- 
dence at  his  disposal  the  enemy  destination  with  which  the  goods  were  shipped  was  re- 
cognized in  all  the  leading  decisions  in  the  prize  courts  of  the  United  States  during  the 
Civil  War. 

No  clearer  instance  could  be  given  than  the  reporter's  statement  of  the  case  of  the 
Bermuda  (3  Wallace,  514)  : 

The  final  destination  of  the  cargo  in  this  particular  voyage  was  left  so  skilfully  open  *  *  *  that  it  was 
not  quite  easy  to  prove,  with  that  certainty  which  American  courts  require,  the  intention,  which  it  seemed  plain 
must  have  really  existed.  Thus  to  prove  it  required  that  truth  should  be  collated  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
darkened  and  disguised;  from  others  opened  as  the  cause  advanced,  and  by  accident  only;  from  coincidences 
undesigned,  and  facts  that  were  circumstantial.  Collocations  and  comparisons,  in  short,  brought  largely  their 
collective  force  in  aid  of  evidence  that  was  more  direct. 

It  is  not  impossible  that  the  course  of  the  present  struggle  will  show  the  necessity 
for  belligerent  action  to  be  taken  in  various  ways  which  may  at"  first  sight  be  regarded 
as  a  departure  from  old  practice.  In  my  note  of  the  7th  January,  I  dealt  at  some  length 
with  the  question  of  necessity  of  taking  vessels  into  port  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out 
an  effective  search,  where  search  was  necessary;  to  that  subject  I  feel  that  I  need  not 
again  recur. 

The  growth  in  the  size  of  steamships  necessitates  in  many  cases  that  the  vessels 
should  go  into  calm  water,  in  order  that  even  the  right  of  visit,  as  apart  from  the  right 
of  search,  should  be  exercised.  In  modern  times  a  steamer  is  capable  of  pursuing  her 
voyage  irrespective  of  the  conditions  of  the  weather.  Many  of  the  neutral  merchantmen 
which  our  naval  oflflcers  are  called  upon  to  visit  at  sea  are  encountered  by  our  cruisers  in 


116  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

places  and  under  conditions  which  render  the  launching  of  a  boat  impossible.  The  con- 
ditions during  winter  in  the  North  Atlantic  frequently  render  it  impracticable  for  days 
together  for  a  naval  officer  to  board  a  vessel  on  her  way  to  Scandinavian  countries.  If 
a  belligerent  is  to  be  denied  the  right  of  taking  a  neutral  merchantman,  met  with  under 
such  conditions,  into  calm  water  in  order  that  the  visiting  officer  may  go  aboard,  the 
right  of  visit  and  of  search  would  become  a  nullity. 

The  present  conflict  is  not  the  first  in  which  this  necessity  has  arisen.  As  long  ago  as 
the  Civil  War  the  United  States  found  it  necessary  to  take  vessels  to  United  States  ports 
in  order  to  determine  whether  the  circumstances  justified  their  detention. 

The  same  need  arose  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  also  during  the  second 
Balkan  War,  when  it  sometimes  happened  that  British  vessels  were  made  to  deviate 
from  their  course  and  follow  the  cruisers  to  some  spot  where  the  right  of  visit  and  of 
search  could  be  more  conveniently  carried  out.  In  both  cases  this  exercise  of  belligerent 
rights,  although  questioned  at  first  by  His  Majesty's  Government,  was  ultimately  ac- 
quiesced in. 

No  Power  in  these  days  can  afford  during  a  great  war  to  forego  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  visit  and  search.  Vessels  which  are  apparently  harmless  merchantmen  can  be 
used  for  carrying  and  laying  mines  and  even  fitted  to  discharge  torpedoes.  Supplies 
for  submarines  can  without  difficulty  be  concealed  under  other  cargo.  The  only  protec- 
tion against  these  risks  is  to  visit  and  search  thoroughly  every  vessel  appearing  in  the 
zone  of  operations,  and  if  the  circumstances  are  such  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  carry 
it  out  at  the  spot  where  the  vessel  was  met  with  the  only  practicable  course  is  to  take 
the  ship  to  some  more  convenient  locality  for  the  purpose.  To  do  so  is  not  to  be  looked 
upon  as  a  new  belligerent  right,  but  as  an  adapation  of  the  existing  right  to  the  modern 
conditions  of  commerce.  Like  all  belligerent  rights,  it  must  be  exercised  with  due  regard 
for  neutral  interests,  and  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  expect  a  neutral  vessel  to  make 
long  deviations  from  her  course  for  this  purpose.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  have  done 
all  we  can  to  encourage  neutral  merchantmen  on  their  way  to  ports  contiguous  to  the 
enemy  country  to  visit  some  British  port  lying  on  their  line  of  route  in  order  that  the 
necessary  examination  of  the  ship's  papers,  and,  if  required,  of  the  cargo,  can  be  made 
under  conditions  of  convenience  to  the  ship  herself.  The  alternative  would  be  to  keep 
a  vessel  which  the  naval  officers  desired  to  board  waiting,  it  might  be  for  days  together, 
until  the  weather  conditions  enabled  the  visit  to  be  carried  out  at  sea. 

No  war  has  yet  been  waged  in  which  neutral  individuals  have  not  occasionally  suffer- 
ed from  unjustified  belligerent  action;  no  neutral  nation  has  experienced  this  fact  more 
frequently  in  the  past  than  Great  Britain.  The  only  method  by  which  it  is  possible  to 
harmonise  belligerent  action  with  the  rights  of  neutrals  is  for  the  belligerent  nation  to 
provide  some  adequate  machinery  by  which  in  any  such  case  the  facts  can  be  investigat- 
ed and  appropriate  i-edress  can  be  obtained  by  the  neutral  individual.  In  this  country 
such  machinery  is  provided  by  the  powers  which  are  given  to  the  prize  court  to  deal  not 
only  with  captures,  but  also  with  claims  for  compensation.  Order  V,  rule  2,  of  the 
British  prize  court  rules,  provides  that  where  a  ship  has  been  captured  as  prize,  but  has 
been  subsequently  released  by  the  captors,  or  has  by  loss,  destruction,  or  otherwise  ceased 
to  be  detained  by  them,  without  proceedings  for  condemnation  having  been  taken, 
any  person  interested  in  the  ship  (which  by  Order  I,  rule  2,  includes  goods)  wishing 
to  make  a  claim  for  costs  and  damages  in  respect  thereof,  shall  issue  a  writ  as  provided 
by  Order  II.  A  writ  so  issued  will  initiate  a  proceeding,  which  will  follow  its  ordinary 
course  in  the  prize  court. 

This  rule  gives  the  prize  court  ample  jurisdiction  to  deal  with  any  claim  for  com- 
pensation by  a  neutral  arising  from  the  interference  with  a  ship  or  goods  by  our  naval 
forces.  The  best  evidence  that  can  be  given  of  the  discrimination  and  the  moderation 
with  which  our  naval  officers  have  carried  out  their  duties  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
up  to  this  time  no  proceedings  for  the  recovery  of  compensation  have  been  initiated  un- 
der the  rule  which  I  have  quoted. 

It  is  the  common  experience  of  every  war  that  neutrals  whose  attempts  to  engage 
in  suspicious  trading  are  frustrated  by  a  belligerent  are  wont  to  have  recourse  to  their 
Government  to  urge  th'at  diplomatic  remonstrances  should  be  made  on  their  behalf,  and 
that  redress  should  be  obtained  for  them  in  this  way.  When  an  effective  mode  of  redress 
is  open  to  them  in  the  courts  of  a  civilized  country  by  which  they  can  obtain  adequate 
satisfaction  for  any  invasion  of  their  rights  which  is  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations,  the 
only  course  which  is  consistent  with  sound  principle  is  that  they  should  be  referred  to 
that  mode  of  redress,  and  that  no  diplomatic  action  should  be  taken  until  their  legal 
remedies  have  been  exhausted,  and  they  are  in  a  position  to  show  prima  facie  denial  of 
justice. 

The  course  adopted  by  His  Majesty's    Government    during   the   American  Civil 
War  was  in  strict  accordance  with  this  principle.    In  spite  of  remonstrances  from  many 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  117 

quarters,  they  placed  full  reliance  on  the  American  prize  courts  to  grant  redress  to  the 
parties  interested  in  cases  of  alleged  wrongful  capture  by  American  ships  of  war,  and 
put  forward  no  claims  until  the  opportunities  for  redress  in  those  courts  had  been  ex- 
hausted. The  same  course  was  adopted  in  the  Spanish- American  War,  when  all  British 
subjects  who  complained  of  captures  or  detentions  of  their  ships  were  referred  to  the 
prize  courts  for  relief. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  may  I  remind  Your  Excellency  of  the  fact  that  at  your 
request  you  are  now  supplied  immediately  by  this  department  with  particulars  of  evei-v 
ship  under  American  colors  which  is  detained,  and  of  every  shipment  of  cargo  in  which 
an  American  citizen  appears  to  be  the  party  interested.  Not  only  is  the  fact  of  deten- 
tion notified  to  Your  Excellency,  but  so  far  its  is  practicable  the  grounds  upon  which 
the  vessel  or  cargo  has  been  detained  are  also  communicated  to  you ;  a  concession  which 
enables  any  United  States  citizen  to  take  steps  at  once  to  protect  his  interests. 

His  Majesty's  Government  have  also  done  all  that  lies  in  their  power  to  insure  rapid 
action  when  ships  are  reported  in  British  i)orts.  They  realize  that  the  ship  and  cargo 
owners  may  reasonably  expect  an  immediate  decision  to  be  taken  as  to  whether  the  ship 
may  be  allowed  to  proceed,  and  whether  her  cargo  or  any  part  of  it  must  be  discharged 
and  put  into  the  prize  court.  Eealizing  that  the  ordinary  methods  of  interdepartmental 
cori'espondence  might  cause  delays  which  could  be  obviated  by  another  method  of  proced- 
ure, they  established  several  months  ago  a  special  committee,  on  which  all  the  depart- 
ments concerned  are  represented.  This  committee  sits  daily,  and  is  provided  with  a  spe- 
cial clericar  staff.  As  soon  as  a  ship  reaches  port  full  particulars  are  telegraphed  to 
London,  and  the  case  is  dealt  with  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  committee,  immediate 
steps  being  taken  to  carry  out  the  action  decided  upon.  By  the  adoption  of  this  proce- 
dure it  has  been  found  possible  to  reduce  to  a  minimum  the  delays  to  which  neutral 
shipping  is  exposed  by  the  exercise  of  belligerent  rights,  and  by  the  necessity,  imposed 
by  modern  conditions,  of  examining  with  care  the  destination  of  contraband  articles. 

Particular  attention  is  directed  in  Your  Excellency's  note  to  the  policy  we  are 
pursuing  with  regard  to  conditional  contraband,  especially  foodstuffs,  and  it  is  there 
stated  that  a  number  of  American  cargoes  have  been  seized  without,  so  far  as  Your  Ex- 
cellency's Government  are  informed,  our  being  in  possession  of  facts  which  warranted  a 
reasonable  belief  that  the  shipments  had  in  reality  a  belligerent  destination,  and  in 
spite  of  the  presumption  of  innocent  use  due  to  their  being  destined  to  neutral  territory. 
The  note  does  not  specify  any  particular  seizures  as  those  which  formed  the  basis  of  this 
complaint,  and  I  am  therefore  not  aware  whether  the  passage  refers  to  cargoes  which 
were  detained  before  or  since  the  Order  in  Council  of  the  29th  October  was  issued. 

Your  excellency  will  no  doubt  remember  tliat  soon  after  the  outbreak  of  war  an  Or- 
der of  His  Majesty  in  Council  was  issued  under  which  no  distinction  was  drawn  in  the  ap- 
plication of  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage  between  absolute  contraband  and  condi- 
tional contraband,  and  which  also  imposed  upon  the  neutral  owner  of  contraband  some- 
what drastic  conditions  as  to  the  burden  of  proof  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  ship- 
ment. 

The  principle  that  the  burden  of  proof  should  always  be  imposed  upon  the  captor 
has  usually  been  admitted  as  a  theory.  In  practice,  however,  it  has  always  been  other- 
wise, and  any  student  of  the  prize  courts  decisions  of  the  past  or  even  of  modern  wars 
will  find  that  goods  seldom  escape  condemnation  unless  their  owner  was  in  a  position  to 
prove  that  their  destination  was  innocent.  An  attempt  was  made  some  few  years  ago, 
in  the  unratified  Declaration  of  London,  to  formulate  some  definite  rules  upon  this  sub- 
ject, but  time  alone  can  show  whether  the  rules  there  laid  down  will  stand  the  test  of 
modern  warfare. 

The  rules  which  His  Majesty's  Government  published  in  the  Order  in  Council  of  the 
20th  August,  1914,  were  criticised  by  the  United  States  Government  as  contrary  to  the 
generally  recognized  principles  of  international  law,  and  as  inflicting  unnecessary  hard- 
ship upon  neutral  commerce,  and  Your  Excellency  will  remember  the  prolonged  discus- 
sion which  took  place  between  us  through  the  month  of  October  with  a  view  to  finding 
some  new  formulae  which  should  enable  us  to  restrict  supplies  to  the  enemy  forces,  and 
to  prevent  the  supply  to  the  enemy  of  materials  essential  for  the  making  of  munitions  of 
war,  while  inflicting  the  minimum  of  injury  and  interference  with  neutral  commerce.  It 
was  with  this  object  that  the  Order  in  Council  of  the  29th  October  was  issued,  under  the 
provisions  of  which  a  far  greater  measure  of  immunity  is  conferred  upon  neutral  com- 
merce. In  that  Order  the  principle  of  noninterference  with  conditional  contraband  on 
its  way  to  a  neutral  port  is  in  large  measure  admitted ;  only  in  three  cases  is  the  right 
to  seize  maintained,  and  in  all  those  cases  tJ'e  opportunity  is  given  to  the  claimant  of 
the  goods  to  establish  their  innocence. 

Two  of  those  cases  are  where  the  ship's  papers  afford  no  information  as  to  the  per- 
son for  whom  the  goods  are  intended.     It  is  only  reasonable  that  k  belligerent  should  be 


118  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

entitled  to  regard  as  suspicious  cases  where  the  shippers  of  the  goods  do  not  choose  to 
disclose  the  name  of  the  individual  who  is  to  receive  them.  The  third  case  is  that  of  goods 
addressed  to  a  person  in  the  enemy  territory.  In  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  pres- 
ent struggle,  where  the  forces  of  the  enemy  comprise  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  popu- 
lation, and  where  there  is  so  little  evidence  of  shipments  on  private  as  distinguished 
from  Government  account,  it  is  most  reasonable  that  the  burden  of  proof  should  rest  up- 
on the  claimant. 

The  most  difficult  questions  in  connection  with  conditional  contraband  arise  with 
reference  to  the  shipment  of  foodstuffs.  No  country  has  maintained  more  stoutly  than 
Great  Britain  in  modern  times  the  principle  that  a  belligerent  should  abstain  from  in- 
terference with  the  foodstuffs  intended  for  the  civil  population.  The  circumstances 
of  the  present  struggle  are  causing  His  Majesty's  Government  some  anxiety  as  to  wheth- 
er the  existing  rules  with  regard  to  conditional  contraband,  framed  as  they  were  with  the 
object  of  protecting  so  far  as  possible  the  supplies  which  were  intended  for  the  civil 
population,  are  effective  for  the  purpose,  or  suitable  to  the  conditions  present.  The 
principle  which  I  have  indicated  above  is  one  which  His  Majesty's  Government  have 
constantly  had  to  uphold  against  the  opposition  of  continental  powers.  In  the  absence 
of  some  certainty  that  the  rule  would  be  respected  by  both  parties  to  this  conflict,  we  feel 
great  doubt  whether  it  should  be  regarded  as  an  established  principle  of  international 
law. 

Your  Excellency  will,  no  doubt,  remember  that  in  1885,  at  the  time  when  His 
Majesty's  Government  were  discussing  with  the  French  Government  this  question  of 
the  right  to  declare  foodstuffs  not  intended  for  the  military  forces  to  be  contraband,  and 
when  public  attention  had  been  drawn  to  the  matter,  the  Kiel  Chamber  of  Commerce  ap- 
plied to  the  German  Government  for  a  statement  of  the  latter's  views  on  the  subject. 
Prince  Bismarck's  answer  was  as  follows : 

In  answer  to  their  representation  of  the  ist  instant,  I  reply  to  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  that  any  disad- 
vantage our  commercial  and  carrying  interests  may  suffer  by  the  treatment  of  rice  as  contraband  of  war  does 
not  justify  our  opposing  a  measure  which  it  has  been  thought  fit  to  take  in  carrying  on  a  foreign  war.  Every 
war  is  a  calamity,  which  entails  evil  consequences  not  only  on  the  combatants,  but  also  on  neutrals.  These 
evils  may  easily  be  increased  by  the  interference  of  a  neutral  power  with  the  way  in  which  a  third  carries  on  the 
war,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  subjects  of  the  interfering  power,  and  by  this  means  German  commerce  might 
be  weighted  with  far  heavier  losses  than  a  transitory  prohibition  of  the  rice  trade  in  Chinese  waters.  The  meas- 
ure in  question  has  for  its  object  the  shortening  of  the  war  by  increasing  the  difficulties  of  the  enemy,  and  is  a 
justifiable  step  in  war  if  impartially  enforced  against  all  neutral  ships. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  disposed  to  think  that  the  same  view  is  still  main- 
tained by  the  German  Government. 

Another  circumstance  which  is  now  coming  to  light  is  that  an  elaborate  machinery 
has  been  organized  by  the  enemy  for  the  supply  of  foodstuffs  for  the  iise  of  the  German 
army  from  overseas.  Under  these  circumstances  it  would  be  absurd  to  give  any  definite 
pledge  that  in  cases  where  the  supplies  can  be  proved  to  be  for  the  use  of  the  enemy 
forces  they  should  be  given  complete  immunity  by  the  simple  expedient  of  dispatching 
them  to  an  agent  in  a  neutral  port. 

The  reason  for  drawing  a  distinction  between  foodstuffs  intended  for  the  civil  popu- 
lation and  those  for  the  armed  forces  or  enemy  Government  disappears  when  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  civil  population  and  the  armed  forces  itself  disappears. 

In  any  country  in  Avhich  there  exists  such  a  tremendous  organization  for  war  as  now 
obtains  in  Germany  there  is  no  clear  division  between  those  whom  the  Government  is  re- 
sponsible for  feeding  and  those  whom  it  is  not.  Experience  shows  that  the  power  to  re- 
quisition will  be  used  to  the  fullest  extent  in  order  to  make  sure  that  the  wants  of  the 
military  are  supplied,  and  however  much  goods  may  be  imported  for  civil  use  it  is  by 
the  military  that  they  will  be  consumed  if  military  exigencies  require  it,  especially  now 
that  the  German  Government  have  taken  control  of  all  the  foodstuffs  in  the  country. 

I  do  not  wish  to  overburden  this  note  with  statistics,  but  in  proof  of  my  statement  as 
to  the  unprecedented  extent  to  which  supplies  are  reaching  neutral  ports  I  should  like  to 
instance  the  figures  of  the  exports  of  certain  meat  products  to  Denmark  during  the  months 
of  September  and  October.  Denmark  is  a  country  which  in  normal  times  imports  a 
certain  quantity  of  such  products,  but  exports  still  more.  In  1913,  during  the  above  two 
months,  the  United  States  exports  of  lard  to  Denmark  were  nil,  as  compared  with  22,- 
652,598  pounds  in  the  same  two  months  of  1914.  The  corresponding  figures  with  regard 
to  bacon  were:  1913,  nil;  1914,  1,022,195  pounds;  canned  beef,  1913,  nil;  1914,  151,200 
pounds;  pickled  and  cured  beef,  1913,  42,901  pounds;  1914,  156,143  pounds;  pickled 
pork,  1913,  nil;  1914,  812,872  pounds. 

In  the  same  two  months  the  United  States  exported  to  Denmark  280,176  gallons  of 
mineral  lubricating  oil  in  1914  as  compared  with  179,252  in  1913;  to  Norway,  335,468 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  119 

gallons  in  1914,  as  against  151,179  gallons  in  1913;  to  Sweden,  896.193  gallons  in  1914, 
as  against  385,476  gallons  in  1913. 

I  have  already  mentioned  the  framing  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  the  20tli  October, 
and  the  transmission  to  your  Excellency  of  particulars  of  ships  and  cargoes  seized  as  in- 
stances of  the  efforts  which  we  have  made  throughout  the  course  of  this  war  to  meet  all 
reasonable  complaints  made  on  behalf  of  American  citizens,  and  in  my  note  of  the  7th 
January  I  alluded  to  the  decision  of  our  prize  court  in  the  case  of  the  Miramichi,  as  evi- 
dencing the  liberal  principles  adopted  toward  neutral  commerce. 

I  should  also  like  to  refer  to  the  steps  which  we  took  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  to 
insure  the  speedy  release  of  cargo  claimed  by  neutrals  on  board  enemy  ships  which  were 
captured  or  detained  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  Under  our  prize  court  rules  release  of  such 
goods  can  be  obtained  without  the  necessity  of  entering  a  claim  in  the  prize  court  if 
the  documents  of  title  are  produced  to  the  officer  representing  His  Maesty's  Govern- 
ment, and  the  title  to  the  goods  is  established  to  his  satisfaction.  It  was  shortly  found, 
however,  that  this  procedure  did  not  provide  for  the  case  where  the  available  evidence 
was  so  scanty  that  the  officer  representing  the  Crown  was  not  justified  in  consenting  to 
a  release.  In  order,  therefore,  to  ameliorate  the  situation  we  established  a  special  com- 
mittee, with  full  powers  to  authorise  the  release  of  goods  without  insisting  on  full  evi- 
dence of  title  being  produced.  This  committee  dealt  with  the  utmost  expedition  with 
a  large  number  of  claims.  In  the  great  majority  of  cases  the  goods  claimed  were  re- 
leased at  once.  In  addition  to  the  cases  dealt  with  by  this  committee  a  very  large  amount 
of  cargo  was  released  at  once  by  the  procurator  general  on  production  of  documents. 
Claimants  therefore  obtained  their  goods  without  the  necessity  of  applying  to  the  prize 
court  and  of  incurring  the  expense  involved  in  retaining  lawyers,  and  without  the  risk, 
which  was  in  some  cases  a  considerable  one,  of  the  goods  being  eventually  held  to  be 
enemy  property  and  condemned.  We  have  reason  to  know  that  our  action  in  this  mat- 
ter was  highly  appreciated  by  many  American  citizens. 

Another  instance  of  the  efforts  which  His  Majesty's  Government  have  made  to  deal 
as  leniently  as  possible  with  neutral  interests  may  be  found  in  the  policy  which  we  have 
followed  with  regard  to  the  transfer  to  a  neutral  flag  of  enemy  ships  belonging  to  com- 
panies which  were  incorporated  in  the  enemy  country,  but  all  of  whose  shareholders  were 
neutral.  The  rules  applied  by  the  British  and  by  the  American  prize  courts  have  always 
treated  the  flag  as  conclusive  in  favour  of  tbe  captors  in  spite  of  neutral  propriety  inter- 
ests (see  the  case  of  the  Pedro,  175  U.  S.,  354).  In  several  cases,  however,  we  have  con- 
sented to  waive  our  belligerent  rights  to  treat  as  enemy  vessels  ships  belonging  to  com- 
panies incorporated  in  Germany  which  were  subsidiary  to  and  owned  by  American  cor- 
porations. The  only  condition  which  we  have  imposed  is  that  these  vessels  should  take 
no  further  part  in  trade  with  the  enemy  country. 

I  have  given  these  indications  of  the  policy  which  we  have  followed,  because  I  can- 
not help  feeling  that  if  the  facts  were  more  fully  known  as  to  the  efforts  which  we  have 
made  to  avoid  inflicting  any  avoidable  injury  on  neutral  interests,  many  of  the  com- 
plaints which  have  been  received  by  the  administration  in  Washington,  and  which  led  to 
the  protest  which  Your  Excellency  handed  to  me  on  the  29th  December  would  never 
have  been  made.  My  hope  is  that  when  the  facts  which  I  have  set  out  above  are  realised, 
and  when  it  is  seen  that  our  naval  operations  have  not  diminished  American  trade  with 
neutral  countries,  and  that  the  lines  on  which  we  have  acted  are  consistent  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  international  law,  it  will  be  apparent  to  the  Government  and 
people  of  the  United  States  that  His  Majesty's  Government  have  hitherto  endeavoured 
to  exercise  their  belligerent  rights  with  every  possible  consideration  for  the  interests  of 
neutrals. 

It  will  still  be  our  endeavour  to  avoid  injury  and  loss  to  neutrals,  but  the  announce- 
ment by  the  German  Government  of  their  intention  to  sink  merchant  vessels  and  their 
cargoes  without  verification  of  their  nationality  or  character,  and  without  making  any 
provision  for  the  safety  of  non-combatant  crews  or  giving  them  a  chance  of  saving  their 
lives,  has  made  it  necessary  for  His  Majesty's  Government  to  consider  what  measures 
they  should  adopt  to  protect  their  interests.  It  is  impossible  for  one  belligerent  to  de- 
part from  rules  and  precedents  and  for  the  other  to  remain  bound  by  them. 

I  have  the  honour,  etc.,  etc.,  (Signed)  E.  Grey. 

To  His  Excellency 

The  Honourable  W.  H.  Page 
etc.,  etc.,  etc. 


120  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Dbpaktment  of  State, 
Washington,  February  15,  1915. 

The  department  notes  that  you  have  been  informed  by  the  British  Government  that 
the  cargo  of  the  American  steamer  Wilhelmlna  has  been  sent  to  prize  court,  but  is  not 
yet  unloaded.  The  Government  of  the  United  States,  of  course,  has  no  intention  of  inter- 
fering with  the  proper  course  of  judicial  procedure  in  the  British  prize  courts,  but  deems 
it  proper  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  British  Government  information  which  has  been 
received  in  relation  to  the  character  and  destination  of  the  cargo  and  to  point  out  certain 
considerations  prompting  the  supposition  that  the  seizure  may  not  be  justified. 

This  Government  is  informed  that  the  W.  L.  Green  Commission  Company,  an 
American  corporation  organized  in  1891,  which  in  the  past  has  made  extensive  ship- 
ments of  goods  to  Germany,  is  the  sole  owner  of  the  cargo  which  consists  entirely  of 
foodstuffs  consigned  to  the  W.  L.  Green  Commission  Company,  Hamburg,  and  that  the 
Company's  manager,  now  in  Europe,  has  instructions  to  sell  the  cargo  solely  to  the  civ- 
ilian population  of  Hamburg.  A  copy  of  the  ship's  manifest  has  been  submitted  to  this 
Government,  accompanied  by  a  sworn  statement  from  the  Company's  manager  in  which 
he  represents  that  he  was  instructed  to  proceed  to  Germany  to  dispose  of  the  cargo  to 
private  purchasers  in  that  country,  and  not  to  any  belligerent  government  nor  armed 
forces  of  such  government,  nor  to  any  agent  of  a  belligerent  government  or  of  its  armed 
forces. 

According  to  well-established  practice  among  nations,  admitted,  as  this  Government 
understands,  by  the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  the  articles  of  which  the  Wilhelmina's 
cargo  is  said  to  consist,  are  subject  to  seizure  as  contraband  only  in  case  they  are 
destined  for  the  use  of  a  belligerent  government  or  its  armed  forces.  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  understands  that  the  British  authorities  consider  the  seizure  of  the 
cargo  justified  on  the  ground  that  a  recent, order  of  the  Federal  Council  of  Germany, 
promulgated  after  the  vessel  sailed,  required  the  delivery  of  imported  articles  to  the  Ger- 
man Government.  The  owners  of  the  cargo  have  represented  to  this  Government  that 
such  a  position  is  untenable.  They  point  out  that,  by  a  provision  of  the  order  in  ques- 
tion as  originally  announced,  the  regulations  in  relation  to  the  seizure  of  food  products 
are  made  inapplicable  to  such  products  imported  after  January  thirty-one,  nineteen 
fifteen.  They  further  represent  that  the  only  articles  shipped  on  the  Wilhelmina  which 
are  embraced  within  the  terms  of  these  regulations  are  wheat  and  bran,  which  constitute 
about  fifteen  per  centum  of  the  cargo  as  compared  with  eighty-five  per  centum  consist- 
ing of  meats,  vegetables,  and  fruits.  The  owners  also  assert  that  the  regulations  con- 
template the  disposition  of  foodstuffs  to  individuals  through  municipalities;  that  mu- 
nicipalities are  not  agents  of  the  Government,  and  that  the  purpose  of  the  regulations 
is  to  conserve  the  supply  of  food  products  and  to  prevent  speculation  and  inflation  of 
prices  to  noncombatants. 

The  German  Government  has  addressed  a  formal  communication  to  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  in  relation  to  the  effect  of  the  decree  issued  by  the  German  Fed- 
eral Council,  and  this  Government  deems  it  pertinent  to  call  to  the  attention  of  the 
British  Government  a  material  portion  of  this  communication,  which  is  as  follows: 

"1.  The  Federal  Council's  decision  concerning  the  seizure  of  food  products,  which 
England  alleges  to  be  the  cause  of  food  products  shipped  to  Germany  being  treated  as 
contraband,  bears  exclusively  on  wheat,  rye,  both  unmixed  and  mixed  with  other  prod- 
ucts, and  also  wheat,  rye,  oats,  and  barley  flour. 

"2.  The  Federal  Council  makes  an  express  exception  in  section  forty-five  of  the 
order.  Section  forty-five  provides  as  follows :  The  stipulations  of  this  regulation  do  not 
apply  to  grain  or  flour  imported  from  abroad  after  January  thirty-one. 

"3.  Conjunctively  with  that  saving  clause  the  Federal  Council's  order  contains  a 
provision  under  which  imported  cereals  and  flours  would  be  sold  exclusively  to  the  mu- 
nicipalities or  certain  specially  designated  organizations  by  the  importers.  Although 
that  provision  had  for  its  object  simply  to  throw  imported  grain  and  flours  into  such 
channels  as  supply  the  private  consumption  of  civilians  and,  in  consequence  of  that 
provision,  the  intent  and  purpose  of  the  Federal  Council's  order  which  was  to  protect 
the  civilian  population  from  speculators  and  engrossers  were  fully  met,  it  was  neverthe- 
less rescinded  so  as  to  leave  no  room  for  doubt. 

"4.  My  Government  is  amenable  to  any  proposition  looking  to  control  by  a  special 
American  organization  under  the  supervision  of  the  American  Consular  oflBcers  and,  if 
necessary,  will  itself  make  a  proposition  in  that  direction. 

"5.  The  German  Government  further  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  municipalities 
do  not  form  part  of  or  belong  to  the  Government,  but  are  self  administrative  bodies, 
which  are  elected  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  commune  in  accordance  with  fixed  rules  and 
therefore  exclusively  represent  the  private  part  of  the  population  and  act  as  it  directs. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  121 

Although  those  principles  are  generally  known  and  obtain  in  the  United  States  as  well 
as  in  England  itself,  the  German  Government  desired  to  point  out  the  fact  so  as  to  avoid 
any  further  unnecessary  delay. 

"6.  Hence  it  is  absolutely  assured  that  imported  food  products  will  be  consumed  by 
the  civilian  population  in  Germany  exclusively." 

It  will  be  observed  that  it  is  stated  in  this  communication,  which  appears  to  confirm 
the  contentions  of  the  cargo  owners,  that  a  part  of  the  order  of  the  German  Federal 
Council  relating  to  imported  food  products  has  now  been  rescinded. 

This  Government  has  received  another  communication  from  the  German  Govern- 
ment giving  formal  assurance  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  that  all  goods  im- 
ported into  Germany  from  the  United  States  directly  or  indirectly,  which  belong  to  the 
class  of  relative  contraband,  such  as  foodstuffs,  will  not  be  used  by  the  German  army  or 
navy  or  by  Government  authorities,  but  will  be  left  to  the  free  consumption  of  the  Ger- 
man civilian  population,  excluding  all  Government  purveyors. 

If  the  British  authorities  have  not  in  their  possession  evidence,  other  than  that  pre- 
sented to  this  Government  as  to  the  character  and  destination  of  the  cargo  of  the  Wil- 
lielmina,  sufficient  to  warrant  the  seizure  of  this  cargo,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  hopes  that  the  British  Government  will  release  the  vessel  together  with  her  cargo 
and  allow  her  to  proceed  to  her  port  of  destination. 

Please  communicate  with  the  British  Government  in  the  sense  of  the  foregoing. 

Beyan. 


German  note,  February  15,  1915,  in  reference  to  the  proclamation  of  January  25, 
concerning  foodstuffs* 

The  German  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

1.  The  Federal  Council's  decision  concerning  the  seizure  of  food  products  which 
England  alleges  to  be  the  cause  of  food  products  shipped  to  Germany  being  treated  as 
contraband,  is  exclusively  on  "wheat,  rye,  both  unmixed  and  mixed  with  other  products," 
and  also  "wheat,  rye,  oats,  and  barley  flour." 

2.  The  Federal  Council  makes  an  express  exception  in  Section  45  of  the  order. 
Section  45  pi'ovides  as  follow:s:  "The  stipulations  of  this  regulation  do  not  apply  to  grain 
or  flour  imported  from  abroad  after  January  31." 

3.  Conjunctively  with  that  saving  clause,  the  Federal  Council's  order  contains  a 
provision  under  which  imported  cereals  and  flours  could  be  sold  exclusively  to  the  munici- 
palities of  certain  specially  designated  organizations  by  the  importers.  Although  that  pro- 
vision had  for  its  object  simply  to  throw  imported  grain  and  flour  into  such  channels  as 
supply  the  private  consumption  of  civilians,  and,  in  consequence  of  that  provision,  the  in- 
tent and  purpose  of  the  Federal  Council's  order  which  was  to  protect  the  civilian  popula- 
tion from  speculators  and  engrossers,  were  fully  met,  it  was  nevertheless  rescinded  so  as 
to  leave  no  room  for  doubt. 

4.  My  Government  is  amenable  to  any  proposition  looking  to  control  by  a  special 
American  organization  under  the  supervision  of  the  American  Consular  officers,  and,  if 
necessary,  will  itself  make  a  proposition  in  that  direction. 

5.  The  German  Government  further  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  municipalities 
do  not  form  part  of  or  belong  to  the  Government,  but  are  "self-administrative  bodies," 
which  are  elected  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  commune  in  accordance  with  fixed  rules,  and, 
therefore,  exclusively  represent  the  private  part  of  the  population  and  act  as  it  directs. 
Although  these  principles  are  generally  known  and  obtain  in  the  United  States,  as  well 
as  in  England  itself,  the  German  Government  desired  to  point  out  the  fact  so  as  to  avoid 
any  further  unnecessary  delay. 

6.  Hence  it  is  absolutely  assured  that  imported  food  products  will  be  consumed  by 
the  civilian  population  in  Germany  exclusively,  and  there  remains  no  doubt  upon  which 
England  can  prevent  the  exportation  of  food  products  from  America  to  Germany  for  the 
use  of  civilians. 

The  Imperial  Government  expresses  the  firm  hope  that  the  American  Government 
will  stand  on  its  right  in  this  matter. 


German  statement,  February  15, 1915,  in  regard  to  armed  British  merchantmen,  the 
use  of  neutral  flags  and  the  mining  of  the  war  zoneA 

Paraphrase  of  a  note  from  the  German  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
According  to  absolutely  reliable  information  British  merchant  ships  intend  to  op- 


*  Not  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence,   but   referred  to   in   preceding   note. 
tNot  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  etc.     The  New  York  Times,  February  l6,  1915. 


122  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

pose  armed  resistance  to  German  men-of-war  in  the  area  declared  as  war  zone  by  the  Ger- 
man Admiralty. 

Some  of  these  ships  were  already  armed  with  British  naval  guns.  Now  all  the 
others  are  speedily  being  equipped  in  a  similar  way.  Merchant  ships  have  been  in- 
structed to  sail  in  groups,  and  to  ram  German  submarines,  while  the  examination  is  pro- 
ceeding, or  should  the  submarines  lie  alongside,  to  throw  bombs  upon  them,  or  else  to 
attempt  to  overpower  the  examining  party  coming  on  board. 

A  very  high  premium  has  been  offered  for  the  destruction  of  the  first  German  sub- 
marine by  a  British  merchant  vessel.  Therefore,  British  merchant  ships  cannot  any  more 
be  considered  as  undefended,  so  that  they  may  be  attacked  by  German  war  vessels  without 
warning  or  search.  The  British  admitted  that  instructions  had  been  given  to  misuse  neu- 
tral flags.  It  is  almost  certain  that  British  merchant  vessels  will  by  all  means  try  to  con- 
ceal their  identity.  Thereby,  It  also  becomes  almost  impossible  to  ascertain  the  Identity 
of  neutral  ships,  unless  they  sail  in  daylight  under  convoy,  as  all  measures  suggested  by 
neutrals,  for  instance,  painting  of  the  ships,  in  the  national  colors,  may  be  promptly  imi- 
tated by  British  ships.  The  attacks  to  be  expected  by  masked  British  merchant  vessels 
make  a  search  impossible,  as  the  examining  party  and  the  submarines  themselves  would 
thereby  be  exposed  to  destruction. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  safety  of  neutral  shipping  in  the  war  zone  around  the 
British  Isles  is  seriously  threatened.  There  is  also  an  increased  danger  resulting  from 
mines,  as  these  will  be  laid  in  the  war  zone  to  a  great  extent.  Accordingly,  neutral  ships 
are  urgently  warned  against  entering  that  area,  while  the  course  around  Scotland  will  be 
safe. 

Germany  has  been  compelled  to  resort  to  this  kind  of  warfare  by  the  murderous 
ways  of  British  naval  warfare,  which  aims  at  the  destruction  of  legitimate  neutral  trade 
and  at  the  starvation  of  the  German  people.  Germany  will  be  obliged  to  adhere  to  these  an- 
nounced principles  till  England  submits  to  the  recognized  rules  of  warfare,  established  by 
the  Declarations  of  Paris  and  London,  or  till  she  is  compelled  to  do  so  by  the  neutral 
powers. 


The  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  Gerard. 

Berlin,  February  16,  1915. 

In  reference  to  the  note  of  the  twelfth  instant,  Foreign  Oflfice  number  twenty-two 
sixty,  relative  to  the  German  measures  respecting  the  theater  of  war  in  the  waters 
surrounding  England,  the  undersigned  has  the  honor  to  reply  to  His  Excellency  the 
Ambassador  of  the  United  States,  James  W.  Gerard,  as  follows : 

The  Imperial  German  Government  have  examined  the  communication  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  in  the  same  spirit  of  good  will  and  friendship  which  seems 
to  have  prompted  this  communication. 

The  Imperial  German  Government  are  in  entire  accord  with  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  that  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  desirable  for  all  parties  to  avoid  the  mis- 
understanding which  might  arise  from  the  measures  announced  by  the  German  Admi- 
ralty and  to  avert  the  intrusion  of  events  calculated  to  interrupt  the  most  friendly  rela- 
tions which  have  so  happily  existed  between  the  two  Governments  up  to  this  time. 

On  this  assurance  the  German  Government  believe  that  they  may  depend  on  full 
understanding  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  all  the  more  because  the  action  announced 
by  the  German  Admiralty,  as  was  dwelt  upon  at  length  in  the  note  of  the  fourth  instant, 
is  in  no  wise  directed  against  the  legitimate  trade  and  navigation  of  neutral  states,  but 
merely  represents  an  act  of  self-defense  which  Germany's  vital  interests  force  her  to  take 
against  England's  method  of  conducting  maritime  war  in  defiance  of  international  law, 
which  no  protest  on  the  part  of  neutrals  has  availed  to  bring  into  accordance  with  the 
legal  status  generally  recognized  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

In  order  to  exclude  all  possible  doubt  on  this  cardinal  point  the  German  Govern- 
ment beg  to  set  forth  once  more  the  actual  situation. 

Up  to  now  Germany  has  scrupulously  observed  the  existing  provisions  of  interna- 
tional law  relative  to  maritime  war.  In  particular  she  assented  without  delay  to  the 
proposal  made  by  the  American  Government  directly  after  the  war  began  to  ratify  the 
Declaration  of  London  and  embodied  the  contents  thereof  without  change  in  her  prize 
law,  even  without  formally  binding  herself  in  this  direction.  The  German  Government 
have  adhered  to  these  provisions,  even  where  they  conflicted  with  military  interests. 
Our  Government  at  the  same  time  have  permitted  the  supply  of  food  by  Denmark  to 
England  until  the  present,  although  they  could  well  have  prevented  this  traffic  by  means 
of  their  naval  forces. 

In  direct  opposition  to  this,  England  has  not  shrunk  from  grave  violations  of  inter- 
national law  wherever  she  could  thereby  cripple  Germany's  peaceable  trade  with  neutral 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  123 

countries.  It  will  not  be  necessary  for  the  German  Government  to  go  into  great  detail  on 
this  point,  especially  since  the  American  note  to  the  British  Government  dated  Decem- 
ber twenty-eighth,  nineteen  fourteen,  which  has  been  brought  to  their  knowledge,  has 
dealt  with  this  point  very  aptly  if  not  very  exhaustively  on  the  ground  of  the  experiences 
of  months. 

It  is  conceded  that  the  intention  of  all  these  aggressions  is  to  cut  off  Germany  from 
all  supplies  and  thereby  to  deliver  up  to  death  by  famine  a  peaceful  civilian  population, 
a  procedure  contrary  to  the  laws  of  war  and  every  dictate  of  humanity. 

The  neutrals  have  not  been  able  to  prevent  this  interception  of  different  kinds  of 
trade  with  Germany  contrary  to  international  law.  It  is  true  that  the  American  Gov- 
ernment have  protested  against  England's  procedure,  and  Germany  is  glad  to  acknowl- 
edge this,  but  in  spite  of  this  protest  and  the  protests  of  the  other  neutral  Governments 
England  has  not  allowed  herself  to  be  dissuaded  from  the  course  originally  adopted. 
Thus,  the  American  ship  Wilhelmina  was  recently  brought  into  port  by  England, 
although  her  cargo  was  destined  solely  for  the  civil  population  of  Germany  and  was  to 
be  used  only  for  this  purpose  according  to  an  express  declaration  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment. 

In  this  way  the  following  has  been  created :  Germany  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
cut  off  from  oversea  supplies  with  the  toleration,  tacit  or  protesting,  of  the  neutrals 
regardless  of  whether  it  is  a  question  of  goods  which  are  absolute  contraband,  or  only 
conditional  contraband,  or  not  contraband  at  all,  following  the  law  generally  recognized 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  On  the  other  hand  England  with  the  indulgence  of 
neutral  Governments  is  not  only  being  provided  with  such  goods  as  are  not  contraband 
or  merely  conditional  contraband,  namely,  foodstuffs,  raw  material,  et  cetera,  although 
these  are  treated  by  England  when  Germany  is  in  question  as  absolute  contraband,  but 
also  with  goods  which  have  been  regularly  and  unquestionably  acknowledged  to  be  abso- 
lute contraband.  The  German  Government  believe  that  they  are  obliged  to  point  out 
very  particularly  and  with  the  greatest  emphasis,  that  a  trade  in  arms  exists  between 
American  manufacturers  and  Germany's  enemies  which  is  estimated  at  many  hundred 
million  marks. 

The  German  Government  have  given  due  recognition  to  the  fact  that  as  a  matter  of 
form  the  exercise  of  rights  and  the  toleration  of  wrong  on  the  part  of  neutrals  is  limited 
by  their  pleasure  alone  and  involves  no  formal  breach  of  neutrality.  The  German  Gov- 
ernment have  not  in  consequence  made  any  charge  of  formal  breach  of  neutrality.  The 
German  Government  can  not,  however,  do  otherwise,  especially  in  the  interest  of  abso- 
lute clearness  in  the  relations  between  the  two  countries,  than  to  emphasize  that  they, 
in  common  with  the  public  opinion  in  Germany,  feel  themselves  placed  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage through  the  fact  that  the  neutral  powers  have  hitherto  achieved  no  success  or 
only  an  unmeaning  success  in  their  assertion  of  the  right  to  trade  with  Germany, 
acknowledged  to  be  legitimate  by  international  law,  whereas  they  make  unlimited  use  of 
their  right  to  tolerate  trade  in  contraband  with  England  and  our  other  enemies.  Con- 
ceded that  it  is  the  formal  right  of  neutrals  not  to  protect  their  legitimate  trade  with 
Germany  and  even  to  allow  themselves  knowingly  and  willingly  to  be  induced  by  Eng- 
land to  restrict  such  trade,  it  is  on  the  other  hand  not  less  their  good  right,  although 
unfortunately  not  exercised,  to  stop  trade  in  contraband,  especially  the  trade  in  arms, 
with  Germany's  enemies. 

In  view  of  this  situation  the  German  Government  see  themselves  compelled,  after 
six  months  of  patience  and  watchful  waiting,  to  meet  England's  murderous  method  of 
conducting  maritime  war  with  drastic  counter  measures.  If  England  invokes  the  powers 
of  famine  as  an  ally  in  its  struggle  against  Germany  with  the  intention  of  leaving  a  civ- 
ilized people  the  alternative  of  perishing  in  misery  or  submitting  to  the  yoke  of 
England's  political  and  commercial  will,  the  German  Government  are  to-day  determined 
to  take  up  the  gauntlet  and  to  appeal  to  the  same  grim  ally.  They  rely  on  the  neutrals 
who  have  hitherto  tacitly  or  under  protest  submitted  to  the  consequences,  detrimental  to 
themselves,  of  England's  war  of  famine  to  display  not  less  tolerance  toward  Germany, 
even  if  the  German  measures  constitute  new  forms  of  maritime  war,  as  has  hitherto 
been  the  case  with  the  English  measures. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  German  Government  are  determined  to  suppress  with  all 
the  means  at  their  disposal  the  supply  of  war  material  to  England  and  her  allies  and 
assume  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  a  matter  of  course  that  the  neutral  Governments 
which  have  hitherto  undertaken  no  action  against  the  trade  in  arms  with  Germany's 
enemies  do  not  intend  to  oppose  the  forcible  suppression  of  this  trade  by  Germany. 

Proceeding  from  these  points  of  view,  the  German  Admiralty  has  declared  the  zone 
prescribed  by  it  the  seat  of  war;  it  will  obstruct  this  area  of  maritime  war  by  mines 
wherever  possible  and  also  endeavor  to  destroy  the  merchant  vessels  of  the  enemy  in  any 
other  way. 


124  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

It  is  very  far  indeed  from  the  intention  of  the  German  Government,  acting  in  obedi- 
ence to  these  compelling  circumstances,  ever  to  destroy  neutral  lives  and  neutral  prop- 
erty, but  on  the  other  hand  they  can  not  be  blind  to  the  fact  that  dangers  arise  through 
the  action  to  be  carried  out  against  England  which  menace  without  discrimination  all 
trade  within  the  area  of  maritime  war.  This  applies  as  a  matter  of  course  to  war  mines^ 
which  place  any  ship  approaching  a  mined  area  in  danger,  even  if  the  limits  of  interna- 
tional law  are  adhered  to  most  strictly. 

The  German  Government  believe  that  they  are  all  the  more  justified  in  the  hope 
that  the  neutral  powers  will  become  reconciled  with  this,  just  as  they  have  with  the 
serious  injury  caused  them  thus  far  by  England's  measures,  because  it  is  their  will  to 
do  everything  in  any  way  compatible  with  the  accomplishment  of  their  purpose  for  the 
protection  of  neutral  shipping  even  within  the  area  of  maritime  war. 

They  furnish  the  first  proof  of  their  good  will  by  announcing  the  measures  intended 
by  them  at  a  time  not  less  than  two  weeks  beforehand,  in  order  to  give  neutral  shipping 
an  opportunity  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements  to  avoid  the  threatening  danger. 
The  safest  method  of  doing  this  is  to  stay  away  from  the  area  of  maritime  war.  Neutral 
ships  entering  the  closed  waters  in  spite  of  this  announcement,  given  so  far  in  advance, 
and  which  seriously  impairs  the  accomplishment  of  the  military  purpose  against  Eng- 
land, bear  their  own  responsibility  for  any  unfortunate  accidents.  The  German  Govern- 
ment on  their  side  expressly  decline  all  responsibility  for  such  accidents  and  their 
consequences. 

Furthermore,  the  German  Government  announced  merely  the  destruction  of  enemy 
merchant  vessels  found  within  the  area  of  maritime  war,  and  not  the  destruction  of  all 
merchant  vessels,  as  the  American  Government  appear  to  have  erroneously  understood. 
This  limitation  which  the  German  Government  have  imposed  upon  themselves  impairs 
the  military  purpose,  especially  since  the  presumption  will  prevail,  even  in  the  case  of 
neutral  ships,  that  they  have  contraband  on  board,  in  view  of  the  interpretation  of  the 
idea  of  contraband  in  which  the  English  Government  have  indulged  as  regards  Germany 
and  which  the  German  Government  will  accordingly  apply  against  England. 

Naturally  the  Imperial  Government  are  not  willing  to  waive  the  right  to  establish 
the  presence  of  contraband  in  the  cargoes  of  neutral  ships  and,  in  cases  requiring  it,  to 
take  any  action  necessary  on  the  grounds  established.  Finally  the  German  Government 
are  prepared  to  accord,  in  conjunction  with  the  American  Government,  the  most  earnest 
consideration  to  any  measure  that  might  be  calculated  to  insure  the  safety  of  legitimate 
shipping  of  neutrals  within  the  seat  of  war.  They  can  not,  however,  overlook  the  fact 
that  all  efforts  in  this  direction  are  considerably  hampered  by  two  circumstances :  First, 
by  the  misuse  of  the  neutral  flag  by  Englisli  merchant  vessels,  which  in  the  meantime 
has  probably  been  established  beyond  a  doubt  by  the  American  Government  likewise. 
Second,  by  the  above-mentioned  trade  in  contraband,  especially  war  materials,  by  neutral 
merchant  vessels.  In  regard  to  the  latter  point,  the  German  Government  ventures  to 
hope  that  the  American  Government  upon  reconsideration  will  see  their  way  clear  to  a 
measure  of  intervention  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  true  neutrality. 

As  regards  the  first  point,  the  secret  order  of  the  British  Admiralty  has  already 
been  communicated  to  the  American  Government  by  Germany.  It  recommends  English 
merchant  vessels  to  use  neutral  flags  and  has  in  the  meantime  been  confirmed  by  a  state- 
ment of  the  British  Foreign  Office  which  refers  to  the  municipal  law  of  England  and 
characterizes  such  action  as  quite  unobjectionable.  The  English  merchant  marine  has  fol- 
lowed this  counsel  without  delay,  as  is  probably  known  to  the  American  Government, 
from  the  cases  of  the  Lusitania  and  Laertes.  Moreover,  the  British  Government  have 
armed  English  merchant  vessels  and  instructed  them  to  resist  by  force  the  German  sub- 
marines. In  these  circumstances  it  is  very  difficult  for  the  German  submarines  to  rec- 
ognize neutral  merchant  vessels  as  such,  for  even  a  search  will  not  be  possible  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  since  the  attacks  to  be  anticipated  in  the  case  of  a  disguised  English 
ship  would  expose  the  commanders  conducting  a  search  and  the  boat  itself  to  the  danger 
of  destruction. 

The  British  Government  would  then  be  in  a  position  to  render  the  German  measures 
illusory  if  their  merchant  marine  persists  in  the  misuse  of  neutral  flags  and  neutral 
vessels  are  not  marked  in  some  other  manner  admitting  of  no  possible  doubt.  Germany 
must,  in  the  exigency  into  which  she  has  unlawfully  been  forced,  make  her  measures 
effective  at  all  events  in  order  thereby  to  compel  her  adversary  to  conduct  maritime  war- 
fare in  accordance  with  international  law  and  thus  to  re-establish  the  freedom  of  the 
seas  which  she  has  ever  advocated  and  for  which  she  is  fighting  likewise  to-day. 

The  German  Government,  therefore,  welcomes  the  fact  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment have  made  representations  to  the  British  Government  relative  to  the  use  of  their 
flag  contrary  to  law  and  give  expression  to  the  expectation  that  this  action  will  cause 
England  to  respect  the  American  flag  in  future. 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  125 

In'  this  expectation  the  commanders  of  the  German  submarines  have  been  instructed, 
as  was  already  stated  in  the  note  of  fourth  instant,  to  abstain  from  violence  to  Ameri- 
can merchant  vessels  when  they  are  recognizable  as  such. 

In  order  to  meet  in  the  safest  manner  all  the  consequences  of  mistaking  an  Ameri- 
can for  a  hostile  merchant  vessel  the  German  Government  recommended  that  (although 
this  would  not  apply  in  the  case  of  danger  from  mines)  the  United  States  convoy  their 
ships  carrying  peaceable  cargoes  and  traversing  the  English  seat  of  maritime  war  in 
order  to  make  them  recognizable.  In  this  connection  the  German  Government  believe  it 
should  be  made  a  condition  that  only  such  ships  should  be  convoyed  as  carry  no  mer- 
chandise which  would  have  to  be  considered  as  contraband  according  to  the  interpreta- 
tion applied  by  England  against  Germany.  The  German  Government  are  prepared  to 
enter  into  immediate  negotiations  with  the  American  Government  relative  to  the  manner 
of  convoy.  They  would,  however,  be  particularly  grateful  if  the  American  Government 
would  urgently  advise  their  merchant  vessels  to  avoid  the  English  seat  of  maritime  war, 
at  any  rate  until  the  flag  question  is  settled. 

The  German  Government  resign  themselves  to  the  confident  hope  that  the  American 
Government  will  recognize  the  full  meaning  of  the  severe  struggle  which  Germany  is 
conducting  for  her  very  existence  and  will  gain  full  understanding  of  the  reasons  which 
prompt  Germany  and  the  aims  of  the  measures  announced  by  her  from  the  above  expla- 
nations and  promises. 

The  German  Government  repeat  that  in  the  scrupulous  consideration  for  neutrals 
hitherto  practiced  by  them  they  have  determined  upon  the  measures  planned  only  under 
the  strongest  compulsion  of  national  self-preservation.  Should  the  American  Govern- 
ment at  the  eleventh  hour  succeed  in  removing,  by  virtue  of  the  weight  which  they  have 
the  right  and  ability  to  throw  into  the  scales  of  the  fate  of  peoples,  the  reasons  which 
have  made  it  the  imperative  duty  of  the  German  Government  to  take  the  action  indi- 
cated, should  the  American  Government  in  particular  find  a  way  to  bring  about  the 
observation  of  the  Declaration  of  London  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  at  war  with  Germany 
and  thereby  to  render  possible  for  Germany  the  legitimate  supply  of  foodstuffs  and  in- 
dustrial raw  materials,  the  German  Government  would  recognize  this  as  a  service  which 
could  not  be  too  highly  estimated  in  favor  of  more  humane  conduct  of  war  and  would 
gladly  draw  the  necessary  conclusions  from  the  new  situation  thus  created. 

The  undersigned  requests  the  Ambassador  to  bring  the  above  to  the  attention  of 
the  American  Government  and  avails  himself  of  the  opportunity  to  renew,  et  cetera. 

Von  Jagow. 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy^ 
London,  February  19,  1915. 
Your  1105,  10th.     Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  handed  me  the  following  memorandum 
since  your  telegram  to  him  was  given  to  the  press  in  Washington.     I  consented  to  his 
proposal  to  give  this  memorandum  out  for  publication  in  Saturday  morning  newspapers : 

The  memorandum  communicated  on  the  nth  February  calls  attention  in  courteous  and  friendly  terms  to  the 
action  of  the  captain  of  the  British  S.  S.  Lusitania  in  raising  the  flag  of  the  United  States  of  America  when  ap- 
proaching British  waters  and  says  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  feel  a  certain  anxiety  in  consider- 
ing the  possibility  of  any  general  use  of  the  flag  of  the  United  States  by  British  vessels  traversing  those  waters 
since  the  effect  of  such  a  policy  might  be  to  bring  about  a  menace  to  the  lives  and  vessels  of  United  States  citizens. 

It  was  understood  that  the  German  Government  had  announced  their  intention  of  sinking  British  merchant 
vessels  at  sight  by  torpedoes  without  giving  any  opportunity  of  making  any  provision  for  saving  the  lives  of 
noncombatant  crews  and  passengers.  It  was  in  consequence  of  this  threat  that  the  Lusitania  raised  the  United 
States  flag  on  her  inward  voyage  and  on  her  subsequent  outward  voyage.  A  request  was  made  by  the  United 
States  passengers  who  were  embarking  on  board  her  that  the  United  States  flag  should  be  hoisted  presumably 
to  insure  their  safety.  Meanwhile  the  memorandum  from  Your  Excellency  had  been  received.  His  Majesty's 
Government  did  not  give  any  advice  to  the  company  as  to  how  to  meet  this  request  and  it  is  understood  that  the 
Lusitania  left  Liverpool  under  the  British   flag. 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  say  rhore  as  regards  the  Lusitania  in  particular  regard  to  the  use  of  foreign  flags  by 
merchant  vessels.  The  British  merchant  shipping  act  makes  it  clear  that  the  use  of  the  British  flag  by  foreign 
merchant  vessels  is  permitted  in  time  of  war  for  the  purpose  of  escaping  capture.  It  is  believed  that  in  the  case 
of  some  other  nations  there  is  a  similar  recognition  of  the  same  practice  with  regard  to  their  flags  and  that  none 
have  forbidden  it.  It  would  therefore  be  unreasonable  to  expect  His  Majesty's  Government  to  pass  legislation 
forbidding  the  use  of  foreign  flags  by  British  merchant  vessels  to  avoid  capture  by  the  enemy.  Now  that  the 
German  Government  have  announced  their  intention  to  sink  merchant  vessels  at  sight  with  their  noncombatant 
crews,  cargoes,  and  papers,  a  proceeding  hitherto  regarded  by  the  opinion  of  the  world  not  as  war,  but  as  piracy, 
it  is  felt  that  the  United  States  Government  could  not  fairly  ask  the  British  Government  to  order  British  mer- 
chant vessels  to  forego  the  means — always  hitherto  permitted — of  escaping  not  only  capture  but  the  much  worse 
fate  of  sinking  and  destruction.     Great  Britain  has  alwavs  when  neutral  accorded  to  the  vessels  of  other  States 


126  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

at  war  liberty  to  use  the  British  flag  as  a  means  of  protection  against  capture,  and  instances  are  on  record  when 
United  States  vessels  availed  themselves  of  this  facility  during  the  American  Civil  War.  It  would  be  contrary 
to  fair  expectation  if  now  when  the  conditions  are  reversed  the  United  States  and  neutral  nations  were  to  grudge 
to  British  ships  liberty  to  take  similar  action.  The  British  Government  have  no  intention  of  advising  their  mer- 
chant shipping  to  use  foreign  flags  as  general  practice  or  to  resort  to  them  otherwise  than  for  escaping  capture 
or  destruction. 

The  obligation  upon  a  belligerent  warship  to  ascertain  definitely  for  itself  the  nationality  and  character  of  a 
merchant  vessel  before  capturing  it  and  "a  fortiori"  before  sinking  and  destroying  it  has  been  universally  recog- 
nized. If  that  obligation  is  fulfilled,  hoisting  a  neutral  flag  on  board  a  British  vessel  cannot  possibly  endanger 
neutral  shipping  and  the  British  Government  hold  that  if  loss  to  neutrals  is  caused  by  disregard  of  this  obligation 
it  is  upon  the  enemy  vessel  disregarding  it  and  upon  the  Government  giving  orders  that  it  should  be  disregarded 
that  the  sole  responsibility  for  injury  to  neutrals  ought  to  rest. 

Page. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  February  19,  1915. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  handed  me  the  following  memorandum.    Since  your  tele- 
gram to  him  was  given  to  the  press  in  Washington  I  consented  to  his  proposal  to  give  this 
memorandum  out  for  publication  in  Saturday  morning's  newspapers : 

MEMORANDUM. 

The  communication  made  by  the  United  States  Ambassador  in  his  note  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  the  sixteenth 
instant  has  been  carefully  considered  and  the  following  observations  are  offered  in  reply: — 

2.  At  the  time  when  His  Majesty's  Government  gave  directions  for  the  seizure  of  the  cargo  of  the  steamship 
Wilhelmina  as  contraband  they  had  before  them  the  text  of  the  decree  made  by  the  German  Federal  Council  on 
the  twenty-fifth  January,  under  Article  forty-five  of  which  all  grain  and  flour  imported  into  Germany  after  the 
thirty-first  January  was  declared  deliverable  only  to  certain  organizations  under  direct  government  control  or  to 
municipal  authorities.  The  vessel  was  bound  for  Hamburg,  one  of  the  free  cities  of  the  German  Empire,  the  gov- 
ernment of  which  is  vested  in  the  municipality.  This  was  one  of  the  reasons  actuating  His  Majesty's  Government 
in  deciding  to  bring  the  cargo  of  the  Wilhelmina  before  the  prize  court. 

3.  Information  has  only  now  reached  them  that  by  a  subsequent  decree,  dated  the  sixth  February,  the 
above  provision  in  Article  forty-five  of  the  previous  decree  was  repealed,  it  would  appear  for  the  express  purpose 
of  rendering  difficult  the  anticipated  proceedings  against  the  Wilhelmina.  The  repeal  was  not  known  to  His 
Majesty's  Government  at  the  time  of  detention  of  the  cargo,  or  indeed,  until  now. 

4.  How  far  the  ostensible  exception  of  imported  supplies  from  the  general  Government  monopoly  of  all  grain 
artd  flour  set  up  by  the  German  Government  may  affect  the  question  of  the  contraband  nature  of  the  shipment 
seized  is  a  matter  which  will  most  suitably  be  investigated  by  the  prize  court. 

5.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to  state  that  the  German  decree  is  not  the  only  ground  on  which  the  submission  of 
the  cargo  of  the  Wilhelmina  to  a  prize  court  is  justified.  The  German  Government  have  in  public  announcements 
claimed  to  treat  practically  every  town  or  port  on  the  English  east  coast  as  a  fortified  place- and  base  of  operations. 
On  the  strength  of  this  contention  they  have  subjected  to  bombardment  the  open  towns  of  Yarmouth,  Scarborough, 
and  Whitby,  among  others.  On  the  same  ground,  a  number  of  neutral  vessels  sailing  for  English  ports  on  the  east 
coast  with  cargoes  of  goods  on  the  German  list  of  conditional  contraband  have  been  seized  by  German  cruisers 
and  brought  before  the  German  prize  court.  Again,  the  Dutch  vessel  Maria,  having  sailed  from  California  with 
a  cargo  of  grain  consigned  to  Dublin  and  Belfast,  was  sunk  in  September  last  by  the  German  cruiser  Karlsruhe. 
This  could  only  have  been  justified  if,  among  other  things,  the  cargo  could  have  been  proved  to  be  destined  for 
the  British  Government  or  armed  forces  and  if  a  presumption  to  this  effect  had  been  established  owing  to  Dub- 
lin or  Belfast  being  considered  a  fortified  place  or  a  base  for  the  armed  forces. 

6.  The  German  Government  can  not  have  it  both  ways.  If  they  consider  themselves  justified  in  destroying 
by  bombardment  the  lives  and  property  of  peaceful  civil  inhabitants  of  English  open  towns  and  watering  places, 
and  in  seizing  and  sinking  ships  and  cargoes  of  conditional  contraband  on  the  way  thither,  on  the  ground  that 
they  were  consigned  to  a  fortified  place  or  base,  "a  fortiori"  His  Majesty's  Government  must  be  at  liberty 
to  treat  Hamburg,  which  is  in  part  protected  by  the  fortifications  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe,  as  a  fortified  town, 
and  a  base  of  operations  and  supply  for  the  purposes  of  Article  thirty-four  of  the  Declaration  of  London.  If  the 
owners  of  the  cargo  of  the  Wilhelmina  desire  to  question  the  validity  in  international  law  of  the  action  taken  by 
order  of  His  Majesty's  Government  they  will  have  every  opportunity  of  establishing  their  case  in  due  course 
before  the  prize  court,  and  His  Majesty's  Government  would,  in  this  connection,  recall  the  attention  of  the 
United  States  Government  to  the  considerations  put  forward  in  Sir  Edward  Grey's  note  to  Mr.  Page  of  the 
tenth  instant  as  to  the  propriety  of  awaiting  the  result  of  prize  court  proceedings  before  diplomatic  action  is 
initiated.  It  will  be  remembered  that  they  have  from  the  outset  given  a  definite  assurance  that  the  owners  of 
the  Wilhelmina,  as  well  as  the  owners  of  her  cargo,  if  found  to  be  contraband  would  be  equitably  idemnified. 

7.  There  is  one  further  observation  to  which  His  Majesty's  Government  think  it  right,  and  appropriate  in 
the  present  connection,  to  give  expression.  They  have  not,  so  far,  declared  foodstuffs  to  be  absolute  contraband. 
They  have  not  interfered  with  any  neutral  vessels  on  account  of  their  carrying  foodstuffs,  except  on  the  basis  of 
such  foodstuffs  being  liable  to  capture  if  destined  for  the  enemy  forces  or  governments.  In  so  acting  they  have 
been  guided  by  the  general  principle,  of  late  universally  upheld  by  civilized  nations,  and  observed  in  practice,  that 
the  civil  populations  of  countries  at  war  are  not  to  be  exposed  to  the  treatment  rightly  reserved  for  combatants. 
This  distinction  has  to  all  intents  and  purposes  been  swept  away  by  the  novel  doctrines  proclaimed  and  acted  upon 
by  the  German  Government. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  127 

8.  It  is  unnecessary  here  to  dwell  upon  the  treatment  that  has  been  meted  out  to  the  civil  population  of  Bel- 
gium, and  those  parts  of  France  which  are  in  German  occupation.  When  Germany,  long  before  any  mines  had 
been  laid  by  British  authorities,  proceeded  to  sow  mines  upon  the  high  seas,  and,  by  this  means,  sunk  a  consider- 
able number  not  only  of  British  but  also  of  neutral  merchantmen  with  their  unoffending  crews,  it  was,  so  His 
Majesty's  Government  held,  open  to  them  to  take  retaliatory  measures,  even  if  such  measures  were  of  a  kind  to 
involve  pressure  of  the  civil  population — not  indeed  of  neutral  states — but  of  their  enemies.  They  refrained  from 
doing  so. 

9.  When,  subsequently,  English  towns  and  defenseless  British  subjects,  including  women  and  children,  were 
deliberately  and  systematically  fired  upon  and  killed  by  ships  flying  the  flag  of  the  Imperial  German  Navy,  when 
quiet  country  towns  and  villages,  void  of  defenses,  and  possessing  no  military  or  naval  importance,  were  bom- 
barded by  German  airships.  His  Majesty's  Government  still  abstained  from  drawing  the  logical  consequences  from 
this  form  of  attack  on  defenseless  citizens.  Further  steps  in  the  same  direction  are  now  announced,  and  in  fact 
have  already  been  taken,  by  Germany.  British  merchant  vessels  have  been  torpedoed  at  sight  without  any  attempt 
being  made  to  give  warning  to  the  crew,  or  any  opportunity  being  given  to  save  their  lives,  a  torpedo  has  been  fired 
against  a  British  hospital  ship  in  daylight,  and  similar  treatment  is  threatened  to  all  British  merchant  vessels  in 
future  as  well  as  to  any  neutral  ships  that  may  happen  to  be  found  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  British  Isles. 

10.  Faced  with  this  situation,  His  Majesty's  Government  consider  it  would  be  altogether  unreasonable  that 
Great  Britain  and  her  allies  should  be  expected  to  remain  indefinitely  bound,  to  their  grave  detriment,  by  rules 
and  principles  of  which  they  recognize  the  justice  if  impartially  observed  as  between  belligerents,  but  which  are 
at  the  present  moment  openly  set  at  defiance  by  their  enemy. 

11.  If,  therefore,  His  Majesty's  Government  should  hereafter  feel  constrained  to  declare  foodstuffs  absolute 
contraband,  or  to  take  other  measures  for  interfering  with  German  trade,  by  way  of  reprisals,  they  confidently 
expect  that  such  action  will  not  be  challenged  on  the  part  of  neutral  states  by  appeals  to  laws  and  usages  of  war 
whose  validity  rests  on  their  forming  an  integral  part  of  that  system  of  international  doctrine  which  as  a  whole 
their  enemy  frankly  boasts  the  liberty  and  intention  to  disregard,  so  long  as  such  neutral  states  can  not  compel  the 
German  Government  to  abandon  methods  of  warfare  which  have  not  in  recent  history  been  regarded  as  having  the 
sanction  of  either  law  or  humanity. 

Page. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page} 

[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State^ 
Washington,  February  20,  1915. 

You  will  please  deliver  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  the  following  identic  note  which  we 
are  sending  England  and  Germany : 

In  view  of  the  correspondence  which  has  passed  between  this  Government  and 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  respectively,  relative  to  the  declaration  of  a  war  zone  by  the 
German  Admiralty  and  the  use  of  neutral  flags  by  British  merchant  vessels,  this  Gov- 
ernment ventures  to  express  the  hope  that  the  two  belligerent  Governments  may,  through 
reciprocal  concessions,  find  a  basis  for  agreement  which  will  relieve  neutral  ships  en- 
gaged in  peaceful  commerce  from  the  great  dangers  which  they  will  incur  in  the  high 
seas  adjacent  to  the  coasts  of  the  belligerents. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  respectfully  suggests  that  an  agreement  in 
terms  like  the  following  might  be  entered  into.  This  suggestion  is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
in  any  sense  a  proposal  made  by  this  Government,  for  it  of  course  fully  recognizes  that 
it  is  not  its  privilege  to  propose  terms  of  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many, even  though  the  matter  be  one  in  which  it  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  are 
directly  and  deeply  interested.  It  is  merely  venturing  to  take  the  liberty  which  it  hopes 
may  be  accorded  a  sincere  friend  desirous  of  embarrassing  neither  nation  involved  and 
of  serving,  if  it  may,  the  common  interests  of  humanity.  The  course  outlined  is  offered 
in  the  hope  that  it  may  draw  forth  the  views  and  elicit  the  suggestions  of  the  British 
and  German  Governments  on  a  matter  of  capital  interest  to  the  whole  world. 

Germany  and  Great  Britain  to  agree : 

1.  That  neither  will  sow  any  floating  mines,  whether  upon  the  high  seas  or  in  terri- 
torial waters ;  that  neither  will  plant  on  the  high  seas  anchored  mines  except  within  can- 
non range  of  harbors  for  defensive  purposes  only ;  and  that  all  mines  shall  bear  the  stamp 
of  the  Government  planting  them  and  be  so  constructed  as  to  become  harmless  if  sepa- 
rated from  their  moorings. 

2.  That  neither  will  use  submarines  to  attack  merchant  vessels  of  any  nationality 
except  to  enforce  the  right  of  visit  and  search. 

3.  That  each  will  re  quire  their  respective  merchant  vessels  not  to  use  neutral  flags 
for  the  purpose  of  disguise  or  ruse  de  guerre. 

Germany  to  agree: 

That  all  importations  of  food  or  foodstuffs  from  the  United  States  (and  from  such 
other  neutral  countries  as  may  ask  it)  into  Germany  shall  be  consigned  to  agencies  to 
be  designated  by  the  United  States  Government;  that  these  American  agencies  shall  have 

^  Same  to  the  American  Embassy  at  Berlin. 


128  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

entire  charge  and  control  without  interference  on  the  part  of  the  German  Government, 
of  the  receipt  and  distribution  of  such  importations,  and  shall  distribute  them  solely  to 
retail  dealers  bearing  licenses  from  the  German  Government  entitling  them  to  receive 
and  furnish  such  food  and  foodstuffs  to  noncombatants  only;  that  any  violation  of  the 
terms  of  the  retailers'  licenses  shall  work  a  forfeiture  of  their  rights  to  receive  such  food 
and  foodstuffs  for  this  purpose;  and  that  such  food  and  foodstuffs  will  not  be  requisi- 
tioned by  the  German  Government  for  any  purpose  whatsoever  or  be  diverted  to  the  use 
of  the  armed  forces  of  Germany. 

Great  Britain  to  agree : 

That  food  and  foodstuffs  will  not  be  placed  upon  the  absolute  contraband  list  and 
that  shipments  of  such  commodities  will  not  be  interfered  with  or  detained  by  British 
authorities  if  consigned  to  agencies  designated  by  the  United  States  Government  in 
Germany  for  the  receipt  and  distribution  of  such  cargoes  to  licensed  German  retailers 
for  distribution  solely  to  the  noncombatant  population. 

In  submitting  this  proposed  basis  of  agreement  this  Government  does  not  wish  to 
be  understood  as  admitting  or  denying  any  belligerent  or  neutral  right  established  by 
the  principles  of  international  law,  but  would  consider  the  agreement,  if  acceptable  to 
the  interested  powers,  a  modus  vivendi  based  upon  expediency  rather  than  legal  right 
and  as  not  binding  upon  the  United  States  either  in  its  present  form  or  in  a  modified 
form  until  accepted  by  this  Government. 

Beyan. 


Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
Berlin,  March  1,  1915. 

Following  is  translation  of  the  German  reply: 

The  undersigned  has  the  honor  to  inform  His  Excellency,  Mr.  James  W.  Gerard, 
Ambassador  of  the  United  States  of  America,  in  reply  to  the  note  of  the  22d  instant  that 
the  Imperial  German  Government  have  taken  note  with  great  interest  of  the  suggestion 
of  the  American  Government  that  certain  principles  for  the  conduct  of  maritime  war  on 
the  part  of  Germany  and  England  be  agreed  upon  for  the  protection  of  neutral  shipping. 
They  see  therein  new  evidence  of  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  American  Government 
toward  the  German  Government  which  are  fully  reciprocated  by  Germany. 

It  is  in  accordance  with  Germany's  wishes  also  to  have  maritime  war  conducted 
according  to  rules  which  without  discriminately  restricting  one  or  the  other  of  the  bel- 
ligerent powers  in  the  use  of  their  means  of  warfare  are  equally  considerate  of  the  inter- 
ests of  neutrals  and  the  dictates  of  humanity.  Consequently  it  was  intimated  in  the 
German  note  of  the  16th  instant  that  observation  of  the  Declaration  of  London  on  the 
part  of  Germany's  adversaries  would  create  a  new  situation  from  which  the  German 
Government  would  gladly  draw  the  proper  conclusions. 

Proceeding  from  this  view,  the  German  Government  have  carefully  examined  the 
suggestion  of  the  American  Government  and  believe  that  they  can  actually  see  in  it  a 
suitable  basis  for  the  practical  solution  of  the  questions  which  have  arisen. 

With  regard  to  the  various  points  of  the  American  note  they  beg  to  make  the  fol- 
lowing remarks : 

1.  With  regard  to  the  sowing  of  mines,  the  German  Government  would  be  willing 
to  agree  as  suggested  not  to  use  floating  mines  and  to  have  anchoi'ed  mines  constructed 
as  indicated.  Moreover,  they  agree  to  put  the  stamp  of  the  Government  on  all  mines  to 
be  planted.  On  the  other  hand,  it  does  not  appear  to  them  to  be  feasible  for  the  belliger- 
ents wholly  to  forego  the  use  of  anchored  mines  for  offensive  purposes. 

2.  The  German  Government  would  undertake  not  to  use  their  submarines  to  attack 
mercantile  ships  of  any  flag  except  when  necessary  to  enforce  the  right  of  visit  and  search. 
Should  the  enemy  nationality  of  the  vessel  or  the  presence  of  contraband  be  ascertained 
submarine  would  proceed  in  accordance  with  the  general  rules  of  international  law. 

3.  As  provided  in  the  American  note,  this  restriction  of  the  use  of  the  submarines  is 
contingent  on  the  fact  that  enemy  mercantile  abstain  from  the  use  of  the  neutral  flag 
and  other  neutral  distinctive  marks.  It  would  appear  to  be  a  matter  of  course  that  such 
mercantile  also  abstain  from  arming  themselves  and  from  all  resistance  by  force,  since 
such  procedure  contrary  to  international  law  would  render  impossible  any  action  of  the 
submarines  in  accordance  with  international  law. 

4.  The  regulation  of  legitimate  importations  of  food  into  Germany  suggested  by  the 
American  Government  appears  to  be  in  general  acceptable.  Such  regulation  would,  of 
course,  be  confined  to  importations  by  sea,  but  that  would  on  the  other  hand  include  indi- 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  129 

rect  importations  by  way  of  neutral  ports.  The  German  Government  would,  therefore, 
be  willing  to  make  the  declarations  of  the  nature  provided  in  the  American  note  so  that 
the  use  of  the  imported  food  and  foodstuffs  solely  by  the  noncombatant  population 
would  be  guaranteed.  The  Imperial  Government  must,  however,  in  addition  (»♦♦)! 
having  the  importation  of  other  raw  material  used  by  the  economic  system  of  noncom- 
batants  including  forage  permitted.  To  that  end  the  enemy  Governments  would  have 
to  permit  the  free  entry  into  Germany  of  the  raw  material  mentioned  in  the  free  list  of 
the  Declaration  of  London  and  to  treat  materials  included  in  the  list  of  conditional  con- 
traband according  to  the  same  principles  as  food  and  foodstuffs. 

The  German  Government  venture  to  hope  that  the  agreement  for  which  the  Ameri- 
can Government  have  paved  the  way  may  be  reached  after  due  consideration  of  the  re- 
marks made  above,  and  that  in  this  way  peaceable  neutral  shipping  and  trade  will  not 
have  to  suffer  any  more  than  is  absolutely  necessary  from  the  unavoidable  effects  of 
maritime  war.  These  effects  could  be  still  further  reduced  if,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the 
German  note  of  the  16th  instant,  some  way  could  be  found  to  exclude  the  shipping  of 
munitions  of  war  from  neutral  countries  to  belligerents  on  ships  of  any  nationality. 

The  German  Government  must,  of  course,  reserve  a  definite  statement  of  their  posi- 
tion until  such  time  as  they  may  receive  further  information  from  the  American  Govern- 
ment enabling  them  to  see  what  obligations  the  British  Government  are  on  their  part 
willing  to  assume. 

The  undersigned  avails  himself  of  this  occasion,  etc. 

(Signed)         Von  Jagow. 

Dated  Foreign  Office,  Berlin,  February  28,  1915.  Geeaed. 


The  British,  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Germany  has  declared  that  the  English  Channel,  the  north  and  west  coasts  of  France, 
and  the  waters  around  the  British  Isles  are  a  war  area  and  has  officially  notified  that 
all  enemy  ships  found  in  that  area  will  be  destroyed  and  that  neutral  vessels  may  be 
exposed  to  danger.  This  is  in  e€ect  a  claim  to  torpedo  at  sight,  without  regard  to  the 
safety  of  the  crew  or  passengers,  any  merchant  vessel  under  any  flag.  As  it  is  not  in  the 
power  of  the  German  Admiralty  to  maintain  any  surface  craft  in  these  waters,  this 
attack  can  only  be  delivered  by  submarine  agency. 

The  law  and  custom  of  nations  in  regard  to  attacks  on  commerce  have  always  pre- 
sumed that  the  first  duty  of  the  captor  of  a  merchant  vessel  is  to  bring  it  before  a  prize 
court  where  it  may  be  tried,  where  the  regularity  of  the  capture  may  be  challenged  and 
where  neutrals  may  recover  their  cargoes.  The  sinking  of  prizes  is  in  itself  a  question- 
able act  to  be  resorted  to  only  in  extraordinary  circumstances  and  after  provision  has 
been  made  for  the  safety  of  all  the  crew  or  passengers,  if  there  are  passengers  on  board. 
The  responsibility  for  discriminating  between  neutral  and  enemy  vessels,  and  between 
neutral  and  enemy  cargo,  obviously  rests  with  the  attacking  ship,  whose  duty  is  to  verify 
the  status  and  character  of  the  vessel  and  cargo  and  to  preserve  all  papers  before  sinking 
or  even  capturing  it.  So  also  is  the  humane  duty  of  providing  for  the  safety  of  the  crews 
of  merchant  vessels,  whether  neutral  or  enemy,  an  obligation  upon  every  belligerent. 

It  is  upon  this  basis  that  all  previous  discussions  of  the  law  for  regulating  warfare 
at  sea  have  proceeded.  A  German  submarine,  however,  fulfills  none  of  these  obligations ; 
she  enjoys  no  local  command  of  the  waters  in  which  she  operates;  she  does  not  take  her 
captures  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  prize  court;  she  carries  no  prize  crew  which  she 
can  put  on  board  a  prize;  she  uses  no  effective  means  of  discriminating  between  a  neu- 
tral and  an  enemy  vessel;  she  does  not  receive  on  board  for  safety  the  crew  and  passen- 
gers of  the  vessel  she  sinks ;  her  methods  of  warfare  are  therefore  entirely  outside  the 
scope  of  any  of  the  international  instruments  regulating  operations  against  commerce  in 
time  of  war.  The  German  declaration  substitutes  indiscriminate  destruction  for  regu- 
lated capture.  Germany  is  adopting  these  methods  against  peaceful  traders  and  non- 
combatant  crews  with  the  avowed  object  of  preventing  commodities  of  all  kinds,  includ- 
ing food  for  the  civil  population,  from  reaching  or  leaving  the  British  Isles  or  northern 
France. 

Her  opponents  are  therefore  driven  to  frame  retaliatory  measures  in  order  in  their 
turn  to  prevent  commodities  of  any  kind  from  reaching  or  leaving  Germany.  These 
measures  will,  however,  be  enforced  by  the  British  and  French  Governments  without 
risk  to  neutral  ships  or  to  neutral  or  noncombatant  life  and  in  strict  observance  of  the 
dictates  of  humanity.  The  British  and  French  Governments  will  therefore  hold  them- 
selves free  to  detain  and  take  into  port  ships  carrying  goods  of  presumed  enemy  destina- 

1  Apparent    omission. 


130  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

tion,  ownership,  or  origin.  It  is  not  intended  to  confiscate  such  vessels  or  cargoes  unless 
they  would  otherwise  be  liable  to  condemnation.  The  treatment  of  vessels  and  cargoes 
which  have  sailed  before  this  date  will  not  beafifected. 


British  Embassy, 

Washington,  March  1,  1915. 


Cecil  Spbing-Kice. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  II.  Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  March  5, 1915. 

In  regard  to  the  recent  communications  received  from  the  British  and  French  Gov- 
ernments concerning  restraints  upon  commerce  with  Germany,  please  communicate  with 
the  British  foreign  office  in  the  sense  following: 

The  difficulty  of  determining  action  upon  the  British  and  French  declarations  of 
intended  retaliation  upon  commerce  with  Germany  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  proposed 
measures  in  their  relation  to  commerce  by  neutrals. 

While  it  appears  that  the  intention  is  to  interfere  with  and  take  into  custody  all 
ships  both  outgoing  and  incoming,  trading  with  Germany,  which  is  in  effect  a  blockade 
of  German  ports,  the  rule  of  blockade,  that  a  ship  attempting  to  enter  or  leave  a  German 
port  regardless  of  the  character  of  its  cargo  may  be  condemned,  is  not  asserted. 

The  language  of  the  declaration  is  "the  British  and  French  Governments  will,  there- 
fore, hold  themselves  free  to  detain  and  take  into  port  ships  carrying  goods  of  presumed 
enemy  destination,  ownership,  or  origin.  It  is  not  intended  to  confiscate  such  vessels  or 
cargoes  unless  they  would  otherwise  be  liable  to  condemnation." 

The  first  sentence  claims  a  right  pertaining  only  to  a  state  of  blockade.  The  last  sen- 
tence proposes  a  treatment  of  ships  and  carooes  as  if  no  blockade  existed.  The  two 
together  present  a  proposed  course  of  action  previously  unknown  to  international  law. 

As  a  consequence  neutrals  have  no  standard  by  which  to  measure  their  rights  or  to 
avoid  danger  to  their  ships  and  cargoes.  The  paradoxical  situation  thus  created  should 
be  changed  and  the  declaring  powers  ought  to  assert  whether  they  rely  upon  the  rules 
governing  a  blockade  or  the  rules  applicable  when  no  blockade  exists. 

The  declaration  presents  other  perplexities. 

The  last  sentence  quoted  indicates  that  the  rules  of  contraband  are  to  be  applied  to 
cargoes  detained.  The  rule  covering  noncontraband  articles  carried  in  neutral  bottoms 
is  that  the  cargoes  shall  be  released  and  the  ships  allowed  to  proceed.  This  rule  can  not, 
under  the  first  sentence  quoted,  be  applied  as  to  destination.  What  then  is  to  be  done 
with  a  cargo  of  noncontraband  goods  detained  under  the  declaration?  The  same  ques- 
tion may  be  asked  as  to  conditional  contraband  cargoes. 

The  foregoing  comments  apply  to  cargoes  destined  for  Germany.  Cargoes  coming 
out  of  German  ports  present  another  problem  under  the  terms  of  the  declaration.  Under 
the  rules  governing  enemy  exports  only  goods  owned  by  enemy  subjects  in  enemy  bot- 
toms are  subject  to  seizure  and  condemnation.  Yet  by  the  declaration  it  is  purposed  to 
seize  and  take  into  port  all  goods  of  enemy  "ownership  and  origin."  The  word  "origin" 
is  particularly  significant.  The  origin  of  goods  destined  to  neutral  territory  on  neutral 
ships  is  not  and  never  has  been  a  ground  fbr  forfeiture  except  in  case  a  blockade  is  de- 
clared and  maintained.  What  then  would  the  seizure  amount  to  in  the  present  case 
except  to  delay  the  delivery  of  the  goods?  The  declaration  does  not  indicate  what  dispo- 
sition would  be  made  of  such  cargoes  if  owned  by  a  neutral  or  if  owned  by  an  enemy  sub- 
ject. Would  a  different  rule  be  applied  according  to  ownership?  If  so,  upon  what  prin- 
ciples of  international  law  would  it  rest?  And  upon  what  rule  if  no  blockade  is  declared 
and  maintained  could  the  cargo  of  a  neutral  ship  sailing  out  of  a  German  port  be  con- 
demned?   If  it  is  not  condemned,  what  other  legal  course  is  there  but  to  release  it? 

While  this  Government  is  fully  alive  to  the  possibility  that  the  methods  of  modern 
naval  warfare,  particularly  in  the  use  of  the  submarine  for  both  defensive  and  offensive 
operations,  may  make  the  former  means  of  maintaining  a  blockade  a  physical  impossibil- 
ity, it  feels  that  it  can  be  urged  with  great  force  that  there  should  be  also  some  limit  to 
"the  radius  of  activity,"  and  especially  so  if  this  action  by  the  belligerents  can  be  con- 
strued to  be  a  blockade.  It  would  certainly  create  a  serious  state  of  affairs  if,  for  exam- 
ple, an  American  vessel  laden  with  a  cargo  of  German  origin  should  escape  the  British 
patrol  in  European  waters  only  to  be  held  up  by  a  cruiser  off  New  York  and  taken  into 
Halifax. 

Similar  cablegram  sent  to  Paris. 

Bryan. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  131 

Consul  General  Skinner  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Consulate  General, 

London,  March  i).  1915. 
British  Government  announces  that:  "All  cotton  for  which  contracts  of  sale  and 
freight  engagements  had  already  been  made  before  March  2,  to  be  allowed  free  or  bought 
at  contract  price  if  stopped  provided  the  ship  sails  not  later  than  March  31 ;  similar  treat- 
ment to  be  accorded  to  all  cotton  insured  before  March  2,  provided  the  cotton  is  put  on 
board  not  later  than  March  16.  All  shipments  of  cotton  claiming  the  above  protection  to 
be  declared  before  sailing  and  documents  produced  to  and  certificates  obtained  from  con- 
sular officers  or  other  authority  fixed  by  the  Government." 

Skinner. 


The  British  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

British  Embassy, 
Washington,  March  10,  1915 
The  British  Ambassador  presents  his  compliments  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  has 
the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  twenty  copies  of  a  list  enumerating  certain  oils  and  sub- 
stances included  under  the  heading  "Lubricants"  in  the  British  list  of  articles  to  be 
treated  as  conditional  contraband. 

Cecil  Spring-Rice. 


[Indosure.] 

OILS    AND    SUBSTANCES    INCLUDED    UNDER   THE    HEADING    LUBRICANTS    IN    THE   BRITISH    LIST    OF    ARTICLES    TO   BE   TREATED 

AS   CONDITIONAL   CONTRABAND. 

I.  Principal  oils  used  as  lubricants : 

Tallow  oil. 

Lard  oil. 

Neat's-foot  oil   (including  sheep's  foot  oil,  horse's  foot  oil,  and  fatty  bone  oil). 

Olive  oil. 

Rape  oil  (including  Colza  oil,  Ravisson  oil,  or  Black  Sea  rape  oil,  and  Jamba  oil). 

Castor  oil. 

Particularly  for  fine  mechanisms — 

Hazelnut  oil. 

Ben  oil. 

Porpoise  oil  (including  body  oil  and  jaw  oil). 

Dolphin  oil  or  blackfish  oil  (including  body  oil   and  jaw  oil). 

Sperm  oil. 

Arctic  sperm  oil. 
Whale  oil. 
Rosin  oil. 

II.  Solid  lubricants : 

1.  Graphite    (including  natural  graphite,   artificial  graphite,  Atcheson's  graphite,  colloidal  graphite,  de- 

flocculated   graphite,   "Oildag,"   "Aquadag,"  or  "Waterdag"). 

2.  Mineral  jellies. 

3.  Tallow    (including    mutton-tallow,    beef -tallow  and  goat-and-buck- tallow). 

4.  All  unctuous  bodies  which  do  not  flow  (or  flow   extremely   slowly)    at   ordinary   temperatures  con- 

taining : 

a.  Tallow  mixed  with  any  other  oil,  fat,  or  mineral  jelly. 

b.  Any  oil,  fat,  or  mineral  jelly  containing  aluminum  soap,  lead  soap,  lime  soap,  or  rosin  soap. 

c.  Commercial  forms  of  lead  soap,  lime  soap,  and  aluminium  soap. 

d.  Any  oil,  fat,  or  mineral  jelly  containing  water  and  an  alkali,   or  containing  potash  or  soda 

soap    (but   not   including   "superfatted   soaps"  of  various  kinds). 
V  5.    Rosin  greases  or  rosin  soaps. 

Aluminium  soap  in  oleaginous  solution  is  also  known  as  "oil-pulp,"  "thickener,"  "gelatin,"  and  "viscom." 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  March  15,  1915. 
Following  is  the  full  text  of  a  memorandum  dated  March  13,  which  Grey  handed 
me  to-day : 

On  the  22d  of  February  last  I  received  a  communication  from  Your  Excellency  of  the  identic  note  addressed 
to  His  Majesty's  Government  and  to  Germany,  respecting  an  agreement  on  certain  points  as  to  the  conduct  of  the 


132  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

war  at  sea.  The  reply  of  the  German  Government  to  this  note  has  been  pubhshed  and  it  is  not  understood  from 
the  reply  that  the  German  Government  are  prepared  to  abandon  the  practice  of  sinking  British  merchant  vessels 
by  submarines,  and  it  is  evident  from  their  reply  that  they  will  not  abandon  the  use  of  mines  for  offensive  pur- 
poses on  the  high  seas  as  contrasted  with  the  use  of  mines  for  defensive  purposes  only  within  cannon  range  of 
their  own  harbors  as  suggested  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  This  being  so,  it  might  appear  un- 
necessary for  the  British  Government  to  make  any  further  reply  than  to  take  note  of  the  German  answer.  We 
desire,  however,  to  take  the  opportunity  of  making  a  fuller  statement  of  the  whole  position  and  of  our  feeling 
with  regard  to  it.  We  recognize  with  sympathy  the  desire  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  see  the 
European  war  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  previously  recognized  rules  of  international  law  and  the  dictates 
of  humanity.  It  is  thus  that  the  British  forces  have  conducted  the  war,  and  we  are  not  aware  that  these  forces, 
either  naval  or  military,  can  have  laid  to  their  charge  any  improper  proceedings,  either  in  the  conduct  of  hostilities 
or  in  the  treatment  of  prisoners  or  wounded.    On  the  German  side  it  has  been  very  different. 

1.  The  treatment  of  civilian  inhabitants  in  Belgium  and  the  north  of  France  has  been  made  public  by  the 
Belgian  and  French  Governments  and  by  those  who  have  had  experience  of  it  at  first  hand.  Modern  historj 
affords  no  precedent  for  the  sufferings  that  have  been  inflicted  on  the  defenseless  and  noncombatant  population 
in  the  territory  that  has  been  in  German  military  occupation.  Even  the  food  of  the  population  was  confiscated 
until  in  Belgium  an  International  Commission,  largely  influenced  by  American  generosity  and  conducted  under 
American  auspices,  came  to  the  relief  of  the  population  and  secured  from  the  German  Government  a  promise  to 
spare  what  food  was  still  left  in  the  country,  though  the  Germans  still  continue  to  make  levies  in  money  upon 
the  defenseless   population   for  the  support  of  the  German  Army. 

2.  We  have  from  time  to  time  received  most  terrible  accounts  of  the  barbarous  treatment  to  which  British 
officers  and  soldiers  have  been  exposed  after  they  have  been  taken  prisoner  while  being  conveyed  to  German 
prison  camps ;  one  or  two  instances  have  already  been  given  to  the  United  States  Government  founded  upon  au- 
thentic and  first-hand  evidence  which  is  beyond  doubt.  Some  evidence  has  been  received  of  the  hardships  to 
which  British  prisoners  of  war  are  subjected  in  the  prison  camps  contrasting,  we  believe,  most  unfavorably  with 
the  treatment  of  German  prisoners  in  this  country.  We  have  proposed,  with  the  consent  of  the  United  States 
Government,  that  a  commission  of  United  States  officers  should  be  permitted  in  each  country  to  inspect  the  treat- 
ment of  prisoners  of  war.  The  United  States  Government  have  been  unable  to  obtain  any  reply  from  the  German 
Government  to  this  proposal  and  we  remain  in  continuing  anxiety  and  apprehension  as  to  the  treatment  of 
British  prisoners  of  war  in  Germany. 

3.  At  the  very  outset  of  the  war  a  German  mine  layer  was  discovered  laying  a  mine  field  on  the  high  seas. 
Further  mine  fields  have  been  laid  from  time  to  time  without  warning  and  so  far  as  we  know  are  still  being  laid 
on  the  high  seas,  and  many  neutral  as  well  as  British  vessels  have  been*  sunk  by  them. 

4.  At  various  times  during  the  war  German  submarines  have  stopped  and  sunk  British  merchant  vessels, 
thus  making  the  sinking  of  merchant  vessels  a  general  practice,  though  it  was  admitted  previously,  if  at  all,  only 
as  an  exception,  the  general  rule  to  which  the  British  Government  have  adhered  being  that  merchant  vessels,  if 
captured,  must  be  taken  before  a  prize  court.  In  one  case  already  quoted  in  a  note  to  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, a  neutral  vessel  carrying  foodstuffs  to  an  unfortified  town  in  Great  Britain  has  been  sunk.  Another  case  is 
now  reported  in  which  a  German  armed  cruiser  has  sunk  an  American  vessel,  the  William  P.  Frye,  carrying  a 
cargo  of  wheat  from  Seattle  to  Queenstown.  In  both  cases  the  cargoes  were  presumably  destined  for  the  civil 
population.  Even  the  cargoes  in  such  circumstances  should  not  have  been  condemned  without  the  decision  of  a 
prize  court,  much  less  should  the  vessels  have  been  sunk.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  both  these  cases  occurred  before 
the  detention  by  the  British  authorities  of  the  Wilhelmina  and  her  cargo  of  foodstuffs  which  the  German 
Government  allege  is  the  justification  for  their  own  action.  The  Germans  have  announced  their  intention  of 
sinking  British  merchant  vessels  by  torpedo  without  notice  and  without  any  provision  for  the  safety  of  the  crew. 
They  have  already  carried  out  this  intention  in  the  case  of  neutral  as  well  as  of  British  vessels,  and  a  number  of 
noncombatant  and  innocent  lives  on  British  vessels,   unarmed  and  defenseless,  have  been  destroyed  in  this  way. 

5.  Unfortified,  open,  and  defenseless  towns,  such  as  Scarborough,  Yarmouth,  and  Whitby,  have  been  deliber- 
ately and  wantonly  bombarded  by  German  ships  of  war,  causing  in  some  cases  considerable  loss  of  civilian  life, 
including  women  and  children. 

6.  German  aircraft  have  dropped  bombs  on  the  east  coast  of  England  where  there  were  no  military  or 
strategic  points  to  be  attacked.  On  the  other  hand,  I  am  aware  of  but  two  criticisms  that  have  been  made  on 
British  action  in  all  these  respects:  (i)  It  is  said  that  the  British  naval  authorities  also  have  laid  some  anchored 
mines  on  the  high  seas.  They  have  done  so,  but  the  mines  were  anchored  and  so  constructed  that  they  would  be 
harmless  if  they  went  adrift,  and  no  mines  whatever  were  laid  by  the  British  naval  authorities  till  many  weeks 
after  the  Germans  had  made  a  regular  practice  of  laying  mines  on  the  high  seas.  (2)  It  is  said  that  the  British 
Government  have  departed  from  the  view  of  international  law  which  they  had  previously  maintained  that  food- 
stuffs destined  for  the  civil  population  should  never  be  interfered  with,  this  charge  being  founded  on  the  sub- 
mission to  a  prize  court  of  the  cargo  of  the  Wilhelmina.  The  special  considerations  affecting  this  cargo  have 
already  been  presented  in  a  memorandum  to  the  United  States  Government,  and  I  need  not  repeat  them  here. 
Inasmuch  as  the  stoppage  of  all  foodstuffs  is  an  admitted  consequence  of  blockade,  it  is  obvious  that  there  can 
be  no  universal  rule  based  on  considerations  of  morality  and  humanity  which  is  contrary  to  this  practice.  The 
right  to  stop  foodstuffs  destined  for  the  civil  population  must  therefore  in  any  case  be  admitted  if  an  effective 
"cordon"  controlling  intercourse  with  the  enemy  is  drawn,  announced,  and  maintained.  Moreover,  independ- 
ently of  rights  arising  from  belligerent  action  in  the  nature  of  blockade,  some  other  nations,  differing  from  the 
opinion  of  the  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  have  held  that  to  stop  the  food  of  the  civil 
population  is  a  natural  and  legitimate  method  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  an  enemy  country,  as  it  is  upon 
the  defense  of  a  besieged  town.  It  is  also  upheld  on  the  authority  of  both  Prince  Bismarck  and  Count  Caprivi, 
and  therefore  presumably  is  not  repugnant  to  German  morality.  The  following  are  the  quotations  from  Prince 
Bismarck  and  Count  Caprivi  on  this  point.  Prince  Bismarck,  in  answering,  in  1885,  an  application  from  the 
Kiel  Chamber  of  Commerce  for  a  statement  of  the  view  of  the  German  Government  on  the  question  of  the  right 
to  declare  as  contraband  foodstuffs  that  were  not  intended  for  military  forces,  said :    "I  reply  to  the  chamber  of 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  133 

commerce  that  any  disadvantage  our  commercial  and  carrying  interests  may  suffer  by  the  treatment  of  rice  as 
contraband  of  war  does  not  justify  our  opposing  a  measure  which  it  has  been  thought  fit  to  take  in  carrying  on 
a  foreign  war.  Every  war  is  a  calamity  which  entails  evil  consequences,  not  only  on  the  combatants  but  also 
on  neutrals.  These  evils  may  easily  be  increased  by  the  interference  of  a  neutral  power  with  the  way  in  which 
a  third  carries  on  the  war  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  subjects  of  the  interfering  power,  and  by  this  means  German 
commerce  might  be  weighted  with  far  heavier  losses  than  a  transitory  prohibition  of  the  rice  trade  in  Chinese 
waters.  The  measure  in  question  has  for  its  object  the  shortening  of  the  war  by  increasing  the  difficulties  of 
the  enemy,  and  is  a  justifiable  step  in  war  if  impartially  enforced  against  all  neutral  ships."  Count  Caprivi,  dur- 
ing a  discussion  in  the  German  Reichstag  on  the  4th  of  March,  1892,  on  the  subject  of  the  importance  of  inter- 
national protection  for  private  property  at  sea,  made  the  following  statements:  "A  country  may  be  dependent 
for  her  food  or  for  her  raw  products  upon  her  trade.  In  fact,  it  may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  destroy  the 
enemy's  trade."  *  *  «  "The  private  introduction  of  provisions  into  Paris  was  prohibited  during  the  siege, 
and  in  the  same  way  a  nation  would  be  justified  in  preventing  the  import  of  food  and  raw  produce."  The 
Government  of  Great  Britain  have  frankly  declared,  in  concert  with  the  Government  of  France,  their  intention 
to  meet  the  German  attempt  to  stop  all  supplies  of  every  kind  from  leaving  or  entering  British  or  French  ports 
by  themselves  stopping  supplies  going  to  or  from  Germany  for  this  end.  The  British  fleet  has  instituted  a 
blockade,  effectively  controlling  by  cruiser  "cordon"  all  passage  to  and  from  Germany  by  sea.  The  difference 
between  the  two  policies  is,  however,  that  while  our  object  is  the  same  as  that  of  Germany,  we  propose  to  attain 
it  without  sacrificing  neutral  ships  or  noncombatant  lives  or  inflicting  upon  neutrals  the  damage  that  must  be 
entailed  when  a  vessel  and  its  cargo  are  sunk  without  notice,  examination,  or  trial.  I  must  emphasize  again  that 
this  measure  is  a  natural  and  necessary  consequence  of  the  unprecedented  methods,  repugnant  to  all  law  and 
morality,  which  have  been  described  above,  which  Germany  began  to  adopt  at  the  very  outset  of  the  war,  and 
the  effects  of  which  have  been  constantly  accumulating. 

Page. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 

London,  March  15,  1915. 
Following  is  the  full  text  of  a  note,  dated  to-day,  and  an  Order  in  Council  I  have  just 
received  from  Grey: 

1.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  had  under  careful  consideration  the  inquiries  which,  under  instructions 
from  your  Government,  Your  Excellency  addressed  to  me  on  the  eighth  instant  regarding  the  scope  and  mode  of 
application  of  the  measures,  foreshadowed  in  the  British  and  French  declarations  of  the  first  of  March,  for 
restricting  the  trade  of  Germany.  Your  Excellency  explained  and  illustrated  by  reference  to  certain  contingencies 
the  difficulty  of  the  United  States  Government  in  adopting  a  definite  attitude  toward  these  measures  by  reason  of 
uncertainty  regarding  their  bearing  upon  the  commerce  of  neutral  countries. 

2.  I  can  at  once  assure  Your  Excellency  that  subject  to  the  paramount  necessity  of  restricting  German  trade 
His  Majesty's  Government  have  made  it  their  first  aim  to  minimize  inconvenience  to  neutral  commerce.  From 
the  accompanying  copy  of  the  Order  in  Council,  which  is  to  be  published  to-day,  you  will  observe  that  a  wide  dis- 
cretion is  afforded  to  the  prize  court  in  dealing  with  the  trade  of  neutrals  in  such  manner  as  may  in  the  circum- 
stances be  deemed  just  and  that  full  provision  is  made  to  facilitate  claims  by  persons  interested  in  any  goods 
placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize  court  under  the  Order.  I  apprehend  that  the  perplexities  to 
which  Your  Excellency  refers  will  for  the  most  part  be  dissipated  by  the  perusal  of  this  document  and  that  it  is 
only  necessary  for  me  to  add  certain  explanatory  observations. 

3.  The  effect  of  the  Order  in  Council  is  to  confer  certain  powers  upon  the  executive  officers  of  His  Majesty's 
Government.  The  extent  to  which  those  powers  "will  be  actually  exercised  and  the  degree  of  severity  with  which  the 
measures  of  blockade  authorized  will  be  put  into  operation,  are  matters  which  will  depend  on  the  administrative 
orders  issued  by  the  Government  and  the  decisions  of  the  authorities  specially  charged  with  the  duty  of  dealing 
with  individual  ships  and  cargoes,  according  to  the  merits  of  each  case.  The  United  States  Government  may  rest 
assured  that  the  instructions  to  be  issued  by  His  Majesty's  Government  to  the  fleet  and  to  the  customs  officials  and 
executive  committees  concerned  will  impress  upon  them  the  duty  of  acting  with  the  utmost  dispatch  consistent 
with  the  object  in  view  and  of  showing  in  every  case  such  consideration  for  neutrals  as  may  be  compatible  with 
that  object  which  is,  succinctly  stated,  to  establish  a  blockade  to  prevent  vessels  from  carrying  goods  for  or 
coming  from  Germany. 

4.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  felt  most  reluctant  at  the  moment  of  initiating  a  policy  of  blockade  to 
exact  from  neutral  ships  all  the  penalites  attaching  to  a  breach  of  blockade.  In  their  desire  to  alleviate  the  burden 
which  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  at  sea  must  inevitably  impose  on  neutral  sea-borne  commerce,  they  declare 
their  intention  to  refrain  altogether  from  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  confiscate  ships  or  cargoes  which  belligerents 
have  always  claimed  in  respect  to  breaches  of  blockade.  They  restrict  their  claim  to  the  stopping  of  cargoes  des- 
tined for  or  coming  from  the  enemy's  territory. 

5.  As  regards  cotton,  full  particulars  of  the  arrangements  contemplated  have  already  been  explained.  It  will 
be  admitted  that  every  possible  regard  has  been  had  to  the  legitimate  interests  of  the  American  cotton  trade. 

6.  Finally,  in  reply  to  the  penultimate  paragraph  of  Your  Excellency's  note,  I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  it 
is  not  intended  to  interfere  with  neutral  vessels  carrying  enemy  cargo  of  noncontraband  nature  outside  European 
waters,  including  the  Mediterranean. 


134  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 

London,  March  16,  1915. 

Sib  :  In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  the  department,  and  confirming  my  cable- 
gram No.  1780  of  the  13th  instant,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  copies,  in  dupli- 
cate, of  a  proclamation  adding  to  the  list  of  articles  to  be  treated  as  contraband  of  war 
dated  March  11,  1915. 

I  have,  etc.,  Walter  Hines  Page. 


PROCLAMATION. 

March  ii,  1915. 

Adding  to  the  List  of  Articles  to  be  Treated  as  Contraband  of  War. 
George  R.  I. 

Whereas  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  December,  1914,  we  did  issue  our  royal  proclamation  specifying  the 
articles  which  it  was  our  intention  to  treat  as  contraband  during  the  continuance  of  hostilities  or  until  we  did 
give  futher  public  notice,  and 

Whereas  it  is  expedient  to  make  certain  additions  to  the  lists  contained  in  the  said  proclamation: 

Now,  therefore,  we  do  hereby  declare,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  our  privy  council,  that  during  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war  or  until  we  do  give  further  public  notice.the  following  articles  will  be  treated  as  absolute  contra- 
band in  addition  to  those  set  out  in  our  royal  proclamation  aforementioned: 

Raw  wool,  wool  tops  and  noils,  and  woolen  and  worsted  yarns. 

Tin,  chloride  of  tin,  til.  ore. 

Castor  oil. 

ParaiEn  wax. 

Copper  iodide. 

Lubricants. 

Hides  of  cattle,  buffaloes,  and  horses;  skins  of  calves,  pigs,  sheep,  goats,  and  deer;  leather,  undressed  or 
dressed,  suitable  for  saddlery,  harness,  military  boots,  or  military  clothing. 

Ammonia  and  its  salts  whether  simple  or  compound;  ammonia  liquor,  urea,  aniline,  and  their  compounds. 

And  we  do  hereby  declare  that  the  following  articles  will  be  treated  as  conditional  contraband  in  addition  to 
those  set  out  in  our  royal  proclamation  aforementioned : 

Tanning  substances  of  all  kinds   (including  extracts  for  use  in  tanning). 

And  we  do  hereby  further  declare  that  the  terms  "foodstuffs"  and  "feeding  stuffs  for  animals"  in  the  list 
of  conditional  contraband  contained  in  our  royal  proclamation  aforementioned  shall  be  deemed  to  include  oleagi- 
nous seeds,  nuts  and  kernels;  animal  and  vegetable  oils  and  fats  (other  than  linseed  oil)  suitable  for  use  in  the 
manufacture  of  margarine ;  and  cakes  and  meals  made  from  oleaginous  seeds,  nuts  and  kernels. 

Given  at  our  court  at  Buckingham  Palace,  this  eleventh  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  fifteen,  etc.,  etc. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  March  20, 1915. 

Department  of  State  is  in  receipt  of  a  telegram  from  the  American  Minister  at 
Stockholm,  as  follows: 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Legation  has  the  honor  to  inform  the  Royal  Swedish  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs 
that  the  American  Steamship  IVico  has  arrived  in  the  United  Kingdom  with  a  full  cargo  of  oil  for  Krooks  Pe- 
troleum and  Oil  Company,  Stockholm.  In  view  of  the  recent  seizure  by  German  men  of  war  off  Falsterbo  of  the 
Steamship  Bryssel  and  her  cargo  of  oil  His  Majesty's  Government  require  to  have  complete  assurances  that 
this  vessel  will  not  share  the  same  fate  before  they  can  allow  her  to  proceed  to  destination.  His  Britannic 
Majesty's  Legation  would  therefore  be  much  obliged  to  be  furnished  with  such  assurances  for  immediate  com- 
munication to  the  Foreign  Office. 

Ambassador  Page  is  instructed  to  inquire  of  the  British  Government  as  to  whether 
the  vessel  is  held  for  reasons  stated  in  the  above  telegram,  and  to  state  that,  in  that  case, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  considers  that  the  vessel  should  be  released  at  once, 
in  view  of  the  evident  fact  that  the  United  States  Government  can  not  admit  the  right  of 
the  British  Government  to  detain  the  vessel  without  any  evidence  showing  that  her 
cargo  has  an  illegal  destination,  and  before  a  reply  has  been  received  to  demand  made  on 
a  nonbelligerent  country,  which  such  country  is  evidently  unable  to  comply  with,  viz, 
that  it  give  assurances  that  the  ship  while  on  her  way  will  not  be  held  up  by  the  forces 
of  another  belligerent  Government. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  135 

The  Secretary  of  State   to  Minister  Morris. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  op  State, 
Washington,  March  20,  1915. 

Mr.  Bryan  informs  Mr.  Morris  that  his  telegram  under  date  of  March  18,  4  p.  m.,  to 
the  Department,  has  been  communicated  to  Ambassador  Page.  Minister  Morris  is  also 
advised  that  Ambassador  Page  has  been  instructed  to  make  representations  to  the  British 
Government  for  the  release  of  the  steamer  Wico. 


The  British  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

British  Embassy^ 
Washington,  March  23, 1915. 

My  Dear  Mr.  Secretary  :  I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  informal  letter  of 
March  20th  in  which  you  are  good  enough  to  submit  certain  observations  on  the  British 
contraband  list. 

I  have  not  in  my  possession  any  further  information  than  that  which  I  have  com- 
municated to  you,  but  I  expect  before  long  to  receive  a  uniform  printed  list  as  revised 
up  to  date  and  I  shall  take  pleasure  in  sending  you  a  copy  so  soon  as  it  arrives. 

In  the  list  sent  to  you  on  March  10  which  reached  me  by  post  the  term  "castor  oil"  was 
mentioned  under  the  heading  of  "  Principal  oils  used  as  lubricants,"  which  were  at  that 
time  treated  as  conditional  contraband.  According  to  the  telegram,  of  which  a  copy  was 
sent  to  you  on  March  13,  "lubricants"  were  transferred  to  the  list  of  absolute  contraband 
and  castor  oil  was  mentioned  separately.  Apart  from  this  and  in  the  absence  of  informa- 
tion to  the  contrary  I  understand  that  the  memorandum  interpreting  the  term  "lubri- 
cants" formerly  listed  as  conditional  contraband  is  to  be  considered  as  still  interpreting 
this  term  as  listed  under  absolute  contraband. 

The  materials  enumerated  in  Articles  11  and  12  of  the  conditional  contraband  list 
appear,  as  you  suggest,  to  have  been  transferred  to  the  absolute  list,  but  I  am  unable  at 
the  present  moment  to  state  definitely  that  this  is  so. 

I  am  taking  steps  to  obtain  a  clear  ruling  on  these  points. 
I  am,  etc., 

Cecil  Speing-Rice. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.   H.  Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department  op  State, 
Washington,  March  30,  1915. 

You  are  instructed  to  deliver  the  following  to  His  Majesty's  Government  in  reply 
to  your  numbers  1795  and  1798  of  March  15 : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  given  careful  consideration  to  the  sub- 
jects treated  in  the  British  notes  of  March  13  and  March  15,  and  to  the  British  Order  in 
Council  of  the  latter  date. 

These  communications  contain  matters  of  grave  importance  to  neutral  nations. 
They  appear  to  menace  their  rights  of  trade  and  intercourse  not  only  with  belligerents 
but  also  with  one  another.  They  call  for  frank  comment  in  order  that  misunderstand- 
ings may  be  avoided.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  deems  it  its  duty,  therefore, 
speaking  in  the  sincerest  spirit  of  friendship,  to  make  its  own  view  and  position  with  re- 
gard to  them  unmistakably  clear. 

The  Order  in  Council  of  the  15th  of  March  would  constitute,  were  its  provisions  to 
be  actually  carried  into  effect  as  they  stand,  a  practical  assertion  of  unlimited  belli- 
gerent rights  over  neutral  commerce  within  the  whole  European  area,  and  an  almost  un- 
qualified denial  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  nations  now  at  peace. 

This  Government  takes  it  for  granted  that  there  can  be  no  question  what  those 
rights  are.  A  nation's  sovereignty  over  its  own  ships  and  citizens  under  its  own  flag 
on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  is,  of  course,  unlimited ;  and  that  sovereignty  suffers 
no  diminution  in  time  of  war,  except  in  so  far  as  the  practice  and  consent  of  civilized 
nations  has  limited  it  by  the  recognition  of  certain  now  clearly  determined  rights, 
which  it  is  conceded  may  be  exercised  by  nations  which  are  at  war. 


136  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

A  belligerent  nation  has  been  conceded  the  right  of  visit  and  search,  and  the  right 
of  capture  and  condemnation,  if  upon  examination  a  neutral  vessel  is  found  to  be  en- 
gaged in  unneutral  service  or  to  be  carrying  contraband  of  war  intended  for  the  enemy's 
government  or  armed  forces.  It  has  been  conceded  the  right  to  establish  and  maintain 
a  blockade  of  an  enemy's  ports  and  coasts  and  to  capture  and  condemn  any  vessel  taken 
in  trying  to  break  the  blockade.  It  is  even  conceded  the  right  to  detain  and  take  to  its 
own  ports  for  judicial  examination  all  vessels  which  it  suspects  for  substantial  reasons 
to  be  engaged  in  unneutral  or  contraband  service  and  to  condemn  them  if  the  suspicion 
is  sustained.  But  such  rights,  long  clearly  defined  both  in  doctrine  and  practice,  have 
hitherto  been  held  to  be  the  only  permissible  exceptions  to  the  principle  of  universal 
equality  of  sovereignty  on  the  high  seas  as  between  belligerents  and  nations  not  engaged 
in  war. 

It  is  confidently  assumed  that  His  Majesty's  Government  will  not  deny  that  it  is  a 
rule  sanctioned  by  general  practice  that,  even  though  a  blockade  should  exist  and  the 
doctrine  of  contraband  as  to  unblockaded  territory  be  rigidly  enforced,  innocent  ship- 
ments may  be  freely  transported  to  and  from  the  United  States  through  neutral  coun- 
tries to  belligerent  territory  without  being  subject  to  the  penalties  of  contraband  traffic 
or  breach  of  blockade,  much  less  to  detention,   requisition,  or  confiscation. 

Moreover  the  rules  of  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856 — among  them  that  free  ships 
make  free  goods — will  hardly  at  this  day  be  disputed  by  the  signatories  of  that  solemn 
agreement. 

His  Majesty's  Government,  like  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  have  often 
and  explicitly  held  that  these  rights  represent  the  best  usage  of  warfare  in  the  dealings 
of  belligerents  with  neutrals  at  sea.  In  this  connection  I  desire  to  direct  attention  to 
the  opinion  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  the  Peterhof,  which 
arose  out  of  the  Civil  War,  and  to  the  fact  that  that  opinion  was  unanimously  sustained 
in  the  award  of  the  Arbitration  Commission  of  1871,  to  which  the  case  was  presented 
at  the  request  of  Great  Britain.  From  that  time  to  the  Declaration  of  London  of  1909, 
adopted  with  modifications  by  the  Order  in  Council  of  the  23d  of  October  last,  these 
rights  have  not  been  seriously  questioned  by  the  British  Government.  And  no  claim  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  of  any  justification  for  interfering  with  these  clear  rights  of  the 
United  States  and  its  citizens  as  neutrals  could  be  admitted.  To  admit  it  would  be  to 
assume  an  attitude  of  unneutrality  toward  the  present  enemies  of  Great  Britain  which 
would  be  obviously  inconsistent  with  the  solemn  obligations  of  this  Government  in  the 
present  circumstances ;  and  for  Great  Britain  to  make  such  a  claim  would  be  for  her  to 
abandon  and  set  at  naught  the  principles  for  which  she  has  consistently  and  earnestly 
contended  in  other  times  and  circumstances. 

The  note  of  His  Majesty's  Principal  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  which 
accompanies  the  Order  in  Council,  and  which  bears  the  same  date,  notifies  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  the  establishment  of  a  blockade  which  is,  if  defined  by  the 
terms  of  the  Order  in  Council,  to  include  all  the  coasts  and  ports  of  Germany  and  every 
port  of  possible  access  to  enemy  territory.  But  the  novel  and  quite  unprecedented  fea- 
ture of  that  blockade,  if  we  are  to  assume  it  to  be  properly  so  defined,  is  that  it  em- 
braces many  neutral  ports  and  coasts,  bars  access  to  them,  and  subjects  all  neutral  ships 
seeking  to  approach  them  to  the  same  suspicion  that  would  attach  to  them  were  they 
bound  for  the  ports  of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain,  and  to  unusual  risks  and  penalties. 

It  is  manifest  that  such  limitations,  risks,  and  liabilities  placed  upon  the  ships  of 
a  neutral  power  on  the  high  seas,  beyond  the  right  of  visit  and  search  and  the  right  to 
prevent  the  shipment  of  contraband  already  referred  to,  are  a  distinct  invasion  of  the 
sovereign  rights  of  the  nation  whose  ships,  trade,  or  commerce  is  interfered  with. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is,  of  course,  not  oblivious  to  the  great  changes 
which  have  occurred  in  the  conditions  and  means  of  naval  warfare  since  the  rules  hither- 
to governing  legal  blockade  were  formulated.  It  might  be  ready  to  admit  that  the  old 
form  of  "close"  blockade  with  its  cordon  of  ships  in  the  immediate  offing  of  the  blockaded 
ports  is  no  longer  practicable  in  face  of  an  enemy  possessing  the  means  and  opportunity 
to  make  an  effective  defense  by  the  use  of  submarines,  mines,  and  air  craft;  but  it  can 
hardly  be  maintained  that,  whatever  form  of  effective  blockade  may  be  made  use  of,  it  is 
impossible  to  conform  at  least  to  the  spirit  and  principles  of  the  established  rules  of  war. 
If  the  necessities  of  the  case  should  seem  to  render  it  imperative  that  the  cordon  of  block- 
ading vessels  be  extended  across  the  approaches  to  any  neighboring  neutral  port  or  coun- 
try, it  would  seem  clear  that  it  would  still  be  easily  practicable  to  comply  with  the  well- 
recognized  and  reasonable  prohibition  of  international  law  against  the  blockading  of 
neutral  ports  by  according  free  admission  and  exit  to  all  lawful  traffic  with  neutral 
ports  through  the  blockading  cordon.  This  traffic  would  of  course  include  all  outward- 
bound  traffic  from  the  neutral  country  and  all  inward-bound  traffic  to  the  neutral  coun 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  137 

try  except  contraband  in  transit  to  the  enemy.  Such  procedure  need  not  conflict  in 
any  respect  with  the  rights  of  the  belligerent  maintaining  the  blockade  since  the  right 
would  remain  with  the  blockading  vessels  to  visit  and  search  all  ships  either  entering  or 
leaving  the  neutral  territory  which  they  were  in  fact,  but  not  of  right,  investing. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  notes  that  in  the  Order  in  Council  His 
Majesty's  Government  give  as  their  reason  for  entering  upon  a  course  of  action,  which 
they  are  aware  is  without  precedent  in  modern  warfare,  the  necessity  they  conceive 
themselves  to  have  been  placed  under  to  retaliate  upon  their  enemies  for  measures  of  a 
similar  nature  which  the  latter  have  announced  it  their  intention  to  adopt  and  which 
they  have  to  some  extent  adopted;  but  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  recalling 
the  principles  upon  which  His  Majesty's  Government  have  hitherto  been  scrupulous  to 
act,  interprets  this  as  merely  a  reason  for  certain  extraordinary  activities  on  the  part 
of  His  Majesty's  naval  forces  and  not  as  an  excuse  for  or  prelude  to  any  unlawful  action. 
If  the  course  pursued  by  the  present  enemies  of  Great  Britain  should  prove  to  be  in  fact 
tainted  by  illegality  and  disregard  of  the  principles  of  war  sanctioned  by  enlightened 
nations,  it  can  not  be  supposed,  and  this  Government  does  not  for  a  moment  suppose,  that 
His  Majesty's  Government  would  wish  the  same  taint  to  attach  to  their  own  actions  or 
would  cite  such  illegal  acts  as  in  any  sense  or  degree  a  justification  for  similar  practices 
on  their  part  in  so  far  as  they  afifect  neutral  rights. 

It  is  thus  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  interprets  the  language  of  the 
note  of  His  Majesty's  Principal  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  which  accompa- 
nies the  copy  of  the  Order  in  Council  which  was  handed  to  the  Ambassador  of  the  United 
States  near  the  Government  in  London  and  by  him  transmitted  to  Washington. 

This  Government  notes  with  gratification  that  "wide  discretion  is  afforded  to  the 
prize  court  in  dealing  with  the  trade  of  neutrals  in  such  manner  as  may  in  the  circum- 
stances be  deemed  just,  and  that  full  provision  is  made  to  facilitate  claims  by  persons 
interested  in  any  goods  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  marshal  of  the  prize  court  under 
the  order" ;  that  "the  effect  of  the  Order  in  Council  is  to  confer  certain  powers  upon  the 
executive  officers  of  His  Majesty's  Government" ;  and  that  "the  extent  to  which  these 
powers  will  be  actually  exercised  and  the  degree  of  severity  with  which  the  measures  of 
blockade  authorized  will  be  put  into  operation  are  matters  which  will  depend  on  the 
administrative  orders  issued  by  the  Government  and  the  decisions  of  the  authorities 
especially  charged  with  the  duty  of  dealing  with  individual  ships  and  cargoes  according 
to  the  merits  of  each  case."  This  Government  further  notes  with  equal  satisfaction  the 
declaration  of  the  British  Government  that  "the  instructions  to  be  issued  by  His  Majes- 
ty's Government  to  the  fleet  and  to  the  customs  officials  and  executive  committees  con- 
cerned will  impress  upon  them  the  duty  of  acting  with  the  utmost  dispatch  consistent 
with  the  object  in  view,  and  of  showing  in  every  case  such  consideration  for  neutrals 
as  may  be  compatible  with  that  object,  which  is,  succinctly  stated,  to  establish  a  block- 
ade to  prevent  vessels  from  carrying  goods  for  or  coming  from  Germany." 

In  view  of  these  assurances  formally  given  to  this  Government,  it  is  confidently  ex- 
pected that  the  extensive  powers  conferred  by  the  Order  in  Council  on  the  executive  officers 
of  the  Crown  will  be  restricted  by  "orders  issued  by  the  Government"  directing  the  exer- 
cise of  their  discretionary  powers  in  such  a  manner  as  to  modify  in  practical  application 
those  provisions  of  the  Order  in  Council  which,  if  strictly  enforced,  would  violate  neutral 
rights  and  interrupt  legitimate  trade.  Relying  on  the  faithful  performance  of  these 
voluntary  assurances  by  His  Majesty's  Government  the  United  States  takes  it  for 
granted  that  the  approach  of  American  merchantmen  to  neutral  ports  situated  upon  the 
long  line  of  coast  affected  by  the  Order  in  Council  will  not  be  interfered  with  when  it 
is  known  that  they  do  not  carry  goods  which  are  contraband  of  war  or  goods  destined  to 
or  proceeding  from  ports  within  the  belligerent  territory  affected. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  assumes  with  the  greater  confidence  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  will  thus  adjust  their  practice  to  the  recognized  rules  of  interna- 
tional law,  because  it  is  manifest  that  the  British  Government  have  adopted  an  extraordi- 
nary method  of  "stopping  cargoes  destined  for  or  coming  from  the  enemy's  territory," 
which,  owing  to  the  existence  of  unusual  conditions  in  modern  warfare  at  sea,  it  will  be 
difficult  to  restrict  to  the  limits  which  have  been  heretofore  required  by  the  law  of  na- 
tions. Though  the  area  of  operations  is  confined  to  "European  waters  including  the  Me- 
diterranean," so  great  an  area  of  the  high  seas  is  covered  and  the  cordon  of  ships  is  so 
distant  from  the  territory  affected  that  neutral  vessels  must  necessarily  pass  through 
the  blockading  force  in  order  to  reach  important  neutral  ports  which  Great  Britain  as  a 
belligerent  has  not  the  legal  right  to  blockade  and  which,  therefore,  it  is  presumed  she 
has  no  intention  of  claiming  to  blockade.  The  Scandinavian  and  Danish  ports,  for  ex- 
ample, are  open  to  American  trade.  They  are  also  free,  so  far  as  the  actual  enforcement 
of  the  Order  in  Council  is  concerned,  to  carry  on  trade  with  German  Baltic  ports  al- 
though it  is  an  essential  element  of  blockade  that  it  bear  with  equal  severity  upon  all 
neutrals. 


138  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

This  Grovernment,  therefore,  infers  that  the  commanders  of  His  Majesty's  ships  of 
war  engaged  in  maintaining  the  so-called  blockade  will  be  instructed  to  avoid  an  en- 
forcement of  the  proposed  measures  of  nonintercourse  in  such  a  way  as  to  impose  re- 
strictions upon  neutral  trade  more  burdensome  than  those  which  have  been  regarded  as 
inevitable  when  the  ports  of  a  belligerent  are  actually  blockaded  by  the  ships  of  its 
enemy. 

The  possibilities  of  serious  interruption  of  American  trade  under  the  Order  in  Coun- 
cil are  so  many,  and  the  methods  proposed  are  so  unusual  and  seem  liable  to  constitute 
so  great  an  impediment  and  embarrassment  to  neutral  commerce  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  if  the  Order  in  Council  is  strictly  enforced,  apprehends  many  inter- 
ferences with  its  legitimate  trade  which  will  impose  upon  His  Majesty's  Government 
heavy  responsibilities  for  acts  of  the  British  authorities  clearly  subversive  of  the  rights 
of  neutral  nations  on  the  hiah  seas.  It  is  therefore,  expected  that  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment, having  considered  these  possibilities,  will  take  the  steps  necessary  to  avoid 
them,  and,  in  the  event  that  they  should  unhappily  occur,  will  be  prepared  to  make  full 
reparation  for  every  act  which  under  the  rules  of  international  law  constitutes  a  viola- 
tion of  neutral  rights. 

As  stated  in  its  communication  of  October  22,  1914,  "this  Government  will  insist 
that  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  in  the  present  war  be  de- 
fined by  the  existing  rules  of  international  law  and  the  treaties  of  the  United  States,  ir- 
respective of  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  and  that  this  Government  re- 
serves to  itself  the  right  to  enter  a  protest  or  demand  in  each  case  in  which  those  rights 
and  duties  so  defined  are  violated  or  their  free  exercise  interfered  with,  by  the  author- 
ities of  the  British  Government." 

In  conclusion  you  will  reiterate  to  His  Majesty's  Government  that  this  statement 
of  the  views  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  made  in  the  most  friendly  spirit, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  uniform  candor  which  has  characterized  the  relations  of  the 
two  Governments  in  the  past,  and  which  has  been  in  large  measure  the  foundation  of  the 
peace  and  amity  existing  between  the  two  nations  without  interruption  for  a  century. 

Beyan. 


The  German  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Translation.] 

Imperial  German  Embassy^ 

Washington,  April  4,  1915. 
Mr.  Secretary  of  State  :  I  have  the  honor  to  deliver  to  Your  Excellency  the  in- 
closed memorandum  on  German-American  trade  and  the  question  of  delivery  of  arms. 
Accept,  etc., 

J.  Bernstorff. 


[  lodosure— Traiulation.] 
MEMORANDUM. 

Imperial  German  Embassy, 
["•'^T ""  ~— — r  Washington,  D.  C,  April  4,  1915. 

The  various  British  Orders  in  Council  have  one-sidedly  modified  the  generally  recog- 
nized principles  of  international  law  in  a  way  which  arbitrarily  stops  the  commerce  of 
neutral  nations  with  Germany.  Even  before  the  last  British  Order  in  Council,  the  ship- 
ment of  conditional  contraband,  especially  food  supplies,  to  Germany  was  practically  im- 
possible. Prior  to  the  protest  sent  by  the  American  to  the  British  Government  on  De- 
cember 28  last,  such  a  shipment  did  not  actually  take  place  in  a  single  case.  Even  after 
this  protest  the  Imperial  Embassy  knows  of  only  a  single  case  in  which  an  American 
shipper  has  ventured  to  make  such  a  shipment  for  the  purpose  of  legitimate  sale  to  Ger- 
many. Both  ship  and  cargo  were  immediately  seized  by  the  English  and  are  being  held 
in  an  English  port  under  the  pretext  of  an  order  of  the  German  Federal  Council  (Bund- 
esrat)  regarding  the  grain  trade,  although  this  resolution  of  the  Federal  Council  relates 
exclusively  to  grain  and  flour,  and  not  to  other  foodstuffs,  besides  making  an  express 
exception  with  respect  to  imported  foodstuffs,  and  although  the  German  Government 
gave  the  American  Government  an  assurance,  and  proposed  a  special  organization 
whereby  the  exclusive  consumption  by  the  civilian  population  is  absolutely  guaranteed. 

Under  the  circumstances  the  seizure  of  the  American  ship  was  inadmissible  accord- 
ing to  recognized  principles  of  international  law.  Nevertheless  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment has  not  to  date  secured  the  release  of  the  ship  and  cargo,  and  has  not,  after  a 
duration  of  the  war  of  eight  months,  succeeded  in  protecting  its  lawful  trade  with  Ger- 
many. 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  139 

Such  a  long  delay,  especially  in  matters  of  food  supply,  is  equivalent  to  an  entire 
denial. 

The  Imperial  Embassy  must  therefore  assume  that  the  United  States  Government 
acquiesces  in  the  violations  of  international  law  by  Great  Britain. 

Then  there  is  also  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  the  question  of  the  exporta- 
tion of  arms.  The  Imperial  Government  feels  sure  that  the  United  States  Government 
will  agree  that  in  questions  of  neutrality  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  consideration  not 
only  the  formal  aspect  of  the  case,  but  also  the  spirit  in  which  the  neutrality  is  carried 
out. 

The  situation  in  the  present  war  differs  from  that  of  any  previous  war.  Therefore 
any  reference  to  arms  furnished  by  Germany  in  former  wars  is  not  justified,  for  then  it 
was  not  a  question  whether  war  material  should  be  supplied  to  the  belligerents,  but  who 
should  supply  it  in  competition  with  other  nations.  In  the  present  war  all  nations  hav- 
ing a  war  material  industry  worth  mentioning  are  either  involved  in  the  war  themselves 
or  are  engaged  in  perfecting  their  own  armaments,  and  have  therefore  laid  an  embargo 
against  the  exportation  of  Avar  material.  The  United  States  is  accordingly  the  only 
neutral  country  in  a  position  to  furnish  war  materials.  The  conception  of  neutrality  is 
thereby  given  a  new  purport,  independently  of  the  formal  question  of  hitherto  existing 
law.  In  contradiction  thereto,  the  United  States  is  building  up  a  powerful  arms  industry 
in  the  broadest  sense,  the  existing  plants  not  only  being  worked  but  enlarged  by  all  avail- 
able means,  and  new  ones  built.  The  international  conventions  for  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  neutral  nations  doubtless  sprang  from  the  necessity  of  protecting  the  existing 
industries  of  neutral  nations  as  far  as  possible  from  injury  in  their  business.  But  it  can 
in  no  event  be  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  true  neutrality  if,  under  the  protection 
of  such  international  stipulations,  an  entirely  new  industry  is  created  in  a  neutral  state, 
such  as  is  the  development  of  the  arms  industry  in  the  United  States,  the  business  where- 
of, under  the  present  conditions,  can  benefit  only  the  belligerent  powers. 

This  industry  is  actually  delivering  goods  only  to  the  enemies  of  Germany.  The 
theoretical  willingness  to  supply  Germany  also  if  shipments  thither  were  possible,  does 
not  alter  the  case.  If  it  is  the  will  of  the  American  people  that  there  shall  be  a  true 
neutrality,  the  United  States  will  find  means  of  preventing  this  one-sided  supply  of  arms 
or  at  least  of  utilizing  it  to  protect  legitimate  trade  with  Germany,  especially  that  in 
foodstuffs.  This  view  of  neutrality  should  all  the  more  appeal  to  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment because  the  latter  enacted  a  similar  policy  toward  Mexico.  On  February  4, 
1914,  President  Wilson,  according  to  a  statement  of  a  Representative  in  Congress  in  the 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  December  30,  1914,  upon  the  lifting  of  the  embargo 
on  arms  to  Mexico,  declared  that  "we  should  stand  for  genuine  neutrality,  considering 
the  surrounding  facts  of  the  case  *  *  *."  He  then  held  that  "in  that  case,  because  Car- 
ranza  had  no  ports,  while  Huerta  had  them  and  was  able  to  import  these  materials,  that 
it  was  our  duty  as  a  nation  to  treat  ( Carranza  and  Huerta)  upon  an  equality  if  we 
wished  to  observe  the  true  spirit  of  neutrality  as  compared  with  a  mere  paper  neutrality." 

If  this  view  were  applied  to  the  present  case,  it  would  lead  to  an  embargo  on  the 
exportation  of  arms. 


Consul  General  Skinner  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Extract.] 

American  Consulate  General^ 

London,  April  7, 1915. 

Sir:  Referring  to  my  telegram  dated  March  31st  setting  forth  that  under  an  un- 
proclaimed  Order  in  Council  dated  March  23d  it  was  proposed  to  requisition  the  cargo 
of  the  Wilhelmina,  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  herewith  a  full  copy  of  the  Order  in  ques- 
tion. 

I  have,  etc.,  Robert  P.  Skinner. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  April  8,  1915. 
Your  1296,  March  20,  regarding  Wico. 

Foreign  OflBce  replies  to  my  representations  in  the  premises  stating  that  it  has  been 
decided  in  this  case  to  permit  this  vessel  to  proceed  to  her  destination,  and  instruc- 
tions in  that  sense  have  already  been  issued.     It  is  further  stated  that  it  is  desii'ed  to 


140  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

point  out  that  British  Government  feels  that  in  event  of  further  cargoes  going  to  Stock- 
holm being  seized  by  German  ships,  the  whole  question  of  permitting  oil  cargoes  to  pro- 
ceed to  that  destination  will  have  to  be  seriously  reconsidered. 

Page. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  April  8,  1915. 

The  Prime  Minister  has  just  handed  me  the  following,  which  I  have  communicated 
to  Hayes  and  Brooking,  who  strongly  recommend  its  acceptance  by  their  principals : 

His  Majest/s  Government  share  the  desire  of  the  United  States  Government  for  an  immediate  settlement  of 
the  case  of  the  Wilhelmina.  This  American  ship  laden  vi^ith  foodstuffs  left  New  York  for  Hamburg  on  January 
22nd.  She  called  at  Falmouth  of  her  own  accord  on  February  gth  and  her  cargo  was  detained  as  prize  on  Feb- 
ruary nth.  The  writ  instituting  prize  court  proceedings  was  issued  on  February  27th,  and  claimed  that  the  cargo 
should  be  condemned  as  contraband  of  war.  No  proceedings  were  taken  or  even  threatened  against  the  ship  her- 
self, and  in  the  ordinary  course  the  cargo  would  have  been  unloaded  when  seized  so  that  the  ship  would  be  free 
to  leave.  The  owners  of  the  cargo,  however,  have  throughout  objected  to  the  discharge  of  the  cargo  and  it  is 
because  of  this  objection  that  the  ship  is  still  at  Falmouth  with  the  cargo  on  board. 

His  Majesty's  Government  have  formally  undertaken  that  even  should  the  condemnation  of  the  cargo  as 
contraband  be  secured  in  the  prize  court  they  would  none  the  less  compensate  the  owners  for  any  loss  sustained  in 
consequence  of    the  ship  having  been  stopped  and  proceedings  taken  against  the  cargo. 

It  was  understood  at  the  time  that  the  proceedings  in  the  prize  court  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  test  case,  the 
decision  in  which  would  govern  the  treatment  of  any  subsequent  shipments  of  food  supplies  to  Germany  in  similar 
circumstances.  Since  then  the  situation  has,  however,  materially  changed  by  the  issue  of  the  Order  in  Council  of 
March  11,  1915,  and  the  measures  taken  thereunder  which  prevent  further  supplies  being  sent  from  America  to 
Germany,  whether  contraband  or  not. 

In  these  circumstances  there  is  no  longer  any  object  in  continuing  the  judicial  proceedings  in  the  case  of  the 
Wilhelmina;  for  it  can  no  longer  serve  as  a  test  case,  and  it  is  really  agreed  that  the  owners  of  the  cargo,  even  if 
proved  to  have  no  claim,  are  to  be  treated  as  if  their  claim  was  good.  Nothing  therefore  remains  but  to  settle  the 
claim  on  proper  and  just  conditions,  and  this  would,  in  the  opinion  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  be  secured  most 
expeditiously  and  with  the  least  inconvenience  to  all  parties  by  an  agreement  between  the  Crown  and  the  claimants 
for  the  disposal  of  the  whole  matter.  His  Majesty's  Government  accordingly  propose  that  such  an  agreement  be 
arrived  at  on  the  following  terms:  "His  Majesty's  Government  having  undertaken  to  compensate  the  claimants 
by  paying  for  the  cargo  seized  on  the  basis  of  the  loss  of  the  profit  the  claimants  would  have  made  if  the  ship  had 
proceeded  in  due  course  to  Hamburg,  and  by  indemnifying  them  for  the  delay  caused  to  the  ship  so  far  as  this 
delay  has  been  due  to  the  action  of  the  British  authorities,  all  proceedings  in  the  prize  court  shall  be  stayed,  on 
the  understanding  that  His  Majesty's  Government  buy  the  cargo  from  the  claimants  on  the  above  terms.  The 
cargo  shall  be  discharged  and  delivered  to  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown  forthwith.  The  sum  to  be  paid  shall  be 
assessed  by  a  single  referee  nominated  jointly  by  the  ambassador  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  His  Ma- 
jesty's principal  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  who  shall  certify  the  total  amount  after  making  such  in- 
quiries as  he  may  think  fit,  but  without  formal  hearing  or  arbitration."  His  Majesty's  Government  would  be 
grateful  if  the  United  States  ambassador  would  inform  the  claimants  of  the  above  proposal  at  his  early  conveni- 
ence and  obtain  their  acceptance. 

Page. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 
[Telegram — Paraphrase — Extract.] 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  April  9,  1915. 

Your  1889,  6th. 

Ambassador  Page  is  instructed  to  inform  the  Foreign  Office  that  this  Government, 
on  behalf  of  the  owners  of  the  Seguranca,  objects  to  its  detention,  as  the  shipper's  mani- 
fest shows  that  the  entire  cargo  was  consigned  to  named  consignees  in  Holland  and  is  ac- 
companied by  a  certificate  of  the  British  Consul  General  at  New  York ;  the  loading  of  the 
vessel  having,  moreover,  been  supervised  by  said  Consul  General's  inspector,  and  the 
vessel  containing  no  cargo  except  what  is  specified  in  the  manifest.  The  Ambassador  is 
further  instructed  to  advise  the  Foreign  Office  that  this  Government  will  support  claims 
of  owners  of  the  vessel  and  cargo  for  damages  for  detention,  as  this  Government  does  not 
admit  the  right  of  British  Government  to  require  that  this  cargo  be  reconsigned  to  the 
Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  141 

The  British  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

British  Embassy, 
Washington,  April  10,  1915. 

My  Dear  Mk.  Secretary  :  With  further  reference  to  your  letter  of  the  20th  of  March 
I  am  informed  that  the  interpretation  of  lubricants  now  absolute  contraband  is  as  follows : 

Mineral.  Including  mineral  oils,  jellies  or  greases  of  all  kinds,  pure  or  compounded ; 
graphite,  natural  or  artificial ; 

Vegetable.  Including  vegetable  lubricating  oils  and  fats  of  all  kinds,  and  resin 
greases,  and  their  mixtures ; 

Animal.    Including  all  animal  oils  and  fats  for  use  as  lubricants,  and  their  mixtures ; 

Fish.  Including  whale  oil  (train,  blubber,  sperm),  seal  or  shark  oil,  and  fish  oil 
generally ; 

Mixtures  or  compounds  of  any  of  the  foregoing. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  above  definition  covers  all  the  articles  mentioned  in  the 
earlier  list  of  lubricants  sent  to  your  Department  on  March  10  and  that  it  is  even  more 
comprehensive  inasmuch  as  it  includes  mixtures  and  compounds  of  these  articles. 

The  whole  of  the  "hides"  heading  (Article  12)  in  the  conditional  list  of  December 
23,  1914,  may  be  regarded  as  transferred  to  the  list  of  absolute  contraband.  Harness  and 
saddlery  (Article  11)  remain  conditional  contraband  unless  it  falls  within  Article  10  of 
the  absolute  list  of  December  23. 

I  am,  etc.  Cecil  Spring-Rice. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  April  12,  1915. 

You  will  say  to  British  Government,  in  replying  to  its  statement  regarding  release 
steamer  Wico,  that  this  Government  considers  that  any  seizure  of  American  cargoes 
which  might  be  made  by  the  German  authorities  would  be  a  matter  which  should  be  ad- 
justed between  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  German  Government,  and 
further  say  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does  not  perceive  that  any  such  ac- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  German  authorities  could  afford  justification  for  seizures  of 
American  cargoes  by  the  British  authorities. 

Bryan. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  German  Ambassador. 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  April  21,  1915. 

Excellency  :  I  have  given  thoughtful  consideration  to  your  Excellency's  note  of  the 
4th  of  April,  1915,  enclosing  a  memorandum  of  the  same  date,  in  which  Your  Excellency 
discusses  the  action  of  this  Government  with  regard  to  trade  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany  and  the  attitude  of  this  Government  with  regard  to  the  exportation  of 
arms  from  the  United  States  to  the  nations  now  at  war  with  Germany. 

I  must  admit  that  I  am  somewhat  at  a  loss  how  to  interpret  Your  Excellency's  treat- 
ment of  these  matters.  There  are  many  circumstances  connected  with  these  important 
subjects  to  which  I  would  have  expected  Your  Excellency  to  advert,  but  of  which  you 
make  no  mention,  and  there  are  other  circumstances  to  which  you  do  refer  which  I 
would  have  supposed  to  be  hardly  appropriate  for  discussion  between  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  and  the  Government  of  Germany. 

I  shall  take  the  liberty,  therefore,  of  regarding  Your  Excellency's  references  to  the 
course  pursued  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  with  regard  to  interferences 
with  trade  from  this  country,  such  as  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  have  attempted, 
as  intended  merely  to  illustrate  more  fully  the  situation  to  which  you  desire  to  call  our 
attention  and  not  as  an  invitation  to  discuss  that  course.  Your  Excellency's  long  ex- 
perience in  international  affairs  will  have  suggested  to  you  that  the  relations  of  the  two 
Governments  with  one  another  can  not  wisely  be  made  a  subject  of  discussion  with  a 
third  Government,  which  can  not  be  fully  informed  as  to  the  facts  and  which  can  not  be 
fully  cognizant  of  the  reasons  for  the  course  pursued.  I  believe,  however,  that  I  am 
justified  in  assuming  that  what  you  desire  to  call  forth  is  a  frank  statement  of  the  posi- 
tion of  this  Government  in  regard  to  its  obligations  as  a  neutral  power.  The  general 
attitude  and  course  of  policy  of  this  Government  in  the  maintenance  of  its  neutrality  I 
am  particularly  anxious  that  Your  Excellency  should  see  in  their  true  light.  I  had  hoped 


142  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

that  this  Government's  position  in  these  respects  had  been  made  abundantly  clear,  but 
I  am  of  course  perfectly  willing  to  state  it  again.  This  seems  to  me  the  more  necessary 
and  desirable  because,  I  regret  to  say,  the  language  which  Your  Excellency  employs  in 
your  memorandum  is  susceptible  of  being  construed  as  impugning  the  good  faith  of  the 
United  States  in  the  performance  of  its  duties  as  a  neutral.  I  take  it  for  granted  that  no 
such  implication  was  intended,  but  it  is  so  evident  that  Your  Excellency  is  laboring  un- 
der certain  false  impressions  that  I  can  not  be  too  explicit  in  setting  forth  the  facts  as 
they  are,  when  fully  reviewed  and  comprehended. 

In  the  first  place,  this  Government  has  at  no  time  and  in  no  manner  yielded  any  one 
of  its  rights  as  a  neutral  to  any  of  the  present  belligerents.  It  has  acknowledged,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  the  right  of  visit  and  search  and  the  right  to  apply  the  rules  of  con- 
traband of  war  to  articles  of  commerce.  It  has,  indeed,  insisted  upon  the  use  of  visit  and 
search  as  an  absolutely  necessary  safeguard  against  mistaking  neutral  vessels  for  ves- 
sels owned  by  an  enemy  and  against  mistaking  legal  cargoes  for  illegal.  It  has  admitted 
also  the  right  of  blockade  if  actually  exercised  and  effectively  maintained.  These  are 
merely  the  well-known  limitations  which  war  places  upon  neutral  commerce  on  the  high 
seas.  But  nothing  beyond  these  has  it  conceded.  I  call  Your  Excellency's  attention  to 
this,  notwithstanding  it  is  already  known  to  all  the  world  as  a  consequence  of  the  pub- 
lication of  our  correspondence  in  regard  to  these  matters  with  several  of  the  belligerent 
nations,  because  I  can  not  assume  that  you  have  official  cognizance  of  it. 

In  the  second  place,  this  Government  attempted  to  secure  from  the  German  and 
British  Governments  mutual  concessions  with  regard  to  the  measures  those  Governments 
respectively  adopted  for  the  interruption  of  trade  on  the  high  seas.  This  it  did,  not  of 
right,  but  merely  as  exercising  the  privileges  of  a  sincere  friend  of  both  parties  and  as 
indicating  its  impartial  good  will.  The  attempt  was  unsuccessful;  but  I  regret  that 
Your  Excellency  did  not  deem  it  worthy  of  mention  in  modification  of  the  impressions 
you  expressed.  We  had  hoped  that  this  act-  on  our  part  had  shown  our  spirit  in  these 
times  of  distressing  war  as  our  diplomatic  correspondence  had  shown  our  steadfast  re- 
fusal to  acknowledge  the  right  of  any  belligerent  to  alter  the  accepted  rules  of  war  at  sea 
in  so  far  as  they  affect  the  rights  and  interests  of  neutrals. 

In  the  third  place,  I  note  with  sincere  regret  that,  in  discussing  the  sale  and  exporta- 
tion of  arms  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  the  enemies  of  Germany,  Your  Excellen- 
cy seems  to  be  under  the  impression  that  it  was  within  the  choice  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  notwithstanding  its  professed  neutrality  and  its  diligent  efforts  to 
maintain  it  in  other  particulars,  to  inhibit  this  trade,  and  that  its  failure  to  do  so  mani- 
fested an  unfair  attitude  toward  Germany.  This  Government  holds,  as  I  believe  Your 
Excellency  is  aware,  and  as  it  is  constrained  to  hold  in  view  of  the  present  indisputable 
doctrines  of  accei)ted  international  law,  that  any  change  in  its  own  laws  of  neutrality 
during  the  progress  of  a  war  which  would  affect  unequally  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  the  nations  at  war  would  be  an  unjustifiable  departure  from  the  principles 
of  strict  neutrality  by  which  it  has  consistently  sought  to  direct  its  actions,  and  I  re- 
spectfully submit  that  none  of  the  circumstances  urged  in  Your  Excellency's  memoran- 
dum alters  the  principle  involved.  The  placing  of  an  embargo  on  the  trade  in  arms  at 
the  present  time  would  constitute  such  a  change  and  be  a  direct  violation  of  the  neutral- 
ity of  the  United  States.  It  will,  I  feel  assured,  be  clear  to  Your  Excellency  that,  hold- 
ing this  view  and  considering  itself  in  honor  bound  by  it,  it  is  out  of  the  question  for 
this  Government  to  consider  such  a  course. 

I  hope  that  Your  Excellency  will  realize  the  spirit  in  which  I  am  drafting  this  reply. 
The  friendship  between  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  the  people  of  Germany  is  so 
warm  and  of  such  long  standing,  the  ties  which  bind  them  to  one  another  in  amity  are  so 
many  and  so  strong,  that  this  Government  feels  under  a  special  compulsion  to  speak  with 
perfect  frankness  when  any  occasion  arises  which  seems  likely  to  create  any  misunder- 
standing, however  slight  or  temporary,  between  those  who  represent  the  Governments  of 
the  two  countries.  It  will  be  a  matter  of  gratification  to  me  if  I  have  removed  from  Your 
Excellency's  mind  any  misapprehension  you  may  have  been  under  regarding  either  the 
policy  or  the  spirit  and  purposes  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  Its  neutrality 
is  founded  upon  the  firm  basis  of  conscience  and  good  will. 

Accept,  etc.,  '    W.  J.  Bryan. 

Ambassador  Gerard  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 

Berlin,  April  26,  1915. 
Sir:  With  reference  to  my  telegram  No.   2097,  dated  April  21,  1915,  I  have  the 
honor  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  five  copies  of  Reichsgesetzblatt,  1915,  No.  49,  with 
translation,  containing  the  modifications  and  amendments  of  the  German  prize  ordinance 
recently  promulgated. 

I  have,  etc.,  Jambs  W.  Gerard, 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  143 

[Translation.] 

Ordinance  relative  to  amendments  of  the  prize   ordinance   of  September  so,   iQog. 

In  retaliation  of  the  regulations  adopted  by  England  and  her  allies,  deviating  from  the  London  declaration  of 

maritime  law  of  February  26,  1909,  I  approve  of  the  followring  amendments  of  the  prize  ordinance  of  September 

30,  1909,  and  of  its  supplements,  dated  October  18,  November  23,  and  December  14,  1914,  for  the  period  of  the 

present  war. 

Articles  21,  23,  27,  33,  35,  40,  and  the  additions  to  Article  23  shall  be  replaced  by  the  following  provisions : 
Article  21.    The  following  articles  and  materials,  designated  absolute  contraband,  shall  be  considered  con- 
traband of  war : 

1.  Arms  of  all  kinds,  including  arms  for  sporting  purposes,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

2.  Projectiles,  charges,  and  cartridges  of  aU  kinds,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

3.  Powder  and  explosives  of  all  kinds. 

4.  Cannon  barrels,  gun  mountings,    limber  boxes,  limbers,  field  kitchens  and  bakeries,  supply  wagons,  field 
forges,  searchlights  and  searchlight  accessories,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

5.  Range  finders  and  their  distinctive  component  parts. 

6.  Field  glasses,  telescopes,  chronometers,  and  all  kinds  of  nautical  instruments. 

7.  Clothing  and  equipment  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

8.  Saddle,  draft,  and  pack  animals  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

9.  All  kinds  of  harness  of  a  distinctively  military  character. 

10.  Articles  of  camp  equipment  and   their  distinctive  component  parts. 

11.  Armor  plates. 

12.  Lead,  pig,  sheet,  or  pipe. 

13.  Barbed  wire,  and  implements  for  fixing  and  cutting  the  same. 

14.  Tinplate. 

15.  Warships,  including  boats  and  their  distinctive  component  parts  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  only  be 
used  on  a  vessel  of  war;  ship  plates  and  construction  steel. 

16.  Submarine  sound  signaling  apparatus. 

17.  Aeroplanes,  airships,  balloons,  and  aircraft  of  all  kinds,  and  their  distinctive  component  parts,  together 
with  accessories,  articles  and  materials,  recognizable  as  intended  for  use  in  connection  with  balloons  and  aircraft. 

18.  Implements  and  devices  designed  exclusively  for  the  manufacture  and  repair  of  arms  and  munitions  of 
war. 

19.  Lathes  of  all  kinds. 

20.  Mining  lumber. 

21.  Coal  and  coke. 

22.  Flax. 

Articxe  23.    The  following  articles  and  materials  suitable  for  warlike  as  well  as  for  peaceful  purposes,  com- 
ing under  the  designation  of  conditional  contraband,  shall  be  considered  as  contraband  of  war: 

1.  Foodstuffs. 

2.  Forage  and  all  kinds  of  feeding  stuffs. 

3.  Clothing,  fabrics  for  clothing,  and  boots  and  shoes,  suitable  for  use  in  war. 

4.  Wool  from  animals,  raw  or  dressed,  together  with  woolen  carded  yarns,  and  worsted  yarns. 

5.  Gold  and  silver,  in  coin  or  bullion ;  paper  money. 

6.  Vehicles  of  all  kinds,  especially  all  motor  vehicles  available  for  use  in  war,  and  their  component  parts. 

7.  Rubber  tires  for  motor  vehicles,  together  with  all  articles  or  materials  especially  used  in  the  manufac- 
ture or  repair  of  rubber  tires. 

8.  Rubber  and  gutta-percha,  together  with  goods  made  thereof. 

9.  Railway  materials,  both  fixed  and  rolling  stock,  and   materials   for  telegraphs,   wireless  telegraphs,   and 
telephones. 

10.  Fuel,  excepting  coal  and  coke;  lubricants. 

11.  Sulphur,  sulphuric  acid,  nitric  acid. 

12.  Horseshoes   and   shoeing   materials. 

13.  The  following  ores :  Wolframite,  scheelite,  molybdenite,  nickel  ore,  chrome  ore,  haematite  iron  ore,  man- 
ganese ore,  lead  ore. 

14.  The  following  metals:    Wolfram,  molybdenum,  vanadium,  nickel,   selenium,   cobalt,  haematite  pig  iron, 
manganese,  aluminium,  copper. 

15.  Antimony,  together  with  the  sulphides  and  oxides  of  antimony. 

16.  Ferro  alloys,  including  ferrowolfram,  ferromolybdenum,   ferromanganese,   ferrovanadium,   ferrochrome. 

17.  Harness  and  saddlery. 

18.  Leather,  treated  and  untreated,  when  suitable  for  saddlery,  harness,  military  boots  or  military  clothing. 

19.  Tanning  materials  of  all  kinds,  including  extracts  used  in  tanning. 

20.  All  kinds  of  lumber,  rough  or  treated,  especially  hewn,  sawed,  planed,  fluted,  excepting  mining  lumber 
tar  of  charcoal. 

21.  Vessels,  craft,  and  boats  of  all  kinds,  floating  docks,  parts  of  docks,  and  their  component  parts. 
The  following  articles  cannot  be  declared  contraband  of  war: 

1.  Raw  cotton,  raw  silk,  raw  jute,  raw  hemp. 

2.  Resin,  lacks,  hops. 

3.  Raw  skins,  horns,  bones,  and  ivory. 

4.  Natural  and  artificial  fertilizers. 

5.  Earth,  clay,  lime,  chalk ;  stones,  including  marble ;  bricks,  slates,  and  roofing  tiles. 

6.  Porcelain  and  glass. 

7.  Paper,  and  the  materials  prepared  for  its  manufacture. 

8.  Soap;  paints,  including  the  materials  exclusively  used  for  their  manufacture,  and  varnish. 


144  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

9.  Chloride  of  lime,  soda,  caustic  soda,  sulphate  of  soda   in   cakes,   ammonia,    sulphate   of   ammonia,   and 

copper  sulphate. 

10.  Machiws  for  agriculture,  for  mining,  for  the  textile  industry,  and  for  printing. 

11.  Precious  stones,  fine  stones,  pearls,  mother-of-pearl,  and  corals. 

12.  Clocks,  standing  clocks  and  watches,  excepting  chronometers. 

13.  Fashion  and  fancy  goods. 

14.  Feathers  of  all  kinds,  hair  and  bristles. 

15.  Furniture   and   decorative  articles,   ofBce   furniture  and  requirements. 

Article  33.  In  the  absence  of  conditions  to  the  contrary,  the  hostile  destination  referred  to  in  article  32  is 
to  be  presumed  when  (A)  the  goods  are  consigned  to  an  enemy  authority  or  the  agent  of  such  or  to  a  dealer 
shown  to  have  supplied  articles  of  the  kind  in  question  or  products  thereof  to  the  armed  forces  or  the  adminis- 
trative authorities  of  the  enemy  state;  (B)  the  goods  are  consigned  to  order  or  the  ship's  papers  do  not  show 
who  is  the  consignee  or  the  goods  are  consigned  to  a  person  in  territory  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy ; 
(C)  the  goods  are  destined  for  an  armed  place  of  the  enemy  or  a  place  serving  as  a  base  of  operations  or  supplies 
to  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy. 

Merchant  vessels  themselves  are  not  to  be  considered  as  destined  for  the  armed  forces  or  the  administrative 
authorities  of  the  enemy  solely  for  the  reason  that  they  are  found  en  route  to  one  of  the  places  referred  to  under 
letter  C. 

Article  35.  Articles  of  conditional  contraband  are  liable  to  seizure  only  on  a  vessel  en  route  to  territory 
belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy  or  to  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  such  vessel  is  not  intended  to 
unload  these  articles  in  an  intermediate  neutral  port — that  is  to  say,  in  a  port  at  which  the  vessel  is  to  call 
previous  to  reaching  the  ultimate  destination  designated. 

This  paragraph  shall  not  apply  if  the  conditions  provided  in  article  33,  letter  B,  are  present  or  if  the  vessel 
is  bound  for  a  neutral  country  with  regard  to  which  it  is  shown  that  the  enemy  government  draws  articles  of  the 
kind  in  question  from  that  country. 

Article  40.  A  vessel  cannot  be  captured  on  the  ground  of  an  already  completed  voyage  carrying  contraband. 
If,  however,  the  vessel  carried  contraband  to  the  enemy  contrary  to  the  indications  of  the  ship's  papers,  it  shall 
be  liable  to  capture  and  condemnation  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

This  ordinance  shall  take  effect  the  day  of  its  promulgation. 

Chief  Headquarters,  April  18,  1915.  (Signed)  Wilhelm. 

[l.  s.]  v.  Tirpitz. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  8tate. 
[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy^ 
London,  April  28,  1915. 

Your  1471,  26th. 

Replying  to  my  representations  of  17th  instant  Foreign  Office  advises  me  as  follows : 

The  steamship  Seguranca  was  allowed  to  proceed  on  April  22,  all  the  consignees  having  agreed  to  receive 
their  goods  through  the  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 

While  His  Majesty's  Government  do  not  "require"  cargoes  to  be  consigned  to  the  Netherlands  Oversea 
Trust,  they  do  accept  a  consignment  in  that  form  as  proof  that  the  cargo  is  intended  for  bona  fide  consumption 
in  Holland,  and  they  find  by  experience  that  no  objection  to  that  course  is  raised  by  reputable  shippers  and  con- 
signees. 

As  this  practice  has  greatly  facilitated  and  expedited  the  release  of  vessels  bound  for  Dutch  ports  when 
brought  in  or  calling  for  examination,  it  is  hoped  that  the  United  States  Government  will  not  do  anything  to 
interfere  with  its  smooth  working  in  the  future. 

Page. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 
[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  op  State, 
Washington,  May  6,  1915. 

Ambassador  Page  is  instructed  to  inform  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  owners  of  the 
Seguranca  advise  the  Department  that  though  the  British  Consul  General  supervised  the 
loading  of  the  vessel,  he  failed  to  advise  them  of  the  practice  of  consigning  shipments  to 
the  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust,  and  that  if  the  British  Government  desires  the  practice 
followed  as  a  matter  of  convenience,  it  should  bring  the  same  to  the  knowledge  of  ship- 
pers. 

Ambassador  Page  is  also  instructed  to  Inform  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  United 
States  Government  does  not  object  to  the  consignment  of  American  shipments  to  the 
Netherlands  Oversea  Trust,  provided  the  plan  be  voluntarily  acquiesced  in  by  the  ship- 
pers, but  that  it  does  object  to  the  holding  up  by  British  Government  of  noncontraband 
cargoes  until  reconsigned  to  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust,  and  maintains  also  that  ship- 
ments consigned  to  other  consignees  in  Holland  have  the  same  legal  status  as  those  con- 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  145 

signed  to  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust;  that  the  United  States  Government  finds  no  legal 
justification  for  the  detention  of  noncontraband  cargoes  and  that  in  the  circumstances 
of  this  case  the  burden  of  proof  is  not  on  shipper  to  establish  the  noncontraband  char- 
acter, but  is  on  the  British  Government  to  show  contraband  character  of  shipments. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to    Ambassador    Gerard. 

Department  op  State, 
Washington,  May  13,  1915. 

Please  call  on  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  after  reading  to  him  this  com- 
munication leave  with  him  a  copy. 

In  view  of  recent  acts  of  the  German  authorities  in  violation  of  American  rights  on 
the  high  seas  which  culminated  in  the  torpedoing  and  sinking  of  the  British  steamship 
Lusitania  on  May  7,  1915,  by  which  over  100  American  citizens  lost  their  lives,  it  is  clear- 
ly wise  and  desirable  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  should  come  to  a  clear  and  full  understanding  as  to  the  grave  situation 
which  has  resulted. 

The  sinking  of  the  British  passenger  steamer  Falaba  by  a  German  submarine  on 
March  28,  through  which  Leon  C.  Thrasher,  an  American  citizen,  was  drowned;  the  at- 
tack on  April  28  on  the  American  vessel  Gushing  by  a  German  aeroplane ;  the  torpedoing 
on  May  1  of  the  American  vessel  Gulflight  by  a  German  submarine,  as  a  result  of 
which  two  or  more  American  citizens  met  their  death;  and,  finally,  the  torpedoing  and 
sinking  of  the  steamship  Lusitania,  constitute  a  series  of  events  which  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  observed  with  growing  concern,  distress,  and  amazement. 

Recalling  the  humane  and  enlightened  attitude  hitherto  assumed  by  the  Imperial 
German  Government  in  matters  of  international  right,  and  particularly  with  regard  to 
the  freedom  of  the  seas;  having  learned  to  recognize  the  German  views  and  the  German 
influence  in  the  field  of  international  obligation  as  always  engaged  upon  the  side  of  jus- 
tice and  humanity;  and  having  understood  the  instructions  of  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment to  its  naval  commanders  to  be  upon  the  same  plane  of  humane  action  prescribed 
by  the  naval  codes  of  other  nations,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  loath  to 
believe — it  can  not  now  bring  itself  to  believe — that  these  acts,  so  absolutely  contrary  to 
the  rules,  the  practices,  and  the  spirit  of  modern  warfare,  could  have  the  countenance  or 
sanction  of  that  great  Government.  It  feels  it  to  be  its  duty,  therefore,  to  address  the 
Imperial  German  Government  concerning  them  with  the  utmost  frankness  and  in  the 
earnest  hope  that  it  is  not  mistaken  in  expecting  action  on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  which  will  correct  the  unfortunate  impressions  which  have  been  cre- 
ated and  vindicate  once  more  the  position  of  that  Government  with  regard  to  the  sacred 
freedom  of  the  seas. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  been  apprised  that  the  Imperial  German 
Government  considered  themselves  to  be  obliged  by  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of 
the  present  war  and  the  measures  adopted  by  their  adversaries  in  seeking  to  cut  Germany 
off  from  all  commerce,  to  adopt  methods  of  retaliation  which  go  much  beyond  the  ordinary 
methods  of  wai  fare  at  sea,  in  the  proclamation  of  a  war  zone  from  which  they  have 
warned  neutral  ships  to  keep  away.  This  Government  has  already  taken  occasion  to  in- 
form the  Imperial  German  Government  that  it  can  not  admit  the  adoption  of  such  meas- 
ures or  such  a  warning  of  danger  to  operate  as  in  any  degree  an  abbreviation  of  the 
rights  of  American  shipmasters  or  of  American  citizens  bound  on  lawful  errands  as  pas- 
sengers on  merchant  ships  of  belligerent  nationality ;  and  that  it  must  hold  the  Imperial 
German  Government  to  a  strict  accountability  for  any  infringement  of  those  rights,  in- 
tentional or  incidental.  It  does  not  understand  the  Imperial  German  Government  to 
question  those  rights.  It  assumes,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  Imperial  Government  ac- 
cept, as  of  course,  the  rule  that  the  lives  of  noncombatants,  whether  they  be  of  neutral 
citizenship  or  citizens  of  one  of  the  nations  at  war,  can  not  lawfully  or  rightfully  be  put 
in  jeopardy  by  the  capture  or  destruction  of  an  unarmed  merchantman,  and  recognize 
also,  as  all  other  nations  do,  the  obligation  to  take  the  usual  precaution  of  visit  and 
search  to  ascertain  whether  a  suspected  merchantman  is  in  fact  of  belligerent  nationality 
or  is  in  fact  carrying  contraband  of  war  under  a  neutral  flag. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  desires  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
Imperial  German  Government  with  the  utmost  earnestness  to  the  fact  that  the  objection 
to  their  present  method  of  attack  against  the  trade  of  their  enemies  lies  in  the  practical 
impossibility  of  employing  submarines  in  the  destruction  of  commerce  without  disregard- 
ing those  rules  of  fairness,  reason,  justice,  and  humanity,  which  all  modern  opinion  re- 
gards as  imperative.  It  is  practically  impossible  for  ofllcers  of  a  submarine  to  visit  a 
merchantman  at  sea  and  examine  her  papers  and  cargo.    It  is  practically  impossible  for 


146  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

them  to  make  a  prize  of  her ;  and,  if  they  can  not  put  a  prize  crew  on  board  of  her,  they 
can  not  sink  her  without  leaving  her  crew  and  all  on  board  of  her  to  the  mercy  of  the 
sea  in  her  small  boats.  These  facts  it  is  understood  the  Imperial  German  Government 
frankly  admit.  We  are  informed  that  in  the  instances  of  which  we  have  spoken  time 
enough  for  even  that  poor  measure  of  safety  was  not  given,  and  in  at  least  two  of  the 
cases  cited  not  so  much  as  a  warning  was  received.  Manifestly  submarines  can  not  be 
used  against  merchantmen,  as  the  last  few  weeks  have  shown,  without  an  inevitable 
violation  of  many  sacred  principles  of  justice  and  humanity. 

American  citizens  act  within  their  indisputable  rights  in  taking  their  ships  and  in 
traveling  wherever  their  legitimate  business  calls  them  upon  the  high  seas,  and  exercise 
those  rights  in  what  should  be  the  well-justified  confidence  that  their  lives  will  not  be 
endangered  by  acts  done  in  clear  violation  of  universally  acknowledged  international 
obligations,  and  certainly  in  the  confidence  that  their  own  Government  will  sustain  them 
in  the  exercise  of  their  rights. 

There  was  recently  published  in  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States,  I  regret  to 
inform  the  Imperial  German  Government,  a  formal  warning,  purporting  to  come  from 
the  Imperial  German  Embassy  at  Washington,  addressed  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  and  stating,  in  effect,  that  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  exercised  Lis 
right  of  free  travel  upon  the  seas  would  do  so  at  his  peril  if  his  journey  should  take  him 
within  the  zone  of  waters  within  which  the  Imperial  German  Navy  was  using  subma- 
rines against  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  notwithstanding  the  respectful 
but  very  earnest  protest  of  his  Government,  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  I 
do  not  refer  to  this  for  the  purpose  of  calling  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  at  this  time  to  the  surprisingly  irregularity  of  a  communication  from  the 
Imperial  German  Embassy  at  Washington,  addressed  to  the  people  of  the  United  States 
through  the  newspapers,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  pointing  out  that  no  warning  that 
an  unlawful  and  inhumane  act  will  be  committed  can  possibly  be  accepted  as  an  excuse 
or  palliation  for  that  act  or  as  an  abatement  of  the  responsibility  for  its  commission. 

Long  acquainted  as  this  Government  has  been  with  the  character  of  the  Imperial 
German  Government  and  with  the  high  principles  of  equity  by  which  they  have  in  the 
past  been  actuated  and  guided,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  can  not  believe 
that  the  commanders  of  the  vessels  which  committed  these  acts  of  lawlessness  did  so  ex- 
cept under  a  misapprehension  of  the  orders  issued  by  the  Imperial  German  naval  authori- 
ties. It  takes  it  for  granted  that,  at  least  within  the  practical  possibilities  of  every  such 
case,  the  commanders  even  of  submarines  were  expected  to  do  nothing  that  would  in- 
volve the  lives  of  noncombatants  or  the  safety  of  neutral  ships,  even  at  the  cost  of  failing 
of  their  object  of  capture  or  destruction.  It  confidently  expects,  therefore,  that  the  Im- 
perial German  Government  will  disavow  the  acts  of  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  complains,  that  they  will  make  reparation  so  far  as  reparation  is  possible  for  in- 
juries which  are  without  measure,  and  that  they  will  take  immediate  steps  to  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  anything  so  obviously  subversive  of  the  principles  of  warfare  for  which  the 
Imperial  German  Government  have  in  the  past  so  wisely  and  so  firmly  contended. 

The  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  look  to  the  Imperial  German 
Government  for  just,  prompt  and  enlightened  action  in  this  vital  matter  with  the  greater 
confidence  because  the  United  States  and  Germany  are  bound  together  not  only  by  spe- 
cial ties  of  friendship  but  also  by  the  explicit  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1828  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia. 

Expressions  of  regret  and  offers  of  reparation  in  case  of  the  destruction  of  neutral 
ships  sunk  by  mistake,  while  they  may  satisfy  international  obligations,  if  no  loss  of  life 
results,  can  not  justify  or  excuse  a  practice,  the  natural  and  necessary  effect  of  which 
is  to  subject  neutral  nations  and  neutral  persons  to  new  and  immeasurable  risks. 

The  Imperial  German  Government  will  not  expect  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  omit  any  word  or  any  act  necessai-y  to  the  performance  of  its  sacred  duty  of 
maintaining  the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  and  of  safeguarding  their 
free  exercise  and  enjoyment. 

Bryan. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

American  Embassy, 
London,  May  18,  1915. 
Sir:  Adverting  to  the  Department's  cablegram  No.  1408  of  April  12,  regard  to  the 
detention  of  the  S.  S.  Wico  by  the  British  authorities,  and  instructing  me  to  acquaint  the 
British  Government  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  considered  that  any  ques- 
tion arising  out  of  the  seizure  of  American  cargoes  by  the  German  authorities  would  be 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  147 

a  matter  for  adjustment  between  the  two  Governments,  and  could  not  afford  justification 
for  the  seizure  of  American  cargoes  by  the  British  authorities,  I  have  the  honor  to  trans- 
mit herewith,  for  the  information  of  the  Department,  a  copy  of  a  note,  under  date  of 
May  16,  which  I  have  received  from  the  Foreign  Office  in  reply  to  my  representations 
in  the  premises. 

I  have,  etc.,  Walter  Hines  Page. 


[Inclosure.] 

The  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

Foreign  Office, 

May  l6,  I9IS- 
Sir:  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  note  of  the  i6th  ultimo,  in  which  Your  Excel- 
lency stated,  in  connection  with  the  detention  of  the  American  ship  Wico,  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  considered  that  any  question  arising  out  of  the  seizure  of  American  cargoes  by  the  German  authorities 
would  be  a  matter  for  adjustment  between  the  two  Governments,  and  could  not  afford  justification  for  the  seiz- 
ure of  American  cargoes  by  British  authorities. 

I  regret  that  my  note  of  the  7th  instant  did  not  explain  with  sufficient  clearness  the  attitude  which  His 
Majesty's  Government  feel  constrained  to  adopt  in  the  matter.  They  had  no  intention  of  claiming  the  right 
to  interfere  with  neutral  vessels  on  their  way  to  neutral  ports,  on  the  ground  that  such  vessels  were  liable  to 
be  captured  by  enemy  cruisers.  I  should  have  stated  that  the  recent  seizures  of  a  number  of  such  vessels  and 
their  diversion  to  German  ports  were  effected  in  circumstances  which  left  no  doubt  that  there  was  collusion 
between  the  parties  interested  in  the  cargoes  and  the  German  authorities. 

The  right  which  His  Majesty's  Government  claim,  and  which  they  feel  confident  will  not  be  questioned  by 
the  United  States  Government,  is  that  neutral  ships  may  be  held  up  in  cases  where  there  are  good  grounds  to 
suspect  that  their  ostensible  destination  is  not  the  genuine  destination,  and  that  fraudulent  arrangements  have 
been  concerted  with  the  enemy  cruisers  for  delivering  ship  and  cargo  into  their  hands. 
I  have,  etc., 

For  the  Secretary  of  State: 

W.  Langley. 


British  memorandum,  May  20,  1915,  in  reference  to  the  detention  of  American  ships 
and  cargoes* 

First:  There  are  at  the  present  moment  three  American  ships  detained  in  this 
country.  Two  of  them  are  cotton  ships,  which  are  dealt  with  below.  The  third  is  the 
steamer  Joseph  W.  Fordney.  This  vessel,  with  a  cargo  of  foodstuffs  consigned  to  E.  Klin- 
gener  at  Malmo  (Sweden),  was  brought  into  Kirkwall  on  April  8th.  She  had  been 
sighted  by  His  Majesty's  ships  about  ten  miles  from  the  Norwegian  coast  and  had  there- 
upon endeavored,  with  the  evident  desire  to  evade  search,  to  escape  rapidly  into  Norwegian 
territorial  waters,  but  without  success. 

On  the  vessel's  arrival  in  Kirkwall,  inquiries  were  at  once  addressed  to  His  Maj- 
esty's Minister  at  Stockholm,  with  regard  to  tlie  consignee  of  the  cargo,  and  a  reply  was 
received  to  the  effect  that  no  person  of  that  name  could  be  identified  at  Malmo,  though 
there  was  a  person  of  that  name  who  resided  al  Gothenburg,  and  was  manager  of  the  Goth- 
enburg branch  of  Hugo  Hartvig,  and  who  had  stated  that  the  consignments  addressed  to 
him  on  board  the  Joseph  W.  Fordney  were  intended  for  storage  in  Malmo. 

Second:  The  suspicious  conduct  of  tlie  vessel  in  endeavoring  to  elude  His  Majes- 
ty's patrols  and  the  known  connections  of  the  consignee  of  her  cargo  have  tended  to  con- 
firm other  evidence,  which  has  come  to  the  knowledge  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  that 
the  foodstuffs  were  in  reality  destined  for  Germany.  It  was  accordingly  decided  that  the 
cargo  must  be  placed  in  the  Prize  Court,  and  the  vessel  is  at  present  discharging  at  Portis- 
head,  England,  on  the  completion  of  which  operation  she  will  be  released. 

His  Majesty's  Government  feel  satisfied  that  in  the  circumstances  of  this  case  un- 
due interference  with  American  interests  cannot  with  reason  be  imputed  to  them. 

Third  :  The  number  of  neutral  vessels  carrying  American  cargoes  and  at  present 
held  up  is  thirty-six.  Of  these  twenty-three  carry  cargoes  of  American  cotton.  The  United 
States  Government  are  aware  that  since  the  enforcement  of  the  blockade  measures  an- 
nounced in  the  supplement  to  The  London  Gazette,-  of  the  12th  of  March  last.  His  Majesty's 
Government  have  acted  as  regards  shipments  of  American  cotton  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  an  arrangement  arrived  at  in  collaboration  with  representatives  of  the  Amer- 
ican cotton  interests.    The  terms  of  the  arrangement  are  as  follows : 

A.  All  cotton  for  which  contracts,  sale  and  freight  engagements  already  have 
been  made  before  March  2nd,  is  to  be  allowed  free  transit  or  bought  at  the  contract  price 
if  stopped,  provided  the  ship  sails  not  later  than  the  31st  of  March. 

*  Not  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence,   etc.     The  New  York  Times,  May  21,    191 5. 


148  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

B.  Similar  treatment  is  to  be  accorded  all  cotton  insured  before  the  2nd  of  March, 
provided  it  is  put  aboard  not  later  than  the  16th  of  March. 

C.  All  shipments  of  cotton  claiming  the  above  protection  are  to  be  declared  before 
sailing,  and  documents  produced  and  certificates  obtained  from  Consular  officers  or  other 
authorities  fixed  by  the  Government. 

Fourth  :  In  accepting  this  scheme,  which  it  may  be  noted  applies  to  shipments  of 
cotton  for  a  neutral  destination  only,  the  principal  representatives  of  the  American  cotton 
interests  described  it  to  his  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  Washington  as  conceding  all  that  the 
American  interests  could  properly  ask.  It  was  never  suggested  that  vessels  or  cargoes 
with  an  enemy  destination  should  be  allowed  to  proceed.  His  Majesty's  Government  were, 
moreover,  given  to  understand  that  the  provisions  of  the  arrangement  were  acceptable  to 
the  United  States  Government. 

Fifth  :  It  is  intended  shortly  to  furnish  a  statement  showing  precisely  what  car- 
goes or  portions  of  cargoes  his  Majesty's  Government  have  dealt  with  under  the  above  ar- 
rangement, and  as  regards  those  which  they  have  decided  to  purchase  at  the  contract 
price  under  the  terms  of  Paragraph  A  of  the  arrangement,  direct  discussions  have 
already  been  opened  with  the  special  representatives  of  the  American  parties  interested  in 
London. 

Sixth  :  A  considerable  portion  of  the  cotton  has  already  been  sold,  and  arrange- 
ments are  being  made  for  handing  over  the  proceeds  to  the  parties  entitled  to  receive  the 
total  value,  as  a  first  installment  of  the  completed  transaction.  It  is  obvious  that  all  these 
arrangements  require  some  time  for  adjustment.  Meanwhile,  it  is  not  believed  that  the 
original  owners  can,  as  appears  to  be  apprehended,  be  suffering  acutely  by  the  delay  of 
full  payment.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  in  accordance  with  the  customs  of  trade,  the  own- 
ers drew  bills  to  the  value  of  their  goods  before  or  at  the  time  of  shipment,  and,  if  such 
bills  have  been  negotiated  in  the  usual  way,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  the  drawers 
should  be  put  to  inconvenience  on  this  account,  at  least  before  the  date  when  the  bills  fall 
due. 

Seventh  :  On  an  impartial  review  of  the  facts  it  will,  his  Majesty's  Government 
feel  sure,  be  admitted  that  no  arbitrary  interference  with  American  interests  has,  in  regard 
to  these  cargoes,  occurred,  seeing  that  his  Majesty's  Government  has  acted  throughout  in 
conformity  with  the  terms  of  an  arrangement  agreeable  to  the  interests  concerned,  and 
that  United  States  citizens  will  suffer  no  pecuniary  loss. 

Eighth  :  As  regards  other  American  cargoes,  or  portions  of  cargoes,  which  have 
been  placed  in  the  Prize  Court  his  Majesty's  Government  resort  to  this  measure  in  cases 
where  either  the  goods  concerned  are  contraband,  or  there  is  evidence  that,  although  os- 
tensibly consigned  to  a  person  in  neutral  countries,  they  are  in  reality  destined  to  the 
enemy  in  contravention  of  the  rules  of  blockade.  The  right  to  submit  such  cases  to  the 
public  investigation  of  a  judicial  tribunal  is  one  which  his  Majesty's  Government  cannot 
forego,  and  they  feel  convinced  that  the  enlightened  opinion  in  the  United  States  cannot 
adversely  criticize  their  course  of  action  in  this  respect. 

Ninth  :  It  is  true  that  a  number  of  these  cases  have  been  pending  in  the  Prize  Court 
for  some  time.  This  is  notably  tlie  case  in  regard  to  certain  vessels  carrying  large  ship- 
ments of  meat  and  lard  ostensibly  consigned  to  Scandinavian  ports.  The  United  States 
Government  are,  however,  no  doubt  aware  that  much  of  the  delay  involved  in  these  in- 
stances is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  negotiations  have  been  carried  on  for  many  weeks  with  a 
representative  of  the  princii)al  American  meat  packers,  for  an  arrangement  designated  to 
limit  importation  into  neutral  countries  adjacent  to  Germany,  to  quantities  actually  re- 
quired in  those  countries  for  bona  fide  home  consumption.  The  American  meat  packers 
have  demanded  as  a  part  of  the  settlement  to  be  agreed  upon,  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment should  buy  the  cargoes  of  several  ships  now  held  up  in  the  Prize  Court.  Hence  the 
delay  in  bringing  these  cases  to  adjudication. 

The  negotiations  for  an  amicable  settlement  have,  unfortunately,  come  to  a  stand- 
still owing  to  the  exorbitant  terms  insisted  upon  by  the  representative  of  the  American 
packers.  This  stage  having  now  been  reached.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  decided  to 
go  on  with  the  Prize  Court  proceedings  in  these  cases,  and  it  is  not  expected  tliat  a  deci- 
sion will  be  much  longer  delayed. 

Tenth  :  It  may  finally  be  pointed  out  that  repeated  complaint,  as  to  injury  suffered 
generally  by  American  trade  in  consequence  of  interference  due  to  British  naval  measures, 
derives  little  substance  from  the  published  American  trade  returns.  A  table  of  figures 
taken  from  these  returns  and  showing  the  amount  of  recent  American  trade  with  Germany 
and  with  neutral  countries  supplying  Germany,  is  annexed  hereto.  It  certainly  tends  to 
disprove  any  contention  that  American  trade  with  neutral  countries  has  recently  suffered. 
It  will  be  seen  that  whereas  American  exports  to  Germany  and  Austria  in  February,  1915, 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  149 

fell  by  $21,500,000,  as  compared  with  the  same  month  in  1914,  American  exports  to  Scan- 
dinavia, Holland  and  Italy  rose  by  the  enormous  figure  of  f  61,100,000. 

Eleventh:  Similar  figures  for  the  month  of  March  have  not  yet  reached  His  Maj- 
esty's Government,  but  they  have  received  statistics  for  that  month  of  the  value  of  exports 
and  imports  through  New  York,  as  issued  by  the  Collector  of  the  Port,  and  while  point- 
ing out  a  large  increase  in  the  value  of  exports  in  1915,  compared  with  those  of  1914,  as 
shown  in  the  tables  annexed,  they  desire  especially  to  call  attention  to  a  separate  state- 
ment indicating  the  increase  in  the  amount  of  the  export  to  Scandinavian- and  Dutch  ports 
of  two  commodities  only — bacon  and  lard.  These  figures  show  that  as  against  1,253  boxes  of 
bacon  and  9,816  tierces  of  lard  exported  to  the  ports  noted  in  the  above  countries  in  March, 
1914,  there  were  exported  in  March,  1915,  32,222  boxes  of  bacon  and  95,676  tierces  of  lard. 

Twelfth  :  His  Majesty's  Government  consider  that  the  abnormal  increase  in  sup- 
plies imported  by  neutral  countries,  as  shown  in  these  statistics,  alone  justifies  their  as- 
sumption as  to  the  ultimate  destination  of  many  items  in  cargoes  consigned  to  one  or 
the  other  of  the  countries  in  question  in  the  vessels  which  they  have  detained,  but  they 
would  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  is  only  when  they  have  believed  themselves  to  be  in 
possession  of  conclusive  evidence  of  the  enemy  destination  of  a  cargo  that  they  have  seized 
such  a  cargo,  and  that  American  interests,  as  for  instance  in  the  case  of  cotton,  have  re- 
ceived especially  sympathetic  consideration. 


Statement  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  May  21,  1915,  regarding  an  error  in  the  fore- 
going:* 

The  foreign  trade  advisers'  attention  has  been  called  to  the  statement  of  the  Foreign 
Officeof  Great  Britain,  published  in  this  morning's  papers,  an  extract  from  which  follows: 

"Fourth  :  In  accepting  this  scheme,  which,  it  may  be  noted,  applies  to  shipments 
of  cotton  for  a  neutral  destination  only,  the  principal  representative  of  the  American  inter- 
ests described  it  to  his  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  Washington  as  conceding  all  that  the 
American  interests  could  properly  ask.  It  was  never  suggested  that  vessels  or  cargoes 
with  an  enemy  destination  should  be  allowed  to  proceed.  His  Majesty's  Government  were, 
moreover,  given  to  understand  that  the  provisions  of  the  arrangements  were  acceptable  to 
the  United  States  Government." 

The  plan  referred  to  is  the  one  which  was  entered  into  between  the  cotton  shippers 
of  this  country  and  the  British  Embassy,  a  portion  of  which  is  quoted  in  the  statement  of 
the  British  Foreign  Ofiice. 

Without  discussing  at  this  time  the  statement  that  "it  was  never  suggested  that 
vessels  or  cargoes  with  an  enemy  destination  should  be  allowed  to  proceed,"  the  foreign 
trade  advisers,  who  informally  and  unofficially  represented  the  cotton  shippers  in  the  nego- 
tiations which  led  to  the  so-called  cotton  arrangement,  state  that  it  was  distinctly  under- 
stood between  Sir  Arthur  Cecil  Spring-Rice,  the  British  Ambassador,  and  Robert  F.  Rose, 
the  foreign  trade  adviser  conducting  this  discussion  on  behalf  of  the  American  cotton  ex- 
porters, that  nothing  done  by  the  foreign  trade  advi>sers  should  be  regarded  as  official,  and 
that  everything  done  was  to  be  considered  as  informal  and  unofficial,  and  in  no  way  binding 
the  United  States  Government  to  any  arrangement  reached,  or  be  construed  as  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  Order  in  Council  to  be  issued  or  the  Declaration  of  March  1,  which  has  been 
issued.  This  statement  was  made  to  the  British  Ambassador  on  March  3,  when  the  first 
conference  in  the  matter  was  held,  was  repeated  at  each  subsequent  conference,  and  each 
time  the  absolute  assurance  from  the  British  Ambassador  was  received  that,  in  acting  for 
the  cotton  shippers  in  any  way,  the  foreign  trade  advisers  were  to  be  regarded  as  not  repre- 
senting the  United  States  Government  in  any  manner. 


Statement  of  the  British  Amhassador,  May  21, 1915,  correcting  an  error  in  the  fare- 
going  :-\ 

The  terms  of  the  arrangement  quoted  in  the  British  statement  as  telegraphed  were 
arrived  at  in  London  between  a  private  representative  of  the  American  cotton  interests  in 
London  and  British  officials  in  London.  The  reference  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Par- 
agraph 4  is,  therefore,  an  error. 

The  arrangement  in  question  formed  the  subject  of  conversations  between  the  Am- 
bassador and  representatives  of  the  cotton  interests  in  this  country.  There  never  was  any 
question  of  a  formal  and  official  understanding  between  the  United  States  Government 
gnd  the  British  Embassy. 

*  Not  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence^  etc.    The  New  York  Times,  May  as.  1915. 
tNot   printed    in    Diplomatic   Correspondence,   etc.      The   New    York    Times,    May  22,   1915. 


150  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State  ad  Interim. 

[Telegram.] 

Ameeican  Embassy, 
London,  June  22,  1915. 
Lord  Crewe,  in  charge  of  Foreign  Office  during  Sir  Edward  Grey's  temporary  ab- 
sence, has  just  handed  me  a  printed  memorandum  dated  June  17.  It  is  not  an  answer  to 
the  principles  set  forth  in  the  note  transmitted  in  your  1343  of  March  30,  but  merely  an 
explanation  of  concrete  cases  and  the  regulations  under  which  they  are  dealt  with.  Fo- 
reign Office  wishes  to  arrange  for  simultaneoHis  publication  here  and  in  Washington  morn- 
ing of  25th  inst.  Please  telegraph  if  this  date  is  satisfactory.  Memorandum  reads  as  fol- 
lows : 

1.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  on  various  occasions,  and  notably  in  the  communication  which  was  ad- 
dressed to  the  United  States  Ambassador  on  the  isth  March  last,  given  assurances  to  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment that  they  would  make  it  their  first  aim  to  minimize  the  inconvenience  which  must  inevitably  be  caused 
to  neutral  commerce  from  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  at  sea,  and  in  particular  from  the  measures  taken  by 
the  Allied  Governments  for  the  restriction  of  the  enemies'  oversea  trade.  In  view  of  the  representation  and 
complaints  made  to  this  department  by  the  Ambassador  from  time  to  time  as  to  the  peculiar  hardships  alleged 
to  have  been  wrongly  inflicted  on  American  trade  and  shipping  by  the  operation  of  those  measures,  His  Majesty's 
Government  desire  to  offer  the  following  observations  respecting  to  manner  in  which  they  have  consistently 
endeavored  to  give  practical  effect  to  those  assurances. 

2.  It  will  be  recalled  that,  at  the  moment  when  His  Majesty's  Government  announced  their  measures 
against  enemy  commerce,  they  declared  their  intention  to  refrain  altogether  from  the  exercise  of  the  right  to 
confiscate  ships  or  cargoes,  which  belligerents  had  always  previously  claimed  in  respect  of  breaches  of  blockade; 
that  under  Article  Five  [1]  of  the  enactment  of  the  11th  March,  it  was  expressly  provided  that  any  person  claiming 
to  be  interested  in  goods  placed  in  the  Prize  Court  in  puisuance  of  the  provision  of  that  enactment,  might  forth- 
with issue  a  writ  against  the  proper  officer  of  the  Crown,  the  object  being  to  confer  upon  claimants  the  right 
to  institute  proceedings  without  waiting  for  the  writ  of  the  procurator  general,  and  thus  to  remove  all  possible 
cause  of  legitimate  grievance  on  account  of  delay ;  and  that,  finally,  a  pacific  rssurance  was  given  to  the  United 
States  Government  that  the  instructions  to  be  issued  by  His  Majesty's  Government  to  the  fleet,  and  to  the  cus- 
toms officials  and  executive  officials  concerned,  would  impress  upon  them  the  duty  of  acting  with  the  utmost 
dispatch  consistent  with  the  object  in  view,  and  of  showing  in  every  case  such  consideration  for  neutrals  as 
might  be  compatible  with  that  object,  namely,  to  prevent  vessels  carrying  goods  for,  or  coming  from,  the 
enemy's  territory. 

3.  The  above  measures  were  all  designed  to  alleviate  the  burdens  imposed  upon  neutral  sea-borne  com- 
merce in  general.  Various  special  concessions,  over  and  above  those  enumerated,  have  moreover  been  made  in 
favour  of  United  States  citizens. 

4.  Thus  His  Majesty's  Government  have  acted,  as  regards  shipments  of  American  cotton,  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  an  agreement  arrived  at  in  direct  collaboration  with  representatives  of  the  American  cot- 
ton interests.  In  accepting  this  scheme,  the  principal  representative  of  those  interests  described  it  as  conceding 
all  that  American  interests  could  properly  ask.  The  provisions  of  the  arrangement  were,  as  the  United  States 
Ambassador  is  aware,  as  follows: 

"(i)  All  cotton  for  which  contracts  of  sale  and  freight  engagements  have  already  been  made  before  the 
2d  March  is  to  be  allowed  free  [or  bought  at  contract  price  if  stopped],  provided  the  ship  sails  not  later  than 
the  31st  March. 

"(2)  Similar  treatment  is  to  be  accorded  to  all  cotton  insured  before  the  2d  March,  provided  it  is  put  on 
board  not  later  than  the  i6th  March. 

"(3)  All  shipments  of  cotton  claiming  the  above  protection  are  to  be  declared  before  sailing,  and  docu- 
ments produced  to,  and  certificates  obtained  from,  consular  officers  or  other  authority  fixed  by  the  Government." 

5.  Considerable  shipments  of  cotton  have  already  been  dealt  with  under  this  arrangement,  and  in  certain 
cases  the  dates  specified  have  been  extended  in  favour  of  American  shippers.  The  Board  of  Trade  have 
already  paid  a  sum  exceeding  £4.50,000  to  various  American  claimants,  and  all  claims  are  being  and  will  continue 
to  be  paid  as  rapidly  as  they  are  presented  and  the  proofs  of  title  can  be  checked.  If  in  some  cases  progress 
has  been  delayed,  this  has  been  due  to  the  fact  which  has  seriously  embarrassed  His  Majesty's  Government — 
that  a  number  of  consignments,  for  which  the  American  shippers  had  specifically  invoked  the  protection  of  the 
arrangement,  are  now  claimed  by  Swedish  and  Dutch  firms,  whose  title  of  ownership,  notwithstanding  the 
action  of  the  American  shipper,  appears,  in  some  cases  to  be  valid,  and  in  others  has  led  to  the  issue  of  writs 
in  the  Prize  Court. 

6.  It  has  been  explicitly  acknowledged  by  the  special  representatives  of  the  American  claimants,  who  have 
been  in  constant  and  direct  communication  with  the  Board  of  Trade,  that  all  the  claims  so  far  submitted  under 
the  cotton  arrangement  have  been  settled  with  the  utmost  promptitude  so  soon  as  the  production  of  the  neces- 
sary documents  by  the  claimants  allowed  of  this  being  done.  There  is,  at  the  present  moment,  no  claim  before 
His  Majesty's  Government  that  has  not  been  paid,  and  the  sums  so  paid  over  are  already  considerably  in  excess 
of  the  amounts  realized  by  the  sale  of  the  goods. 

7.  As  regards  the  more  general  allegation  of  delay  in  dealing  with  cases  of  detained  cargoes,  the  following 
facts  and  figures  may  be  quoted : 

"The  total  number  of  vessels  which,  having  cleared  from  United  States  ports  since  the  initiation  of  the 
retaliatory  measures  against  German  trade,  are  still  detained  in  United  Kingdom  ports,  is  27;  of  this  number, 
8  are  discharging  cotton  which  His  Majesty's  Government  has  agreed  to  purchase  under  the  above  arrangement. 
Of  the  remaining  19  vessels,  7  are  free  to  depart  so  soon  as  the  items  of  their  cargo  placed  in  the  Prize  Court 
have  been  discharged.  The  other  12,  of  which  3  only  are  American  ships,  are  detained  pending  inquiries  as  to 
suspicious  consignments,  and  particulars  as  to  the  dates  and  approximate  causes  of  detention  are  furnished 
in  the  accompanying  list:    It  will  be  observed  that  8  have  been  detained  for  a  period  of  less  than  a  week,  and 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  151 

3  for  a  period  of  less  than  a  fortnight,  while  the  deten.ion  of   I   is  due  to  the  difficulties  in  regard  to  transit 
across  Sweden  and  Russia." 

8.  His  Majesty's  Government  remain  convinced  that,  on  an  impartial  review  of  the  facts,  it  will  be  admitted 
that  no  arbitrary  interference  with  American  interests  has,  in  regard  to  cotton  cargoes,  occurred;  while  if 
due  regard  be  paid  to  the  e^iormous  volume  of  American  and  neutral  shipping  which  is  continually  engaged  in 
the  trans-Atlantic  trade,  the  figures  and  dates  quoted  in  the  preceding  paragraph  will  emphasize  the  restricted 
nature  of  any  interference  which  has  taken  place  and  the  close  attention  with  which  the  officials  concerned  have 
adhered  to  their  instructions  to  act  in  all  cases  with  expedition  and  with  every  possible  consideration  for 
neutrals. 

9.  Since  His  Majesty's  Government  have  been  compelled  to  adopt  their  present  measures  against  German 
commerce,  they  have  given  special  consideration  to  the  question  of  avoiding  as  far  as  possible  unnecessary 
damage  to  the  interests  of  neutrals  in  regard  to  the  export  of  goods  of  German  origin,  and  here  again  liberal 
concessions  have  been  made  to  United  States  citizens.  Under  the  rules  enacted  on  the  nth  March  provision 
is  made  for  the  investigation  of  all  neutral  claims  respecting  such  goods  in  the  Prize  Court,  and  it  is  obvious 
that  these  claims  can  receive  due  and  equitable  consideration  most  properly  before  a  judicial  tribunal.  Never- 
theless, in  deference  to  the  express  desire  of  the  United  States  Government,  arrangments  were  made  toward 
the  end  of  March  whereby  United  States  citizens  who  might  desire  to  import  goods  of  German  origin  via  a  neu- 
tral port  were  enabled  to  produce  proof  of  payment  to  His  Majesty's  Embassy  at  Washington.  If  such  proof 
were  deemed  satisfactory,  His  Majesty's  Government  gave  an  undertaking  that  the  goods  concerned  should  not 
be  interfered  with  in  transit,  and  the  American  importer  was  freed  from  the  necessity  of  submitting  his  claim 
to  the  Prize  Court  in  London  for  adjudication.  A  few  days  later  His  Majesty's  Government  further  agreed 
to  recognize  the  neutral  ownership  of  goods  of  enemy  origin  even  if  not  paid  for  before  the  ist  March,  pro- 
vided they  were  subject  of  an  f.  o.  b.  contract  of  earlier  date,  and  had  arrived  at  a  neutral  port  before  the  isth 
March. 

10.  Special  treatment  has  also  been  accorded  to  cargoes  of  particular  products  destined  for  the  United 
States  and  stated  to  be  indispensable  for  the  industries  of  the  country;  and,  in  notes  addressed  to  the  United 
States  Ambassador  in  April  and  May,  undertakings  were  given. not  to  interfere  during  transit  with  certain 
cargoes  of  dyestuffs,  potash,  and  German  beet  seed. 

11.  When  it  became  apparent  that  large  quantities  of  enemy  goods  were  still  passing  out  through  neutral 
countries.  His  Majesty's  Government  felt  it  necessary  to  fix  a  definite  date  after  which  such  shipments  must 
cease  to  enjoy  the  special  immunity,  theretofore  granted,  from  liability  to  being  placed  in  the  Prize  Court.  It 
had  been  observed  that  a  large  increase  had  taken  place  in  the  number  of  vessels  sailing  from  neutral  coun- 
tries to  America  and  one  of  the  principal  lines  of  steamships  advertised  a  daily  in  place  of  a  weekly  service. 
In  such  circumstances  it  appeared  scarcely  possible  that  goods  of  enemy  origin,  bought  and  paid  for  prior  to 
the  1st  March,  should  not  have  already  been  shipped  to  their  destination.  First  June  was  accordingly  fixed  as 
the  date  after  which  the  privilege  allowed  in  the  case  of  such  shipments  should  cease;  but  once  more  a  special 
favour  was  granted  by  extending  the  date  in  exceptional  cases  to  the  iSth  June. 

12.  Importers  in  the  United  States  having  now  had  three  months  in  which  to  clear  off  their  purchases  in 
enemy  territory,  His  Majesty's  Government  trust  that,  in  presence  of  the  circumstances  enumerated,  the  United 
States  Government  will  acknowledge  the  great  consideration  which  has  been  shown  to  American  interests. 

13.  Nevertheless  a  fresh  appeal  has  now  been  made  to  His  Majesty's  Government  that  shipments  of 
American  owned  goods  of  enemy  origin,  if  paid  for  before  the  beginning  of  March,  should  be  allowed  to  be 
shipped  without  molestation  after  the  15th  June.  The  appeal  is  based  principally  upon  the  contentions  [A]  that 
insufficient  time  has  already  elapsed;  [B]  that  no  mention  of  a  time  limit  is  made  in  the  enactment  of  the  nth 
March;  [C]  that  the  proofs  of  ownership  required  by  His  Majesty's  Government  are  of  an  exacting  nature  and 
involve  much  time  for  preparation. 

14.  The  first  contention  [A]  has  already  been  dealt  with.  As  regards  [B]  and  [C],  it  is  true  that  the 
enactment  of  the  nth  March  contains  no  mention  of  a  time  limit.  But  it  seems  to  be  overlooked  that  the 
time  limit  had  been  fixed  only  for  the  special  immunity  granted  as  an  exception  from  that  enactment.  It  was 
as  a  friendly  concession  to  American  interests  that  His  Majesty's  Government  agreed  to  an  investigation  of  claims 
outside  the  Prize  Court.  As  for  the  exacting  nature  of  the  proofs  required  by  His  Majesty's  Government,  experi- 
ence has  shown  that  such  proofs  were  necessary. 

15.  In  deference,  however,  to  the  renewed  representations  of  the  United  States  Ambassador,  His  Majesty's 
Government  have  given  further  directions  that  in  all  such  cases,  as  may  have  been  specially  submitted  through 
the  British  Embassy  at  Washington  or  to  His  Majesty's  Government  direct  on  or  before  the  15th  June  and 
passed,  the  goods  shall  be  allowed  to  proceed  without  interference,  if  shipped  from  a  neutral  port  on  the  condi- 
tions already  laid  down,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  shipment  may  not  have  been  made  before  the  15th  June. 

16.  His  Majesty's  Government  will  also  be  prepared  hereafter  to  give  special  consideration  to  cases  pre- 
sented to  them  and  involving  particular  hardships,  if  the  goods  concerned  are  required  for  neutral  Governments 
or  municipalities,  or  in  respect  of  works  of  public  utility,  and  where  payment  can  be  shown  to  have  been  made 
before  the  ist  March,  1915. 

17.  With  the  above  exceptions.  His  Majesty's  Government  regret  they  can  not  continue  to  deal  through  the 
diplomatic  channel  with  individual  cases,  but  they  would  again  point  out  that  special  provision  is  made  for 
the  consideration  of  such  cases  in  the  Prize  Court. 

18.  Complaints  have  not  infrequently  been  made  that  undue  delay  occurs  in  dealing  with  American  cargoes 
in  the  Prize  Court.  An  interesting  comment  on  this  subject  was  made  by  the  president  of  the  Prize  Court  in 
the  case  of  the  cargo  ex  steamship  Ogeechee  on  the  14th  instant.  His  lordship,  according  to  the  transcript 
from  the  official  shorthand  writer's  notes,  made  the  following  observations : 

"It  is  a  very  extraordinary  thing  that,  when  the  Crown  are  ready  to  go  on,  the  claimants  come  here  and 
say,  'We  can  not  proceed  for  six  weeks.'  Some  day,  towards  the  end  of  last  term,  I  had  a  row  of  eminent 
counsel  in  front  pressing  me  to  fix  a  case  at  once.  I  fixed  it  very  nearly  at  once — that  is  to  say,  the  second  day 
of  the  following  term.    They  all  came  and  said:    'We  want  an  adjournment  for  six  weeks.'" 

19.  The  solicitor  general  hereupon  remarked: 


152  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

"If  I  might  say  so  on  that  one  of  the  reasons  I  applied  to-day  on  behalf  of  the  Crown  that  the  matter 
should  be  dealt  with  as  soon  as  possible  is  for  that  very  reason.  There  has  been  such  a  strong  desire  on  the 
part  of  America  and  American  citizens  that  there  should  be  no  delay,  but  one  finds,  in  fact,  the  delay  comes 
from  there." 

20.  The  president  then  stated: 

"I  know  that.    I  do  not  know  what  the  explanation  is.  but  I  am  anxious  that  there  should  be  no  delay." 

21.  It  is  true  that  a  number  of  cases,  principally  relating  to  cargoes  which,  though  ostensibly  consigned  to 
a  person  in  a  neutral  country,  are  in  reality  believed  to  be  destined  for  the  enemy,  have  been  pending  in  the 
Prize  Court  for  some  time.  The  United  States  Government  are  aware  that  most  of  these  cargoes  consist  of 
meat  and  lard,  and  that  much  of  the  delay  in  bringing  these  cargoes  to  adjudication  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
negotiations  were  being  carried  on  for  many  weeks  with  a  representative  of  the  principal  American  meat  pack- 
ers, for  an  amicable  settlement  out  of  court.  When  at  length,  owing  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations.  His 
Majesty's  Government  decided  that  they  would  continue  the  Prize  Court  proceedings,  and  had  at  the  request 
of  the  claimants  fixed  the  earliest  possible  date  for  the  hearing,  counsel  for  the  latter  asked  for  an  adjournment 
in   their  interests   despite  the   fact  that  the  Crown   was,  by  his  own  admission,  ready  to  proceed. 

22.  His  Majesty's  Government  are  earnestly  desirous  of  removing  all  causes  of  avoidable  delay  in  dealing 
with  American  cargoes  and  vessels  which  may  be  detained,  and  any  specific  inquiries  or  representations  which 
may  be  made  by  the  United  States  Government  in  regard  to  particular  cases  will  always  receive  the  most 
careful  consideration  and  all  information  which  can  be  afforded  without  prejudice  to  Prize  Court  proceedings 
will  be  readily  communicated;  but  they  can  scarcely  admit  that  on  the  basis  of  actual  facts,  any  substantial 
grievance  on  the  part  of  American  citizens  is  justified  or  can  be  sustained,  and  they  therefore  confidently 
appeal  to  the  opinion  of  the  United  States  Government  as  enlightened  by  this  memorandum. 

Page. 


The  Oerman  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Ambassador  Gerard. 

[Translation.] 

Foreign  Office, 
Berlin,  July  8,  1915. 

The  undersigned  has  the  honor  to  make  tfie  following  reply  to  the  note  of  His  Excel- 
lency, Mr.  James  W.  Gerard,  Ambassador  of  the  United  States  of  America,  dated  the 
10th  ultimo,  Foreign  Office  No.  3814,  on  the  subject  of  the  impairment  of  American  in- 
terests by  the  German  submarine  war. 

The  Imperial  Government  has  learned  with  satisfaction  from  the  note  how  earn- 
estly the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  concerned  in  seeing  the  principles  of  hu- 
manity realized  in  the  present  war.  Also,  this  appeal  meets  with  full  sympathy  in 
Germany,  and  the  Imperial  Government  is  quite  willing  to  permit  its  statements  and 
decisions  in  the  case  under  consideration  to  be  governed  by  the  principles  of  humanity 
just  as  it  has  done  always. 

The  Imperial  Government  welcomed  it  with  gratitude  when  the  American  Govern- 
ment in  its  note  of  May  15,  1915,  itself  recalled  that  Germany  had  always  permitted 
itself  to  be  governed  by  the  principles  of  progress  and  humanity  in  dealing  with  the  law 
of  maritime  war.  Since  the  time  when  Frederick  the  Great  negotiated  with  John 
Adams,  Benjamin  Franklin,  and  Thomas  Jefferson  the  treaty  of  friendship  and  com- 
merce of  September  10,  1785,  between  Prussia  and  the  Eepublic  of  the  West,  German 
and  American  statesmen  have  in  fact  always  stood  together  in  the  struggle  for  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas  and  for  the  protection  of  peaceable  trade.  In  the  international  proceed- 
ings which  have  since  been  conducted  for  the  regulation  of  the  right  of  maritime  war 
Germany  and  America  have  jointly  advocated  progressive  principles,  especially  the 
abolishment  of  the  right  of  capture  at  sea  and  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  neu- 
trals. Even  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war  the  German  Government  immediately 
declared  its  willingness,  in  response  to  the  proposal  of  the  American  Government,  to 
ratify  the  Declaration  of  London  and  thereby  to  subject  itself,  in  the  use  of  its  naval 
forces,  to  all  the  restrictions  provided  therein  in  favor  of  neutrals.  Germany  has  like- 
wise been  always  tenacious  of  the  principle  that  war  should  be  conducted  against  the 
armed  and  organized  forces  of  the  enemy  country,  but  that  the  civilian  population  of  the 
enemy  must  be  spared  as  far  as  possible  from  the  measures  of  war.  The  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment cherishes  the  definite  hope  that  some  way  will  be  found  when  peace  is  con- 
cluded, or  perhaps  earlier,  to  regulate  the  law  of  maritime  war  in  a  manner  guarantee- 
ing the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  will  welcome  it  with  gratitude  and  satisfaction  if  it  can 
work  hand  in  hand  with  the  American  Government  on  that  occasion. 

If  in  the  present  war  the  principles  which  should  be  the  ideal  of  the  future  have 
been  traversed  more  and  more  the  longer  its  duration,  the  German  Government  has  no 
guilt  therein. 

It  is  known  to  the  American  Government  how  Germany's  adversaries,  by  com- 
pletely paralyzing  peaceable  traffic  between  Germany  and  the  neutral  countries,  have 
aimed  from  the  very  beginning,  and  with  increasing  lack  of  consideration,  at  the  destruc- 
tion not  so  much  of  the  armed  forces  as  the  life  of  the  German  nation,  repudiating  in 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  153 

so  doing  all  the  rules  of  international  law  and  disregarding  all  the  rights  of  neutrals. 
On  November  3,  1914,  England  declared  the  North  Sea  to  be  a  war  area,  and  by  plant- 
ing poorly  anchored  mines  and  the  stoppage  and  capture  of  vessels  made  passage  ex- 
tremely dangerous  and  difficult  for  neutral  shipping,  so  that  it  is  actually  blockading 
neutral  coasts  and  ports,  contrary  to  all  international  law.  Long  before  the  beginning 
of  the  submarine  war  England  practically  completely  intercepted  legitimate  neutral 
navigation  to  Germany  also.  Thus  Germany  was  driven  to  submarine  war  on  trade. 
On  November  16,  1914,  the  English  Prime  Minister  declared  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  it  was  one  of  England's  principal  tasks  to  prevent  food  for  the  German  population 
from  reaching  Germany  by  way  of  neutral  ports.  Since  March  1  of  this  year  England 
has  been  taking  from  neutral  ships,  without  further  formality,  all  merchandise  pro- 
ceeding to  Germany,  as  well  as  all  merchandise  coming  from  Germany,  even  when  neu- 
tral property.  Just  as  was  the  case  with  the  Boers,  the  German  people  is  now  to  be 
given  the  choice  of  perishing  from  starvation,  with  its  women  and  children,  or  of  relin- 
quishing its  independence. 

While  our  enemies  thus  loudly  and  openly  have  proclaimed  war  without  mercy  un- 
til our  utter  destruction,  we  are  conducting  war  in  self-defense  for  our  national  exist- 
ence and  for  the  sake  of  peace  of  assured  permanency.  We  have  been  obliged  to  adopt 
submarine  warfare  to  meet  the  declared  intentions  of  our  enemies  and  the  method  of  war- 
fare adopted  by  them  in  contravention  of  international  law. 

With  all  its  efforts  in  principle  to  protect  neutral  life  and  property  from  damage  as 
much  as  possible,  the  German  Government  recognized  unreservedly  in  its  memorandum 
of  February  4  that  the  interests  of  neutrals  might  suffer  from  submarine  warfare.  How- 
ever, the  American  Government  will  also  understand  and  appreciate  that  in  the  fight  for 
existence  which  has  been  forced  upon  Germany  by  its  adversaries  and  announced  by 
them,  it  is  the  sacred  duty  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  do  all  within  its  power  to  pro- 
tect and  to  save  the  lives  of  German  subjects.  If  the  Imperial  Government  were  derelict 
in  these,  its  duties,  it  would  be  guilty  before  God  and  history  of  the  violation  of  those 
principles  of  the  highest  humanity  which  are  the  foundation  of  every  national  existence. 

The  case  of  the  Lusitania  shows  with  horrible  clearness  to  what  jeopardizing  of  hu- 
man lives  the  manner  of  conducting  war  employed  by  our  adversaries  leads.  In  most 
direct  contradiction  of  international  law,  all  distinctions  between  merchantmen  and  war 
vessels  have  been  obliterated  by  the  order  to  British  merchantmen  to  arm  themselves 
and  to  ram  submarines  and  the  promise  of  rewards  therefor ;  and  neutrals  who  use  mer- 
chantmen as  travelers  have  tliereby  been  exposed  in  an  increasing  degree  to  all  the  dan- 
gers of  war.  If  the  commander  of  the  German  submarine  which  destroyed  the  Lusita- 
nia had  caused  the  crew  and  travelers  to  put  out  in  boats  before  firing  the  torpedo  this 
would  have  meant  the  sure  destruction  of  his  own  vessel.  After  the  experiences  in  the 
sinking  of  much  smaller  and  less  seaworthy  vessels,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  a  mighty 
ship  like  the  Lusitania  would  remain  above  water  long  enough,  even  after  the  torpedo- 
ing, to  permit  the  passengers  to  enter  the  ship's  boats.  Circumstances  of  a  very  peculiar 
kind,  especially  the  presence  on  board  of  large  quantities  of  highly  explosive  materials, 
defeated  this  expectation.  In  addition,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  if  the  Lusitania  had 
been  spared  thousands  of  cases  of  ammunition  would  have  been  sent  to  Germany's  ene- 
mies and  thereby  thousands  of  German  mothers  and  children  robbed  of  their  supporters. 

In  the  spirit  of  friendship  with  which  the  German  nation  has  been  imbued  toward 
the  Union  and  its  inhabitants  since  the  earliest  days  of  its  existence,  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment will  always  be  ready  to  do  all  it  can,  during  the  present  war  also,  to  prevent  the 
jeopardizing  of  the  lives  of  American  citizens. 

The  Imperial  Government  therefore  repeats  the  assurances  that  American  ships  will 
not  be  hindered  in  the  prosecution  of  legitimate  shipping,  and  the  lives  of  American 
citizens  on  netitral  vessels  shall  not  be  placed  in  jeopardy. 

In  order  to  exclude  any  unforeseen  dangers  to  American  passenger  steamers,  made 
possible  in  view  of  the  conduct  of  maritime  war  on  the  part  of  German's  adversaries,  the 
German  submarines  will  be  instructed  to  permit  the  free  and  safe  passage  of  such  pas- 
senger steamers  when  made  recognizable  by  special  markings  and  notified  a  reasonable 
time  in  advance.  The  Imperial  Government,  however,  confidently  hopes  that  the  Ameri- 
can Government  will  assume  the  guarantee  that  these  vessels  have  no  contraband  on 
board.  The  details  of  the  arrangements  for  the  unhampered  passage  of  these  vessels 
would  have  to  be  agreed  upon  by  the  naval  authorities  of  both  sides. 

In  order  to  furnisTi  adequate  facilities  for  travel  across  the  Atlantic  Ocean  for 
American  citizens,  the  German  Government  submits  for  consideration  a  proposal  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  available  steamers  by  installing  in  the  passenger  service  a  reason- 
able number  of  neutral  steamers,  the  exact  number  to  be  agreed  upon,  under  the  Ameri- 
can flag  under  the  same  conditions  as  the  American  steamers  above  mentioned. 

The  Imperial  Government  believes  that  it  can  assume  that  in  this  manner  adequate 


154  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

facilities  for  travel  across  the  Atlantic  Ocean  can  be  afforded  American  citizens.  There 
would  therefore  appear  to  be  no  compelling  necessity  for  American  citizens  to  travel  to 
Europe  in  time  of  war  on  ships  carrying  an  enemy  flag.  In  particular  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment is  unable  to  admit  that  American  citizens  can  protect  an  enemy  ship  through  the 
mere  fact  of  their  presence  on  board.  Germany  merely  followed  England's  example 
when  it  declared  part  of  the  high  seas  an  area  of  war.  Consequently  accidents  suffered 
by  neutrals  on  enemy  ships  in  this  area  of  war  can  not  well  be  judged  differently  from 
accidents  to  which  neutrals  are  at  all  times  exposed  at  the  seat  of  war  on  land  when 
they  betake  themselves  into  dangerous  localities  in  spite  of  previous  warning. 

If,  however,  it  should  not  be  possible  for  the  American  Government  to  acquire  an 
adequate  number  of  neutral  passenger  steamers,  the  Imperial  Government  is  prepared 
to  interpose  no  objections  to  the  placing  under  the  American  flag  by  the  American  Gov- 
ernment of  four  enemy  passenger  steamers  for  the  passenger  traffic  between  America  and 
England.  The  assurances  of  "free  and  safe"  passage  for  American  passenger  steamers 
would  then  be  extended  to  apply  under  the  identical  pre-conditions  to  these  formerly 
hostile  passenger  ships. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  has  declared  his  readiness,  in  a  way  deserving  of 
thanks,  to  communicate  and  suggest  proposals  to  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  with 
particular  reference  to  the  alteration  of  maritime  war.  The  Imperial  Government  will 
always  be  glad  to  make  use  of  the  good  offices  of  the  President,  and  hopes  that  his  efforts 
in  the  present  case,  as  well  as  in  the  direction  of  the  lofty  ideal  of  the  freedom  of  the 
seas,  will  lead  to  an  understanding. 

The  undersigned  requests  the  Ambassador  to  bring  the  above  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
American  Government,  and  avails  himself  of  the  opportunity  to  renew  to  His  Excellency 
the  assurance  of  his  most  distinguished  consideration. 

VON  Jagow. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 
[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  July  I4,  1915. 
In  view  of  differences  which  are  understood  to  exist  between  the  two  Governments 
as  to  the  principles  of  law  applicable  in  prize  court  proceedings  in  cases  involving  Ameri- 
can interests,  and  in  order  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding  as  to  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  in  regard  to  such  proceedings,  you  are  instructed  to  inform  the  British 
Government  that  in  so  far  as  the  interests  of  American  citizens  are  concerned  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  will  insist  upon  their  rights  under  the  principles  and  rules 
of  international  law  as  hitherto  established,  governing  neutral  trade  in  time  of  war, 
without  limitation  or  impairment  by  Orders  in  Council  or  other  municipal  legislation 
by  the  British  Government,  and  will  not  recognize  the  validity  of  prize  court  proceed- 
ings taken  under  restraints  imposed  by  British  municipal  law  in  derogation  of  the  rights 
of  American  citizens  under  international  law. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department  op  State, 
Washington,  July  15,  1915. 

Ambassador  Page  is  informed  that  it  has  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  De- 
partment that  the  steamship  Neches,  of  American  register,  sailing  from  Rotterdam  for 
the  United  States,  carrying  a  general  cargo,  after  being  detained  at  the  Downs,  was 
brought  to  London,  where  it  was  required  by  the  British  authorities  to  discharge  cargo, 
the  property  of  American  citizens. 

It  appears  that  the  ground  advanced  to  sustain  this  action  is  that  the  goods  origi- 
nated, in  part  at  least,  in  Belgium,  and  fall,  therefore,  within  the  provisions  of  paragraph 
4  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  which  stipulates  that  every  merchant  vessel  sail- 
ing from  a  port  other  than  a  German  port,  carrying  goods  of  enemy  origin,  may  be  re- 
quired to  discharge  such  goods  in  a  British  or  allied  port. 

Ambassador  Page  is  instructed  in  this  case  to  reiterate  the  position  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  as  set  forth  in  the  Department's  instruction  of  March  30,  1915, 
with  respect  to  the  Order  in  Council  mentioned,  the  international  invalidity  of  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  regards  as  plainly  illustrated  by  the  present  in- 
stance of  the  seizure  of  American-owned  goods  passing  from  the  neutral  port  of  Rotter- 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  155 

dam  to  a  neutral  port  of  the  United  States  merely  because  the  goods  came  originally 
frqm  territory  in  the  possession  of  an  enemy  of  Great  Britain. 

Mr.  Page  is  also  instructed  to  inform  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  legality  of  this 
seizure  can  not  be  admitted  and  that  in  the  view  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  it  violates  the  right  of  the  citizens  of  one  neutral  to  trade  with  those  of  another,  as 
well  as  with  those  of  belligerents  except  in  contraband,  or  in  violation  of  a  legal  block- 
ade of  an  enemy  seaport;  and  that  the  rights  of  American  owners  of  goods  to  bring  them 
out  of  Holland,  in  due  course,  in  neutral  ships  must  be  insisted  upon  by  the  United 
States,  even  though  such  goods  may  have  come  originally  from  the  territories  of  enemies 
of  Great  Britain.  He  is  directed  further  to  insist  upon  the  desire  of  this  Government  that 
goods  taken  from  the  Neches,  which  are  the  property  of  American  citizens,  should  be 
expeditiously  released  to  be  forwarded  to  their  destination,  and  to  request  that  he  be 
advised  of  the  British  Government's  intended  course  in  this  matter  at  the  earliest  mo- 
ment convenient  to  that  Government. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  J.  W.  Gerard* 

[Telegram.] 

Department  of  State. 
Washington,  July  21,  1915. 

You  are  instructed  to  deliver  textually  the  following  note  to  the  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs: 

The  note  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  dated  the  8th  of  July,  1915,  has 
received  the  careful  consideration  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  it  regrets 
to  be  obliged  to  say  that  it  has  found  it  very  unsatisfactory,  because  it  fails  to  meet  the 
real  differences  between  the  two  Governments,  and  indicates  no  way  in  which  the  accepted 
principles  of  law  and  humanity  may  be  applied  in  the  grave  matter  of  controversy,  but 
proposes,  on  the  contrary,  arrangements  for  a  partial  suspension  of  those  principles  which 
virtually  set  them  aside. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  notes  with  satisfaction  that  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  recognizes  without  reservation  the  validity  of  the  principles  insisted  on 
in  the  several  communications  which  this  Government  has  addressed  to  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  with  regard  to  its  announcement  of  a  war  zone  and  the  use  of  subma- 
rines against  merchantmen  on  the  high  seas — the  principle  that  the  high  seas  are  free, 
that  the  character  and  cargo  of  a  merchantman  must  first  be  ascertained  before  she  can 
lawfully  be  seized  or  destroyed,  and  that  the  lives  of  noncombatants  may  in  no  case  be  put 
in  jeopardy  unless  the  vessel  resists  or  seeks  to  escape  after  being  summoned  to  submit 
to  examination,  for  a  belligerent  act  of  retaliation  is  per  se  an  act  beyond  the  law,  and 
the  defense  of  an  act  as  retaliatory  is  an  admission  that  it  is  illegal. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is,  however,  keenly  disappointed  to  find  that 
the  Imperial  German  Government  regards  itself  as  in  large  degree  exempt  from  the  obli- 
gation to  observe  these  principles,  even  where  neutral  vessels  are  concerned,  by  what  it 
believes  the  policy  and  practice  of  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  to  be  in  the  present 
war  with  regard  to  neutral  commerce.  The  Imperial  German  Government  will  readily 
understand  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  cannot  discuss  the  policy  of  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain  with  regard  to  neutral  trade  except  with  that  Government 
itself,  and  that  it  must  regard  the  conduct  of  other  belligerent  Governments  as  irrelevant 
to  any  discussion  with  the  Imperial  German  Government  of  what  this  Government  regards 
as  grave  and  unjustifiable  violations  of  the  rights  of  American  citizens  by  German  naval 
commanders. 

Illegal  and  inhuman  acts,  however  justifiable  they  may  be  thought  to  be,  against 
an  enemy  who  is  believed  to  have  acted  in  contravention  of  law  and  humanity,  are  mani- 
festly indefensible  when  they  deprive  neutrals  of  their  acknowledged  rights,  particularly 
when  they  violate  the  right  to  life  itself.  If  a  belligerent  cannot  retaliate  against  an 
enemy  without  injuring  the  lives  of  neutrals,  as  well  as  their  property,  humanity,  as  well 
as  justice  and  a  due  regard  for  the  dignity  of  neutral  powers,  should  dictate  that  the  prac- 
tice be  discontinued.  If  persisted  in  it  would  in  such  circumstances  constitute  an  unpar- 
donable offense  against  the  sovereignty  of  the  neutral  nation  affected. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not  unmindful  of  the  extraordinary  condi- 
tions created  by  this  war  or  of  the  radical  alterations  of  circumstance  and  method  of 
attack  produced  by  the  use  of  instrumentalities  of  naval  warfare  which  the  nations  of 
the  world  cannot  have  had  in  view  when  the  existing  rules  of  international  law  were  for- 
mulated, and  it  is  ready  to  make  every  reasonable  allowance  for  these  novel  and  unex- 
pected aspects  of  war  at  sea ;  but  it  cannot  consent  to  abate  any  essential  or  fundamental 

•Not  printed  in   Diplomatic  Correspondence.       The  New  York  Times,  July  24,   1915. 


156  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

right  of  its  people  because  of  a  mere  alteration  of  circumstances.  The  rights  of  neutrals 
in  time  of  war  are  based  upon  principle,  not  upon  expediency,  and  the  principles  are  im- 
mutable. It  is  the  duty  and  obligation  of  belligerents  to  find  a  way  to  adapt  the  new 
circumstances  to  them. 

The  events  of  the  past  two  months  have  clearly  indicated  that  it  is  jwssible  and 
practicable  to  conduct  such  submarine  operations  as  have  characterized  the  activity  of  the 
imperial  German  Navy  within  the  so-called  war  zone  in  substantial  accord  with  the  ac- 
cepted practices  of  regulated  warfare.  The  whole  world  has  looked  with  interest  and 
increasing  satisfaction  at  the  demonstratioi;  of  that  possibility  by  German  naval  com- 
manders. It  is  manifestly  possible,  therefore,  to  lift  the  whole  practice  of  submarine 
attack  above  the  criticism  which  it  has  aroused  and  remove  the  chief  causes  of  offense. 

In  view  of  the  admission  of  illegality  made  by  the  Imperial  Government  when  it 
pleaded  the  right  of  retaliation  in  defense  of  its  acts,  and  in  view  of  the  manifest  possi- 
bility of  conforming  to  the  established  rules  of  naval  warfare,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  cannot  believe  that  the  Imperial  Government  will  longer  refrain  from  dis- 
avowing the  wanton  act  of  its  naval  commander  in  sinking  the  Lusitania  or  from  offering 
reparation  for  the  American  lives  lost,  so  far  as  reparation  can  be  made  for  a  needless 
destruction  of  human  life  by  an  illegal  act. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  while  not  indifferent  to  the  friendly  spirit  in 
which  it  is  made,  cannot  accept  the  suggestion  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  that 
certain  vessels  be  designated  and  agreed  upon  which  shall  be  free  on  the  seas  now  illegally 
proscribed.  The  very  agreement  would  by  implication,  subject  other  vessels  to  illegal 
attack,  and  would  be  a  curtailment  and  therefore  an  abandonment  of  the  principles  for 
which  this  Government  contends,  and  which  in  times  of  calmer  counsels  every  nation 
would  concede  as  of  course. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial  German  Government  are 
contending  for  the  same  great  object,  have  Ittng  stood  together  in  urging  the  very  prin- 
ciples upon  which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  now  solemnly  insists.  They  are 
both  contending  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
continue  to  contend  for  that  freedom,  from  whatever  quarter  violated,  without  compromise 
and  at  any  cost.  It  invites  the  practical  co-operation  of  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment at  this  time,  when  co-operation  may  accomplish  most  and  this  great  common  object 
be  most  strikingly  and  effectively  achieved. 

The  Imperial  German  Government  expresses  the  hope  that  this  object  may  be  in 
some  measure  accomplished  even  before  the  present  war  ends.  It  can  be.  The  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  not  only  feels  obliged  to  insist  upon  it,  by  whomsoever  violated 
or  ignored,  in  the  protection  of  its  own  citizens,  but  is  also  deeply  interested  in  seeing  it 
made  practicable  between  the  belligerents  themselves,  and  holds  itself  ready  at  any  time 
to  act  as  the  common  friend  who  may  be  privileged  to  suggest  a  way. 

In  the  meantime  the  very  value  which  this  Government  sets  upon  the  long  and 
unbroken  friendship  between  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the 
people  and  Government  of  the  German  nation  impels  it  to  press  very  solemnly  upon  the 
Imperial  German  Government  the  necessity  for  a  scrupulous  observance  of  neutral  rights 
in  this  critical  matter.  Friendship  itself  prompts  it  to  say  to  the  Imperial  Government 
that  repetition  by  the  commanders  of  German  naval  vessels  of  acts  in  contravention  of 
those  rights  must  be  regarded  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  when  they  affect 
American  citizens,  as  deliberately  unfriendly. 

Lansing. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  July  24,  1915. 
Following  note,  dated  July  23,  received  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  morning : 

On  the  2d  April  Your  Excellency  handed  me  a  copy  of  a  communication  containing  the  criticisms  of  the 
United  States  Government  on  the  measures  we  have  been  constrained  to  take  on  account  of  the  menace  to 
peaceful  commerce  resulting  from  the  German  submarine  policy.  This  communication  has  received  the  most 
careful  consideration  of  His  Majesty's  Government. 

2.  I  fully  appreciate  the  friendly  spirit  and  the  candour  which  are  shown  in  the  communication  and,  reply- 
ing in  the  same  spirit,  I  trust  that  I  may  be  able  to  con f nice  lour  Excellency  and  also  the  administration  at 
Washington  that  the  measures  we  have  announced  are  not  only  reasonable  and  necessary  in  themselves,  but  con- 
stitute no  more  than  an  adaptation  of  the  old  principles  of  blockade  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  with  which 
we  are  confronted. 

3.  I  need  scarcely  dwell  on  the  obligation  incumbent  upon  the  allies  to  take  every  step  in  their  power  to 
overcome  their  common  enemy  in  view  of  the  shocking  violation  of  the  recognized  rules  and  principles  of 
civilized  warfare  of  which  he  has  been  guilty  during  the   present   struggle.     Your    Excellency's    attention    has 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  157 

already  been  drawn  to  some  of  these  proceedings  in  the  memorandum  which  I  handed  to  you  on  the  19th  Feb- 
ruary. Since  that  time  Lord  Bryce's  report,  based  on  evidence  carefully  sifted  by  legal  experts,  describing  the 
atrocities  committed  in  Belgium,  the  poisoning  of  wells  in  German  Southwest  Africa,  the  use  of  poisonous 
gases  against  the  troops  in  Flanders,  and  finally  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  without  any  opportunity  to  passen- 
gers and  noncombatants  to  save  their  lives,  have  shown  how  indispensable  it  is  that  we  should  leave  unused 
no  justifiable  method  of   defending  ourselves. 

4.  Your  Excellency  will  remember  that  in  my  notes  of  the  13th  and  isth  March  I  explained  that  the 
allied  Governments  intended  to  meet  the  German  attempt  to  stop  all  supplies  of  every  kind  from  leaving  or 
entering  British  or  French  ports  by  themselves  intercepting  goods  going  to  or  from  Germany.  I  read  the  com- 
munication from  Your  Excellency's  Government  not  as  questioning  the  necessity  for  our  taking  all  the  steps 
open  to  us  to  cripple  the  enemy's  trade,  but  as  directed  solely  to  the  question  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  particu- 
lar measures  adopted. 

5.  In  the  various  notes  which  I  have  received  from  Your  Excellency  the  right  of  a  belligerent  to  establish 
a  blockade  of  the  enemy  ports  is  admitted  a  right  which  has  obviously  no  value  save  in  so  far  as  it  gives 
power  to  a  belligerent  to  cut  off  sea-borne  exports  and  imports  of  his  enemy.  The  contention  which  I  under- 
stand the  United  States  Government  now  put  forward  is  that  if  a  belligerent  is  so  circumstanced  that  his 
commerce  can  pass  through  adjacent  neutral  ports  as  easily  as  through  ports  in  his  own  territory,  his  opponent 
has  no  right  to  interfere  and  must  restrict  his  measures  of  blockade  in  such  a  manner  as  to  leave  such  avenues 
of  commerce  still  open  to  his  adversary.  This  is  a  contention  which  His  Majesty's  Government  feel  unable  to 
accept  and  which  seems  to  them  unsustainable  either  in  point  of  law  or  upon  principles  of  international  equity. 
They  are  unable  to  admit  that  a  belligerent  violates  any  fundamental  principle  of  international  law  by  applying 
a  blockade  in  such  a  way  as  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  commerce  with  foreign  countries  through  neutral  ports  if 
the  circumstances  render  such  an  application  of  the  principles  of  blockade  the  only  means  of  making  it  effective. 
The  Government  of  the  United  States  indeed  intimates  its  readiness  to  take  into  account  "the  great  changes 
which  have  occurred  in  the  conditions  and  means  of  naval  warfare  since  the  rules  hitherto  governing  legal 
blockade  were  formulated,"  and  recognizes  that  "the  form  of  close  blockade  with  its  cordon  of  ships  in  the 
immediate  offing  of  the  blockaded  ports  is  no  longer  practicable  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  possessing  the  means 
and  opportunity  to  make  an  effective  defense  by  the  use  of  submarines,  mines,  and  aircraft." 

6.  The  only  question  then  which  can  arise  in  regard  to  the  measures  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  carry- 
ing out  a  blockade  upon  these  extended  lines  is  whether,  to  use  Your  Excellency's  words,  they  "conform  to 
the  spirit  and  principles  of  the  essence  of  the  rules  of  war" ;  and  we  shall  be  content  to  apply  this  test  to  the 
iction  which  we  have  taken  in  so  far  as  it  has  necessitated  interference  with  neutral  commerce. 

7.  It  may  be  noted  in  this  connection  that  at  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  the  United  States  found  themselves 
under  the  necessity  of  declaring  a  blockade  of  some  3,000  miles  of  coast  line,  a  military  operation  for  which 
the  number  of  vessels  available  was  at  first  very  small.  It  was  vital  to  the  cause  of  the  United  States  in  that 
great  struggle  that  they  should  be  able  to  cut  off  the  trade  of  the  Southern  States.  The  Confederate  Armies 
were  dependent  on  supplies  from  over  seas,  and  those  supplies  could  not  be  obtained  without  exporting  the 
cotton  wherewith  to  pay  for  them.  To  cut  off  this  trade  the  United  States  could  only  rely  upon  a  blockade. 
The  difficulties  confronting  the  Federal  Government  were  in  part  due  to  the  fact  that  neighbouring  neutral 
territory  afforded  convenient  centres  from  which  contraband  could  be  introduced  into  the  territory  of  their 
enemies  and  from  which  blockade  running  could  be  facilitated.  Your  Excellency  will  no  doubt  remember  how, 
in  order  to  meet  this  new  difficulty,  the  old  principles  relating  to  contraband  and  blockade  were  developed  and 
the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage  was  applied  and  enforced  under  which  goods  destined  for  the  enemy  terri- 
tory were  intercepted  before  they  reached  the  neutral  ports  from  which  they  were  to  be  re-exported. 

8.  The  difficulties  which  imposed  upon  the  United  States  the  necessity  of  reshaping  some  of  the  old  rules 
are  somewhat  akin  to  those  with  which  the  allies  are  now  faced  in  dealing  with  the  trade  of  their  enemy. 
Adjacent  to  Germany  are  various  neutral  countries  which  afford  her  convenient  opportunities  for  carrying  on 
her  trade  with  foreign  countries.  Her  own  territories  are  covered  by  a  network  of  railways  and  waterways, 
which  enable  her  commerce  to  pass  as  conveniently  through  ports  in  such  neutral  countries  as  through  her 
own.  A  blockade  limited  to  enemy  ports  would  leave  open  routes  by  which  every  kind  of  German  commerce 
could  pass  almost  as  easily  as  through  the  ports  in  her  own  territory.  Rotterdam  is  indeed  the  nearest  outlet 
for  some  of  the  industrial  districts  of  Germany. 

9.  As  a  counterpoise  to  the  freedom  with  which  one  belligerent  may  send  his  commerce  across  a  neutral 
country  without  compromising  its  neutrality,  the  other  belligerent  may  fairly  claim  to  intercept  such  commerce 
before  it  has  reached,  or  after  it  has  left,  the  neutral  State,  provided,  of  course,  that  he  can  establish  that  the 
commerce  with  which  he  interferes  is  the  commerce  of  his  enemy  and  not  commerce  which  is  bona  fide 
destined  for  or  proceeding  from  the  neutral  State.  It  seems,  accordingly,  that  if  it  be  recognized  that  a  block- 
ade is  in  certain  cases  the  appropriate  method  of  intercepting  the  trade  of  an  enemy  country,  and  if  the  blockade 
can  only  become  effective  by  extending  it  to  enemy  commerce  passing  through  neutral  ports,  such  an  extension 
is  defensible  and  in  accordance  with  principles  which  have  met  with  general  acceptance. 

10.  To  the  contention  that  such  action  is  not  directly  supported  by  written  authority,  it  may  be  replied 
that  it  is  the  business  of  writers  on  international  law  to  formulate  existing  rules  rather  than  to  offer  sugges- 
tions for  their  adaptation  to  altered  circumstances,  and  Your  Excellency  will  remember  the  unmeasured  terms 
in  which  a  group  of  prominent  international  lawyers  of  all  nations  condemned  the  doctrine  which  had  been 
laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  the  Springbok,  a  doctrine  upheld  by  the 
Claims  Commission  at  Washington  in  1873.  But  the  United  States  and  the  British  Governments  took  a  broader 
view  and  looked  below  the  surface  at  the  underlying  principles,  and  the  Government  of  this  country,  whose 
nationals  were  the  sufferers  by  the  extension  and  development  of  the  old  methods  of  blockade  made  by  the 
United  States  during  the  Civil  War,  abstained  from  all  protest  against  the  decisions  by  which  the  ships  and 
their  cargoes  were  condemned. 

11.  What  is  really  important  in  the  general  interest  is  that  adaptations  of  the  old  rules  should  not  be 
made  unless  they  are  consistent  with  the  general  principles  upon  which  an  admitted  belligerent  right  is  based. 
It  is  also  essential  that  all  unnecessary  injury  to  neutrals  should  be  avoided.    With  these  conditions  it  may  be 


158  AMERICAN  RIGHTS   AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

safely  affirmed  that  the  steps  we  are  taking  to  intercept  commodities  on  their  way  to  and  from  Germany 
fully  comply.  We  are  interfering  with  no  goods  with  which  we  should  not  be  entitled  to  interfere  by  blockade 
if  the  geographical  position  and  the  conditions  of  Germany  at  present  were  such  that  her  commerce  passed 
through  her  own  ports.  We  are  taking  the  utmost  possible  care  not  to  interfere  with  commerce  genuinely 
destined  for  or  proceeding  from  neutral  countries.  Furthermore,  we  have  tempered  the  severity  with  which 
our  measures  might  press  upon  neutrals  by  not  applying  the  rule  which  was  invariable  in  the  old  form  of 
blockade  that  ships  and  goods  on  their  way  to  or  from  the  blockaded  area  are  liable  to  condemnation. 

12.  The  communication  made  by  the-  United  States  Embassy  on  the  2d  April  describes  as  a  novel  and  quite 
unprecedented  feature  of  the  blockade  that  it  embraces  many  neutral  ports  and  coasts  and  has  the  effect  of 
barring  access  to  them.  It  does  not  appear  that  our  measures  can  be  properly  so  described.  If  we  are  success- 
ful in  the  efforts  we  are  making  to  distinguish  between  the  commerce  of  neutral  and  enemy  countries  there  will 
be  no  substantial  interference  with  the  trade  of  neutial  ports  except  in  so  far  as  they  constitute  ports  of 
access  to  and  exit  from  the  enemy  territory.  There  are  at  this  moment  many  neutral  ports  which  it  would 
be  mere  affectation  to  regard  as  offering  facilities  only  for  the  commerce  of  the  neutral  country  in  which 
they  are  situated,  and  the  only  commerce  with  which  we  propose  to  interfere  is  that  of  the  enemy  who  seeks  to 
make  use  of  such  ports  for  the  purposes  of  transit  to  oi   from  his  own  country. 

13.  One  of  the  earlier  passages  in  Your  Excellency's  memorandum  was  to  the  effect  that  the  sovereignty 
of  neutral  nations  in  time  of  war  suffers  no  diminution  except  in  so  far  as  the  practice  and  consent  of  civilized 
nations  has  limited  it  "by  the  recognition  of  certain  now  clearly  determined  rights,"  which  it  is  considered 
may  be  exercised  by  nations  at  war;  and  these  it  defines  as  the  right  of  capture  and  condemnation  for  unneu- 
tral service,  for  the  carriage  of  contraband  and  for  breach  of  blockade.  I  may,  however,  be  permitted  to  point 
out  that  the  practice  of  nations  on  each  of  the  three  subjects  mentioned  has  not  at  any  time  been  uniform  or 
clearly  determined,  nor  has  the  practice  of   any  maritime  nation  always  been  consistent. 

14.  There  are  various  particulars  in  which  the  exact  method  of  carrying  a  blockade  into  effect  has  from 
time  to  time  varied.  The  need  of  a  public  notification,  the  requisite  standard  of  effectiveness,  the  locality  of 
the  blockading  squadrons,  the  right  of  the  individual  ship  to  a  preliminary  warning  that  the  blockade  is  in 
force,  and  the  penalty  to  be  inflicted  on  a  captured  blockade  runner  are  all  subjects  on  which  different  views 
have  prevailed  in  different  countries  and  in  which  the  practice  of  particular  countries  has  been  altered  from 
time  to  time.  The  one  principle  which  is  fundamental  and  has  obtained  universal  recognition  is  that  by  means 
of  blockade  a  belligerent  is  entitled  to  cut  off  by  effective  means  the  sea-borne  commerce  of  his  enemy. 

15.  It  is  the  same  with  contraband.  The  underlying  principle  is  well  established,  but  as  to  the  details 
there  has  been  a  wide  variety  of  view.  As  for  unneutral  service — the  very  term  is  of  such  recent  introduc- 
tion that  many  writers  of  repute  on  international  law  do  not  even  mention  it.  It  is  impossible  in  the  view  of 
His  Majesty's  Government  in  these  circumstances  to  m^aintain  that  the  right  of  a  belligerent  to  intercept  the 
commerce  of  his  enemy  is  limited  in  the  way  suggested  in  Your  Excellency's  communication. 

16.  There  are  certain  subsidiary  matters  dealt  with  in  Your  Excellency's  communication  to  which  I  think 
it  well  to  refer.  Amongst  these  may  be  mentioned  your  citation  of  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  due  no  doubt  to 
the  words  which  occur  in  the  memorandum  sent  by  me  to  Your  Excellency  on  the  ist  March,  wherein  it  was 
stated  that  the  allied  Governments  would  hold  themselves  free  to  detain  and  take  into  port  ships  carrying 
goods  of  presumed  enemy  destination,  ownership,  or  origin,  and  to  our  announcement  that  vessels  might  be 
required  to  discharge  goods  of  enemy  ownership  as  well  as  those  of  enemy  origin  or  destination. 

17.  It  is  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  the  extent  to  which  the  second  rule  of  the  Declaration  of  Paris  is 
affected  by  these  measures  or  whether  it  could  be  held  to  apply  at  all  as  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  In  actual  practice,  however,  we  are  not  detaining  goods  on  the  sole  ground  that  they  are  the 
property  of  an  enemy.  The  purpose  of  the  measures  we  are  taking  is  to  intercept  commerce  on  its  way  from 
and  to  the  enemy  country.  There  are  many  cases  in  which  proof  that  the  goods  were  enemy  property  would 
afford  strong  evidence  that  they  were  of  enemy  origin  or  enemy  destination,  and  it  is  only  in  such  cases  that  w© 
are  detaining  them.  Where  proof  of  enemy  ownership  would  afford  no  evidence  of  such  origin  or  destina- 
tion we  are  not  in  practice  detaining  the  goods. 

18.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  been  gratified  to  observe  that  the  measures  which  they  are  enforcing 
have  had  no  detrimental  effect  on  the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  Figures  of  recent  months  show  that 
the  increased  opportunities  afforded  by  the  war  for  American  commerce  have  more  than  compensated  for  the 
loss  of  the  German  and  Austrian  markets. 

19.  I  trust  that  in  the  light  of  the  above  explanations  it  will  be  realized  that  the  measures  to  which  we 
have  resorted  have  been  not  only  justified  by  the  exigencies  of  the  case,  but  can  be  defended  as  in  accordance 
with  general  principles  which  have  commended  themselves  to  the  Governments  of  both  countries.  I  am  glad  to 
be  able  to  assure  Your  Excellency  that  we  shall  continue  to  apply  these  measures  with  every  desire  to  occasion 
the  least  possible  amount  of  inconvenience  to  persons  engaged   in   legitimate  commerce. 

I  have,  etc.,  E.   Grey. 


Ambassador  W.  H.  Page  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

American  Embassy, 
London,  July  SI,  1915. 

Your  1848,  July  14,  5  p.  m.  I  have  to-day  received  the  following  note  from  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey: 

Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1915. 
Your  Excellency: 

I.  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  note  dated  the  i6th  instant  in  which  you  were  good 
enough  to  communicate  to  me  for  the  information  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  the  opinion  held  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  that  in  view  of  differences    which   they   understand   to   exits   between   the   two 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  159 

countries  as  to  the  principles  of  law  applicable  in  cases  before  the  prize  court,  they  could  not  recognize  the 
validity  of  proceedings  taken  in  His  Majesty's  prize  court  in  derogation  of  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States. 

2.  I  do  not  understand  to  what  divergence  of  views  as  to  the  principles  of  law  applicable  in  cases  before 
the  prize  court  the  Government  of  the  United  States  refer,  for  I  am  not  aware  of  any  differences  existing  be- 
tween the  two  countries  as  to  the  principles  of  law  applicable  in  cases  before  such  courts. 

3.  British  prize  courts,  "According  to  the  ancient  form  of  commission  under  which  they  sit,  are  to  determine 
cases  which  come  before  them  according  to  the  course  of  admiralty  and  the  law  of  nations  and  the  statutes, 
rules,  and  regulations  for  the  time  being  in  force  in  that  behalf." 

As  to  the  principles  applied  by  the  American  prize  courts,  I  note  that  in  the  case  of  the  Amy  Warwick  (2 
Sprague,  123),  it  was  held  that  prize  courts  are  subject  to  the  instructions  of  their  own  sovereign.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  such  instructions  their  jurisdiction  and  rules  of  decision  are  to  be  ascertained  by  reference  to  the  known 
powers  of  such  tribunals  and  the  principles  by  which  they  are  governed  under  the  public  law  and  the  practice 
of  nations.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  principles  applied  by  the  prize  courts  of  the  two  countries  are 
identical. 

4.  As  illustrating  further  the  attitude  adopted  by  the.  judges  of  British  prize  courts  toward  these  two  sources 
of  law,  the  municipal  legislation  of  its  Sovereign  on  the  one  hand  and  the  principles  of  International  Law  on  the 
other,  I  should  like  to  refer  Your  Excellency  to  a  classical  passage  in  the  judgment  of  Lord  Stowell,  in  the  case  of 
the  Fox,  in  which  that  famous  judge  observed  in  the  course  of  the  discussion:  "A  question  has  been  stated,  what 
would  be  the  duty  of  the  court  under  Orders  in  Council, that  were  repugnant  to  the  Law  of  Nations?  It  has  been 
contended  on  one  side  that  the  court  would  at  all  events  be  bound  to  enforce  the  Orders  in  Council,  on  the  other 
that  the  court  would  be  bound  to  apply  the  rule  of  the  law  of  nations  adapted  to  the  particular  case,  in  disregard  of 
the  Orders  in  Council.  This  court  is  bound  to  administer  the  law  of  nations  to  the  subjects  of  other  countries 
in  the  different  relations  in  which  they  may  be  placed  toward  this  country  and  its  Government.  That  is  what 
others  have  a  right  to  demand  for  their  subjects  and  to  complain  if  they  receive  it  not.  This  is  its  unwritten 
law  evidenced  in  the  course  of  its  decisions  and  collected  from  the  common  usage  of  civilized  states.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  strictly  true  that  by  the  Constitution  of  this  country  the  King  in  Council  possesses  legislative 
rights  over  this  court  and  has  power  to  issue  orders  and  instructions  which  it  is  bound  to  obey  and  enforce; 
and  these  constitute  the  written  law  of  this  court.  These  two  propositions,  that  the  court  is  bound  to  admin- 
ister the  law  of  nations,  and  that  it  is  bound  to  enforce  the  King's  Orders  in  Council,  are  not  at  all  inconsist- 
ent with  each  other,  because  these  orders  and  instructions  are  presumed  to  conform  themselves,  under  the 
given  circumstances,  to  the  principles  of  its  unwritten  law.  They  are  either  directory  applications  of  those 
principles  to  the  cases  indicated  in  them — cases  which,  with  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  belonging  to  them, 
and  which  constitute  their  legal  character  could  be  but  imperfectly  known  to  the  court  itself ;  or  they  are  posi- 
tive regulations,  consistent  with  these  principles,  applying  to  matters  which  would  require-  more  exact  and 
definite  rules  than  those  general  principles  are  capable  of  furnishing.  The  constitution  of  this  court,  relatively 
to  the  legislative  power  of  the  King  in  Council,  is  analogous  to  that  of  the  courts  of  common  law  relatively  to 
that  of  the  Parliament  of  this  Kingdom.  These  courts  have  their  unwritten  law,  the  approved  reasons,  prin- 
ciples of  natural  reason  and  justice — they  have  likewise  the  written  or  statute  law  in  acts  of  Parliament, 
which  are  directory  applications  of  the  same  principles  to  particular  subjects,  or  positive  regulations  consistent 
with  them,  upon  matters  which  would  remain  too  much  at  large  if  they  were  left  to  the  imperfect  information 
which  the  courts  could  extract  from  mere  general  speculations.  What  would  be  the  duty  of  the  individuals 
who  preside  in  these  courts,  if  required  to  enforce  an  act  of  Parliament  which  contradicted  those  principles,  is 
a  question  which  I  presume  they  would  not  entertain  a  priori;  because  they  will  not  entertain  a  priori,  the  sup- 
position that  any  such  will  arise.  In  like  manner  this  court  will  not  let  itself  loose  into  speculations  as  to  what 
would  be  its  duty  under  such  an  emergency;  because  it  can  not,  without  extreme  indecency,  presume  that  any 
such  emergency  will  happen.  And  it  is  the  less  disposed  to  entertain  them  because  its  own  observation  and 
experience  attest  the  general  conformity  of  such  orders  and  instructions  to  its  principles  of  unwritten  law." 

5.  The  above  passage  has  recently  been  quoted  and  adopted  by  the  president  of  the  prize  court  in  the 
case  of  the  Zamora,  in  which  Sir  S.  Evans  said:  "  I  make  bold  to  express  the  hope  and  belief  that  the  nations 
of  the  world  need  not  be  apprehensive  that  Orders  in  Council  will  emanate  from  the  Governm.ent  of  this  coun- 
try in  such  violation  of  the  acknowledged  laws  of  nations  that  it  is  conceivable  that  our  prize  tribunals,  hold- 
ing the  law  of  nations  in  reverence,  would  feel  called  upon  to  disregard  and  refuse  obedience  to  the  provisions 
of  such  orders." 

6.  In  the  note  which  I  handed  to  Your  Excellency  on  the  23d  of  July,  I  endeavored  to  convince  the  Grovem- 
ment  of  the  United  States,  and  I  trust  with  success,  that  the  measures  that  we  have  felt  ourselves  compelled 
to  adopt,  in  consequence  of  the  numerous  acts  committed  by  our  enemies  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war  and 
the  dictates  of  humanity  are  consistent  with  the  principles  of  international  law.  The  legality  of  these  measures 
has  not  yet  formed  the  subject  of  a  decision  of  the  prize  court ;  but  I  wish  to  take  this  opportunity  of  remind- 
ing Your  Excellency  that  it  is  open  to  any  United  States  citizen  whose  claim  is  before  the  prize  court  to 
contend  that  any  Order  in  Council  which  may  affect  his  claim  is  inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  international 
law  and  is,  therefore,  not  binding  upon  the  court.  If  the  prize  court  declines  to  accept  his  contentions,  and 
if,  after  such  a  decision  has  been  upheld  on  appeal  by  the  Judicial  Committee  of  His  Majesty's  Privy  Council, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  considers  that  there  is  serious  ground  for  holding  that  the 
decision  is  incorrect  and  infringes  the  rights  of  their  citizens,  it  is  open  to  them  to  claim  that  it  should  be  sub- 
jected to  review  by  an  international  tribunal. 

7.  This  principle  that  the  decisions  of  the  national  prize  courts  may  properly  be  subjected  to  international 
review  was  conceded  by  Great  Britain  in  Article  7  of  the  Jay  Treaty  of  1793  and  by  the  United  States  of 
America  under  the  Treaty  of  Washington  of  1871.  Your  Excellency  will  no  doubt  remember  that  certain  cases 
(collectively  known  as  the  "Matamoros  cases")  were  submitted  to  the  commission  established  under  Articles 
12-17  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington.  In  each  of  these  cases  proceedings  in  prize  had  been  instituted  in  the  prize 
courts  of  the  United  States,  and  in  each  case  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  court  of  last  resort,  in 
cases  of  prize  had  been  obtained,  the  United  States  filed  a  demurrer  in  these  cases,  alleging  that  as  they  had 


1(J0  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

been  heard  by  the  prize  courts  of  the  United  States  of  original  and  appellate  jurisdiction,  the  decision  of  the 
appellate  court  was  final  and  no  claim  based  upon  it  could  be  made  before  the  commission.  The  demurrer 
was  unanimously  overruled  and  the  cases  heard,  and  the  agent  of  the  United  States,  in  his  report  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  commission,  stated  that  he  personally  "maintained  no  doubt  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  commis- 
sion as  an  international  tribunal  to  review  the  decisions  of  the  prize  courts  of  the  United  States,  where  the 
parties  alleging  themselves  aggrieved  had  prosecuted  their  claims  by  appeals  to  the  court  of  last  resort,  as  this 
jurisdiction,  however,  had  been  sometimes  questioned,  he  deemed  it  desirable  that  a  formal  adjudication  by  the 
commission  should  be  had  upon  this  question." 

8.  The  same  principle  was  accepted  both  by  the  United  States  Government  and  His  Majesty's  Government 
in  1907  in  connection  with  the  proposed  establishment  of  an  international  prize  court,  although  certain  constitu- 
tional difficulties  have  led  the  United  States  Government  to  propose  that  the  right  of  recourse  to  the  interna- 
tional prize  court  in  connection  with  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  should  take  the  form 
of  a  direct  claim  for  compensation. 

9.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  both  the  United  States  Government  and  His  Majesty's  Government  have 
adopted  the  principle  that  the  decisions  of  a  national  prize  court  may  be  open  to  review  if  it  is  held  in  the  prize 
court  and  in  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  on  appeal  that  the  orders  and  instructions  issued  by 
His  Majesty's  Government  in  matters  relating  to  prize  are  in  harmony  with  the  principles  of  international 
law ;  and  should  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  unfortunately,  feel  compelled  to  maintain  a  contrary 
view.  His  Majesty's  Government  will  be  prepared  to  concert  with  the  United  States  Government  in  order  to 
decide  upon  the  best  way  of  applying  the  above  principle  to  the  situation  which  would  then  have  arisen.  I 
trust,  however,  that  the  defense  of  our  action,  which  I  have  already  communicated  to  Your  Excellency,  and  the 
willingness  of  His  Majesty's  Government  (which  has  been  shown  in  so  many  instances)  to  make  reasonable 
concessions  to  American  interests,  will  prevent  the  necessity  for  such  action  arising. 

10.  In  any  case,  I  trust  that  the  explanations  given  above  will  remove  the  misapprehension  under  which  I 
can  not  but  feel  the  Government  of  the  United  States  are  labouring  as  to  the  principles  applied  by  British  prize 
courts  in  dealing  with  the  cases  which  come  before  them. 

I  have,  etc.,  E.  Grey. 

Page. 


British  proclamation,  August  21, 1915,  declaring  cotton  contraband  of  war* 

Now,  therefore,  we  do  hereby  declare,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  our  Privy  Council, 
that,  during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  or  until  we  do  give  further  public  notice,  the  fol- 
lowing articles  wilUl^treated  as  absolutely  contraband,  in  addition  to  those  set  out  in  our 
royal  proclamaticm  aforementioned :  Raw  cotton,  cotton  linters,  cotton  waste,  and  cotton 
yam. 

And  we  do  hereby  further  declare  that  this  our  royal  proclamation  shall  take  effect 
from  the  date  of  its  publication  in  the  London  Gasette. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  W.  H.  Page. 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  October  21,  1915. 

SiE :  I  desire  that  you  present  a  note  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the  sense  of  the  fol- 
lowing : 

(1)  The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  given  careful  consideration  to  Your 
Excellency's  notes  of  January  7,  February  10,  June  22,  July  23,  July  31,  (2)  August  13, 
and  to  a  note  verbale  of  the  British  Embassy  of  August  6,  relating  to  restrictions  upon 
American  commerce  by  certain  measures  adopted  by  the  British  Government  during  the 
present  war.  This  Government  has  delayed  answering  the  earlier  of  these  notes  in  the 
hope  that  the  announced  purpose  of  His  Majesty's  Government  "to  exercise  their  bellig- 
erent rights  with  every  possible  consideration  for  the  interests  of  neutrals"  and  their 
intention  of  "removing  all  causes  of  avoidable  delay  in  dealing  with  American  cargoes" 
and  of  causing  "the  least  possible  amount  of  inconvenience  to  persons  engaged  in  legiti- 
mate trade,"  as  well  as  their  "assurances  to  the  United  States  Government  that  they 
would  make  it  their  first  aim  to  minimize  the  inconveniences"  resulting  from  the  "meas- 
ures taken  by  the  Allied  Governments,"  would  in  practice  not  unjustifiably  infringe  upon 
the  neutral  rights  of  American  citizens  engaged  in  trade  and  commerce.  It  is,  there- 
fore, a  matter  of  regret  that  this  hope  has  not  been  realized,  but,  that,  on  the  contrary, 
interferences  with  American  ships  and  cargoes  destined  in  good  faith  to  neutral  ports 
and  lawfully  entitled  to  proceed  have  become  increasingly  vexatious,  causing  American 
shipowners  and  American  merchants  to  complain  to  this  Government  of  the  failure  to 

•Not  printed  in  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  etc.     The  New  York  Times,   August  22,  1915. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  161 

take  steps  to  prevent  an  exercise  of  belligerent  power  in  contravention  of  their  just 
rights.  As  the  measm-es  complained  of  proceed  directly  ?rom  orders  issued  by  the  Brit- 
ish Government,  are  executed  by  British  authorities,  and  arouse  a  reasonable  apprehen- 
sion that,  if  not  resisted,  they  may  be  carried  to  an  extent  even  more  injurious  to  Ameri- 
can interests,  this  Government  directs  the  attention  of  His  Majesty's  Government  to  the 
following  considerations : 

(2)  Without  commenting  upon  the  statistics  presented  by  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  show  that  the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  has  increased  in  volume  since 
the  war  began  further  than  to  point  out  that  the  comparative  values  fail  to  take  into 
account  the  increased  price  of  commodities  resulting  from  a  state  of  war  or  to  make  any 
allowance  for  the  diminution  in  the  volume  of  trade  which  the  neutral  countries  in  Eu- 
rope previously  had  with  the  nations  at  war,  a  diminution  which  compelled  them  to  buy 
in  other  markets,  I  will  pass  directly  to  the  matters  which  constitute  the  specific  com- 
plaints of  this  Government. 

(3)  First.  The  detentions  of  American  vessels  and  cargoes  which  have  taken  place 
since  the  opening  of  hostilities  have,  it  is  presumed,  been  pursuant  to  the  enforcement 
of  the  Orders  in  Council,  which  were  issued  on  August  20  and  October  29,  1914,  and 
March  11,  1915,  and  relate  to  contraband  traffic  and  to  the  interception  of  trade  to  and 
from  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  In  practice  these  detentions  have  not  been  uni- 
formly based  on  proofs  obtained  at  the  time  of  seizure,  but  many  vessels  have  been  de- 
tained while  search  was  made  for  evidence  of  the  contraband  character  of  cargoes  or  of 
an  intention  to  evade  the  nonintercourse  measures  of  Great  Britain.  The  question,  con- 
sequently, has  been  one  of  evidence  to  support  a  belief  of — in  many  cases  a  bare  suspicion 
of — enemy  destination,  or  occasionally  of  enemy  origin  of  the  goods  involved.  Whether 
this  evidence  should  be  obtained  by  search  at  sea  before  the  vessel  or  cargo  is  taken  into 
port,  and  what  the  character  of  the  evidence  should  be,  which  is  necessary  to  justify  the 
detention,  are  the  points  to  which  I  direct  Your  Excellency's  attention. 

(4)  In  regard  to  search  at  sea,  an  examination  of  the  instructions  issued  to  naval 
commanders  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Japan,  Spain,  Germany,  and 
France  from  1888  to  the  beginning  of  the  present  war  shows  that  search  in  port  was  not 
contemplated  by  the  Government  of  any  of  these  countries.  On  the  contrary,  the  con- 
text of  the  respective  instructions  shows  that  search  at  sea  was  the  procedure  expected 
to  be  followed  by  the  commanders.  All  of  these  instructions  impress  upon  the  naval  offi- 
cers the  necessity  of  acting  with  the  utmost  moderation — and  in  some  cases  commanders 
are  specifically  instructed — in  exercising  the  right  of  visit  and  search,  to  avoid  undue 
deviation  of  the  vessel  from  her  course. 

(5)  An  examination  of  the  opinions  of  the  most  eminent  text  writers  on  the  laws 
of  nations  shows  that  they  give  practically  no  consideration  to  the  question  of  search  in 
port,  outside  of  examination  in  the  course  of  regular  prize  court  proceedings. 

(6)  The  assertion  by  His  Majesty's  Government  that  the  position  of  the  United 
States  in  relation  to  search  at  sea  is  inconsistent  with  its  practice  during  the  American 
Civil  War  is  based  upon  a  misconception.  Irregularities  there  may  have  been  at  the  be- 
ginning of  that  war,  but  a  careful  search  of  the  records  of  this  Government  as  to  the 
practice  of  its  commanders  shows  conclusively  that  there  were  no  instances  when  ves- 
sels were  brought  into  port  for  search  prior  to  instituting  prize  court  proceedings,  or 
that  captures  were  made  upon  other  grounds  than,  in  the  words  of  the  American  note  of 
November  7,  1914,  "evidence  found  on  the  ship  under  investigation  and  not  upon  circum- 
stances ascertained  from  external  sources."  A  copy  of  the  instruction  issued  to  Ameri- 
can naval  officers  on  Aug.  18,  1862,  for  their  guidance  during  the  Civil  War  is  appended. 

(7)  The  British  contention  that  "modern  conditions"  justify  bringing  vessels  into 
port  for  search  is  based  upon  the  size  and  seaworthiness  of  modern  carriers  of  commerce 
and  the  difficulty  of  uncovering  the  real  transaction  in  the  intricate  trade  operations 
of  the  present  day.  It  is  believed  that  commercial  transactions  of  the  present  time, 
hampered  as  they  are  by  censorship  of  telegraph  and  postal  communication  on  the  part 
of  belligerents,  are  essentially  no  more  complex  and  disguised  than  in  the  wars  of  recent 
years,  during  which  the  practice  of  obtaining  evidence  in  port  to  determine  whether  a 
vessel  should  be  held  for  prize  proceedings  was  not  adopted.  The  effect  of  the  size  and 
seaworthiness  of  merchant  vessels  upon  their  search  at  sea  has  been  submitted  to  a  board 
of  naval  experts,  which  reports  that : 

"At  no  period  in  history  has  it  been  considered  necessary  to  remove  every  package 
of  a  ship's  cargo  to  establish  the  character  and  nature  of  her  trade  or  the  service  on  which 
she  is  bound,  nor  is  such  removal  necessary.     •     ♦     • 

"The  facilities  for  boarding  and  inspection  of  modern  ships  are  in  fact  greater  than 
in  former  times,  and  no  difference,  so  far  as  the  necessities  of  the  case  are  concerned,  can 
be  seen  between  the  search  of  a  ship  of  a  thousand  tons  and  one  of  twenty  thousand 
tons — except  possibly  a  difference  in  time — for  the  purpose  of  establishing  fully  the  char- 


162  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

acter  of  her  cargo  and  the  nature  of  her  service  and  destination.  ♦  *  •  This  method 
would  be  a  direct  aid  to  the  belligerents  concerned  in  that  it  would  release  a  belligerent 
vessel  overhauling  the  neutral  from  its  duty  of  search  g.nd  set  it  free  for  further  bellig- 
erent operations." 

(8)  Turning  to  the  character  and  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  of  the  contraband  na- 
ture of  shipments  to  warrant  the  detention  of  a  suspected  vessel  or  cargo  for  prize  pro- 
ceedings, it  will  be  recalled  that  when  a  vessel  is  brought  in  for  adjudication  courts  of 
prize  have  heretofore  been  bound  by  well-established  and  long-settled  practice  to  consider 
at  the  first  hearing  only  the  ship's  papers  and  documents,  and  the  goods  found  on  board, 
together  with  the  written  replies  of  the  officers  and  seamen  to  standing  interrogatories 
taken  under  oath,  alone  and  separately,  as  soon  as  possible  and  without  communication 
with  or  instruction  by  counsel,  in  order  to  avoid  possibility  of  corruption  and  fraud. 

(9)  Additional  evidence  was  not  allowed  to  be  introduced  except  upon  an  order  of 
the  court  for  "further  proof,"  and  then  only  after  the  cause  had  been  fully  heard  upon 
the  facts  already  in  evidence  or  when  this  evidence  furnished  a  ground  for  prosecuting 
the  inquiry  further.  This  was  the  practice  of  the  United  States  courts  during  the  War 
of  1812,  the  American  Civil  War,  and  the  Spanish- American  War,  as  is  evidenced  by  the 
reported  decisions  of  those  courts,  and  has  been  the  practice  of  the  British  prize  courts 
for  over  a  century.  This  practice  has  been  changed  by  the  British  prize  court  rules 
adopted  for  the  present  war  by  the  Order  in  Council  of  August  5.  Under  these  new 
rules  there  is  no  longer  a  "first  hearing"  on  the  evidence  derived  from  the  ship,  and  the 
prize  court  is  no  longer  precluded  from  receiving  extrinsic  evidence  for  which  a  sug- 
gestion has  not  been  laid  in  the  preparatory  evidence.  The  result  is,  as  pointed  out 
above,  that  innocent  vessels  or  cargoes  are  now  seized  and  detained  on  mere  suspicion, 
while  efforts  are  made  to  obtain  evidence  from  extraneous  sources  to  justify  the  deten- 
tion and  the  commencement  of  prize  proceedings.  The  effect  of  this  new  procedure  is 
to  subject  traders  to  risk  of  loss,  delay,  and  expense  so  great  and  so  burdensome  as  prac- 
tically to  destroy  much  of  the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  to  neutral  countries  of 
Europe. 

(10)  In  order  to  place  the  responsibility  for  the  delays  of  vessels  and  cargoes  upon 
American  claimants,  the  Order  in  Council  of  October  29,  1914,  as  pointed  out  in  the  Brit- 
ish note  of  February  10,  seeks  to  place  the  burden  of  proof  as  to  the  noncontraband  char- 
acter of  the  goods  upon  the  claimant  in  cases  where  the  goods  are  consigned  to  order, 
or  the  consignee  is  not  named  or  the  consignee  is  within  enemy  territory.  Without  ad- 
mitting that  the  onus  probandi  can  rightfully  be  made  to  rest  upon  the  claimant  in 
these  cases,  and  is  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  this  state  to  point  out  that  the  three 
classes  in  cases  indicated  in  the  Order  in  Council  of  October  29  apply  to  only  a  few  of 
the  many  seizures  or  detentions  which  have  actually  been  made  by  British  authorities. 

( 11 )  The  British  contention  that  in  the  American  Civil  War  the  captor  was  allowed 
to  establish  enemy  destination  by  "all  the  evidence  at  liis  disposal,"  citing  the  Bermuda 
case  (3  Wallace,  515),  is  not  borne  out  by  the  facts  of  that  case.  The  case  of  the  Ber- 
muda was  one  of  "further  proof,"  a  proceeding  not  to  determine  whether  the  vessel  should 
be  detained  and  placed  in  a  prize  court,  but  whether  the  vessel,  having  been  placed  in 
prize  court,  should  be  restored  or  condemned.  The  same  ruling  was  made  in  the  case  of 
the  Sir  William  Peel  (5  Wallace,  517).  These  cases,  therefore,  can  not  be  properly 
cited  as  supporting  the  course  of  a  British  captor  in  taking  a  vessel  into  port,  there  to 
obtain  extrinsic  evidence  to  justify  him  in  detaining  the  vessel  for  prize  proceedings. 

(12)  The  further  contention  that  the  greatly  increased  imports  of  neutral  countries, 
adjoining  Great  Britain's  enemies,  raise  a  presumption  that  certain  commodities,  such  as 
cotton,  rubber,  and  others  more  or  less  useful  for  military  purposes,  though  destined  for 
those  countries,  are  intended  for  re-exportation  to  the  belligerents  who  can  not  import 
them  directly,  and  that  this  fact  justifies  the  detention  for  the  purpose  of  examination  of 
all  vessels  bound  for  the  ports  of  those  neutral  countries,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
most  of  the  articles  of  trade  have  been  placed  on  the  embargo  lists  of  those  countries,  can 
not  be  accepted  as  laying  down  a  just  or  legal  rule  of  evidence.  Such  a  presumption  is 
too  remote  from  the  facts  and  offers  too  great  opportunity  for  abuse  by  the  belligerent, 
who  could,  if  the  rule  were  adopted,  entirely  ignore  neutral  rights  on  the  high  seas  and 
prey  with  impunity  upon  neutral  commerce.  To  such  a  rule  of  legal  presumption  this 
Government  can  not  accede,  as  it  is  opposed  to  those  fundamental  principles  of  justice 
which  are  the  foundation  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 

(13)  Before  passing  from  the  discussion  of  this  contention  as  to  the  presumption 
raised  by  increased  importations  to  neutral  countries,  this  Government  directs  atten- 
tion to  the  fact,  that  His  Majesty's  Government  admit  that  the  British  exports  to  those 
countries  have  also  materially  increased  since  the  present  war  began.  Thus  Great  Brit- 
ain concededly  shares  in  creating  a  condition  which  is  relied  upon  as  a  sufficient  ground 
to  justify  the  interception  of  American  goods  destined  to  neutral  European  ports.     If 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  163 

British  exports  to  those  ports  should  be  still  further  increased,  it  is  obvious  that,  under 
the  rule  of  evidence  contended  for  by  the  British  Government,  the  presumption  of  enemy 
destination  could  be  applied  to  a  greater  number  of  American  cargoes,  and  American 
trade  would  suffer  to  the  extent  that  British  trade  benefited  by  the  increase.  Great 
Britain  can  not  expect  the  United  States  to  submit  to  such  manifest  injustice  or  to  per- 
mit the  rights  of  its  citizens  to  be  so  seriously  impaired. 

(14)  When  goods  are  clearly  intended  to  become  incorporated  in  the  mass  of  mer- 
chandise for  sale  in  a  neutral  country  it  is  an  unwarranted  and  inquisitorial  proceeding 
to  detain  shipments  for  examination  as  to  whether  those  goods  are  ultimately  destined 
for  the  enemy's  country  or  use.  Whatever  may  be  the  conjectural  conclusions  to  be 
drawn  from  trade  statistics,  which,  when  stated  by  value,  are  of  uncertain  evidence  as 
to  quantity,  the  United  States  maintains  the  right  to  sell  goods  into  the  general  stock  of 
a  neutral  country  and  denounces  as  illegal  and  unjustifiable  any  attempt  of  a  belligerent 
to  interfere  with  that  right,  on  the  ground  that  it  suspects  that  the  previous  supply  of 
such  goods  in  the  neutral  country,  which  the  imports  renew  or  replace,  has  been  sold  to 
an  enemy.  That  is  a  matter  with  which  the  neutral  vendor  has  no  concern  and  which  can 
in  no  way  affect  his  rights  of  trade.  Moreover,  even  if  goods  listed  as  conditional  con- 
traband are  destined  to  an  enemy  country  through  a  neutral  country,  that  fact  is  not  in 
itself  sufficient  to  justify  their  seizure. 

(15)  In  view  of  these  considerations  the  United  States,  reiterating  its  position  in 
this  matter,  has  no  other  course  but  to  contesc  seizures  of  vessels  at  sea  upon  conjectural 
suspicion  and  the  practice  of  bringing  them  into  port  for  the  purpose,  by  search  or  other- 
wise, of  obtaining  evidence,  for  the  purpose  of  justifying  prize  proceedings,  of  the  car- 
riage of  contraband  or  of  breaches  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11.  Relying  up- 
on the  regard  of  the  British  Government  for  the  principles  of  justice  so  frequently  and 
uniformly  manifested  prior  to  the  present  war,  this  Government  anticipates  that  the 
British  Government  will  instruct  their  officers  to  refrain  from  these  vexatious  and  ille- 
gal practices. 

(16)  Second.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  further  desires  to  direct  par- 
ticular attention  to  the  so-called  "blockade"  measures  imposed  by  the  Order  in  Council 
of  March  11.  The  British  note  of  July  23,  1915,  appears  to  confirm  the  intention  indi- 
cated in  the  note  of  March  15,  1915,  to  establish  a  blockade  so  extensive  as  to  prohibit 
trade  with  Germany  or  Austria-Hungary,  (;ven  through  the  ports  of  neutral  countries 
adjacent  to  them.  Great  Britain,  however,  admits  that  it  should  not,  and  gives  as- 
surances that  it  will  not,  interfere  with  trade  with  the  countries  contiguous  to  the  terri- 
tories of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain.  Nevertheless,  after  over  six  months'  application 
of  the  "blockade"  order,  the  experience  of  American  citizens  has  convinced  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  that  Great  Britain  has  been  unsuccessful  in  her  efforts  to  dis- 
tinguish between  enemy  and  neutral  trade.  Arrangements  have  been  made  to  create  in 
these  neutral  countries  special  consignees,  or  consignment  corporations,  with  power  to 
refuse  shipments  and  to  determine  when  the  state  of  the  country's  resources  requires  the 
importation  of  new  commodities.  American  commercial  interests  are  hampered  by  the 
intricacies  of  these  arrangements,  and  many  American  citizens  justly  complain  that  their 
bona  fide  trade  with  neutral  countries  is  greatly  reduced  as  a  consequence,  while  others 
assert  that  their  neutral  trade,  which  amounted  annually  to  a  large  sum,  has  been  en- 
tirely interrupted. 

(17)  It  makes  this  practice  even  more  harassing  to  neutral  traders  that  the  British 
authorities  require  a  consignor  to  prove  that  his  shipments  are  not  bound  to  an  enemy  of 
Great  Britain,  even  when  the  articles  are  on  the  embargo  list  of  the  neutral  country  to 
which  they  are  destined,  and  that  notwithstanding  the  assertion  in  the  last  British  note 
that  interference  with  such  trade  by  a  belligerent  can  only  take  place  "provided,  of 
course,  that  he  (the  belligerent)  can  establish"  that  the  commerce  is  with  the  enemy. 

(18)  While  the  United  States  Government  was  at  first  inclined  to  view  with  leniency 
the  British  measures  which  were  termed  in  the  correspondence,  but  not  in  the  Order  in 
Council  of  March  11,  a  "blockade,"  because  of  the  assurances  of  the  British  Government 
that  inconvenience  to  neutral  trade  would  be  minimized  by  the  discretion  left  to  the 
courts  in  the  application  of  the  Order  in  Council  and  by  the  instructions  which  it  was 
said  would  be  issued  to  the  administrative  and  other  authorities  having  to  do  with  the 
execution  of  the  so-called  "blockade"  measures,  this  Government  is  now  forced  to  the  re- 
alization that  its  expectations,  which  were  fully  set  forth  in  its  note  of  March  30,  were 
based  on  a  misconception  of  the  intentions  of  the  British  Government.  Desiring  to  avoid 
controversy  and  in  the  expectation  that  the  administration  of  the  Order  in  Council 
would  conform  to  the  established  rules  of  international  law,  this  Government  has  until 
now  reserved  the  question  of  the  actual  validity  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  considered  by  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  to  establish  a  blockade 
within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as  understood  in  the  law  and  the  practice  of  nations ;  but 


164  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

in  the  circumstances  now  developed  it  feels  that  it  can  no  longer  permit  the  validity  of 
the  alleged  blockade  to  remain  unchallenged. 

(19)  The  Declaration  of  Paris  in  1856,which  has  been  universally  recognized  as  cor- 
rectly stating  the  rule  of  international  law  as  to  blockade,  expressly  declares  that  "block- 
ades, in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective;  that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  force  suffi- 
cient really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy."  The  effectiveness  of  a  blockade 
is  manifestly  a  question  of  fact.  It  is  common  knowledge  that  the  German  coasts  are 
open  to  trade  with  the  Scandinavian  countries  and  that  German  naval  vessels  cruise  both 
in  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic  and  seize  and  bring  into  German  ports  neutral  vessels 
bound  for  Scandinavian  and  Danish  ports.  Futhermore,  from  the  recent  placing  of  cot- 
ton on  the  British  list  of  contraband  of  war,  it  appears  that  the  British  Government 
have  themselves  been  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  blockade  is  ineffective  to  prevent 
shipments  of  cotton  from  reaching  their  enemies,  or  else  that  they  are  doubtful  as  to  the 
legality  of  the  form  of  blockade  which  they  have  sought  to  maintain. 

(20)  Moreover,  it  is  an  essential  principle  which  has  been  universally  accepted  that 
a  blockade  must  apply  impartially  to  the  ships  of  all  nations.  This  was  set  forth  in  the 
Declaration  of  London,  is  found  in  the  prize  rules  of  Germany,  France,  and  Japan,  and 
has  long  been  admitted  as  a  basic  principle,  of  the  law  of  blockade.  This  principle,  how- 
ever, is  not  applied  in  the  present  British  "blockade,"  for,  as  above  indicated,  German 
ports  are  notoriously  open  to  traffic  with  the  ports  of  Denmark,  Norway,  and  Sweden. 
So  strictly  has  this  principle  been  enforced  in  the  past  that  in  the  Crimean  War  the  Judi- 
cial Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  on  appeal  laid  down,  that  if  belligerents  them- 
selves trade  with  blockade  ports  they  can  not  be  regarded  as  effectively  blockaded.  ( The 
Franciska,  Moore,  P.  C,  56.)  This  decision  has  special  significance  at  the  present  time, 
since  it  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  Great  Britain  exports  and  re-exports 
large  quantities  of  merchandise  to  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Holland,  whose 
ports,  so  far  as  American  commerce  is  concerned,  she  regards  as  blockaded.  In  fact, 
the  British  note  of  August  13  itself  indicates  that  the  British  exports  of  many  articles, 
such  as  cotton,  lubricating  oil,  tobacco,  cocoa,  coffee,  rice,  wheat  flour,  barley,  spices, 
tea,  copra,  etc.,  to  these  countries  have  greatly  exceeded  the  British  exports  of  the  same 
articles  for  the  corresponding  period  of  1914.  The  note  also  shows  that  there  has  been  an 
important  British  trade  with  these  countries  in  many  other  articles,  such  as  machinery, 
beef,  butter,  cotton  waste,  etc. 

(21)  Finally,  there  is  no  better  settled  principle  of  the  law  of  nations  than  that 
which  forbids  the  blockade  of  neutral  ports  in  time  of  war.  The  Declaration  of  London, 
though  not  regarded  as  binding  upon  the  signatories  because  not  ratified  by  them,  has 
been  expressly  adopted  by  the  British  Government  without  modification  as  to  blockade  in 
the  British  Order  in  Council  of  October  29,  1914.  Article  18  of  the  Declaration  declares 
specifically  that  "The  blockading  forces  must  not  bar  access  to  neutral  ports  or  coasts." 
This  is,  in  the  opinion  of  this  Government,  a  correct  statement  of  the  universally  ac- 
cepted law  as  it  exists  to-day  and  as  it  existed  prior  to  the  Declaration  of  London.  The 
meaning  of  this  statement  is  elucidated  by  Mr.  Renault  in  the  report  of  the  drafting  com- 
mittee upon  the  convention,  in  which  he  states: 

"This  rule  has  been  thought  necessary  the  better  to  protect  the  commercial  interests 
of  neutral  countries ;  it  completes  article  1,  according  to  which  a  blockade  must  not  ex- 
tend beyond  the  ports  and  coasts  of  the  enemy,  which  implies  that,  as  it  is  an  operation 
of  war,  it  must  not  be  directed  against  a  neutral  port,  in  spite  of  the  importance  to  a  bel- 
ligerent of  the  part  played  hy  that  port  in  supplying  his  adversary." 

As  the  conference  assembled  at  London  upon  the  invitation  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, it  is  important  to  recall  the  instruction  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the  British  dele- 
gates, "setting  out  the  views  of  his  Majesty's  Government,  founded  on  the  decisions  of 
the  British  courts,"  in  which  he  says: 

"A  blockade  must  be  confined  to  the  ports  and  coast  of  the  enemy,  but  it  may  be  in- 
stituted of  one  port  or  of  several  ports  or  of  the  whole  of  the  seaboard  of  the  enemy.  It 
may  be  instituted  to  prevent  the  ingress  only  or  egress  only,  or  both." 

He  added: 

"Where  the  ship  does  not  intend  to  proceed  to  the  blockaded  port,  the  fact  that  gooas 
on  board  are  to  be  sent  on  by  sea  or  by  inland  transport  is  no  ground  for  condemnation." 

In  support  of  this  announcement,  Sir  Edward  Grey  referred  to  several  decisions  of 
British  prize  courts,  among  which  an  early  one  of  1801  held  that  goods  shipped  from  Lon- 
don to  Emden,  thence  inland  or  by  canal  to  Amsterdam,  then  blockaded  by  sea,  were  not 
subject  to  condemnation  for  breach  of  blockade.  {Jonge  Pieter,  4  C.  B.  79.)  This  has 
been  the  rule  for  a  century,  so  that  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  recall  that  the  Matamoras 
cases,  well  known  to  the  British  Government,  support  the  same  rule,  that  neutral  ports 
may  not  be  blockaded,  though  "trade  with  unrestricted  inland  commerce  between  such  a 


DIPLOMATIC   CORRESPONDENCE  165 

port  and  the  enemy's  territoi'j,  impairs  undoubtedly,  and  very  seriously  impairs,  the  val- 
ue of  a  blockade  of  the  enemy's  coast." 

(22)  Without  mentioning  the  other  customary  elements  of  a  regularly  imposed 
blockade,  such  as  notification  of  the  particular  coast  line  invested,  the  imposition  of  the 
penalty  of  confiscation,  etc.,  which  are  lacking  in  the  present  British  "blockade"  policy, 
it  need  only  be  pointed  out  that,  measured  by  the  three  universally  conceded  tests  above 
set  forth,  the  present  British  measures  cannot  be  regarded  as  constituting  a  blockade  in 
law,  in  practice,  or  in  effect. 

(23)  It  is  incumbent  upon  the  United  States  Government,  therefore,  to  give  the 
British  Government  notice  that  the  blockade,  which  they  claim  to  have  instituted  under 
the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  cannot  be  recognized  as  a  legal  blockade  by  the  United 
States. 

(24)  Since  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  has  laid  much  emphasis  on  the  ruling 
of  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Springbok  case,  that  goods  of  contra- 
band character  seized  while  going  to  the  neutral  port  of  Nassau,  though  actually  bound 
for  the  blockaded  ports  of  the  south,  were  subject  to  condemnation,  it  is  not  inappropri- 
ate to  direct  attention  to  the  British  view  of  this  case  in  England  prior  to  the  present 
war,  as  expressed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  his  instructions  to  the  British  delegates  to  the 
London  Conference  in  1908: 

"It  is  exceedingly  doubtful  whether  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  in  reality 
meant  to  cover  a  case  of  blockade-running  in  which  no  question  of  contraband  arose. 
Certainly  if  such  was  the  intention,  the  decision  would  pro  tanto  be  in  conflict  with  the 
practice  of  the  British  courts.  His  Majesty's  Government  sees  no  reason  for  departing 
from  that  practice,  and  you  should  endeavor  to  obtain  general  recognition  of  its  correct- 
ness." 

It  may  be  pointed  out  also  that  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  Springbok  case 
were  essentially  different  from  those  of  the  present  day  to  which  the  rule  laid  down  in 
that  case  is  sought  to  be  applied.  When  the  Springbok  case  arose,  the  ports  of  the  Con- 
federate States  were  effectively  blockaded  by  the  naval  forces  of  the  United  States, 
though  no  neutral  ports  were  closed,  and  a  continuous  voyage  through  a  neutral  port  re- 
quired an  all-sea  voyage  terminating  in  an  attempt  to  pass  the  blockading  squadron. 

(25)  Third.  It  appears  to  be  the  position  of  Great  Britain  that  if,  as  the  United 
States  alleges,  American  citizens  or  American  interests  are  directly  and  adversely  af- 
fected by  the  British  policies  of  contraband  and  nonintercourse,  resulting  in  interference 
with  ships  and  cargoes,  they  should  seek  redress  in  the  prize  courts  which  the  British 
Government  have  established,  and  that,  pending  the  exhaustion  of  such  legal  remedies 
with  the  result  of  a  denial  of  justice,  the  British  Government  "can  not  continue  to  deal 
through  the  diplomatic  channels  with  the  individual  cases." 

(26)  It  is  declared  that  this  was  the  course  followed  by  the  United  States  during 
the  American  Civil  War  and  the  Spanish  War,  and  that  both  countries  have  supported  the 
practice  by  allowing  their  prize  court  decisions,  when  shown  to  be  unjust  or  inadequate, 
to  be  reviewed  by  an  international  tribunal,  as  was  done  under  the  treaties  of  1794  and 
1871.  The  ground  upon  which  this  contention  is  put  forth,  and  the  results  which  would 
follow,  if  the  course  of  procedure  suggested  were  accepted,  give  the  impression  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  do  not  rely  upon  its  soundness  or  strength.  Nevertheless,  since  it 
has  been  advanced,  I  can  not  refrain  from  presenting  certain  considerations  which  will 
show  that  the  proposed  course  embodies  the  form  rather  than  the  substance  of  redress. 
The  cases  which  the  British  Government  would  have  claimants  present  to  their  prize 
courts  are  essentially  different  from  cases  arising  wholly  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  for- 
eign country.  They  result  from  acts  committed  by  the  British  naval  authorities  upon 
the  high  seas,  where  the  jurisdiction  over  neutral  vessels  is  acquired  solely  by  interna- 
tional law.  Vessels  of  foreign  nationality  flying  a  neutral  flag  and  finding  their  pro- 
tection in  the  country  of  that  flag,  are  seized  without  facts  warranting  a  reasonable 
suspicion  that  they  are  destined  to  blockaded  ports  of  the  enemy  or  that  their  cargoes 
are  contraband,  although  the  possession  of  such  facts  is,  by  international  law,  essential 
to  render  a  seizure  legal.  The  officers  appear  to  find  their  justification  in  the  Orders  in 
Council  and  regulations  of  the  British  Government,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  in  many  of 
the  present  cases  the  Orders  in  Council  and  the  regulations  for  their  enforcement  are 
themselves  complained  of  by  claimants  as  contrary  to  international  law.  Yet  the  very 
courts  which,  it  is  said,  are  to  dispense  justice  to  dissatisfied  claimants,  are  bound  by  the 
Orders  in  Council.  This  is  unmistakably  indicated  to  be  the  case  in  the  British  note  of 
July  31,  which  states  that — 

"British  prize  courts  'according  to  the  ancient  form  of  commission  under  which 
they  sit  are  to  determine  cases  according  to  the  course  of  admiralty  and  the  law  of  nations 
and  the  statutes,  rules,  and  regulations  for  the  time  being  in  force  in  that  behalf.' " 

This  principle,  the  note  adds,  has  recently  been  announced  and  adhered    to   by   the 


166  ■  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

British  prize  court  in  the  case  of  the  Zamora.  It  is  manifest  therefore,  that,  if  prize 
courts  are  bound  by  the  laws  and  regulations  under  which  seizures  and  detentions  are 
made,  and  which  claimants  allege  are  in  contravention  of  the  law  of  nations,  those 
courts  are  powerless  to  pass  upon  the  real  ground  of  complaint  or  to  give  redress  for 
wrongs  of  this  nature.  Nevertheless,  it  is  seriously  suggested  that  claimants  are  free  to 
request  the  prize  court  to  rule  upon  a  claim  of  conflict  between  an  Order  in  Council  and 
a  rule  of  international  law.  How  can  a  tribunal  fettered  in  its  jurisdiction  and  proced- 
ure by  municipal  enactments  declare  itself  emancipated  from  their  restrictions  and  at 
liberty  to  apply  the  rules  of  international  law  with  freedom?  The  very  laws  and  regula- 
tions which  bind  the  court  are  now  matters  of  dispute  between  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  and  that  of  His  Britannic  Majesty.  If  Great  Britain  followed,  as  she  de- 
clares that  she  did,  the  course  of  first  referring  claimants  to  local  remedies  in  cases  aris- 
ing out  of  American  wars,  it  is  presumed  that  she  did  so  because  of  her  knowledge  or 
understanding  that  the  United  States  had  not  sought  to  limit  the  jurisdiction  of  its 
courts  of  prize  by  instructions  and  regulations  violative  of  the  law  and  practice  of  na- 
tions, or  open  to  such  objection. 

(27)  The  British  note  of  February  10  states  that  the  British  Government  in  the 
American  Civil  War,  "in  spite  of  remonstrances  from  many  quarters,  placed  full  reliance 
on  the  American  prize  courts  to  grant  redress  to  the  parties  interested  in  cases  of  al- 
leged wrongful  capture  by  American  ships  of  war  and  put  forward  no  claim  until  the 
opportunity  for  redress  in  those  countries  had  been  exhausted." 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  recalls  that  during  the  progress  of  that  war 
Great  Britain,  in  several  instances,  demanded  through  diplomatic  channels  damages  for 
seizures  and  detentions  of  British  ships  alleged  to  have  been  made  without  legal  justifi- 
cation. Among  these  may  be  mentioned  the  cases  of  the  Magicienne,  the  Don  Jose,  the 
Labuan,  and  the  Saxon.  Two  of  these  cases  were,  at  the  time  the  demands  were  made, 
before  American  prize  courts  for  adjudication.  It  is  understood  also  that  during  the 
Boer  War,  when  British  authorities  seized  the  German  vessels,  the  Hertzog,  the  General, 
and  the  Bundesrath,  and  released  them  without  prize  proceedings,  compensation  for 
damages  suffered  was  arranged  through  diplomatic  channels. 

(28)  There  is,  furthermore,  a  real  and  far-reaching  injury  for  which  prize  courts 
offer  no  means  of  reparation.  It  is  the  disastrous  effect  of  the  methods  of  the  allied 
Governments  upon  the  general  right  of  the  United  States  to  enjoy  its  international 
trade  free  from  unusual  and  arbitrary  limitations  imposed  by  belligerent  nations. 
Unwarranted  delay  and  expense  in  bringing  vessels  into  port  for  search  and  investi- 
gation upon  mere  suspicion  has  a  deterrent  effect  upon  trade  ventures,  however  lawful 
they  may  be,  which  can  not  be  adequately  measured  in  damages.  The  menace  of  inter- 
ference with  legal  commerce  causes  vessels  to  be  withdrawn  from  their  usual  trade 
routes  and  insurance  on  vessels  and  cargoes  to  be  refused,  while  exporters  for  the 
same  reason  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  send  their  goods  to  foreign  markets  and  im- 
porters dare  not  buy  commodities  abroad  because  of  fear  of  their  illegal  seizure  or  be- 
cause they  are  unable  to  procure  transportation.  For  such  injuries  there  can  be  no 
remedy  through  the  medium  of  courts  established  to  adjust  claims  for  goods  detained 
or  condemned.  For  specific  injuries  suffered  by  private  interests  prize  courts,  if  they 
are  free  to  apply  the  law  of  nations,  might  mete  out  an  adequate  indemnity,  but  for 
the  injury  to  the  trade  of  a  nation  by  the  menace  of  unwarranted  interference  with  its 
lawful  and  established  pursuit  there  can  manifestly  be  found  no  remedy  in  the  prize 
courts  of  Great  Britain,  to  which  United  States  citizens  are  referred  for  redress. 

(29)  There  is  another  ground  why  American  citizens  can  not  submit  their  wrongs 
arising  out  of  undue  detentions  and  seizures  to  British  prize  courts  for  reparation 
which  I  can  not  pass  over  unnoticed.  It  is  the  manner  in  which  British  courts  obtain 
jurisdiction  of  such  cases.  The  jurisdiction  over  merchant  vessels  on  the  high  seas  is 
that  of  the  nation  whose  flag  it  rightfully  flies.  This  is  a  principle  of  the  law  and 
practice  of  nations  fundamental  to  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas.  Municipal  enact- 
ments of  a  belligerent  power  can  not  confer  jurisdiction  over  or  establish  rules  of  evi- 
dence governing  the  legality  of  seizures  of  vessels  of  neutral  nationality  on  the  high 
seas.  International  law  alone  controls  the  exercise  of  the  belligerent  right  to  seize 
and  detain  such  vessels.  Municipal  laws  and  regulations  in  violation  of  the  interna- 
tional rights  of  another  nation,  can  not  be  extended  to  the  vessels  of  the  latter 
on  the  high  seas  so  as  to  justify  a  belligerent  nation  bringing  them  into  its  ports, 
and,  having  illegally  brought  them  within  its  territorial  jurisdiction,  compelling  thein 
to  submit  to  the  domestic  laws  and  regulations  of  that  nation.  Jurisdiction  obtained 
in  such  a  manner  is  contrary  to  those  principles  of  justice  and  equity  which  all  nations 
should  respect.  Such  practice  should  invalidate  any  disposition  by  a  municipal  court 
of  property  thus  brought  before  it.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  has,  there- 
fore, viewed  with  surprise  and  concern  the  attempt  of  His  Majesty's  Government  to 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  167 

confer  upon  the  British  prize  courts  jurisdiction  by  this  illegal  exercise  of  force  in 
order  that  these  courts  may  apply  to  vessels  and  cargoes  of  neutral  nationalities  seized 
on  the  high  seas,  municipal  laws  and  orders  which  can  only  rightfully  be  enforceable 
within  the  territorial  waters  of  Great  Britain,  or  against  vessels  of  British  nationality 
when  on  the  high  seas. 

(30)  In  these  circumstances  the  United  States  Government  feels  that  it  can  not 
reasonably  be  expected  to  advise  its  citizens  to  seek  redress  before  tribunals  which 
are,  in  its  opinion,  unauthorized  by  the  unrestricted  application  of  international  law 
to  grant  reparation,  nor  to  refrain  from  presenting  their  claims  directly  to  the  British 
Government  through  diplomatic  channels. 

(31)  This  Govei"nment  is  advised  that  vessels  and  cargoes  brought  in  for  exam- 
ination prior  to  prize  proceedings  are  released  only  upon  condition  that  costs  and  ex- 
penses incurred  in  the  course  of  such  unwarranted  procedure,  such  as  pilotage,  wharf- 
age, demurrage,  harbor  dues,  warehousage,  unlading  costs,  etc.,  be  paid  by  the  claim- 
ants or  on  condition  that  they  sign  a  waiver  of  right  to  bring  subsequent  claims 
against  the  British  Government  for  these  exactions.  This  Government  is  loathe  to  be- 
lieve that  such  imgenerous  treatment  will  continue  to  be  accorded  American  citizens 
by  the  Government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty,  but  in  order  that  the  position  of  the 
United  States  Government  may  be  clearly  understood,  I  take  this  opportunity  to  inform 
Your  Excellency  that  this  Government  denies  that  the  charges  incident  to  such  deten- 
tions are  rightfully  imposed  upon  innocent  trade  or  that  any  waiver  of  indemnity 
exacted  from  American  citizens  under  such  conditions  of  duress  can  preclude  them 
from  obtaining  redress  through  diplomatic  channels  or  by  whatever  other  means  may 
be  open  to  them. 

(32)  Before  closing  this  note,  in  which  frequent  reference  is  made  to  contraband 
traffic  and  contraband  articles,  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  avoid  possible  misconstruc- 
tion, that  it  should  be  clearly  understood  by  His  Majesty's  Government  that  there  is 
no  intention  in  this  discussion  to  commit  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  a 
policy  of  waiving  any  objections  which  it  may  entertain  as  to  the  propriety  and  right 
of  the  British  Government  to  include  in  their  list  of  contraband  of  war  certain  articles 
which  have  been  so  included.  The  United  States  Government  reserves  the  right  to 
make  this  matter  the  subject  of  a  communication  to  His  Majesty's  Government  at  a 
later  day. 

(33)  I  believe  it  has  been  conclusively  shown  that  the  methods  sought  to  be  em- 
ployed by  Great  Britain  to  obtain  and  use  evidence  of  enemy  destination  of  cargoes 
bound  for  neutral  ports  and  to  impose  a  contraband  character  upon  such  cargoes  are 
without  justification;  that  the  blockade,  upon  which  such  methods  are  partly  founded, 
is  ineffective,  illegal,  and  indefensible:  that  the  judicial  procedure  offered  as  a  means 
of  reparation  for  an  international  injury  is  inherently  defective  for  the  purpose;  and 
that  in  many  cases  jurisdiction  is  asserted  in  violation  of  the  law  of  nations.  The 
United  States,  therefore,  can  not  submit  to  the  curtailment  of  its  neutral  rights  by 
these  measures,  which  are  admittedly  retaliatory,  and  therefore  illegal,  in  conception 
and  in  nature,  and  intended  to  punish  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain  for  alleged  ille- 
galities on  their  part.  The  United  States  might  not  be  in  a  position  to  object  to  them 
if  its  interests  and  the  interests  of  all  neutrals  were  unaffected  by  them,  but,  being 
affected,  it  can  not  with  complacence  suffer  further  subordination  of  its  rights  and 
interests  to  the  plea  that  the  exceptional  geographic  position  of  the  enemies  of  Great 
Britain  require  or  justify  oppressive  and  illegal  practices. 

(34)  The  Government  of  the  United  States  desires,  therefore,  to  impress  most 
earnestly  upon  His  Majesty's  (jovernment  that  it  must  insist  that  the  relations  be- 
tween it  and  His  Majesty's  Government  be  governed,  not  by  a  policy  of  expediency, 
but  by  those  established  rules  of  international  conduct  upon  which  Great  Britain  in 
the  past  has  held  the  United  States  to  account  when  the  latter  nation  was  a  bellig- 
erent engaged  in  a  struggle  for  national  existence.  It  is  of  the  highest  importance  to 
neutrals  not  only  of  the  present  day,  but  of  the  future  that  the  principles  of  interna- 
tional right  be  maintained  unimpaired. 

(35)  This  task  of  championing  the  integrity  of  neutral  rights,  which  have  re- 
ceived the  sanction  of  the  civilized  world  against  the  lawless  conduct  of  belligerents 
arising  out  of  the  bitterness  of  the  great  conflict  which  is  now  wasting  the  countries  of 
Europe,  the  United  States  unhesitatingly  assumes,  and  to  the  accomplishment  of  that 
task  it  will  devote  its  energies,  exercising  always  that  impartiality  which  from  the  out- 
break of  the  war  it  has  sought  to  exercise  in  its  relations  with  the  warring  nations. 

I  inclose  as  supplements  to  this  instruction  the  United  States  Navy  Order  of 
August  18,  1862,  and  a  statement  regarding   vessels    detained    by    British    authorities. 


168  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

These  two  documents  should  be  transmitted  as  inclosures  in  your  note  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. 

I  am,  etc., 

Robert  Lansing. 
Inclosures : 

United  States  Navy  Order  of  August  18,  1862,  and  Statement  regarding  vessels  de- 
tained by  British  authorities. 


APPENDIX  NO.  1. 


Instructions  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  flag    officers    commanding    squadrons    and 
officers  commanding  cruisers,  relative  to  the  right  of  search. 

Navy  Depaetment^  August  18,  1862. 

Sir:  Some  recent  occurrences  in  the  capture  of  vessels,  and  matters  pertaining  to 
the  blockade,  render  it  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  recapitulation  of  the  instruc- 
tions heretofore  from  time  to  time  given,  and  also  of  the  restrictions  and  precautions 
to  be  observed  by  our  squadrons  and  cruisers. 

It  is  essential,  in  the  remarkable  contest  now  waging,  that  we  should  exercise 
great  forbearance,  with  great  firmness,  and  manifest  to  the  world  that  it  is  the  inten- 
tion of  our  Government,  while  asserting  and  maintaining  our  own  rights,  to  respect 
and  scrupulously  regard  the  rights  of  others.  It  is  in  this  view  that  the  following 
instructions  are  explicitly  given: 

First.  That  you  will  exercise  constant  vigilance  to  prevent  supplies  of  arms, 
munitions,  and  contraband  of  war  from  being  conveyed  to  the  insurgents,  but  that 
under  no  circumstances  will  you  seize  any  vessel  within  the  waters  of  a  friendly 
nation. 

Secondly.  That,  while  diligently  exercising  the  right  of  visitation  on  all  suspected 
vessels,  you  are  in  no  case  authorized  to  chase  and  fire  at  a  foreign  vessel  without  show- 
ing your  colors  and  giving  her  the  customary  preliminary  notice  of  a  desire  to  speak  and 
visit  her. 

Thirdly.  That  when  that  visit  is  made,  the  vessel  is  not  then  to  be  seized  without 
a  search  carefully  made,  so  far  as  to  render  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  she  is  engaged 
in  carrying  contraband  of  war  for  or  to  the  insurgents,  and  to  their  ports  directly  or 
indirectly  by  transshipment,  or  otherwise  violating  the  blockade;  and  that  if,  after  visi- 
tation and  search,  it  shall  appear  to  your  satisfaction  that  she  is  in  good  faith  and  without 
contraband,  actually  bound  and  passing  from  one  friendly  or  so-called  neutral  port  to 
another,  and  not  bound  or  proceeding  to  or  from  a  port  in  the  possession  of  the  insur- 
gents, then  she  can  not  be  lawfully  seized. 

Fourthly.  That,  to  avoid  diflSculty  and  error  in  relation  to  papers  which  strictly 
belong  to  the  captured  vessel,  and  mails  that  are  carried,  or  parcels  under  ofiicial  seals, 
you  will,  in  the  words  of  the  law,  "preserve  all  the  papers  and  writings  found  on  board 
and  transmit  the  whole  of  the  originals  unmutilated  to  the  judge  of  the  district  to  which 
such  prize  is  ordered  to  proceed ;  but  official  seals,  or  locks,  or  fastenings  of  foreign  au- 
thorities, are  in  no  case,  nor  on  any  pretext,  to  be  broken,  or  parcels  covered  by  them 
read  by  any  naval  authorities,  but  all  bags  or  other  things  covering  such  parcels,  and  duly 
seized  and  fastened  by  foreign  authorities,  will  be,  in  the  discretion  of  the  United  States 
officer  to  whom  they  may  come  delivered  to  the  consul,  commanding  naval  officer,  or  lega- 
tion of  the  foreign  government,  to  be  opened,  upon  the  understanding  that  whatever  is 
contraband  or  important  as  evidence  concerning  the  character  of  a  captured  vessel  will 
be  remitted  to  the  prize  court,  or  to  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington,  or  such  sealed 
bag  or  parcels  may  be  at  once  forwarded  to  this  Department,  to  the  end  that  the  proper 
authorities  of  the  foreign  Government  may  receive  the  same  without  delay. 

You  are  specially  informed  that  the  fact  that  a  suspicious  vessel  has  been  indicated 
to  you  as  cruising  in  any  limit  which  has  been  prescribed  by  this  Department  does  not 
in  any  way  authorize  you  to  depart  from  the  practice  of  the  rules  of  visitation,  search, 
and  capture  prescribed  by  the  law  of  nations. 

Very  respectfully,  .  Gideon  Welles, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  169 

APPENDIX  NO.  2. 

Statement  regarding  vessels  detained  by  British  authorities. 

September  10,  1915. 

(1)  Vessels  whose  cargoes  and  papers  have  been  of  such  a  character  as  to  require  but 
brief  time  for  examination,  have  been  held  in  British  ports,  according  to  this  Govern- 
ment's  information,  for  prolonged  periods,  in  some  instances  for  more  than  a  month,  and 
then  released  loithout  the  institution  of  prize  court  proceedings. 

The  steamer  Chester,  which  sailed  from  Baton  Rouge  for  Rotterdam  with  a  cargo  of 
illuminating  oil,  was  taken  into  Falmouth,  September  21,  1914,  and  held  until  Novem- 
ber 4  of  that  year. 

The  steamer  Ocean,  carrying  the  same  kind  of  a  cargo,  from  New  York  to  Rotterdam, 
was  taken  into  Plymouth,  September  23,  1914,  and  similarly  released  November  5. 

The  steamer  Charlois  and  the  steamer  New  York,  carrying  similar  cargoes,  were 
taken  into  British  ports  on  September  30  and  October  12,  1914,  respectively  and  simi- 
larly released  on  October  27. 

The  steamers  American  and  Rotterdam,  carrying  cargoes  of  oil  to  Rotterdam,  were 
also  detained  under  conditions  similar  to  those  of  the  vessels  just  mentioned  in  the  fall 
of  1914. 

The  steamer  Christian  Knudsen,  carrying  a  cargo  of  oil  in  bulk,  consigned  to  a 
Danish  corporation  in  Copenhagen,  was  brought  into  the  port  of  Kirkwall,  detained  for 
11  days  and  then  released. 

Vessels  carrying  oil  from  the  United  States  to  long-established  markets  in  Scandina- 
vian countries  have  repeatedly  been  detained  without  being  sent  to  the  prize  court  for 
adjudication.  Among  them  may  be  mentioned  the  Brindilla,  the  Platuria,  the  Wico,  the 
Polarine,  the  Pioneer,  the  Llama,  the  Muskogee,  and  the  John  D.  Rockefeller. 

The  steamer  Denver,  which  carried  a  full  cargo  of  cotton  from  Norfolk  to  Bremen 
and  which  had  been  loaded  under  the  supervision  of  a  British  consular  officer,  was  taken 
into  Kirkwall  in  January  last,  as  the  Department  was  informed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment, just  to  examine  her  papers  and  to  verily  her  cargo. 

The  George  W.  Eawley  was  held  for  a  month  because  she  refused  to  comply  with  a 
requirement  of  the  British  authorities  to  discharge  a  single  shipment,  the  illegal  destina- 
tion of  which  does  not  appear  to  have  been  disclosed  by  any  evidence.  The  vessel  car- 
ried a  mixed  cargo,  including  a  shipment  of  oil.  The  British  authorities  insisted  that 
the  vessel  should  discharge  the  oil,  which,  the  shipper  represented,  was  consigned  to  one 
of  its  long-established  agents  in  Sweden.  Finally  it  was  announced  that  the  vessel  would 
be  released  as  an  act  of  grace. 

The  steamer  Wico  was  held  by  the  British  authorities  last  March.  This  Govern- 
ment was  advised  that  the  British  Minister  at  Stockholm  had  informed  the  Swedish  For- 
eign Office  that  the  vessel  had  arrived  in  a  British  port  with  a  full  cargo  of  oil  for  a 
concern  in  Stockholm,  and  that,  in  view  of  the  recent  seizure  by  a  German  man-of-war 
of  the  steamship  Bryssel  and  her  cargo,  the  British  Government  required  complete  as- 
surances from  the  Swedish  Government  before  the  Wico  could  be  allowed  to  proceed  to 
destination,  that  she  would  not  share  the  fate  of  the  Bryssel. 

Subsequently  this  Government  was  informed  that  the  vessel  had  been  allowed  to  pro- 
ceed, but  that  the  British  Government  felt  that,  in  the  event  of  further  cargoes  going  to 
Stockholm  being  seized  by  German  ships,  the  whole  question  of  permitting  oil  cargoes  to 
proceed  to  that  destination  would  have  to  be  seriously  reconsidered. 

The  steamer  Llama,  carrying  a  cargo  of  oil  to  a  Scandinavian  port,  was  taken  into 
Kirkwall  and  subsequently  released  on  June  5  last.  After  departing  from  Kirkwall  the 
ship  was  again  arrested  on  June  6,  and  although  the  officer  of  the  war  vessel  which 
seized  the  Llama  apparently  was  shown  the  ship's  release  papers,  he  placed  a  prize  crew 
on  board  and  ordered  the  vessel  to  Aberdeen  and  thence  to  Leith,  where  she  was  finally 
released  on  June  12,  although  she  could  not  proceed  until  June  15,  owing  to  a  shortage 
of  coal. 

(2)  Vessels  have  been  held  until  they  have  reconsigned  their  cargoes  to  a  consignee 
in  a  neutral  country  designated  by  the  British  Government. 

The  steamer  Seguranca,  which  carried  a  general  cargo  from  New  York  to  the  Nether- 
lands, was  detained  at  a  great  loss  to  the  owners  of  the  vessel  and  to  the  shippers  in  a 
British  port  for  the  greater  part  of  last  April,  in  order  that  her  cargo  might  be  recon- 
signed to  the  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust.  The  manifest  showed  that  the  entire  cargo 
was  consigned  to  named  consignees  in  the  Netherlands  and  was  accompanied  by  a  certifi- 
cate of  the  British  consul  general  in  New  York,  stating  that  the  loading  was  supervised 
by  his  inspector  and  that  the  vessel  contained  no  cargo  other  than  that  specified  in  the 


170  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

manifest.  A  large  part  of  the  cargo,  consisting  of  fresh  fruit  stored  in  the  hold  of  the 
vessel,  was  subject  to  decay  with  great  rapidity. 

A  similar  requirement  was  imposed  on  the  steamer  F.  J.  Lisman,  which  during  last 
June  was  detained  at  London.  It  appears  that,  after  a  prolonged  detention  of  the  ship 
of  over  a  month,  representatives  of  the  shippers  were  compelled  to  discharge  both  contra- 
band and  non-contraband  articles,  and  that  the  captain  and  the  shippers,  finding  their 
efforts  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  British  authorities  hopeless,  abandoned 
the  voyage. 

The  steamers  A.  A.  Raven  and  Vitalia,  carrying  articles  listed  as  conditional  con- 
traband, were  detained  in  a  British  port  in  March  last  until  the  goods  shipped  to  speci- 
fied consignees  in  Holland  could  be  consigned  to  the  Netherlands  Oversea  Trust. 

The  steamer  Neches  was  detained  last  May  for  about  two  weeks  in  order  that  a  ship- 
ment of  cotton  destined  for  Rotterdam  might  be  consigned  to  the  Netherlands  Oversea 
Trust. 

The  steamer  Zzandjik  was  detained  last  June,  as  the  Department  was  informed, 
while  the  British  minister  at  The  Hague  made  inquiries  as  to  whether  the  Netherlands 
Oversea  Trust  had  accepted  the  consignment  of  the  cargo. 

(3)  Detentions  have  been  made  without  evidence  amounting  to  probable  cause. 
The  steamer  Annam,  which  was  detained  at  Kirkwall  last  April,  carried  a  cargo  of 

food  products  from  the  United  States  to  Swedish  ports.  She  was  detained  owing  to  a 
''suspicion,"  as  the  British  Government  stated,  that  a  part  of  its  cargo  was  destined  for 
Germany. 

The  steamer  Dronning  Olga  was  detained  at  Kirkwall  in  April  last  and  the  cargo, 
which  consisted  of  cotton  and  food  products,  was  placed  in  the  prize  court  on  the 
ground,  as  the  Department  was  informed  by  the  British  Government,  that  it  was  "be- 
lieved" that  it  was  ultimately  destined  for  Germany. 

The  steamer  Hilding,  which  sailed  from  New  York  for  Copenhagen  with  a  general 
cargo  consisting  largely  of  food  products,  was  seized  and  taken  into  Leith  last  April,  and 
this  Government  was  informed  that  the  cargo  had  been  seized  as  contraband  with  the 
expectation  of  holding  it  under  the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  1915,  if  the  charge 
that  the  goods  were  contraband  should  fail. 

Numerous  similar  instances  might  be  cited. 

The  steamers  Christian  Knudsen  and  Platuria,  carrying  oil  from  New  York  to  Den- 
mark, were  detained  by  the  British  authorities  last  Fall,  taken  into  British  ports,  and 
held  until  the  British  Government,  as  they  stated,  could  make  an  investigation  as  to 
the  destination  of  the  cargoes.  Furthermore,  this  Government  was  informed  that  the 
vessels  had  been  detained  pending  the  receipt  of  guarantees  from  Denmark  against  the 
exportation  of  the  cargoes  and  that  the  orders  were  given  for  the  release  of  the  vessels 
on  the  receipt  of  satisfactory  guarantees. 

The  steamer  Brindilla,  which  sailed  from  New  York,  October  13  last,  with  a  cargo 
of  oil  for  Alexandria,  was  taken  into  port  at  Halifax  and  later  released,  as  the  Depart- 
ment was  informed,  when  the  British  authorities  received  information  that  the  ship's 
cargo  was  expected  at  Alexandria. 

The  steamer  Ambra  was  taken  into  a  British  port  in  July  last,  and  this  Government 
was  informed  that  this  vessel  was  held  pending  inquiries  that  had  been  instituted  con- 
cerning destination  of  certain  items  of  her  cargo.  About  a  week  later  the  vessel  was 
allowed  to  proceed. 

In  July  last  this  Government  was  informed  by  the  British  Government  that  the  pro- 
longed detention  of  the  oil  steamers  Polarine,  Platuria,  and  Pioneer  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  His  Majesty's  Government's  attention  had  latterly  been  drawn  to  the  very  large 
quantities  of  oil  which  had  been  shipped  to  Scandinavian  countries  during  the  last  few 
months ;  that  there  had  been  every  reason  to  suspect  that  some  of  the  oil  was  destined  for 
enemy  countries;  and  that  the  arrival  of  the  steamers  in  quick  succession  necessitated 
the  institution  of  inquiries  as  to  the  ultimate  destination  of  the  oil. 

The  owners  of  these  vessels  and  their  cargoes  complained  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  against  their  detention,  stating  that  the  vessels  carried  the  usual  cargoes 
consigned  in  good  faith  to  long-established  subsidiaries  in  neutral  countries,  and  further 
representing  that,  since  supplies  from  Russia  and  Roumania  had  been  prevented  from 
entering  Scandinavian  ports,  a  large  increase  of  business  with  them  had  been  expected, 
but  it  had  been  found  that  during  the  first  five  months  of  the  year  1915  total  shipments 
of  all  petroleum  products  to  these  countries  were  less  than  for  the  same  period  last  year, 
although  business  in  previous  years  had  steadily  increased. 

(4)  Vessels  have  been  held,  according  to  statements  of  the  British  Government,  be- 
cause of  the  manner  in  which  shipments  have  been  consigned. 

The  steamer  Einerjarl  was  brought  into  Kirkwall  last  May  and  its  cargo  of  cotton- 
seed cake,  shipped  from  Newport  News  to  Denmark,  which  the  shippers  represented  was 


DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE  171 

to  be  used  exclusively  for  consumption  in  Denmark,  was  seized.  This  Government  was 
informed  that  the  cargo  was  discharged  because  it  was  consigned  "to  order." 

The  steamers  Alfred  Nobel,  Bjorstjerne  Bjornsen,  and  Friedland  were  seized  last 
Autumn  because  their  cargoes  were  consigned  "to  order." 

The  shipments  on  the  steamers  America  and  Artemis  have  been  placed  in  prize  court 
under  the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  1915,  because,  the  goods  being  consigned  by  the 
shippers  to  themselves,  there  was  no  guarantee  of  their  ultimate  destination. 

(5)  Goods  have  been  seized  by  the  Britiish  Government  on  the  ground,  as  this  Gov- 
ernment has  been  informed,  that  the  country  to  which  they  were  shipped  had  not  pro- 
hibited their  export. 

In  the  fall  of  the  year  1914  copper  shipped  from  the  United  States  to  Sweden  on  the 
steamers  Francisco,  Antares,  Idaho,  Tyr,  and  Toronto  was  seized  by  the  British  authori- 
ties, because,  as  the  British  Government  stated,  the  Swedish  Government  had  not  yet 
prohibited  the  re-exportation  of  copper  from  Sweden. 

A  consignment  of  rubber  on  the  Swedish  ship  Zamore  had  been  placed  in  prize 
court  last  January,  because,  as  the  British  Government  stated,  of  the  absence  of  a  com- 
prehensive prohibition  on  the  exportation  of  rubber  in  all  its  forms  from  Denmark. 

(6)  The  British  authorities  have  repeatedly  seized  articles  classified  as  contraband, 
articles  classified  as  conditional  contraband,  as  well  as  noncontraband  goods,  shipped  to 
Scandinavian  countries,  to  the  Netherlands,  and  to  Italy,  then  neutral,  although  the  re- 
exportation of  such  commodities  from  these  countries  had  been  forbidden. 

In  December  last  the  steamer  Tellus  was  ordered  to  discharge  a  shipment  of  copper 
shipped  from  New  York  directly  to  a  consignee  in  Milan,  Italy,  although  by  an  Italian 
decree  of  November  13,  1914,  the  exportation  of  goods  shipped  in  this  manner  was  for- 
bidden. 

The  steamer  Joseph  W.  Fordney  was  seized  4  miles  oflf  the  coast  of  Norway  and,  in 
charge  of  a  prize  crew,  brought  into  Kirkwall  April  8  last.  The  ship's  manifest  showed 
that  the  cargo  consisted  entirely  of  cattle  fodder  consigned  to  a  person  in  Malmo,  Swe- 
den. It  appeared  from  information  presented  to  this  Government,  that  an  affidavit  re- 
garding the  character  and  destination  of  the  cargo,  made  by  the  shipper  of  the  entire 
cargo,  was  attached  to  the  bill  of  lading,  and  that  this  affidavit  contained  a  certification 
by  the  British  consul  general  and  the  Swedish  consul,  and  also  a  statement  by  the  lat- 
ter to  the  effect  that  the  exportation  from  Sweden  of  the  goods  of  which  the  cargo  con- 
sisted was  prohibited.  The  vessel  was  brought  into  a  British  port  and  her  cargo  dis- 
charged. This  Government  was  informed  by  the  British  Government  that,  apart  from 
the  uncertainty  of  the  address  of  the  consignee  of  the  cargo  of  this  vessel.  His  Majes- 
ty's Government  had  evidence  that  the  cargo  was  not  destined  for  bona  fide  Swedish 
consumption  but  was  intended  for  Germany. 

Numerous  other  similar  instances  might  be  cited,  including  those  of  the  detention 
of  vessels  carrying  oil  to  Scandinavian  ports  which  have  been  mentioned. 

(7)  Detentions  have  been  made  pending  assurances  that  embargoed  goods  would  be 
allowed  to  pass  through  a  neutral  country  to  Great  Britain's  allies. 

The  steamer  Leelanaw,  which  carried  a  cargo  of  cotton  from  Galveston  to  Gothen- 
burg for  transshipment  to  Moscow,  was  detained  in  a  British  port  early  in  June  last. 
Eelative  to  the  detention  of  this  vessel  the  British  Foreign  Office  said : 

"In  view  of  the  fact  that  cotton  has  now  been  placed  on  the  Swedish  prohibition  of 
export  list,  His  Majesty's  Government  have  not  considered  it  advisable  to  allow  this 
large  cargo  to  go  on  to  Gothenburg  until  they  are  assured  that  there  is  a  fair  chance  of 
it  reaching  its  declared  ultimate  destination." 

After  nearly  a  month's  detention  the  vessel  was  released  on  the  understanding  that 
she  should  proceed  directly  to  Archangel. 

The  steamers  Jentland  and  Syrius  appear  to  have  been  recently  detained  under  cir- 
cumstances similar  to  those  of  the  steamer  Leelanaw. 

(8)  From  time  to  time  this  Government  has  been  informed  of  the  seizure  of  cargoes 
on  the  ground  that  consignees  have  been  known  to  trade  with  the  enemy  or  because  they 
were  suspected  of  doing  so. 

In  January  last  this  Government  was  advised  by  the  British  Government  that  the 
British  Government  had  been  compelled  to  place  in  prize  court  a  consignment  of  rubber 
on  board  the  Swedish  vessel  Zamora,  the  consignee  of  these  goods  being  regarded  with 
grave  suspicion,  and  there  being  reason  to  believe  that  the  ultimate  destination  of  the 
rubber  was  the  enemy  forces. 

(9)  Vessels  have  been  seized  and  brought  into  port  and  have  been  required  by  the 
British  authorities  to  pay  pilotage,  harbor,  unloading,  warehouse,  storage  or  other  dues, 
costs,  and  expenses  in  advance  of  a  judicial  determination  of  the  validity  of  the  seizure 
of  vessel  or  cargo. 

Instances  of  such  treatment  of  vessels  may  be  found  in  the  cases  of  the  detention  of 


172  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND   BRITISH  PRETENSIONS 

the  steamer  Neches  last  May,  the  Ogeechee,  which  was  seized  last  April,  and  the  Antilla, 
which  was  seized  in  February  last  and  subjected  to  a  prolonged  detention.  In  the  case 
of  the  last  mentioned  ship,  it  appears,  however,  that  the  cost  of  discharging  was  borne 
by  the  British  Government. 

( 10 )  Detention  of  vessels  proceeding  from  European  ports. 

The  steamer  Ogeechee,  which  left  Bremen  April  3  last  for  the  United  States,  was 
detained  at  Sharpness  and  compelled  to  discharge  its  entire  cargo,  which  consisted  of 
approximately  200  shipments  of  goods  urgently  needed  by  American  citizens.  In  most 
if  not  all  cases  it  appears  that  ownership  of  these  goods  at  the  time  of  the  seizure  had 
passed  to  American  consignees.  In  many  instances  American  citizens  had  contracted  for 
the  sale  of  the  goods  consigned  to  them  and  were  prevented  from  carrying  out  their  con- 
tracts. 

The  release  of  shipments  on  the  vessel  has  been  allowed  on  the  production  of  proofs 
of  American  ownership  of  the  goods  prior  to  March  11,  1915.  American  consignees  in 
order  to  avoid  loss  have  endeavored  to  comply  with  the  requirements  in  the  presenta- 
tion of  proofs. 

The  steamer  Neches,  which  sailed  from  Rotterdam  to  the  United  States,  was 
brought  to  London  and  compelled,  in  June  last,  to  discharge  cargo  on  the  ground,  appar- 
ently, that  the  goods  originated  partly  in  Belgium.  The  vessel  was  detained  about  a 
month  and,  after  having  been  damaged  to  the  extent  of  approximately  £1,500  as  a  result 
of  a  collision  with  another  vessel  while  under  the  control  of  the  British  Admiralty, 
and  after  having  been  involved  in  litigation  growing  out  of  such  collision,  was  allowed 
to  proceed. 

The  following  is  a  list  of  the  vessels  detained  prior  to  March  11  last,  among  which 
are  some  regarding  the  detention  of  which  details  have  been  briefly  stated  in  this  mem- 
orandum : 

Platuria,  BrindiUa,  John  D.  Rochefeller,  Kroonland,  Noorham,  Rotterdam,  Sande- 
fjord,  Thomas  J.  Fordiiey,  Fram,  Edward  Pierce,  Ellen,  Tellus,  Sif,  Kim,  Canton,  Ogee- 
chee, Friedland,  Gallileo,  Uller,  Verona,  Zuiderdijk,  Greenbrier,  Eerm,  Arkansas,  Ascot, 
Carolyn.  Breiford,  Bcrgensfjord,  Bjornstjeriie  Bjornsen,  Ida  Cuneo,  Kentucky,  General 
Minetonka,  General  Caloric,  Denver. 


,.  i 


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j;^  OF  25  CENTS 


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